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2“Mikhail Bakhtin and Walter Benjamin: Experience and Form” 
Dissertation submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy at the University of
London
Timothy Mark Beasley-Murray
University College London, School of Slavonic and East European Studies
June 2006
Abstract
This thesis is a study of the thought of two philosophers and literary and cultural 
critics: Mikhail Bakhtin (1895-1975) and Walter Benjamin (1892-1940). Despite 
the elements of incommensurability that exist between them, I argue that the 
thought of the one may be brought to revitalize and reilluminate the thought of the 
other.
Bakhtin’s and Benjamin’s thought centres on the problems that arise from 
a dislocation of the nature of experience from the forms which enable human 
beings to make sense of that experience. Setting their work in the context of their 
times and of the philosophical tradition that they inherit, 1 examine their response 
to this dislocation through a discussion of their conceptions of habit, tradition, 
language and art.
Closed forms (epic and monologue, for example, in the case of Bakhtin; 
the traditional auratic work of art or the Romantic symbol, for example, in the 
case of Benjamin) provide a completion of experience that fixes experience within 
the flux of life. Nevertheless, forms such as these, both thinkers conclude, are 
implicated in social and political hierarchies and result in an objectification of 
human beings and the world that they inhabit.
The thesis examines Bakhtin’s and Benjamin’s development of theories of 
open forms which challenge completion: dialogue and the novel, in the case of 
Bakhtin; allegory and montage, in the case of Benjamin. I argue that the two 
thinkers’ conceptions of such forms promote the preservation of 
(inter)subjectivity, the dismantling of authoritarian hierarchies and a responsible 
relationship between the conferring of form and the integrity of experience.
Finally, I suggest that Bakhtin’s and Benjamin’s promotions of openness might be 
provisional positions which are predicated on a future completion that will come 
on either the eschatological or the revolutionary plane.
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7Note on References
All quotations are provided in English. References to most texts by Bakhtin and 
Voloshinov are to the English translations of their works and are included in 
parentheses in the text. The following system of abbreviations is used:
AH  M. M. Bakhtin, ‘Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity’, in Art and
Answerability: Early Philosophical Essays by M.M. Bakhtin, ed. by 
Michael Holquist and Vadim Liapunov, trans. by Vadim Liapunov, 
Austin TX, 1990.
DI M. M. Bakhtin, The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays by M.M.
Bakhtin, ed. by Michael Holquist, trans. by Caryl Emerson and 
Michael Holquist, Austin TX, 1981.
DP M. M. Bakhtin, Problems o f Dostoevsky’s Poetics, ed. and trans. by
Caryl Emerson, Manchester, 1984.
MPL V. N. Volosinov, Marxism and the Philosophy o f Language, ed. and
trans. by Ladislav Matejka and I.R. Titunik, London, 1973.
Rabelais Mikhail Bakhtin, Rabelais and his World, trans. by Helene 
Iswolsky, Bloomington IN, 1984.
SG M.M. Bakhtin, Speech Genres and Other Late Essays, ed. by Caryl
Emerson and Michael Holquist, trans. by Vem W. McGee, Austin 
TX, 1986.
TP A M. M. Bakhtin, Toward a Philosophy o f the Act, ed. by Vadim
Liapunov and Michael Holquist, trans. by Vadim Liapunov, Austin 
TX, 1993.
Other works by Bakhtin and the Bakhtin Circle are referred to in the normal 
fashion.
References to Benjamin are to the German edition of his writings as well 
as to English translations, except in the few cases where no published translation 
exists. Most references are also given parentheses in the text and are abbreviated 
as follows:
8GS Walter Benjamin: Gesammelte Schriften, 7 vols, ed. by Rolf
Tiedemann and Hermann Schweppenhauser, Frankfurt/Main, 1974. 
Briefe Walter Benjamin, Brief e, 2 vols, ed. by Gershom Scholem and
Theodor W. Adorno, Frankfurt/Main, 1993.
SW  Walter Benjamin, Selected Writings, ed. by Michael W. Jennings
and others, trans. by Howard Eiland, Rodney Livingstone and 
others, Cambridge MA, 1996-2003.
OGTD Walter Benjamin, On the Origin o f German Tragic Drama, trans.
by John Osborne, London, 1977.
AP Walter Benjamin, The Arcades Project, trans. by Howard Eiland
and Kevin McCloughlin, Cambridge MA, 1999.
Whilst the translations given follow the published versions for the most part, 
occasionally I have made slight modifications. I indicate where such 
modifications have taken place.
References to works by other authors are given first in their full form and 
then, if referred to again, in a shortened form.
9Introduction 
Oblique Angles
A comparative study of Bakhtin and Benjamin cannot proceed along straight 
lines. This study does not ignore the elements of incommensurability in a desire 
to focus on commensurability and comparison. An awareness of elements of 
incommensurability has led me along a crooked path through Bakhtin’s and 
Benjamin’s thought. This produces images of the two thinkers that diverge 
fundamentally from the images that one might construct when picturing any one 
of the thinkers independently. The image of Bakhtin presented here is one of the 
Bakhtin who appears in conjunction with Benjamin, and is a product of the 
oblique angle of comparison. The same holds for the image of Benjamin that 
appears in these pages.1
This thesis sets out to show that the oblique angle of comparison highlights 
aspects of both thinkers that otherwise remain in the shadows. Thus, for example, 
in Chapter 3 that deals with Bakhtin’s and Benjamin’s philosophy of language, a 
Bakhtinian position on the primacy of intersubjectivity over the fixed antinomy of 
subject and object has led me to a reading of Benjamin’s conceptions of 
translation and montage as articulations of an intersubjective relationship between 
the human subject and the world. Similarly, in the final chapter on totality, a 
Benjaminian standpoint on the temporal relationship between provisional 
brokenness and future completion has led me to emphasize the provisional nature 
of dialogue, rather than what some critics see as its eternal open-endedness.
These two interpretations are either absent from the scholarly writing on Bakhtin 
and Benjamin or exist in under-developed forms. I shall use the second 
interpretation suggested here (concerning the provisional nature of dialogue in
1 I am thus in accord with Tihanov’s comments on his own comparison o f Bakhtin and Lukacs: 
‘the comparison o f [Bakhtin and Lukacs] necessarily presupposed a selective redefinition and 
reconstitution o f the objects o f our attention: not Lukacs as such, but the Lukacs who emerges 
when placed next to Bakhtin; not Bakhtin on his own, but rather the Bakhtin who becomes visible 
only in the light o f Lukacs’. Galin Tihanov, The Master and the Slave: Lukacs, Bakhtin, and the 
Ideas o f  their Time, Oxford, 2000. pp. 10-11. This is simply to say, along with Saussure, that, to 
an important extent, ‘it is the viewpoint adopted that creates the object’. Ferdinand de Saussure, 
Course in General Linguistics, trans. by Roy Harris, London, 1983, p. 8.
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Bakhtin) as an example of the method of this thesis. On this point, Paul de Man 
writes:
Whether the passage from otherness to the recognition of the other - 
the passage, in other words, from dialogism to dialogue - can be said 
to take place in Bakhtin as more than a desire, remains a question for 
Bakhtin interpretation to consider in the proper critical spirit. This 
renders premature any more specific consideration of how this 
recognition is to occur: as a religious transcendentalism which would 
allow one to read ‘God’ wherever Bakhtin says ‘society,’ as a 
Heideggerian disclosure of ontological truth in the otherness of 
language or as a secular but messianic ideologism that would bear a 
superficial, and perhaps misleading, resemblance to the position 
attributed to Walter Benjamin. To adjudicate between these various 
options would be unthinkable; what can be observed is that, in each 
case, dialogism appears as a provisional stage underway towards a 
more absolute claim, a claim that is not necessarily monological but 
that points, at any rate, well beyond the limited confines of literary 
theory. Whether such an extension of Bakhtin’s range is sound and 
legitimate also remains to be established.2
This thesis responds to this and similar challenges that de Man and other critics 
have raised. I do not decide between the options that de Man outlines (one might 
well imagine an alternative piece of work that would follow any one of the other 
paths) but I stand by the legitimacy of the extension of Bakhtin that appears when 
the resemblance to Benjamin, which I hold to be neither superficial nor 
misleading, is brought to the fore. The new Bakhtin that appears in the light of 
Benjamin and the new Benjamin that appears in the light of Bakhtin seem, in 
these terms alone, to justify a thesis.
Connections
Mikhail Bakhtin and Walter Benjamin inhabited worlds that seem, at first glance, 
to have few points of contact. The two months that Benjamin spent in Moscow in 
the winter of 1926-27 were marked by the failure of his love affair with the 
Latvian communist, Asja Lacis, and, despite the outwardly enthusiastic tone of his 
‘Moscow Diary’, Benjamin found life in the city alienating and exhausting. 
Benjamin knew no more than a few words of Russian, and whilst his interest in 
Russian, and, especially, Soviet culture was, at times, passionate, it remained
2 Paul de Man, ‘Dialogue and Dialogism’, in Gary Saul Morson and Caryl Emerson (eds), 
Rethinking Bakhtin: Extensions and Challenges, Evanston IL., 1989, pp. 105-14 (110).
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second-hand and somewhat naive. It seems improbable that he could have come 
into contact with the Bakhtin Circle at all. Likewise, Bakhtin, who never left his 
native Russia and the Soviet Union, despite being rooted in the German-orientated 
Bildungskultur of his time, shows no evidence of having been acquainted with 
Benjamin or his work. Benjamin’s publications, in either book or magazine form, 
would have been unlikely to be accessible to Bakhtin, although one might 
speculate that Bakhtin was familiar with the entry on Goethe that was 
commissioned from Benjamin for the Great Soviet Encyclopaedia. Nevertheless, 
as Kassack points out in the editorial apparatus to the Gesammelte Sc hr i f  ten, the 
published text only contains 12 per cent of Benjamin’s original from which 
everything of substance has been eliminated.3 The points of connection, then, 
between the two subjects of this thesis are necessarily mediated, once again, 
obliquely.
First and most straightforwardly, one may speak of the two thinkers’ 
similar backgrounds in the European philosophical tradition. These might be 
considered diachronic contexts. In Chapter 2 ,1 deal with Bakhtin’s and 
Benjamin’s engagement with the philosophical opposition of the late nineteenth 
and the early twentieth century between (neo-)Kantianism and Lebensphilosophie. 
I argue that these parallel engagements create structures that persist throughout 
the careers of the two thinkers and result in parallel emphases on the question of 
the relationship between life and culture, experience and form. Yet, as Chapter 2 
and the thesis more generally show, a reconstruction of diachronic context is itself 
not straightforward given the far from straightforward ways in which the two 
thinkers relate to and represent their intellectual inheritances, nor is it a main aim 
of this thesis.4
3 The entry appeared in volume 16 o f the Great Soviet Encyclopaedia in 1929. See Wolfgang 
Kassack’s analysis o f its relationship to Benjamin’s manuscript in GSII, pp. 1472-75.
Benjamin’s orginal text can be found in GSII, pp. 705-39, SW II, pp. 161-193.
4 Brandist and Tihanov have performed the task o f discovering, reconstructing and elucidating the 
many sources and ideas that Bakhtin draws on: Bergson, Cassirer, Scheler, Simmel, Walzel,
Marty, and so forth. In the case o f Brandist in particular, however, this can result in a 
reductionism that presents Bakhtin’s thought as little more than an admittedly imaginative 
combination o f these sources. Thus, taking one o f many possible examples, in connection with 
Bakhtin’s theory o f laughter in the novel, Brandist demonstrates that Bakhtin’s two main 
influences are Bergson and Cassirer. It is debatable whether his subsequent comments add 
anything to Bakhtin’s theory o f laughter other than a sophisticated and convincing argument that
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Second, one may speak of the connections provided by intermediary 
figures on the synchronic axis. In particular, I am thinking of Georg Lukacs, 
another thinker whose concern is the relationship between form and experience. 
Lukacs’s early work, The Theory o f the Novel (1914), exerted a profound 
influence on both thinkers. Similarly, just as his later work, History and Class 
Consciousness (1923), provides a crucial subterranean strand in Benjamin’s 
thought from the Trauerspiel book onwards, so Tihanov, in his book on the 
subject, demonstrates in great detail the extent of Bakhtin’s complex debt to both 
the early and later Lukacs. In Chapter 1 ,1 discuss the mediation that is provided 
by the nexus of Brecht and Russian Formalism. The radical avant-garde 
aesthetics of both Brecht and Formalism present an extreme of a necessarily 
disruptive relationship between experience and form, a relationship conceived of 
as the automatization and deautomatization of life and art, which exerts a 
continuing influence on both thinkers. There are, however, many such possible 
lines of enquiry and following them up is also not a main aim of this thesis.
Third, it is possible to talk of a form of connection that is posthumous. As 
I argue in Chapter 1, both Bakhtin and Benjamin hold that the meanings contained 
in a work, and a work of philosophy as much as a work of art, are revealed in time 
in the process of criticism. The ideas of Bakhtin and Benjamin are brought 
together not just on the modest territory of this thesis but also in the intellectual 
developments that have followed them. By way of example: both thinkers have, 
to greater or lesser extents, been co-opted into varied discourses of post- 
Structuralism: Bakhtin, initially through Kristeva’s pioneering development of a 
post-Bakhtinian theory of intertextuality and later by thinkers who found in 
Bakhtin a gesture of perpetual openness, analogous to Derrida’s notion of the 
perpetual deferring of signification, which nevertheless did not jettison the notion 
of the individual subject.5 Benjamin, whose focus on the hidden resources of
Bakhtin draws on Bergson and Cassirer. Craig Brandist, The Bakhtin Circle: Philosophy, Culture 
and Politics, London, 2002, pp. 126-28.
5 As Adlam puts it: ‘Bakhtin was given an enthusiastic welcome for ostensibly both anticipating 
and providing the means for a resolution o f the impasses o f structuralism and post-structuralism.’ 
Carol Adlam, ‘Critical Work on the Bakhtin Circle: a New Bibliographical Essay’, in Ken
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writing have proved an inspiration to those who have also been inspired by 
Derrida’s theory of grammatology and whose conception of reading ‘against the 
grain’ has likewise drawn the attention of proponents of Deconstruction.6 In both 
instances I contend that Bakhtin and Benjamin have lent themselves to such an 
appropriation because of their insistence that what seems at first to be a secondary 
phenomenon (dialogue, writing) might fruitfully be understood as of primary 
importance. Another case is that of Bakhtin’s collaborators, Voloshinov and 
Medvedev, whose work has, like that of Benjamin, provided some commentators 
on the left with a more Marx-based critique of Structuralism than the ideologically 
ambiguous approach of post-Structuralism.7 Nevertheless, the question of 
posthumous relationships between Benjamin and Bakhtin in the history of ideas, 
forged not only on the terrain of post-Structuralism, is not the prime focus of this
o
thesis; and yet this thesis, I hope, opens up avenues for such lines of thought.
Hirschkop and David Shepherd (eds), Bakhtin and Cultural Theory’, 2nd edn, Manchester, 2001, 
pp. 241-65 (247). Kristeva’s essay, ‘Word, Dialogue, Novel’, brought a Bakhtinian perspective to 
the French (post)Structuralist theory o f literary production as radical intertextuality, initiated by 
Roland Barthes. See Julia Kristeva, ‘Word, Dialogue, Novel’, in The Kristeva Reader, ed. by 
Toril Moi, Oxford, 1986, pp. 34-61. The position in which Bakhtin becomes a liberal alternative 
to and yet still an articulation of post-structuralist themes is expressed most clearly in the work of 
Michael Holquist and Katerina Clark. See Katerina Clark and Michael Holquist, Mikhail Bakhtin, 
London, 1984, and for the clearest example o f the liberal ideology o f empty openness at work, 
Michael Holquist, Dialogism: Mikhail Bakhtin and his World, London, 1990.
6 Eagleton, for example, finds in Benjamin’s thought support for a Derridean theory of writing 
with a Marxist edge. See Terry Eagleton, Walter Benjamin or Towards a Revolutionary Criticism, 
London, 1981. Eagleton takes Benjamin’s notion o f reading ‘against the grain’ as the title o f his 
collection o f essays, Terry Eagleton, Against the Grain: Selected Essays 1975-1985, London,
1986. This collection also contains an essay on Bakhtin.
7 Voloshinov and Medvedev have exerted a profound influence on thinkers o f the British left, such 
as Raymond Williams, Tony Bennett, and, once again, Terry Eagleton. Raymond Williams, 
Marxism and Literature, Oxford, 1977, and Tony Bennett, Formalism and Marxism, London, 
1979.
8 The most interesting Derridean appropriation of Benjamin is by Derrida himself. In his essay, 
‘The Force o f Law’, Derrida turns his attention to Benjamin’s ‘Critique o f Violence’, reading into 
it a conception o f law as the deferral o f divine judgement. See Jacques Derrida, ‘Force of Law:
The “mystical foundation o f authority’” , in Drucilla Cornell, Michael Rosenfeld and David Gray 
Carlson (eds), Deconstruction and the Possibility o f  Justice, London, 1992, pp. 3-68. Brandist, 
without reference to Derrida, sees a similar conception o f law in Bakhtin, and also points in 
passing to a similarity with Benjamin. See Craig Brandist, ‘Law and the Genres o f Discourse: the 
Bakhtin Circle’s Theory o f Language and the Phenomenology o f Right’, in Finn Bostad, Craig 
Brandist, Lars Sigred Evensen and Hege Faber (eds), Bakhtinian Perspectives on Language and 
Culture: Meaning in Language, Art and New Media, London, 2004, pp. 23-45, especially pp. 39- 
40. The area o f jurisprudence (which Brandist has opened up for Bakhtin scholarship) is another 
area in which analogies between Bakhtin and Benjamin might usefully be followed up.
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Finally, the most important connection between the two thinkers must lie at the 
level of their different but analogous engagements with a world that is 
distinctively modem. This connection is more than a question of the three years 
that separate their births and I hope to show that it is based on more than an empty 
notion such as Zeitgeist. It is a commonplace to say that Benjamin is a thinker of 
modernity. His entire work is preoccupied with finding ways of negotiating and 
making sense of a rapidly changing modem world. As one of his biographers puts 
it:
His life’s work [...] is basically a reflection on his own city origins. It 
amounts to a meditation on the experience of the individual’s altering 
needs and possibilities within the labyrinth of constantly and rapidly 
changing impressions, on whether he can still perceive or grasp his 
historical and social environment in some sort of context, or indeed 
make any kind of picture of it. In a nutshell: how to cope, how to find 
one’s way around.9
This is the question of experience and form. How can one find forms that allow 
the subject to grasp, yet do not distort, an experience that is post-traditional, 
located in the heart of modernity? Benjamin’s writing has as its backdrop the 
traffic of the boulevard and the flickering of neon. The forms that he promotes, 
such as Baudelaire’s poetry of shock and allegorical correspondances, Proust’s 
prose that is convulsed by memoires involuntaires, or Brecht’s epic theatre of 
interruption, articulate and preserve the rhythm of modem life. Even when 
Benjamin looks back to the Baroque, one eye is firmly fixed on his own present.
An engagement with the modem world is far less obvious in Bakhtin. For 
all his emphasis on the dynamic flow of life and the burning need for its 
preservation and not ossification as it takes on linguistic form, and for all his 
emphasis on the diversity of the social world, his world can seem remarkably 
bookish and rooted in the nineteenth century.10 It is to the chagrin of many
9 Momme Brodersen, Walter Benjamin: A Biography, London, 1996, p. 4.
10 Tihanov discerns a certain ‘anachronistic’ aspect to Bakhtin in his discussion o f Bakhtin’s 
concept o f ‘seeing’ in the work on the Bildungsroman. He notes that for Bakhtin ‘seeing’ remains 
something unproblematic, whereas for Benjamin - for example in the work on Baudelaire - the 
impact o f modem experience problematizes the notion o f ‘seeing’: ‘thus Bakhtin entertains hopes 
which appear utopian and perhaps somewhat anachronistic in comparison with other approaches to 
the culture o f seeing in the 1930s, for example Walter Benjamin’s bitter premonition that, with the
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Bakhtin scholars that the most modem of Bakhtin’s line of heroes is Dostoevsky 
and not, say, Joyce.11 Nevertheless, Bakhtin’s commitment to the novel, the genre 
of emancipation that receives its form from modernity itself (as recognised by 
thinkers from Schlegel, through Hegel and Lukacs, to Ian Watt and Lucien 
Goldmann), demonstrates his analogous search for formal models by which a 
specifically modem experience may be understood and in which it may justly find 
expression. The novel, the ‘only genre bom of this new world and in total affinity 
with it’ (D I7), is, in Bakhtin’s analysis, the anti-genre of becoming (in so far as 
genre may be defined as a congealed set of norms) through which the experience 
of modernity and the giving of form come into dynamic resolution.
Nevertheless, if the Bakhtin that appears in this thesis is more obviously a 
participant in his modernity than might be the case of a stand-alone Bakhtin, then 
the comparison with Benjamin throws certain absences and blank spots into relief. 
Despite his insistence on the social, at times Bakhtin’s modernity seems to consist 
in a form of historical dynamism that is curiously devoid of content: a modernity 
of flux without a clear image of the technological and social developments that 
bring that flux into being. His indestructibly modem novelness may, at times, 
seem to be little more than an expression of Hegelian delight in a new expression 
of Geist}2
From early on in his career, Benjamin is alive to the threat of the violence 
that emerges from what Adorno and Horkheimer will later analyse as the
advance o f modernity, the act o f seeing itself becomes a focal point o f contradictions rather than a 
means o f disentangling them’. Tihanov, Master and Slave, p. 238.
11 Clark and Holquist comment: ‘One o f the many enigmas about Bakhtin is that he makes no 
mention in Rabelais o f James Joyce’s Ulysses, a book that might be described as a celebration of 
heteroglossia and of the body as well’. Clark and Holquist, Bakhtin, p. 317. Much literary- 
orientated Bakhtin scholarship makes an unacknowledged attempt to project Bakhtin into a far 
more modem world than that o f Dostoevsky by engaging in Bakhtinian readings o f modernist and 
post-modernist texts, as if, thereby, Bakhtin were being relocated in what should be his spiritual 
home. The theorist o f postmodernism, Linda Hutcheon, is one such critic who enlists Bakhtin as a 
theorist o f parody for a postmodemity which she defines in terms o f the proliferation of parody. 
Linda Hutcheon, ‘Modem Parody and Bakhtin’, in Morson and Emerson (eds), Rethinking 
Bakhtin, pp. 87-103.
12 Tihanov emphasizes the Hegelian element in Bakhtin’s thought which previously had often 
remained obscured by scholars’ preoccupation with Bakhtin’s roots in neo-Kantianism. Tihanov 
also points to the tension between a sociological theory o f the novel and a metaphysical, primarily 
Hegelian, theory o f novelness that exists in Bakhtin’s writings. See Tihanov, Master and Slave, 
especially, on this latter point, pp. 148-49.
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entanglement of enlightenment and myth. This crystallizes in the impassioned 
and concrete analysis of and defence against fascism that occupies him from the 
late 1920s until his death. As I show in Chapter 2, Benjamin’s critique of fascism 
rests on his understanding of the relationship between experience and form: 
fascism, for Benjamin, consists in the fatal bringing together of a cult of mythic, 
pure experience with the abstract formal workings of capitalist technology. In this 
context, the case of Bakhtin is problematic: Bakhtin’s philosophy has proved so 
attractive to his readers exactly because his conception of form is one in which the 
experience of otherness can be negotiated without violence. And yet a 
comparison with Benjamin throws into sharp relief the question of Bakhtin’s 
disquieting silence in the face of Stalinist violence.13 Here, Benjamin’s more 
thorough-going and more responsible political engagement may be used to 
supplement Bakhtin, just as Bakhtin’s more concrete model of benign relations 
between self and other may be used to supplement Benjamin’s sometimes 
frustratingly vague pleas for cultural activity to engage in political combat with 
violence itself.14
Incommensurabilities and Commensurabilities:
1. Melancholy and Laughter
A key difference between Bakhtin and Benjamin, and a difference that makes 
them seem, at times, incommensurable, is that of temperament. An analysis of 
this incommensurability will do much to illustrate the method of this thesis.
13 This is not a new argument amongst critics o f Bakhtin. Morson and Emerson, for example, 
comment: ‘the most vulnerable side o f dialogue, Bakhtin may have sensed, is its benevolence’. 
Gary Saul Morson and Caryl Emerson, Mikhail Bakhtin: Creation o f a Prosaics, Stanford CA, 
1993, pp. 469-70. My point is that Benjamin’s position highlights this side o f Bakhtin particularly 
starkly.
14 The oblique angle o f comparison, where the perspective of one thinker highlights the blindspots 
of the other, has, I hope, enabled me to take as disinterested an approach as possible to both 
thinkers. Rochlitz notes that his book on Benjamin, despite his admiration for the thinker and the 
individual, is not meant to be hagiographical: ‘Until now, too many studies o f Benjamin have 
manifested a fascination -  often recognizable in a virtually uncritical imitation, encouraged, as it 
happens, by the seductive, assured, even authoritarian style of Benjamin’s writing -  that limits any 
real productivity o f the work.’ Rainer Rochlitz, The Disenchantment o f Art: The Philosophy o f  
Walter Benjamin, trans. by Jane Marie Todd, New York, 1996, p. 3. I have attempted to avoid 
these pitfalls.
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If Bakhtin is a theorist of laughter and celebration, Benjamin comes across 
as resolutely melancholy and sober. The image of Benjamin the melancholic is 
fixed most firmly in the writings of his friend, Gershom Scholem. Scholem’s 
biographical Walter Benjamin: The Story o f a Friendship, which in 1988 was 
claimed to be ‘by far the most cited secondary source in the critical literature’, 15 
portrays Benjamin primarily in terms of melancholy. Likewise, in his speech 
given in 1972 to commemorate what would have been Benjamin’s eightieth 
birthday, Scholem reads Benjamin’s ‘On the Concept of History’ as the 
expression of his return to his ‘true’ theological roots following the disillusion 
caused by the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact. This return to theology is the result of 
deep melancholy and, for Scholem, Benjamin’s angel of history is a harbinger of 
melancholy:
If one may speak of Walter Benjamin’s genius, then it was 
concentrated in this angel. In the latter’s Saturnine light Benjamin’s 
life itself ran its course, also consisting only of ‘small-scale victories’ 
and ‘large-scale defeats,’ as he described it from a deeply melancholy 
point of view in a letter which he addressed to me on July 26, 1932, 
one day before his intended, but at the time not executed suicide.16
The effect of Scholem’s melancholic picture is an extraordinary depoliticization 
of Benjamin’s thought. This is part of a deliberate strategy on the part of 
Scholem, who wishes to disentangle Benjamin in a posthumous fashion from the 
clutches of materialism and draw him back to the Jewish, mystical tradition. In 
addition, however, one sees here the outlines of what has now developed into a 
full-blown cult: the cult of Benjamin’s suicide which casts him as the first victim 
of Nazism and the victim of history par excellence. Benjamin becomes the victim 
of his comments in ‘The Storyteller’, which I discuss later in the thesis and 
loosely paraphrase here: a man who, in memory, is destined all his life to die by 
his own hand, if not at the age of thirty-five, then at the age of forty-eight. Such a 
melancholic view of the specificity of Nazi brutality, however, robs it of historical 
meaning and transforms it into the mere object of pathos.
15 This claim is put fl^ j-ward by Gary Smith in his introductory paragraph to the English publication 
of Gershom Scholem’s ‘Walter Benjamin and his Angel’, in Gary Smith (ed.), On Walter 
Benjamin: CriticaPEssays and Reflections, London, 1988, p. 51. See Gershom Scholem, Walter 
Benjamin. Die Geschichte einer Freundschaft, Frankfurt/Main, 1975.
16 Scholem, ‘Walter Benjamin and his Angel’, p. 86.
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Just as Scholem, in the speech referred to above, accuses his audience of
marxisants post-soixante-huitards of canonizing Benjamin as a saint of the
revolutionary cause, so the fascination of critics (and even of those outside the
academy to whom the name Walter Benjamin means something) with his death
has made Benjamin a martyr to the cause of universal victimhood.
Contemplating Benjamin in this muddled-headedly meta-Benjaminian way results
in a melancholic gaze into the past which, once again, depoliticizes. Leslie’s
comments are useful:
Benjamin as tragic hero, tom apart by melancholy and the difficulty of 
existing, becomes detached from the political history in which and 
against which he was engaged actively. There is a danger of memory 
as disempowerment, as sweet melancholy. Benjamin notes the 
tendency for memory and memorials to fetishize the act of 
remembering and not the remembrance of acting. In his 
Passagenwerk, Benjamin sketches the ‘brooder’, the pre-eminent 
melancholy subject, who dwells on fragments, clouded by a tormented 
sense of occluded significance indwelling in insignificant things.17
Similarly, Pensky contrasts Benjamin’s concern with the nature of melancholy 
with his attempts to turn melancholy against itself in the cause of action. Drawing 
attention to Benjamin’s review of Erich Kaestner’s poetry, he highlights 
Benjamin’s venomous rejection o f ‘leftist melancholia’, defined as ‘self- 
indulgence and passivity tricked out as social criticism’, and his search instead for
critical forms of melancholy, such as Trauerspiel, which can be transformed into
18its active opposite.
I have been led, however, by the comparison with Bakhtin and his 
apparently contrary emphasis on laughter, to look again at Benjamin and 
recognise in his work a theory of laughter.19 This theory appears first in nascent
17 Esther Leslie, Walter Benjamin: Overpowering Conformism, London, 2000, pp. 213-14.
18 Max Pensky, Melancholy Dialectics: Walter Benjamin and the Play o f Mourning, Amherst MA, 
p. 247. Benjamin’s review, ‘Left-wing Melancholia’, was so venomous that the Frankfurter 
Zeitung, which had commissioned it, refused to publish it. Benjamin’s review concludes in an 
almost Nietzschean fashion: ‘The rumbling in these lines certainly has more to do with flatulence 
than subversion. Constipation and melancholy have always gone together. But since the juices 
began to dry up in the body social, stuffiness meets us at every turn. Kaestner’s poems do not 
improve the air [machen die Luft nicht besser] ’ (GS III 283; SW II426). This quotation, and 
particularly the pun in the last sentence, is an example o f a Benjaminian joke.
19 One question that lends itself, however, only to speculation is the influence on Benjamin o f his 
close friend, the conservative intellectual, Florens Christian Rang, and his theory of carnival.
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form in Benjamin’s dissertation, ‘The Concept of Criticism in German
Romanticism’ (1920). Here, Benjamin marks out an opposition between ironic
scorn and sobriety. The serious and prosaic mode of reflection is the mode in
which the truth content of the work of art is revealed as the ‘eternal sober
continuance of the work’ (GS 1 109; S W 1 178). Nevertheless, withering, ironic
and scornful satire that reveals the absurdity in the bad work of art (which, hence,
for the Romantics, is not art at all) is a necessary clearing of the ground that
establishes what is criticizable and hence what is art:
The Romantic terminus technicus for the posture that corresponds to 
the axiom of the uncriticizability of the bad -  not only in art, but in all 
realms of intellectual life -  is “annihilate.” It designates the indirect 
refutation of the nugatory through silence, through ironic praise, or 
through the high praise of the good. The mediacy of irony is, in 
Schlegel’s mind, the only mode in which criticism can directly 
confront the nugatory. (GS 1 79-80; SW 1 160)
The cruel laughter of irony is necessary as the destruction of illusion. Laughter 
(here as scorn) and sobriety exist in dialectical interdependence.
Benjamin’s theory of laughter reappears later in his work, particularly in his
analysis of Brecht’s epic theatre. In ‘The Author as Producer’ (1934), he writes:
‘there is no better trigger for thinking than laughter. In particular, convulsion of
the diaphragm usually provides better opportunities for thought than convulsion of
the soul. Epic theatre is lavish only in occasions for laughter’ (GS I I 699; SWII
779). Gilloch has rightly recognized the connection that links this conception of
laughter in Brecht to the theory of irony in Benjamin’s work on the Romantics:
Such mirth has nothing to do with the entertainment of the culture 
industry. It is the bitter, withering laughter of romantic irony which 
liquidates mediocrity; it is the scornful, ruinous laughter of Surrealism
Rang’s lecture o f 1909, which Benjamin knew in manuscript form, develops a theory o f carnival 
that, in its heavily Nietzschean tone, reads like a dark obverse to Bakhtin’s thought. The key to 
Rang’s conception of carnival is scornful laughter [Hohngelachter] which tears down spiritual 
hierarchies as the ‘first blasphemy’. Carnival laughter is also, as in Bakhtin, a means o f combating 
fear: in ancient carnival man got intoxicated ‘until he finally did not take himself seriously; until 
he cast off his cares and the spectre became comical; he abandoned God, as well as the false God 
of being a good man; he drank away his fear with scorn and laughter’. Florens Christian Rang, 
‘Historische Psychologie des Kamevals’, in Rang, Kameval, ed. by Lorenz Jager, Berlin, 1983, 
pp. 7-45(18).
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which humiliates the obsolete and absurd. Brecht’s plays resound to a 
loud liberating laughter.20
Once again, laughter is a critical debunking, a clearing of ground, akin to 
Bakhtin’s concept of ‘parodic destruction’.21 But it is more than mere debunking; 
it is a deconstructive prerequisite, the starting point for something else: sober 
reflection, as in Romantic criticism, and now, in his treatment of Brecht, political 
action. Laughter and seriousness in Benjamin’s thought must be comprehended 
as dialectically intertwined. The result of this comprehension is, unlike the effect 
of critics’ pathological melancholization of Benjamin, his repoliticization.22
Turning back to Bakhtin from Benjamin’s theory of laughter that only came
to the fore in the light of Bakhtin, the Bakhtin who now reappears has likewise
been transformed. It is easy to find a Bakhtin who stands firmly on the side of
laughter in an opposition between laughter and melancholy. According to
Bakhtin in the Rabelais book (1965),23 on feast days, medieval students were:
freed from the heavy chains of devout seriousness, from the ‘continual 
ferment of piety and the fear of God.’ They were freed from the 
oppression of such gloomy categories as ‘eternal,’ immovable,’
‘absolute,’ ‘unchangeable’ and instead were exposed to the gay and
20 Graeme Gilloch, Walter Benjamin: Critical Constellations, Cambridge, 2002, p. 159. Gilloch’s 
reference to the entertainment industry is a comment on Adorno’s criticisms of Benjamin’s 
enthusiasm for the laughter o f popular cinema: ‘The laughter of the audience at a cinema [...] is 
anything but good and revolutionary; instead, it is full o f the worst Sadism. ’ Theodor W. Adorno, 
‘Letters to Benjamin’, trans. by Harry Zohn, in Ernst Bloch et al., Aesthetics and Politics, London, 
1977, pp. 110-33 (123). Adorno may have in mind the violent buffoonery of early cinematic 
slapstick.
21 Benjamin’s conception of barbaric laughter in ‘Experience and Poverty’ (1933) is similar in its 
effect: ‘In its buildings, pictures, and stories, mankind is preparing to outlive culture, if  need be. 
And the main thing is that it does so with a laugh. This laughter may occasionally sound barbaric. 
Well and good. Let us hope that from time to time the individual will give a little humanity to the 
masses, who one day will repay him with compound interest’ (GS 7/219; SW II735). Likewise, as 
well as seeing in Baudelaire an heir to Baroque melancholia, Benjamin also celebrates his ‘satanic 
laughter’ (GS 1 680; S W IV 182).
22 Eagleton notes: ‘the melancholy o f Western Marxism, bred largely by a history of proletarian 
defeat, represents the massive loss o f an essential dimension o f historical materialism. No greater 
contrast in the annals o f Marxist writing could be provided than that between Benjamin’s Theses 
on the Philosophy o f History and Mikhail Bakhtin’s Rabelais and his World' Eagleton, Benjamin, 
p. 144. He thus reveals what a Bakhtinian standpoint can bring to our image o f Benjamin.
The English translation o f Bakhtin’s work on Rabelais, Rabelais and his World, is o f Bakhtin’s 
Tvorchestvo Fransua Rable i narodnaia kul ’turn srednevekov ’ia i renessansa (The Art o f  
Franpois Rabelais and the Popular Culture o f the Middle Ages) which was published in 1965.
This was a revised version o f a text composed 1940-46 which had its basis in Bakhtin’s doctoral 
dissertation. I shall refer to the book as ‘the Rabelais book’.
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free laughing aspect of the world, with its open and unfinished 
character, with the joy of change and renewal. {Rabelais 83)
Nevertheless, if certain strands in the critical literature on Benjamin have
subjected him to a thorough melancholization that renders him politically
immobile, so, too, some critics of Bakhtin have emphasized this theory of laughter
to the extent of emptying his thought of any substance. The theory of
decrowning, debunking laughter in Bakhtin’s writings raises the serious matter of
how far such laughter’s acquiesces with, even participates in, violence.24
Furthermore, Bakhtin’s emphasis on carnival laughter is used by some critics to
paint him as a post-ideological liberal. Thus, for example, Clark and Holquist
contend that Bakhtin’s laughing Rabelais is a champion of unbridled relativism:
Rabelais’s importance lies not in his own particular ideology but in his 
awareness of the limits, the incompleteness of any ideology. No 
matter how serious Rabelais appears to be at any point in a text, he 
makes sure to leave a gap, to provide what Bakhtin calls a ‘merry 
loophole’ -  a loophole that opens on the distant future and that lends 
an aspect of ridicule to the present or to the immediate future [...].25
The Rabelais that results may have a ‘key place in the history of freedom’, as 
Clark and Holquist put it, but, through a denial of the possibility of seriousness, 
such a freedom becomes purely negative; it is the empty, reactive, if not passive 
phenomenon of liberation, rather than positive and concrete freedom.27 What 
emerges is a curiously depoliticized Bakhtin.
24 Averintsev is healthily sceptical towards Bakhtin’s claim in the Rabelais book that ‘violence 
never lurks behind laughter’, commenting: ‘Is it true that violence never, ever lurks behind 
laughter? Well, violence seldom lurks behind laughter, but announces its presence through 
laughter at the top o f its voice.’ Sergei S. Averintsev, ‘Bakhtin and the Russian Attitude to 
Laughter’, in David Shepherd (ed.), Bakhtin, Carnival and Other Subjects, Special edition of 
Critical Studies, 3-4, 1993, pp. 13-19 (16). Bernstein also takes Bakhtin to task on this point, 
noting that ‘in Rabelais it seems to me that we never respond to all the killings, maimings, 
humiliations and catastrophes as if they happened to human beings’, implying that Bakhtin’s 
reading o f Rabelais contains a ‘very un-Bakhtinian’ indifference to the human. Michael Andre 
Bernstein, ‘When the Carnival Turns Bitter: Reflections on the Abject Hero’, in Gary Saul Morson 
(ed.), Bakhtin: Essays and Dialogues on his Work, London, 1986, pp. 99-121 (117).
25 Clark and Holquist, Bakhtin, p. 318.
26 Clark and Holquist, Bakhtin, p. 320.
271 am referring to the distinction made by Arendt. See Hannah Arendt, On Revolution, London, 
1991. As quoted by Emerson, Sergei Averintsev, in his article, ‘Bakhtin, smekh, khristianskaia 
kul’tura’, in Rossia/Russia, 1988, 6, makes a similar point, also, it seems, drawing on this 
distinction: ‘Laughter is always experienced as movement “from a certain unfreedom to a certain 
freedom,” which is to say that laughter is “not freedom, but liberation.” As such, there is an 
inevitable mechanical and involuntary aspect to it, the initiating gesture o f a person who is not yet 
free.’ Caryl Emerson, The First Hundred Years o f Mikhail Bakhtin, Princeton NJ, 1997, p. 181.
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It is necessary, however, to reassess the relationship between laughter and 
seriousness in Bakhtin’s thought. In part, this reassessment has already taken 
place as a result of the critical discovery of Bakhtin’s early works, the tone of 
which is unquestionably serious. Furthermore, religious readings of Bakhtin have 
helped to rebalance the issue. The focus of Coates’s book, for example, on the 
central theme of the Fall produces a far more serious, if not melancholy, image of 
Bakhtin’s thought. Independently of a necessarily religious frame of reference, 
however, Coates’s technique also involves an inversion of the standard reading of 
Bakhtin. Where other critics see in Bakhtin’s theory of the polyphonic novel the 
joyful arrival and coming-to-voice of liberated subjects, Coates sees the 
melancholy exile and falling silent of the author. She traces progressive 
narratives of exile in Bakhtin’s work, which comprise the exile of ‘God Himself, 
whose supremely authoritative discourse has been squeezed out of the world of 
culture as a result of the same paradigmatic shift which, if Bakhtin is correct, 
forced the writer of prose fiction to hide his or her true self. 28 This view of 
Bakhtin, as will become clear in Chapter 3, bears marked similarities to the 
position of Benjamin in ‘Of Language as Such and of the Language of Man’ that 
likewise describes a post-lapsarian world of silence and melancholy. Similarly, 
both Coates and Hirschkop have drawn attention to the distinction (that emerges 
most clearly in the notes towards a revision of the Rabelais book) between official 
seriousness, the legitimate target of laughter, and its unofficial counterpart that 
Bakhtin describes in very Benjaminian, melancholic tones: ‘the unofficial 
seriousness of suffering, of fear, of fright, of weakness, the seriousness of the 
slave and the seriousness of the sacrificial victim’ which expresses ‘the ultimate 
protest of individuality (bodily and spiritual) yearning for immortality, against 
change and absolute renewal, the protest of the part against its dissolution in the 
whole’.29
Ruth Coates, Christianity in Bakhtin: God and the Exiled Author, Cambridge, 1998, p. 23.
29 M. M. Bakhtin, ‘Additions and Amendments to “Rabelais’” , in S. G. Bocharov and L. A. 
Gogotishvili (eds), Sobranie sochinenii, vol. 5, Moscow, 1996, pp. 80-129 (81). See Ken 
Hirschkop, Mikhail Bakhtin: An Aesthetic fo r Democracy, Oxford, 1999, especially pp. 275-78. In 
the Rabelais book Bakhtin also approves o f Greek tragedy which is fused with the ‘spirit of 
creative destruction’ and later genres o f ‘deep and pure, open seriousness’ are likewise praised for 
being ‘always ready to submit to death and renewal’ {Rabelais 121-22).
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A perspective gained from Benjamin may produce something in addition.
Benjamin, I have argued, sees laughter as the dialectical precondition for a
genuine seriousness. It is the agent of clearing and cleansing new territory. It is
possible to see a similar dialectic at work in Bakhtin. Bakhtin writes in the
Dostoevsky book:30
Camivalization is not an eternal and immobile schema which is 
imposed upon ready-made content; it is, rather, an extraordinarily 
flexible form of artistic visualization, a peculiar sort of heuristic 
principle making possible the discovery of new and as yet unseen 
things. By relativizing all that was externally stable, set and ready­
made, camivalization with its pathos of change and renewal permitted 
Dostoevsky to penetrate into the darkest layers of man and human 
relationships. It proved remarkably productive as a means for 
capturing in art the developing relationships under capitalism, at a 
time when previous forms of life, moral principles and beliefs were 
being turned into “rotten cords” and the previously concealed, 
ambivalent and unfinalized nature of man and human thought was 
being nakedly exposed. {DP 165-66)
I suggest that this passage is subtly double-voiced. The passage with which it
appears to polemicize is a passage from the Communist Manifesto:
Constant revolutionizing of production, uninterrupted disturbance of 
all social conditions, everlasting uncertainty and agitation distinguish 
the bourgeois epoch from all earlier ones. All fixed, fast-frozen 
relations, with their train of ancient and venerable prejudices and 
opinions, are swept away, all new formed ones become antiquated 
before they can ossify. All that is solid melts into air, all that is holy is 
profaned, and man is at last compelled to face with sober sense his 
real conditions of life, and his relations with his kind.31
Bakhtin appears to be implying a structural analogy between the relativizing 
dynamism of carnival and the revolutionizing dynamism of capital. Both forces 
invert previous hierarchies. Both forces transform all that they touch (‘moral 
principles’ and ‘venerable prejudices and opinions’). Carnival blasphemy finds 
its counterpart in the profaning of all that is holy; ‘fixed, fast frozen relations’ find 
their counterpart in what is ‘externally stable, set and ready-made’; carnival
30 See my comments below in the section on ‘Selection o f Material and Chronology’ on the 
difficulties in referring to the Dostevsky book and its dating.
31 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, ‘The Communist Manifesto’ [1848], in David McClellan (ed.), 
Karl Marx: Selected Writings, Oxford, 1977, pp. 221-47 (224).
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overturning of the hierarchies of courtly culture finds its counterpart in the 
bourgeois revolutionizing of feudal social and economic relations of production. 
Here is not the place to dwell on what sort of testimony this double-voiced 
passage does or does not bear to Bakhtin’s Marxism. My concern is with the 
parallel that I have established in so far as it affects the last part of these two 
passages. The intoxication of Marx’s description of capitalism finds its terminus 
in sobriety: man’s compulsion to face with sobriety the real conditions of his 
existence. So, too, with Bakhtin: the terminus is not the laughter of the carnival 
mask but the nakedness that follows. The historical and philosophical 
significance of laughter is not laughter itself but the new form of seriousness that 
it enables to come into being. As Bakhtin comments of Rabelais: ‘while breaking 
up the false seriousness, false historic pathos, he prepared the soil for a new 
seriousness and for a new historic pathos’ (.Rabelais 439). Laughter, then, far 
from being the inaction and irresponsibility of eternal relativization, clears the 
ground, as in Benjamin’s thought, for a new form of seriousness that makes 
responsible action possible.
Laughter, for Bakhtin and Benjamin, is an instrument of reconfigured,
anti-Aristotelian catharsis. Bakhtin comments on this in the Dostoevsky book:
Certain scholars [...] apply to Dostoevsky’s works the ancient 
(Aristotelian) term ‘catharsis’ (purification). If this term is understood 
in a very broad sense, then one can agree with it [...]. But tragic 
catharsis (in the Aristotelian sense) is not applicable to Dostoevsky.
The catharsis that finalizes Dostoevsky’s novels might be [...] 
expressed in this way: nothing conclusive has yet taken place in the 
world, the ultimate word o f the world has not yet been spoken, the 
world is open and free, everything is still in the future and will always 
be in the future. But this is, after all, also the purifying sense of 
ambivalent laughter. (DP 165-66)
It is necessary to reassess this passage, the second part of which might well be 
used in support of a conception of Bakhtin as a propagandist of a vacuous 
relativism of mere possibility. For both Bakhtin and Benjamin, laughter clears the 
ground and purifies. This is an inversion of the Aristotelian view. According to 
Aristotle: ‘Tragedy, then, is a representation of an action that is serious, 
complete, and of a certain magnitude [...] and through the arousal of pity and fear
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effecting the katharsis of such emotions.’32 Pity and fear move the spectator; s/he 
is intoxicated by wonder (rhaumaston). Bakhtin’s and Benjamin’s unserious 
mimesis, not of the great and complete, but of the everyday and incomplete, 
consists of a laughter that knows no pity and fear and results not in intoxication 
but in sobriety. According to Benjamin’s analysis of Brecht’s theory of epic 
theatre, Aristotelian theatre, which works through tragic catharsis, is politically 
affirmative of the status quo, paralysing human beings and shutting out 
possibilities for genuine change. An anti-Aristotelian catharsis through laughter 
that results in a new seriousness, such as seems to be visible in Bakhtin’s and 
Benjamin’s theory of laughter, may equip human beings for genuine change and 
action.
The apparent incommensurability that doubtless exists between Bakhtin 
the theorist of carnival laughter and Benjamin the melancholic may, through the 
oblique approach of comparison that I take in this thesis, be reconsidered to 
double effect: first, such an approach might present both thinkers in a new and 
transforming light; second, it might bring new insights to the substance in which 
the incommensurability inheres: here, the relationship between laughter and 
seriousness.
2. Marxism and Theology
Marxism and theology may or may not be incommensurable. Certainly, however, 
it is at the level of their commensurability that a comparison of Bakhtin and 
Benjamin is most productive. The worlds of Benjamin and Bakhtin scholarship 
are divided by the differing standpoints that critics take on Bakhtin’s or 
Benjamin’s commitment to either Marxism or theology. This thesis does not aim 
to solve the controversies. Rather, I intend to suggest some possible approaches 
to the problem, with the overall aim of maximizing rather than reducing the 
dimensions of Bakhtin’s and Benjamin’s thought.
32 Aristotle, The Poetics o f Aristotle, ed. and trans. by Stephen Halliwell, London, 1987, p. 37.
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Let us turn to one of Benjamin’s most striking images of the relationship
between theology and Marxism from ‘On the Concept of History’ (1940):
There was once, we know, an automaton constructed in such a way 
that it could respond to every move by a chess player with a 
countermove that would ensure the winning of a game. A puppet 
wearing Turkish attire and with a hookah in its mouth sat before a 
chessboard placed on a large table. A system of mirrors created the 
illusion that this table was transparent on all sides. Actually, a 
hunchbacked dwarf -  a master at chess - sat inside and guided the 
puppet’s hand by means of strings. One can imagine a philosophic 
counterpart to this apparatus. The puppet, called ‘historical 
materialism’, is to win all the time. It can easily be a match for 
anyone if it enlists the services of theology, which today, as we know, 
is small and ugly and has to keep out of sight. (G S1693; SW IV  389)
In Bakhtin and Benjamin scholarship, theology is sometimes the dwarf who must 
keep out of sight. Leslie is one critic who demands that this be the case. Her 
study of Benjamin exhibits an extraordinary capacity for pushing Benjamin’s 
theological motifs to the sidelines.33 Nevertheless, her main statement on the 
matter is useful: ‘Benjamin is not concerned with developing or interpreting 
religious doctrine in any sense. That was more the work of Scholem. Religious 
motifs are one part of a versatile montage strategy, rather than evidence of ardent 
religious commitment.’34 Ignoring some of the many assumptions in this 
statement, I should like to focus on one. Leslie is correct in stating that religious 
motifs form one part of a versatile montage strategy. Her study assumes, 
however, that she knows exactly what battle is being fought, namely a Marxist- 
revolutionary one. It follows that religious motifs, as a montaged element, are 
dismissed as little more than rhetorical tropes that are subordinate to the 
governing political direction of Benjamin’s project. What is potentially a plural 
montage of Benjamin’s thought is, in Leslie’s hands, reduced to singularity.
33 Leslie only deals with Benjamin’s writings after 1923-24 and what she discerns as the 
beginnings o f his conversion to materialism. Leslie, Benjamin.
34 Leslie, Benjamin, p. 172.
35 This is not to say that I wish to subordinate Benjamin’s politics to his theology. Such an 
approach is taken by Helmut Salzinger in his Swinging Benjamin, Frankfurt/Main, 1973, who 
seeks, in the spirit o f his own times, to make a materialist theologian out o f Benjamin, in the line 
of the Anabaptist revolutionary, Thomas Munster. It seems important that Benjamin’s theological 
discourse is understood as a discourse in its own right and as a discourse that is far from opposed 
to Benjamin’s political discourse. Nevertheless, as Arno Munster points out, it is possible to go 
along with Salzinger in so far as the end o f class struggle might be marked by a ‘double happening 
both religious and political’ in which the ‘social revolution, as realization of the reign of liberty
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Leslie finds her Bakhtinian counterpart in Brandist. In the brief paragraph
devoted to religion in his monograph, Brandist seems happy to accept that
Bakhtin was a religious man. None the less, Brandist attempts to reduce the
theological aspect of Bakhtin’s thought to nothing:
While his work includes terminology with a theological history, there 
is little evidence to suggest that he actually drew on theological 
sources. [...] There are important distinctions between religion, 
religious philosophy and a philosophy of religion, and religious 
overtones detected in a basically secular philosophy are a different 
matter again. In addition to this, the terminology of German idealism 
did not find simple philosophical equivalents in Russian, where there 
was no established philosophical discourse at the beginning of the 
century. Terms with religious connotations were thus often adopted 
for general philosophical discussions.36
There are many things to object to here, but, once again, I wish to focus on one: 
Brandist’s reductionism. This passage displays the tendency of Brandist’s entire 
monograph to reduce Bakhtin to his sources in European philosophy (a tendency 
that I note elsewhere). Furthermore, it is a reduction of Bakhtin’s multi-voiced 
discourse to one particular set of voices (the secular European philosophical 
voices) and no other (theological voices). In a fashion similar to Leslie’s 
treatment of Benjamin, Brandist assumes that he can detect what are fortuitous 
overtones and, presumably, what are authentic undertones.
For this study, the question of the relationship of philosophy, politics 
(which generally means Marxism) and theology is a question of the relation of 
different discourses in Bakhtin’s work. I attempt to take an approach that listens 
to the full range of competing voices and their claims, just as, in my treatment of 
Benjamin, I attempt to preserve a simultaneous awareness of the complexity of 
juxtapositions in the montage of his thought. Eagleton’s comments run along 
more correct, if perhaps topsy-turvy, lines:
and suppression o f universal alienation, necessarily coincides with the act o f the redemption o f  
humanity, o f oppression, of exploitation and injustice’. Amo Munster, Progres et catastrophe: 
Walter Benjamin et I ’histoire. Reflexions sur I ’itineraire philosophique d  ’un marxisme 
melancolique, Paris, 1996, p. 53.
36 Brandist, The Bakhtin Circle, pp. 23-24.
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Nor can Bakhtin be merely appropriated as a materialist. It would 
now appear that behind his work lies a Judaeo-Christian mysticism in 
some ways akin to Benjamin’s -  that Marxism and the Philosophy o f 
Language contains as its secret code a theological devotion to the 
incamational unity of word and being similar to that which marks 
Benjamin’s own mediations.37
The choice of the word ‘code’ here is unfortunate, for code, once again, implies a 
priority of the covert over the overt. The code must work both ways: Bakhtin’s 
theological discourse must be understood as containing a message that is relevant 
to human beings as social and political subjects, just as a meditation on the social 
and political implications of his thought must not expel his theology.
The approach of this thesis is to see theological and political themes in 
Bakhtin and Benjamin not in terms of their mutual exclusivity but in terms of their 
possible alliance. (One might also remember here the argument of thinkers such 
as Carl Schmitt that religion and politics have only recently parted company and 
that our political thinking might still be structured by theological concepts -  this 
might be especially true from a Jewish standpoint.)38 Ultimately, it must be 
conceded that this approach runs into certain buffers: the evidence seems 
overwhelming that Benjamin does indeed ‘break with esotericism’ in favour of 
materialism, as Habermas puts it, and all Scholem’s patient argumentation will 
not win him back. Similarly, the evidence against certainly a Marxist Bakhtin, if 
not against a political Bakhtin, will not refuse to stack up.40 In this sense, though 
their strategies are similar, the nature of the alliances the two thinkers forge are 
different: in the end, on the one hand, Benjamin’s wizened dwarf is indisputably 
in the service of historical materialism; on the other hand, the voice of Marxism in 
Bakhtin’s discourse is not the final voice.
37 Eagleton, Benjamin, pp. 154-55.
38 According to Schmitt, all ‘significant concepts o f the modem theory o f the state are secularized 
theological concepts’; thus the omnipotent God became the omnipotent lawgiver. It is only with 
the twin development of Enlightenment rationalism - which banishes miracle - and the theory of 
the modem constitutional state -  which seeks to curtail the power o f the sovereign - that this 
underlying truth has been repressed. Carl Schmitt, Political Theology> (1922), trans. by George 
Schwab, Cambridge MA, 1985, p. 36. The notion o f Israel as God’s chosen people is the source 
of the close connection between theology and politics in Jewish thought.
39 See Jurgen Habermas, ‘Walter Benjamin: Consciousness-Raising or Rescuing Critique’, in 
Smith (ed.), On Walter Benjamin, pp. 90-128 (109).
40 Coates’s arguments, for example, are persuasive, although I qualify some of them later. See the 
chapter, ‘Was Bakhtin a Marxist?’, in Coates, Christianity in Bakhtin, pp. 57-83.
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An insistence on the irreducible theological and political double­
voicedness of Bakhtin and Benjamin might appear to evince an unwillingness to 
take a decision; it might constitute a form of what Bakhtin terms alibi. Leslie, 
once again, writes forcefully and originally on this issue:
Filtered through the refracting lenses of Scholem, of Heidegger, of the 
postmodern and of poststructuralism, Benjamin returns to us now as 
either fractured or multiplied. [...] He is tom between the messianic 
and the material [...]. Angelic Benjamin floats in theory as a half­
figure -  half-Marxist, half-Jew -  and the partiality of his 
identifications makes it impossible to locate his theory, and it places 
him on a border that cuts through all his work, and even 
(deconstructively? actually?) killed him.41
This thesis is about the multiplication of its subjects. This multiplication, 
however, does not aim at crippling fracture but rather at intensification. Leslie 
and Brandist are guilty, in their own ways, of seeing only half of their subjects. 
The question, one that is rarely posed, remains: what is at stake in this game of 
chess? Brandist is correct, quoting Natorp as his ‘source’, in saying that, for 
Bakhtin, religion was treated ‘within the bounds of humanity’.42 This is true also 
of Benjamin. Both thinkers are concerned with religion as a matter of human 
experience. For both Bakhtin and Benjamin, then, the emphasis is on the divine 
as the sphere of the (possible) fulfilment of strictly human needs, hopes and calls 
for justice. Bakhtin and Benjamin, the chess-players, seek to win for the sake of 
the integrity of the human being within history, not for the sake of abstract and 
eternal theological truth. They use theological and political strategies as tools of 
intensification. Whether Marx is to come to the aid of religion, or religion to the 
aid of Marx, it still follows that, with the confusing but necessary obfuscation of 
smoke and mirrors, the automaton of historical materialism and the ugly dwarf of 
theology are both playing the same opponent.
Relation to Critical Literature
I have deliberately left my treatment of the position that this thesis adopts in 
relation to the existing critical literature on Bakhtin and Benjamin until this late
41 Leslie, Benjamin, pp. 224-25.
42 Brandist, The Bakhtin Circle, p. 24.
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stage in the Introduction. For, in outlining, in discursive fashion, the approach 
that underpins my thematic comparison of the two thinkers, I should have made 
much of this position reasonably clear.
There is a huge volume of secondary literature on both Bakhtin and 
Benjamin, which increases almost daily.43 This has presented a challenge to a 
thesis the ambition of which it is to be a study of not one, but two thinkers who 
command such a high degree of attention. This Introduction cannot attempt a 
thorough survey of this material, but I will give an indication of how I have used 
the critical literature and how certain strands and approaches relate to my own 
contribution.
In the case of Bakhtin, linguistic limitations have prevented me from 
engagement with the Russian secondary literature, although I have benefited from 
Emerson’s survey of Russian responses to Bakhtin over the past century, as well 
as from critics such as Tihanov and Coates who engage with these responses. In 
the case of Benjamin, whilst I have largely drawn on Anglo-American 
scholarship, I also draw on a range of German Benjamin scholarship, both in 
German and in English translation.44 Another resource that has been helpful has 
been the French tradition of Benjamin scholarship. This tradition seems to be less 
radically polarized by the question of Marxism and theology than the Anglo- 
American and German traditions, and, hence, contains a refined presentation of 
the relationship between politics and theology in Benjamin’s thought45
43 Fuller bibliographical information may be found in the following places: for Bakhtin, the best 
source is the online analytical bibliographical database o f Sheffield University’s Bakhtin Centre. 
Hirschkop’s Bakhtin contains a fairly full listing o f both primary and secondary material. Adlam’s 
essay provides a brief survey and bibliography of secondary material up to 2001. Adlam, ‘Critical 
Work on the Bakhtin Circle’. For Benjamin, Momme Brodersen’s Bibliografia critica generate, 
Palermo, 1984, deals with the years 1913-83. The years 1983-92 are covered in Reinhard Markner 
and Thomas Weber (eds), Literatur iiber Walter Benjamin. Kommentierte Bibliographie 1983-92, 
Berlin, 1993. Leslie gives her analysis o f some of the main themes in recent Benjamin scholarship 
in Leslie, Benjamin, pp. 219-28.
44 As well as the texts o f Scholem and Habermas, referred to above, I engage with other major 
works of German Benjamin scholarship such as Winfried Menninghaus, Walter Benjamins 
Theorie der Sprachmagie, Frankfurt/Main, 1995, and Rolf Tiedemann, Studien zur Philosophie 
Walter Benjamins, Frankfurt/Main, 1973.
45 Lowy’s study stands out here in its lucid account o f the political theology o f Benjamin’s ‘On the 
Concept o f History’. Michel Lowy, Walter Benjamin: Avertissement d ’incendie. Une Lecture des 
theses “sur le concept d ’histoire”, Paris, 2001. Likewise, Munster’s work provides an analysis of
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As regards Bakhtin scholarship, I should like to draw attention to a 
number of strands. The first of these is that emerging from Brandist and Tihanov 
who have sought to locate Bakhtin in the European, largely German, 
philosophical tradition.46 The rather aggressive edge of some of this work has 
perhaps been necessary as part of a strategy of wresting Bakhtin from the hands of 
literary scholars. This thesis draws substantially on that research, as it has 
provided a much more substantial bridge linking the worlds of Bakhtin and 
Benjamin. In particular, Tihanov’s and Brandist’s insights into Bakhtin’s 
relationship to neo-Kantianism and Lebensphilosophie have been essential. 
Brandist’s tendency, noted above, to reduce Bakhtin to the sum of his influences, 
combined with a lack of interest in the ethical and theological dimensions of 
Bakhtin’s thought that can amount to dismissal, has created productive tensions. 
Tihanov’s study of Lukacs and Bakhtin is an exhaustively researched work of 
penetrating analysis. It has been a steady point of reference in my own 
comparative work.
A second strand, often allied to the first, consists in the sociological and 
political-theoretical reading of Bakhtin that one finds in the work of Michael 
Gardiner and Ken Hirschkop. Gardiner’s work usefully interprets the Bakhtin 
Circle’s work in relation to the Western Marxist tradition in which Benjamin 
occupies a curious but central position.47 His article on Bakhtin and Bloch, the 
friend and collaborator of Benjamin, has opened avenues for this study.48 
Similarly, his bringing together of Bakhtin and Gramsci (a feature also of 
Brandist’s work) is a theme that is not directly followed up by this thesis but that 
has been of influence. Hirschkop’s work has the virtue of being the first major 
attack on the American tradition of Bakhtin scholarship, which I discuss below. 
His contribution to the polemic collected in the volume edited by Morson is of
the relationship between historical materialism and Jewish messianism in Benjamin that sees the 
two categories in dialectical interdependence. See Munster, Progres et catastrophe.
46 See, in particular, Brandist, The Bakhtin Circle, and Tihanov, Master and Slave.
47 See Michael J. Gardiner, The Dialogics o f Critique: M. M. Bakhtin and the Theory o f Ideology, 
London, 1992.
48 See Michael J. Gardiner, ‘Bakhtin’s Carnival: Utopia as Critique’, in Shepherd (ed.), Bakhtin: 
Carnival and Other Subjects, pp. 20-47.
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continuing relevance as a warning against the reduction of Bakhtin to the mere 
play of difference.49 His monograph is more problematic:50 I cannot agree with 
the fundamental interpretation of Bakhtin as a Habermasian theorist of the public 
sphere. Nevertheless, the expansive nature of Hirschkop’s study, its willingness 
to speculate whilst being rooted in text and its attempt to pinpoint Bakhtin’s 
actuality are all valuable.
A third strand consists of American critical responses to Bakhtin. First, 
there are Emerson and Morson who have done most, perhaps, to set Bakhtin 
scholarship on a solid footing. In particular their Prosaics is exactingly thorough 
in its periodization of Bakhtin’s work and its careful reconstruction of Bakhtinian 
concepts and idiom.51 Nevertheless, their liberal orientation contains a tendency -  
discussed more fully in Chapter 4 -  to present Bakhtin as a thinker of mere 
possibility and openness. Emerson’s later text, however, is a scholarly and 
sophisticated treatment of responses to Bakhtin that provides both a penetrating 
assessment of the past and present of Bakhtin scholarship and an important piece 
of cultural history writing. Second, there are Holquist and Clark. Whilst it must 
be conceded that their study was, in its time, a ground-breaking piece of work, 
subsequent scholarship has revealed its many shallow interpretations and 
untenable assertions.53 Their position on the question of authorship now seems 
untenable, particularly in the light of the persuasive arguments of Emerson and 
Morson. Most important, what remains in Emerson and Morson’s work a mere 
tendency becomes in Clark and Holquist a full-blown project to present Bakhtin 
as the hero of a liberal narrative of mere difference.54
49 See Ken Hirschkop, ‘A Response to the Forum on Mikhail Bakhtin’, in Morson (ed.), Bakhtin: 
Essays and Dialogues, pp 73-79.
50 Hirschkop, Bakhtin.
51 Morson and Emerson, Bakhtin.
52 Emerson, The First Hundred Years.
53 Clark and Holquist, Bakhtin.
54 2iiek comments on the ‘liberal’ celebration of the multiplicity o f mere difference which he 
describes as ‘the obliteration o f Difference in the boring repetitive perverse Sameness which 
serves as the container o f this mulititude’. Slavoj Zizek, Did Somebody Say Totalitarianism?, 
London, 2001, p. 238 .1 return to the question of ‘mere difference’ in my conclusion.
33
Finally, religiously oriented work on Bakhtin presents a fourth strand. I 
have already made substantial comments on the question of religion. Coates’s 
work stands out as a persuasive reading of Bakhtin’s work that is alive to the 
textual nuances as well as to the architectural structure of Bakhtin’s thought.55 
Mihailovic’s monograph is of less value as a result of its more tendentious focus 
on Bakhtin as a thinker rooted in (Russian) Orthodoxy.56 I prefer to emphasize 
Bakhtin’s allegiance to a theological mode of thinking per se rather than to a 
specifically Orthodox tradition. The essays collected in Contino and Felch’s 
edited volume, Bakhtin and Religion, open up a wide variety of approaches to 
religious themes in Bakhtin. In particular, Poole’s essay on apophasis in Bakhtin 
and Pechey’s essay, which highlights similarities between Benjamin’s theology 
and that of Bakhtin, have provided valuable insights.57
In the case of Benjamin, one confronts a more established critical tradition 
that, in part as a result, is less easily divisible into analogous strands. Benjamin’s 
interests (philosophy, literature, religion, the visual arts, politics, popular culture, 
kitsch, anthropology, psychoanalysis, and so forth) are also more disparate than 
those of Bakhtin and he deals with more wide-ranging material. This means that 
the scholarly literature on his work is correspondingly more disparate. Bakhtin is, 
at heart, a philosopher of the experience of self and other, subsequently a 
philosopher of the word, and next a philosopher of artistic genre. He pursues 
these interests with undoubted breadth of thought but with an intensity of focus on 
verbal and literary culture. Benjamin also is concerned with such things, but he 
is, in addition, a theorist of technology, of visual experience, of urban experience, 
and so forth, and critics have constructed images of Benjamin that present him in 
an effective fashion in these later terms.58
55 In particular, Coates, Christianity in Bakhtin.
56 Alexandar Mihailovic, Corporeal Words: Mikhail Bakhtin’s Theology o f Discourse, Evanston 
IL, 1997.
57 Graham Pechey, ‘Philosophy and Theology in “Aesthetic Activity’” , and Randall Poole, ‘The 
Apophatic Bakhtin’, in Paul J. Contino and Susan M. Felch (eds), Bakhtin and Religion: A Feeling 
fo r Faith, Evanston IL, 2001, pp. 47-62 and pp. 151-75.
58 Thus, Leslie’s Benjamin presents Benjamin in terms o f his relation to the notion o f Technik, 
Howard Caygill, Walter Benjamin: The Colour o f  Experience, London, 1998, centres on the theme 
of visual experience; Susan Buck-Morss, Dialectics o f Seeing: Walter Benjamin and the Arcades 
Project, London, 1989, and Margaret Cohen, Profane Illumination: Walter Benjamin and the
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The most important recent development in Benjamin studies has been the
attempt to present Benjamin as, above all, a philosopher. Andrew Benjamin and
Peter Osborne’s introduction to the edited volume, Walter Benjamin’s
Philosophy: Destruction and Experience, constitutes what is almost a manifesto
for this appropriation:
Why read Benjamin today? The simplicity of the question is 
disarming. There are as many answers as there are Benjamins:
Benjamin the Critic, Benjamin the Marxist, Benjamin the Modernist, 
Benjamin the Jew... Behind each of them, however, in one way or 
other, stands Benjamin the philosopher.59
The result has been a reorientation of Benjamin. According to Andrew Benjamin 
and Osborne, previously Arendt’s portrayal of Benjamin as an ‘alchemist-critic’ 
had largely been dominant in English-language Benjamin scholarship.60 Since 
then, a variety of critics have sought to relocate Benjamin in relation to Kant, 
Derrida, Leibniz, Plato, Nietzsche, Spinoza, among others, and, above all, to the 
perennially questionable figure of Heidegger.61 Whilst there is no doubting the 
legitimacy of such endeavours as exercises in academic philosophy, it is exactly
Paris o f Surrealist Revolution, London, 1993, focus on Benjamin’s investigations into the 
archaeology o f modernity that he finds in nineteenth century Paris.
59 Andrew Benjamin and Peter Osborne, ‘Introduction: Destruction and Experience’, in Andrew 
Benjamin and Peter Osborne (eds), Walter Benjamin’s Philosophy: Destruction and Experience, 
London, 1991, pp. x-xiv (x).
60 Rochlitz notes a similar emphasis in French scholarship on Benjamin as a literary critic that his 
study sets out to correct. Rochlitz, The Disenchantment o f  Art, pp. 8-9.
61 Thus, to give only a few examples, Fenves interprets Benjamin’s Trauerspiel text as a dialogue 
with Plato and Nietzsche. Peter Fenves, ‘Tragedy and Prophecy in Benjamin’s “Origin o f the 
German Mourning Play”’, in Gerhard Richter (ed.), Benjamin’s Ghosts: Interventions in 
Contemporary Literary and Cultural Theory, Stanford CA, 2002, pp. 237-59. Hodge sets 
Benjamin’s aesthetics between Derrida and Kant. Joanna Hodge, ‘The Timing o f Elective 
Affinity: Walter Benjamin’s Strong Aesthetics’, in Andrew Benjamin (ed.), Walter Benjamin and 
Art, London, 2005, pp. 14-31. The attempt to engage Benjamin with Heidegger is present 
throughout Benjamin and Osborne, Benjamin’s Philosophy,and most particularly in Howard 
Caygill, ‘Benjamin, Heidegger and the Destruction o f Tradition’, pp. 1-31, which argues that one 
must not succumb to the ‘“left-melancholic” alibi’ that is presented by Heidegger’s association 
with Nazism and instead seek out the ‘sparks thrown up by [Benjamin and Heiddegger’s] I ’entre- 
choc ’. (p. 1) Despite this, a reaction within this strand is already visible in Hanssen’s essay which 
attempts to distance Benjamin from Heidegger in philosophical terms. See Beatrice Hanssen, 
‘Benjamin or Heidegger: Aesthetics and Politics in an Age o f Technology’, in Andrew Benjamin 
(ed.), Benjamin and Art, pp. 73-92. For this strand o f Benjamin scholarship, see also the essays 
edited in Andrew Benjamin (ed.), Walter Benjamin and Romanticism, London, 2001, and Andrew 
Benjamin’s own texts, Art, Mimesis, and the Avant-Garde, London, 1991, and The Plural Event, 
London, 1993, which instigate this development by locating Walter Benjamin in the ontological 
philosophy o f Heidegger and Leibniz.
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as such that these contributions to Benjamin scholarship seem to be off the mark.
Here I agree with Leslie:
Commentators in the 1990s have seen Benjamin’s intention to be that 
of someone who ‘sought to render experience philosophically’. But 
more apt might be the converse: that Benjamin seeks to undermine the 
hypotheses of philosophy by conceptualizing specific experience and, 
vitally, the socio-historical conditions of transformations of 
experience. Philosophy is truly too bloodless for Benjamin. [...] The 
sealed universe of the poststructuralist contribution to Benjaminology
fS)offers a temporality without history.
Despite the problems with Leslie’s approach that I have already noted, the 
acumen of her Marxist-oriented analysis of Benjamin’s contextual and 
contemporary actuality is superb. Her work is invaluable in many senses, not 
least because of her aim of rescuing Benjamin from those critics in whose hands 
he is relentlessly domesticated, apoliticized and rendered bloodless.
Whilst the philosophical Benjamin to be found in these critics has been of 
some use, I have drawn more on the work of critics who depart from other 
disciplinary premises such as those of literary and art criticism, sociology and 
anthropology, history and theology. Among particular examples I would list the 
following. McCole’s text provides a thorough and well argued account of 
Benjamin’s career, focusing on his contradictory response to modernity. Pensky’s 
work on melancholy and Jennings’s discussion of Benjamin’s theory of literary 
criticism are both valuable contributions that have informed my treatment of these 
subjects. Gilloch’s introduction to Benjamin is lucid and strong on 
historicization.64 Rochlitz’s analysis of the development of Benjamin’s art-theory 
is a persuasive reconstruction of the genealogy of themes in Benjamin’s thought.65 
Plate’s work has been illuminating in its attempt not to discuss Benjamin as a 
theologian but rather to look into Benjamin’s work per se for insights into 
theology.66 Taussig’s anthropological account of the mimetic faculty, which deals
62 Leslie, Benjamin, pp. 222-23.
63 Pensky, Melancholy Dialectics, and Michael W. Jennings, Dialectical Images: Walter 
Benjamin’s Theory o f Literary Criticism, London, 1987.
64 Gilloch, Benjamin.
65 Rochlitz, The Disenchantment o f  Art, 1996.
66 S. Brent Plate, Walter Benjamin, Religion and Aesthetics: Rethinking Religion through the Arts, 
London, 2005. Similarly, Reed, rather than looking for Bakhtin’s theology, produces an intriguing
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with an extraordinary range of material and is only concerned incidentally with 
Benjamin, has been an invaluable source of insights, not least in its turning upside 
down of the commonplace reading of Benjamin’s theory of the aura.67 Perhaps 
most important of all, Jay’s essay on Benjamin and the novel has backed up two 
insights that are central to this thesis: first, that Benjamin’s theory of experience 
(as Erlebnis and Erfahrung) must be understood in the context of the division 
between (neo-)Kantianism and Lebensphilosophie; and, second, that Benjamin’s 
notion of ‘experience without a subject’ might fruitfully be compared with 
Bakhtin’s conception of intersubjectivity.68
As far as comparative studies of Bakhtin and Benjamin are concerned, 
despite numerous assertions of affinities and similarity and many comments in 
passing, very little has been written. Sandywell’s essay offers suggestions (such 
as possible affinities between Benjamin’s concept of translation and Bakhtin’s 
concept of dialogue or between Benjamin’s concept of messianic redemption and 
Bakhtin’s concept of ‘great time’) but it operates at such a level of generality and 
abstraction that its contribution is minimal.69 Eagleton’s treatment of Bakhtin in 
the context of his study of Benjamin (he devotes in total about thirteen pages of 
his 179-page study to Bakhtin) is typically provocative but an also typical 
predominance of rhetorical elan over analytical content limits its usefulness.70 
Eagleton is also limited by the fact that Bakhtin’s early works were not available 
to him at the time of writing. Nevertheless, his work on Benjamin is suggestive in 
its use of Bakhtin’s conception of carnival to supplement Benjamin’s messianic 
Marxism and in the concomitant insight that Bakhtin and Benjamin might be 
brought together on the territory of both Marxism and theology.
Bakhtinian reading of the relationship between God and Man. Esther D. Reed, The Genesis o f  
Ethics: On the Authority o f God as the Origin o f Christian Ethics, London, 2000.
67 Taussig argues provocatively that it is mechanical reproducibility itself that recreates and 
reinvigorates the phenomenon of aura. Michael Taussig, Mimesis and Alterity: A Particular 
History o f the Senses, London, 1993.
68 Martin Jay, ‘Experience without a Subject: Walter Benjamin and the Novel’, in Laura Marcus 
and Lynda Nead (eds), The Actuality o f  Walter Benjamin, London, 1998, pp. 194-211. These 
points are the subject o f Chapters 2 and 3 respectively.
69 Barry Sandywell, ‘Memories o f Nature in Bakhtin and Benjamin’, in Craig Brandist and Galin 
Tihanov (eds), Materializing Bakhtin: The Bakhtin Circle and Social Theory, London, 2000, pp. 
94-118.
70 Eagleton, Benjamin.
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Perhaps the most perspicacious study of Bakhtin and Benjamin is the 
essay by Zima which fastens onto the central similarity between Benjamin’s 
concept of the shock of montage and Bakhtin’s concept of carnival laughter. For 
Zima both phenomena, shock and laughter, are ‘liberatory elements of critique 
whose ambivalence (the joining of incompatible values) constitutes the motor of a 
discourse both dialectic and dialogic’.71 In Zima’s analysis, Bakhtin’s and 
Benjamin’s key ideas of carnival and polyphony, on the one hand, and shock, 
montage and the dialectical image, on the other, are brought together in such a 
way that their analogous structure and function are, at least in part, revealed. 
Furthermore, Zima makes a serious attempt to link, via the detour of Benjamin’s 
theory of Baudelaire and commodity form, Bakhtin’s conception of carnival 
ambivalence to the workings of capitalism. Despite this, Zima’s work has clear 
limitations since he deals only with Bakhtin’s books on Rabelais and
72Dostoevsky. Additionally, his emphasis on the eternally unfinalizable nature of 
what he terms Bakhtin and Benjamin’s ambivalence is something that I take issue 
with in my final chapter. Despite these and other contributions, then, this thesis 
represents, to the best of my knowledge, the most complete attempt at a 
comparative study of these two thinkers to date.73
71 Pierre [Petr] V. Zima, ‘L’Ambivalence dialectique: entre Benjamin et Bakhtine’, Revue 
d ’esthetique, 1, 1981, 1, pp. 131-40 (136). Zima describes the conception of ambivalence, which 
he finds in both thinkers and which structures his essay, as follows: ‘The obverse o f official 
culture which recognizes only absolute difference and monologue, carnival presents the 
conjunction of opposites and the plurality o f voices: polyphony. [...] In carnival, the absolute 
difference o f values is abolished by the conjunction of opposing values which brings forth 
laughter. [...] By way of parallel, Benjamin starts out from the notion that opposites touch each 
other and that their conjunction produces the dialectical shock of recognition and criticism. Shock 
destroys monovalent contemplation by revealing the ambivalence o f reality and the equality (but 
not identity) o f opposing values.’ (p. 131)
72 Zima refers to French translations o f Bakhtin. At the time o f writing, the other texts translated 
into French were ‘Discourse in the Novel’, ‘Epic and Novel’ and (under the name o f Bakhtin) 
Voloshinov’s Marxism and the Philosophy o f Language. See the bibliographical appendix to 
Mikhail Bakhtine (V. N. Volochinov), Le Freudisme, trans. by Guy Verret, Lausanne, 1980, pp. 
214-25.
73 One might mention in passing Schleifer’s study which marshals both Bakhtin and Benjamin, 
devoting substantial portions o f text to a comparison o f the two thinkers, in support o f an 
ambitious reassessment o f the temporality o f the post-Enlightenment age. Confused and 
inaccurate with relation to both thinkers, Schleifer’s work, however, itself confuses and obfuscates 
the problem. For example, he wilfully misreads out o f context Bakhtin’s use o f the word, ‘aura’, 
to imply a point o f equivalence between the two thinkers, (p. 211.) Ronald Schleifer, Modernism 
and Time: The Logic o f Abundance in Literature, Science and Culture 1880-1930, Cambridge, 
2000. Cohen’s tendentious study, ‘a transformative mode o f reading I will not quite call
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Experience and Form
The opposition of experience and form finds an analogy in the pre-Socratic 
opposition ofphusis (nature) and nomos (law, custom). This opposition was 
often, but not necessarily, conceived of in political terms: some, such as Antiphon 
the Sophist, stress the priority of phusis, the necessary nature of things, including 
the nature of man, over nomos, understood as the artificial and even arbitrary laws 
and customs of the polis: ‘for the dictates of the laws [ta twn nomwn] are 
adventitious, whereas the dictates of nature are inescapable; dictates of the laws, 
based on agreement as they are, are not natural growths, whereas the dictates of 
nature [ta thsphusews], being natural growths, are not based on agreement’.74 
Others, such as the chorus in Sophocles’ Antigone, attempt to assert the binding 
power of nomos over the irregular forces of nature.75 The distinction between 
these two spheres in Greek thought reveals a division in the very nature of what it 
means to be a social human being: it brings into question the adequacy of the 
shaping forms which human beings devise to make sense of and control a nature 
which includes their own experience. This division is, perhaps in part, the origin 
of the homesickness that Novalis claimed to be the fundamental drive of 
philosophy.76
The question of the relation of experience to form is the question of the 
extent to which human beings are able to recognise themselves in the forms that 
the particular historical and social moment in which they live makes available to 
them. It is the question of the extent to which my experience of my own nature 
(my phusis) is reflected in the formally organized world (the world of nomos) 
which surrounds me.
allographics’ that ‘operates as a form of (perhaps post post-Marxist) ideology critique’ (p. 2), 
lacks scholarly values and calls even more for the little boy who points out that the emperor has no 
clothes. Tom Cohen, Ideology’ and Inscription: “Cultural Studies ” after Benjamin, de Man, and 
Bakhtin, Cambridge, 1998.
74 Antiphon, ‘Peri Alhtheias’, trans. by Jonathan Barnes, text reproduced in full in Martin Oswald, 
‘Nomos and Phusis in Antiphon’s Peri Alhtheias’, in Mark Griffith and Donald D. Mastronarde 
(eds), Cabinet o f the Muses: Essays on Classical and Comparative Literature in Honor o f Thomas 
G. Rosenmeyer, Atlanta GA, 1990, pp. 293-306 (293-96).
75 See George B. Kerferd, The Sophistic Movement, Cambridge, 1981, particularly pp. 111-30.
76 ‘Philosophy is really homesickness; it is the urge to be at home everywhere.’ Quoted in Georg 
Lukacs, Theory o f the Novel, trans. by Anna Bostock, London, 1971, p. 29.
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Central to the thesis is an understanding of the historically located nature 
of the relation between experience and form. I argue that Bakhtin’s and 
Benjamin’s thought is marked by a sense of the fractured nature of modem 
experience. This fracturating arises from an historical dislocation of experience 
from the forms that are designed to enable human beings to make sense of that 
experience (the forms of habitualized social behaviour, tradition, cognition, 
language, artistic genres, and art per se). Thus, for example, Bakhtin and 
Benjamin, in their thinking on the epic and the story, respectively, are heirs to a 
sense similar to Hegel’s sense of the falling into oblivion of the practice of forms 
through transformations in concrete social life. Nevertheless, both thinkers seek 
the seeds of new and productive experience in the new forms that those 
transformations bring into being.
Chapter Outlines
In Chapter 1, ‘Habit and Tradition’, I examine Bakhtin’s and Benjamin’s 
conception of habit and habitualized patterns of behaviour such as ritual and 
tradition. The question of this chapter is the question of whether such habitual 
forms represent media for the subject’s free self-actualization, rescuing her or him 
from the mere flux of existence; or whether, on the contrary, these forms represent 
authoritarian media of alienation in which the subject finds him- or herself 
objectified.
In Chapter 2, ‘Experience’, I take an intellectual-historical approach to the 
relation between experience and form. Taking the ideas of Kant and Hegel as a 
starting point and ending in the confrontation of the late-nineteenth and early- 
twentieth century movements of neo-Kantianism and Lebensphilosophie, I 
investigate the development of two opposing conceptions of experience in the 
philosophical tradition: on the one hand, the concrete, subjective and vital 
experience, opposed to formal regularity, which this tradition terms Erlebnis; and,
77 See Jameson’s comments on this. Fredric Jameson, Marxism and Form, Princeton NJ, 1974, p. 
352, and the long quotation he gives there from Hegel’s Aesthetics concerning the ‘prose o f the 
world’, pp. 352-53.
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on the other hand, the abstract, objective and intrinsically formal experience 
which this tradition terms Erfahrung. The chapter then proceeds to chart both 
thinkers’ articulations of the inadequacy of either conception of experience and 
their attempts to formulate ways beyond this bifurcation of experience.
Chapter 3, ‘Language’, examines Bakhtin’s and Benjamin’s conceptions 
of language as a possible site of unity of the subjective and objective aspects of 
experience. Here, I examine the particular varieties of language that Bakhtin and 
Benjamin suggest might be forms that do not violate the integrity of experience: 
double-voiced discourse, the polyphony of the novel, translation, montage and, 
perhaps paradoxically, silence.
Chapter 4, ‘Totalities’, is devoted to an examination of the place of 
theories of totality in Bakhtin’s and Benjamin’s aesthetic theory. In this chapter, I 
expand on the argument of the thesis as a whole that Bakhtin’s and Benjamin’s 
central concern is the question of the closedness or openness of form. Closed 
forms (epic and monologue, for example, in the case of Bakhtin; the traditional 
auratic work of art or the Romantic symbol, for example, in the case of Benjamin) 
provide a completion of experience which fixes experience within the flux of life. 
Nevertheless, both thinkers argue that closed forms such as these are intimately 
tied up in social and political hierarchies and result in an objectification of human 
beings and the world that they inhabit. Bakhtin and Benjamin develop theories of 
open forms that challenge closedness: dialogue and the novel, in the case of 
Bakhtin, and translation, allegory, and montage, in the case of Benjamin. These 
forms promote the preservation of (inter)subjectivity, the dismantling of 
authoritarian hierarchies and a responsible relationship between the conferring of 
form and the integrity of experience. This final chapter examines the negatively 
constructed images of totality contained in these theories. In the context of a 
discussion of the two thinkers’ theology and their politics, this chapter also deals 
with the temporal orientation of the thinkers’ work and the extent to which 
Bakhtin’s and Benjamin’s promotion of the openness of form might be 
provisional positions predicated on a future completion that will come on either 
the messianic-theological or the political-revolutionary plane.
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Selection of Material and Chronology
The oblique angle that this thesis adopts reveals but also conceals. There is much 
that I have been unable to cover. Among many absences, I have not been able to 
devote a great deal of space to Bakhtin’s and Benjamin’s theories of bodily 
experience. Benjamin’s concern throughout his work with the integrity of bodily 
experience is paralleled throughout Bakhtin’s work, from the interest in the 
wholeness of the body in ‘Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity’ through to the 
counter-tradition of the grotesque body in the Rabelais book. This topic represents 
a rich seam for future research.
Bakhtin’s and Benjamin’s intellectual careers display the development and 
revision of key themes and ideas. This thesis does not take a strictly 
chronological approach but it is in tune with Rochlitz’s comments on his own 
study:
Through the diversity of forms, themes, and conceptions that overlap 
or succeed one another in Benjamin’s corpus, the reading I propose 
here will trace a guiding thread. Only such a systematic approach will 
allow us to discover, behind this multi-faceted critic, the philosopher 
who remains faithful to a few guiding ideas. Such a search for unity 
will not be able to avoid resorting to a certain structured
7Rperiodization.
I have attempted to convey a sense of structured periodization in my treatment of 
the two thinkers. The key task in the case of both thinkers is the bringing together 
of the early works (‘On the Programme of the Coming Philosophy’, and ‘On 
Language as Such and on the Language of Man’, for example, in the case of 
Benjamin, and Toward a Philosophy o f the Act and ‘Author and Hero in Aesthetic 
Activity’, in the case of Bakhtin) with later works which, at first glance, represent 
direct refutations of these (‘The Work of Art in the Age of its Technological 
Reproducibility’, for example, in the case of Benjamin, and the essays on the 
novel, for example, in the case of Bakhtin). In the case of Bakhtin, I have resorted 
to a rather simple periodization that consists of an early stage (Toward a 
Philosophy o f the Act, ‘Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity’), a substantial
78 Rochlitz, The Disenchantment o f  Art, p. 3.
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middle stage ( the Dostoevsky book, the essays on the novel, the Rabelais book)
and a late stage (represented by the texts collected in Speech Genres). The
publication and translation history of the Dostoevsky book (and to a lesser extent
the Rabelais book) presents an additional challenge to periodization in this
study.79 Nevertheless, because I attempt to demonstrate a complex but coherent
structure that underlies Bakhtin’s thought in its entirety and that bears comparison
with the thought of Benjamin, and vice versa, a detailed reconstruction of the
complex development of Bakhtin’s and Benjamin’s thought would not serve my 
80purpose.
I do not pay a great deal of attention to Bakhtin’s work on Rabelais. As 
my comments on carnival in this introduction demonstrate, I have found the 
Rabelais book problematic; it has, perhaps, been the focus of so much critical 
study because of Bakhtin’s unusual discovery in reverse.81 Nevertheless, my 
treatment of Benjamin is also selective. I have not been able to devote much 
attention to important essays such as ‘The Critique of Violence’. Similarly the 
Arcades Project does not figure as greatly here as it perhaps does in the corpus of 
Benjamin’s work. Such absences are, in part, a result of the attempt to draw 
images of Bakhtin in the light of Benjamin and vice versa. They also demonstrate 
the limits of this study and the great potential for further study that these thinkers 
provide.
79 Difficulties lie in the fact the published English translation o f Bakhtin’s Dostoevsky book, 
Problems o f Dostoevsky’s Poetics, is based on the revised edition o f 1963 (Problemy poetiki 
Dostoevskogo) with passages from the original 1929 edition (Problemy tvorchestva Dostoevskogo) 
included in an appendix. As a result, I refer to the text as ‘the Dostoevsky book’. Emerson, the 
editor of the volume, explains this mode o f presentation and its curious rationale in a note in DP, 
p. 275. Tihanov carefully elucidates the divergences between the two versions in Tihanov, Master 
and Slave, pp. 207-15.
80 As indicated, Morson and Emerson’s Bakhtin analyzes in great detail the question of 
periodization in Bakhtin’s work. Coates’s book rigorously traces the development o f Bakhtin’s 
thought and provides an original rethinking o f the generally perceived view in Bakhtin 
scholarship. For Benjamin, reliable guides are Rochlitz, The Disenchantment o f  Art, and McCole, 
Benjamin.
81 Other critics demonstrate similar difficulties with the theory o f carnival. Morson and Emerson, 
for example, point out that the dressing up of carnival is a paradigmatic example o f an ‘alibi-in 
being’, a concept that is heavily condemned by Bakhtin in Toward a Philosophy o f the Act.
Morson and Emerson, Bakhtin, p. 95. By discovery in reverse I mean the fact that Bakhtin’s later 
work, such as the Rabelais text, was made known in the West well before his earlier work.
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Chapter 1: Habit and Tradition 
Habitiialization and Avant-garde Aesthetics: Formalism and Brecht
The avant-garde critical movement Russian Formalism wielded a formative 
influence on Bakhtin and his circle, just as the ideas and person of the German 
playwright, poet and drama theorist, Bertolt Brecht, played a crucial role in the 
formation of Benjamin’s ideas. Formalism and Brecht, moreover, provide a rare 
moment where the contemporary intellectual worlds of Bakhtin and Benjamin 
come into direct contact and the former has an influence on the latter. For it seems 
that Brecht, on his trip to Russia in 1935, drew directly on the Formalist concept 
of ostranenie in his formulation of the notion of Verfremdung} Both concepts 
refer to the action of making strange that which has become familiar and habitual 
to us, and both concepts compel a reworking of the notion of tradition. Bakhtin’s 
and Benjamin’s engagements with Formalism and Brecht, respectively, then, 
provide a fruitful starting point for this chapter and its themes of habit and 
tradition.
1. Bakhtin and Formalism
The relationship between the Bakhtin Circle’s thought and Russian Formalism is a 
matter of debate. Medvedev’s The Formal Method in Literary Scholarship (1928) 
is, at one level, a full-blooded attack on Formalism. Nevertheless, the Bakhtin 
Circle’s critique of Formalism has much in common with the object of its attack. 
At the centre of Formalism project lies the notion of a habitualized and stagnated 
form of everyday experience encapsulated in the Russian word ‘byt\ In his essay 
on Vladimir Mayakovsky, the Formalists’ ally, Jakobson explains the term as 
follows:
1 This is a frequent claim, made, for example, by Ewen. Frederick Ewen, Bertolt Brecht: His Life, 
his Art, his Times, New York, 1992, p. 224. Jameson is more circumspect: ‘Brecht offered many 
definitions o f this term [Verfremdung], which seems to have migrated from the “ostranenie” or 
“making-strange” o f the Russian Formalists via any number of visits to Berlin by Soviet 
modernists like Eisenstein or Tretiakov.’ Fredric Jameson, Brecht and Method, London, 1998, p. 
39.
2 M. M. Bakhtin/P. N. Medvedev, The Formal Method in Literary Scholarship: A Critical 
Introduction to Sociological Poetics, trans. by Albert J. Wehrle, London, 1985. Morson and 
Emerson chart with great subtlety Bakhtin’s complex dialogue with Formalism throughout Morson 
and Emerson, Bakhtin.
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Opposed to this creative urge [Mayakovsky’s poetic urge] toward a 
transformed future is the stabilizing force of an immutable present, 
covered over, as this present is, by a stagnating slime, which stifles 
life in its tight, hard mold. The Russian name for this element is byt?
Jakobson describes here an opposition between byt, life ossified by habit and
ritual, and the creative elan of the poet. It is this opposition between everyday life
and artistic activity that defined Formalism. Viktor Shklovsky, in his manifesto of
1914, ‘The Resurrection of the Word’, writes:
By now the old art has already died, but the new has not yet been 
bom. Things have died too: we have lost the sensation of the world.
We are like a violinist who has stopped feeling his bow and strings.
We have ceased to be artists in our quotidian life; we do not like our 
houses and clothes and easily part with a life that we do not perceive.
Only the creation of new forms of art can bring back to man his 
experience of the world, resurrect things and kill pessimism.4
Or, as he puts it later, in the essay, ‘Art as Device’ (1917): ‘Held accountable for 
nothing, life fades into nothingness [...]. Automatization eats away at things, at 
clothes, at furniture, at our wives, and at our fear of war.’ 5 Everyday life, its 
social and cultural forms, have, through habitualization, become inadequate to the 
subjects that live it. This represents a radical disjuncture between subjects and 
their social and physical environment. Shklovsky looks to art for a renewal of the 
relationship between cultural forms and life in order to bring a change to this 
situation.
Art is the means whereby human beings combat the stagnating effects of byt
by making the everyday strange:
And so, in order to return sensation to our limbs, in order to make us 
feel objects, to make a stone stony, man has been given the tool of art.
The purpose of art, then, is to lead us to a knowledge of things through 
the organ of sight instead of recognition. By ‘enstranging’6 objects
3 Roman Jakobson, ‘On a Generation that Squandered its Poets’ (1931), trans. by Edward J. 
Brown, in Brown (ed.), Major Soviet Writers: Essays in Criticism, Oxford, 1973, pp. 3-32 (11).
4Viktor Shklovsky, ‘The Resurrection of the Word’, trans. by Richard Sherwood, in Stephen Bann 
and John E. Bowlt (eds), Russian Formalism: A Collection o f Articles and Texts in Translation, 
New York, 1973, pp. 41-47 (46).
5 Viktor Shklovsky, ‘Art as Device’, trans. by Benjamin Sher, in The Theory o f Prose, Normal IL, 
1990, pp. 1-14(4).
6 Sher, in his recent translation, to replace the flawed one o f Lemon and Reis, makes a convincing 
case for rendering ostranenie as ‘enstrangement’ rather than the usual ‘defamiliarization’. I shall
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and complicating form, the device of art makes perception long and 
‘laborious.’ The perceptual process in art has a purpose all of its own 
and ought to be extended to the fullest. Art is a means o f experiencing 
the process o f creativity ?
This conception of the disrupting and renewing impact of artistic activity on
habitualized and automatized experience of life signifies a relation to the
European avant-garde movements and their declared rejection of the traditional
norms of bourgeois experience and art.8 It is, moreover, an emphasis that
Bakhtin, in large measure, shares. Brandist notes the closeness of Bakhtin to
Russian avant-gardists, and their shared view of ‘art as a vital activity, in contrast
to culture as the dead incrustations on creativity’.9 Bakhtin shares with the
Formalists an awareness of the competition of tendencies towards habitualization
and tendencies towards disruption. Tihanov comments:
Both [Bakhtin and the Formalists] conceive the work of art as a 
system and both deem the destinies of the genre to be shaped by the 
contest of contrasting metaphysical principles: either by the 
de/automatization of devices or by the de/centralization of languages 
and worldviews. [...].10
Thus, despite fundamental differences, Bakhtin, like the Formalists, sees art 
as a medium which is traversed by opposing forces, by habitualization and 
the breaking of habitualized attitudes.11
The Formalist notion of art as defamiliarization demands a reworked 
conception of artistic tradition. Formalism reconceives literary tradition in terms 
of the replacement of canonized genres by previously uncanonized genres, a
continue to use the more familiar ‘defamiliarization’. See Benjamin Sher, ‘Translator’s 
Introduction’, in Viktor Shklovsky, Theory o f Prose, Normal IL, 1990, pp. xv-xxi (xviii-xix).
7 Shklovsky, ‘Art as Device’, p. 6.
8 Thus, Breton claims that modem experience is in a cage from which Surrealism will liberate it. 
‘[L’experience] toume dans une cage d’ou il est de plus en plus difficile de la faire sortir.’ Andre 
Breton, ‘Manifeste du surrealisme’ (1924), in Manifestes du surrealisme, Paris, 1994, pp. 13-60 
(20).
9 Brandist, The Bakhtin Circle, p. 39.
10 Tihanov, Master and Slave, p. 143.
11 Brandist concludes that where Bakhtin ‘wished to integrate the worlds o f life and culture, the 
avant-gardists aimed to reintegrate art in life’. Brandist, The Bakhtin Circle, p. 39. Similarly, 
Tihanov writes: ‘Bakhtin, however, differs manifestly as regards the substance he fills this matrix 
with: instead of analysing stylistic devices, he concentrates on the struggle o f languages which, 
unlike the Formalists’ understanding o f language, are bound up with worldviews and attitudes.’ 
Tihanov, Master and Slave, p. 145.
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process in which literary inheritance passes ‘not from father to son but from uncle
1 “)to nephew’. This position, which Jameson describes as a notion of ‘artistic 
permanent revolution’, 13 constitutes an attack on the view of the stately progress 
of high cultural tradition, passed down by a cultural and social elite. According to 
the Formalist view, literary history, conceived of as the history of 
defamiliarization, is the story of the overturning of hierarchies. Culture preserves 
its vitality only in combat with that which is taken for granted. Despite the many 
points of divergence between Formalism and Bakhtin, here is an important point 
of connection, since this Formalist notion has affinities with the theme of the 
carnival overturning of social and cultural hierarchies that occupies Bakhtin from 
the beginning of his work on Dostoevsky and the novel through to the Rabelais 
book. 14 This idea that that which has become habit, that which is taken for 
granted and has become what Barthes will later term doxa, is in the favour of the 
culturally and socially dominant, is also an idea shared, for the most part, by 
Benjamin, as we shall see below.15 In this way, combat with habitualization gains 
political significance.
2. Beniamin and Brecht
When Benjamin met Brecht in 1929 it was the beginning of a friendship that 
Arendt described as ‘unique in that here the greatest living German poet met the
12 Viktor Shklovsky, ‘Literature without a Plot: Rozanov’, trans. by Benjamin Sher, in Theory o f  
Prose, pp. 189-209 (190).
13 Fredric Jameson, The Prison-House o f  Language: A Critical Account o f Structuralism and 
Russian Formalism, Princeton NJ, 1972, p. 90.
14 Gardiner makes a similar point: ‘for what else is carnival, one could argue, if not the 
recontextualization o f existing words and images, thereby “making strange” or “defamiliarizing” 
them? Camivalesque mesalliances reveal the arbitrariness of not only established linguistic or 
literary conventions, but also o f a whole range o f institutional arrangements and social roles.’ 
Gardiner, Dialogics o f Critique, p. 94.
15 The theme o f naturalization into doxa runs throughout Barthes’s work and makes him a thinker 
with whom both Bakhtin and Benjamin share much common ground. For the connection between 
Barthes and Bakhtin, see Andrea Lesic-Thomas, ‘Barthes, Bakhtin, Structuralism: a 
Reassessment’, unpublished PhD thesis, London, 2001. For the connection between Barthes and 
Benjamin, see Menninghaus, Benjamins Theorie der Sprachmagie, pp. 127-31. Menninghaus 
comments: ‘If one were looking for a motto for Benjamin’s entire enterprise in the philosophy of 
language and literary criticism, one would scarcely find anything more fitting than Barthes’s 
confession: “I have always been interested in what one might term the responsibility of forms”.’ p. 
128.
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most important critic of the time, a fact both were fully aware o f .16 It was also a 
friendship that was highly unlikely at first glance, one between Benjamin, the 
retiring, bookish, sensitive philosopher, and Brecht, the irreverent, rude proponent 
of crude thinking (plumpes Denkeri)}1 Nevertheless, it can be argued that Brecht 
provided a contemporary and politicized focus for Benjamin’s ideas. McCole 
notes: ‘it could be said that when [their] paths crossed Benjamin had just spent 
several years trying to invent him: in Brecht, he found a writer who seemed to 
step directly into the locus he himself had been working to define since 1925’.18
Brecht brought to Benjamin a force of creative destruction, an avant-gardist
disdain for tradition and convention and an antidote to Benjamin’s tendencies to
habit. Benjamin seems to have felt that Brecht’s aggression and quickness to
ridicule (he used to call Benjamin his Wiirstchen) prevented him from
succumbing to these tendencies. Brecht’s determination to resist habitualization
went to extraordinary lengths. In a diary entry from 1934, Benjamin quotes
Brecht’s remarks after a game of chess:
When Karl Korsch comes, we ought to work out a new game with 
him. A game in which the pieces do not always stay constant, in 
which the functions of each piece change after it has stood in the same 
place for a certain length of time. They would then become either 
stronger or weaker. At present, there is no development; things stay 
as they are for too long. (GS VI526; S W II785)
Brecht’s determined orientation towards the future acted as a counter-balance to 
Benjamin’s nostalgic bent. Benjamin, the collector, the cultural and literary 
historian, stood in self-professed need to be reminded of Brecht’s maxim: ‘Take
16 Hannah Arendt, ‘Introduction’, in Walter Benjamin, Illuminations, trans. by Harry Zohn, 
London, 1992, pp. 9-55 (20). A Russian parallel would be the productive encounter of 
Mayakovsky with the Formalists, referred to above.
17 This relationship of considerable psychological complexity has proved difficult for subsequent 
writers to classify, not least in their attempts to assess the relations of influence and dependency 
that existed between the two men and thinkers. Critics have often noted the sycophantic tone that 
Benjamin adopts in his summer diary o f his stay with Brecht in Sweden, recording Brecht’s words 
as if those o f a guru, the way in which, at times, in his writings on Brecht, Benjamin seems to 
adopt the position o f a privileged exegete o f semi-sacred texts, and finally Brecht’s disparaging 
attitude towards Benjamin’s writings. For attempts to analyse the Benjamin-Brecht relationship, 
see McCole, Walter Benjamin, pp. 195-206; Richard Wolin, Walter Benjamin: An Aesthetic o f  
Redemption, London, 1994, pp. 139-61; and Rolf Tiedemann, “‘Die Kunst, in anderer Leute Kopfe 
zu denken”: Brecht -  kommentiert von Benjamin’, in Walter Benjamin, Versuche iiber Brecht, 
Frankfurt/Main, 1978, pp. 173-208.
18 McCole, Benjamin, p. 196.
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your cue not from the good old things but from the bad new ones’ (GS VI539; SW  
77/340).
In Brecht’s theory of epic theatre Benjamin finds an aesthetic of 
interruption that destroys habitualized modes of behaviour and perception. He 
celebrates the development in epic theatre of what he terms the ‘quotable gesture’, 
the quoting of which rips an action out of its habitual context (GS II 535; SW IV  
305). In Brecht’s notion of Verfremdung Benjamin discerns a concept of 
representation that highlights difference rather than aiming at reproducing the 
identical, the utopia of Naturalism.19 The attractiveness for Benjamin of Brecht’s 
theory of theatre lies in its emphasis on disruption.
This is borne out too by the way epic theatre treats tradition. Brecht’s 
technique takes well-known historical events or well-known literary material, 
such as the life of Galileo or the plays of Marlowe and Shakespeare, and attempts 
to show the extent to which events might have turned out differently or might be
• • onviewed in a different light. In this approach to history it is clear that Benjamin 
finds a presentiment of his own view of history developed in ‘On the Concept of 
History’. The image of history that results both from Brecht and Benjamin is one 
in which history is not seen as the ordered, predictable, unity of tradition but 
rather as a fragmented, unpredictable site of disruption.
Benjamin declared himself a partisan of Brecht, his ideas and his literary 
work, publishing widely and frequently in their support.21 It follows that the
19 ‘The task o f the epic theatre, according to Brecht, is less the development o f actions as the 
representation of situations. “Representation” here does not mean “reproduction” as the 
theoreticians o f Naturalism understood it. Rather, the truly important thing is to discover the 
situations for the first time. (One could just as well say defamiliarize them [verfremden].) This 
discovery (or defamiliarization) o f situations is fostered through interruption o f the action’ (GS II 
535; SW IV 304).
20 Benjamin comments: ‘“It can happen this way, but it can also happen quite a different way” -  
that is the fundamental attitude o f one who writes for epic theatre’ (GS I I 525). Walter Benjamin, 
‘What is Epic Theatre [First Version]’, in Benjamin, Understanding Brecht, trans. by Anna 
Bostock, London, 1983, pp. 1-13 (8).
21 Typically, Brecht was much less supportive o f Benjamin. He does not seem to have read much 
of Benjamin’s work and what he did read he seems to have responded to with deliberate crassness: 
Brecht makes the following comments on ‘The Work o f Art in the Age o f its Technological 
Reproducibility’: ‘[Benjamin] proceeds from something he calls aura, which relates to dreams (to
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relationship between Benjamin and Brecht is different to that which exists 
between Bakhtin and Russian Formalism. Nevertheless, the figure and ideas of 
Brecht seem to function in a similar way for Benjamin’s thought as the traces of 
Formalism seem to function in Bakhtin’s thought: as a principle of radical 
dynamism that opposes tendencies towards habitualization. The link between 
Benjamin and Brecht, on the one hand, and Bakhtin and Russian Formalism, on 
the other, can be understood not merely at the level of historical fortuity and the 
possible path from ostranenie to Verfremdung but also at a conceptual level: the 
level on which exist the themes of habit and tradition.
Habit
1. Bakhtin and Habit
A habit is an activity that has been subjected to a process of formal ordering 
whereby it is made repeatable. In this chapter, I discuss habit in conjunction with 
a range of other cognate phenomena such as custom, rhythm, ritual, collecting, 
and tradition. In these phenomena -  which may operate at either the individual or 
the societal level -  the experience of the world receives form: it acquires, to a 
greater or lesser extent, the attributes of order and repeatability. A concrete 
example of this is the dirty habit of smoking.
The legend according to which Bakhtin smoked away the only manuscript 
of his work on the Bildungsroman has been countered by Hirschkop on the 
grounds that the work itself never existed in any more than the fragmentary form 
that we possess today. Hirschkop’s secondary argument, however, casts scorn
day-dreams). He says: if you feel a gaze directed at you, even behind your back, you return the 
gaze (!), the expectation that what one looks at looks at you in return, produces the aura. The latter 
has recently been in decline, along with the cultic. Benjamin has discovered this through an 
analysis o f film, where the aura disintegrates through the reproduction of the works o f art. All 
mysticism, under the guise o f anti-mysticism. This is the form in which the materialist conception 
of history is adapted! It is fairly dreadful.’ Quoted in Wolin, Benjamin, p. 141.
22 Ken Hirschkop starts his work of debunking Bakhtin legends in his ‘Bakhtin Myths, or Why we 
all need Alibis’, Bakhtin/“Bakhtin Studies in the Archive and Beyond, Special edition o f The 
South Atlantic Quarterly, 97, 1998, 3-4, pp. 579-98 and continues in his Bakhtin, where he refers 
to the myth o f the Bildungsroman text going up in smoke (p. 113). This enduring story about 
Bakhtin has even made its way into fiction in Paul Auster’s The New York Trilogy and from there 
to Wayne Wang’s film o f 1995, Smoke, the screen-play also by Paul Auster. See Paul Auster,
‘The Locked Room’, in The New York Trilogy, London, 1987, pp. 199-314 (254). There is even a
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on the notion that Bakhtin, ‘this most ascetic of scholars was [...] in equal measure 
casual as regards his texts and passionate about one of life’s more suspect 
pleasures’. Although he notes Bakhtin’s passion for smoking, Hirschkop’s 
labelling of smoking as nothing but a pleasurable vice underrates the seriousness 
of Bakhtin’s smoking.
Smoking, it is fair to assume, was for Bakhtin, as for most smokers, at least
as much a ritual as a pleasure in the usual sense. Clark and Holquist refer to the
importance of tea and cigarettes to Bakhtin with great frequency in their
biography. They write of the problems Bakhtin’s friends encountered in moving
the invalid Bakhtin and his wife from Saransk to Moscow:
On the one hand, the Bakhtins had always led a simple and ascetic 
life, but on the other, their habits were so fixed at this point that there 
was very little flexibility [...]. Bakhtin drank tea all day which [Elena] 
insisted on both making and serving herself. She would not agree to 
using an electrical kettle, so that whatever new accommodations were 
found would have to provide a stove on which she could boil water.24
Aspects of Bakhtin’s life were clearly ruled by habit that had become binding 
ritual in the midst of his outward asceticism.
It is curious that Clark and Holquist do not pause to comment on Bakhtin’s 
enslavement to habit. Instead -  as in the second, defining, sentence of their book 
-  they concentrate exclusively on Bakhtin’s ‘preoccupation with variety, 
nonrecurrence, and discorrespondence’.25 This emphasis is, to a large degree, 
correct. A revolt against habitualizing modes of thought and behaviour forms a
major theme in Bakhtin’s work that spans the different incarnations of his
26 .thought. Thus, Toward a Philosophy o f the Act stresses the unrepeatable act in
web-site devoted to the legend, ‘The Mikhail Bakhtin Manuscript Smoking Page’ at 
<http://www.phaxda.com/bakhtin/>. accessed 20 July 2004.
23 Hirschkop, Bakhtin, p. 113.
24 Clark and Holquist, Bakhtin, p. 336.
25 Clark and Holquist, Bakhtin, p. 1.
26 Morson and Emerson make a similar point in their comments on habit in Bakhtin: ‘Because of 
mental habits, intellectual traditions, and centripetal cultural forces, we often lose a sense o f the 
dialogic quality o f an event. The live medium becomes dead. [...] Bakhtin uses a variety o f terms 
for this deadening process. In his earliest writings, he calls it “transcription”; later, he speaks of 
“finalization” and “monologization”, depending on which kind of loss concerns him.’ Morson and 
Emerson, Bakhtin, p. 56.
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the face of the habitualized and repeatable transcription of theoreticism; 
Voloshinov’s work on language argues for the dynamic and unrepeatable nature 
of ‘theme’ against the static and habitualized nature of ‘meaning’; Bakhtin 
repeatedly contrasts the open-ended nature of the novel with the habitual nature of 
the epic, the end of which is always known in advance. This revolt against habit 
should not, however, be misinterpreted. Keeping an eye on Bakhtin the smoker 
and Bakhtin the tea-drinker as well as on Bakhtin the champion of the 
unrepeatable essence of human activity may serve to keep in focus an essential 
ambivalence of Bakhtin’s thought that is lost in accounts such as Clark and 
Holquist’s.
In a passage in his notes from 1970-71, Bakhtin writes:
The rift between real everyday life [byt] and symbolic ritual. How 
unnatural this rift is. Their false juxtaposition. They say: in those 
days everyone travelled in troikas with bells, that was real life [byt].
But the camivalistic overtone remains everyday in life, and in 
literature it can be the main tone. Pure everyday life is a fiction, and a 
product of the intellect [‘an invention of intellectuals’ in Hirschkop’s
9 7rendering ]. Human everyday life is always shaped, and this shaping 
is always ritualistic (even if only aesthetically so). (SG 154)
Ritual is a form of behaviour adopted by a society as a collective habit. Bakhtin 
indicates here the central place of ritual in the midst of life. Far from making a 
simple opposition between life and habit (here, cast as ritual), Bakhtin asserts their 
inseparability. Further, he argues that the notion of sheer life is itself a product of 
abstraction. It follows that the form-giving force of ritual is essential to the 
creative activity that is life.
Another way of approaching Bakhtin’s ambivalence towards habit is to 
examine his treatment of the concept of rhythm. The creation of rhythm is the 
drawing of the irregular and unpredictable activity of the world into regular and 
more predictable patterns. One need only think of, for example, the role that 
rhythm plays in the tradition of oral poetry, making verse memorable and habitual 
to both singers and listeners. In the extensive fragment written in the years 1920-
27 Hirschkop, Bakhtin, p. 265.
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24, ‘Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity’, Bakhtin develops a complex notion
of rhythm. Here, in so far as the author rhythmicizes the hero’s life, he rescues
that life from existential contingency:
In the interior being of another person, when I experience that being 
actively in the category of otherness, ‘is’ and ‘ought’ (being and 
obligation) are not severed and are not hostile to each other, but are 
organically interconnected and exist on one and the same axiological 
plane; the other grows organically in meaning. His self-activity is 
heroic for me and is graciously cherished by rhythm (for the whole of 
him may be in the past for me, and I can justifiably free him from the 
ought-to-be, which confronts only myself, within me myself, as a 
categorical imperative) [...]. Rhythm is an embrace and a kiss 
bestowed upon the axiologically consolidated or ‘bodied’ time of 
another’s mortal life. Where there is rhythm, there are two souls (or 
rather a soul and a spirit) -  two self-activities; one of these lives and 
experiences its own life and has become passive for the other, which 
actively shapes and sings the first. {AH 121)
Bakhtin is making grand claims for the gift of rhythm here which need 
elucidation.
By rhythmicizing the hero, the author bestows the gift of form on a life, 
setting it free from the demands of ethical activity. The reference here is to 
Kant’s moral theory. Kant, unlike Hume from whom the distinction between ‘is’ 
and ‘ought’ is derived, holds that in our use of reason we unite the spheres of is 
and ought through obedience to the categorical imperative. This is the permanent 
task (Aufgabe) of our existence from which we are never absolved. It is, 
nevertheless, a task that we perform in freedom, since we divine the demands of 
the categorical imperative by means of our faculty of reason which is the sign of 
our free will and, in obeying them, we obey ourselves. According to Bakhtin, 
however, the loving gift of rhythm absolves the hero of this task. It should, 
however, be clear that this gift comes at the price of his freedom, returning him to 
the heteronymous sphere of necessity. The kiss of rhythm sets us free from 
freedom:
28 Kant discusses the relationships between heteronomy and autonomy, natural necessity and moral 
freedom in the following words which may help us understand Bakhtin’s ideas: ‘Natural necessity 
was a heteronomy of efficient causes, since every effect was possible only in accordance with the 
law that something else determines the efficient cause to causality; what, then can freedom of the 
will be other than autonomy, that is, the will’s property o f being a law to itself? But the
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Free will and self-activity are incompatible with rhythm. A life (lived 
experience, striving, performed action, thought) that is lived and 
experienced in the categories of moral freedom and of self-activity 
cannot be rhythmicized. Freedom and self-activity create rhythm for 
an existence that is (ethically) unffee and passive. [...] To be sure, the 
unfreedom, the necessity of a life shaped by rhythm is not a cruel 
necessity... [...] rather, it is a necessity bestowed as a gift, bestowed by 
love: it is a beautiful necessity. A rhythmicized existence is 
‘purposive without purpose’. {AH 119)
This necessity, however, is not the sphere of natural necessity. Rather, 
rhythmicization raises the hero into the aesthetic sphere of ‘purposiveness without 
purpose’.29 Nevertheless, despite the fact that beauty has a symbolic and 
propaedeutic connection to morality, the beautiful does not lie within the scope of 
morality and hence is unffee.30 The rhythmicized life, then, acquires an 
ambivalent status as an other transfixed in beloved unfreedom.
In the later essay ‘Discourse in the Novel’, (1934-35), Bakhtin returns to
the theme of rhythm:
Rhythm, by creating an unmediated involvement between every 
aspect of the accentual system of the whole (via the most immediate 
rhythmic unities), destroys in embryo those social worlds of speech 
and of persons that are potentially embedded in the word: in any case, 
rhythm puts definite limits on them, does not let them unfold or 
materialize. (D I298)
Bakhtin has revised his conception of rhythm here. Stripped of the ambivalence 
of the earlier formulation, rhythm is death to the plurality of social worlds 
embedded in language: ‘it destroys them in embryo’. This deadening has the 
effect of reification, reducing these worlds with their manifold speaking subjects 
to an inert thing. One might understand this passage in terms of an image: the 
image of a bud or a seed. The bud is not able to unfold into the multiplicity of the 
living flower; the seed is unable to germinate into a growing plant. Rather it
proposition, the will is in all its actions a law to itself, indicates only the principle, to act on no 
other maxim than that which can also have as object itself as a universal law. This, however, is 
precisely the formula of the categorical imperative and is the principle o f morality; hence, a free 
will and a will under moral laws are one and the same. ’ Immanuel Kant, Groundwork o f the 
Metaphysics o f Morals (1785), ed. and trans. by Mary Gregor, Cambridge, 1998, pp. 52-53.
29 The reference is to Kant’s formulation in Immanuel Kant, The Critique o f the Power o f  
Judgement (1790), ed. by Paul Guyer, trans. by Eric Matthews, Cambridge, 2000, pp. 111-13.
30 On the connection between beauty and morality, see section 59, ‘On Beauty as a Symbol o f  
Morality’, in Kant, The Critique o f  the Power o f Judgement, pp. 225-28.
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remains a dead seed-head or, indeed, a stone, the same for all eternity in its 
unproductiveness. Here, then, the habit of rhythm is the mark of a total deadening 
of the world. Despite this latter image, the ambivalent relationship towards habit 
(that one can discern across the chronological span of Bakhtin’s work) might be 
what is expressed in the apparent contradiction between Bakhtin’s ritualistic 
smoking and tea-drinking and the revolt against habit in so much of his writings.
2. Beniamin and Habit
It is perhaps strange to associate Benjamin with habit. His was a life of continued
interruption, an itinerant life of in part chosen and in part enforced exile and
movement. Van Reijen and van Doom have vividly chronicled the moves
between hotel rooms and rented flats in Berlin, Frankfurt, Ibiza, Paris and
Moscow, and elsewhere, where Benjamin rarely remained for more than six
months at a time. Nevertheless, Benjamin’s obsessive nature and his
preoccupation with habit are to be seen in both his life and his work.32 Adomo
writes in an essay reminiscing about his friend:
[Benjamin’s] private demeanour at times approached the ritualistic. In 
the letters this ritual element extends to the graphic image, indeed 
even to the selection of writing paper; during the period of emigration 
his friend Alfred Cohn continued a longstanding practice of presenting 
him with a specific grade of paper. Benjamin’s ritual behaviour was 
most pronounced in his youth, and only towards the end of his life did 
it begin to relax.33
31 Willem van Reijen and Herman van Doom, Aufenthalte und Passagen: Leben und Werk Walter 
Benjamins, Frankfurt/Main, 2001.
32As one o f Benjamin’s aphorisms has it: ‘If the smoke from my cigarette and the ink from the nib 
of my pen flowed with equal ease, I should be in the Arcadia of writing’ (GS I V 112-13; SW I 
263). Benjamin was also punctiliously observant o f the rituals o f politeness. Lisa Fittko, a 
German refugee who accompanied Benjamin on the trek over the Pyrenees to Port-Bou, the site of 
his suicide, gives her account o f Benjamin’s last days: Gnadige Frau,” he said, “please accept
my apologies for this inconvenience.” The world was coming apart, I thought, but not Benjamin’s 
politesse.' Lisa Fittko, ‘The Story o f Old Benjamin’, in GS V, pp. 1184-94 (1185), in English in 
the original.
33 Theodor W. Adomo, ‘Benjamin the Letter Writer’, in Smith (ed.), On Walter Benjamin, pp. 
329-37 (330-31).
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Benjamin’s practice of and philosophical interest in collecting bears witness
to his tendency to act on the basis of habit.34 Collecting is a matter of obsession
and a ritualized form of habit, just like smoking and tea-drinking. Collecting
grew into a passion during his preparatory work for The Origin o f German Tragic
Drama as Benjamin bought from antiquarian book-sellers, often at ruinous cost,
the seventeenth-century allegory books that were to form the core material of that
work. The concern with collecting as a phenomenon to be studied runs
throughout Benjamin’s work from his interest in the Baroque preoccupation with
collecting symbols and allegories, through the passage on stamp-collecting in
One-Way Street, through the essays, ‘Eduard Fuchs, Collector and Historian’ and
‘On Unpacking my Library’, to the Arcades Project, the sprawling notes for a
work on nineteenth century Paris that Benjamin began in 1927 and never
completed. In the Arcades Project, the reader confronts a document that is at
once a disquisition on collecting -  the mania for collecting that is exhibited in the
nineteenth-century bourgeois interior and in the seductive piling of commodity
upon commodity in the Paris arcade -  and simultaneously a monument of
collecting itself: a store of quotations and sources, laboriously copied out by hand
into vast lists during long hours in the Bibliotheque Nationale. Similarly,
Jameson has discerned in Benjamin’s writings on modem art an underlying
emphasis on the habit and the ‘rhythm of recurrences’:
Thus even in Proust and Baudelaire, who lived in relatively 
fragmented societies, ritualistic devices, often unconscious, are 
primary elements in the construction of form: we recognise them in 
the ‘vie anterieure’ and the correspondences of Baudelaire, in the 
ceremonies of salon life in Proust. And where the modem writer tries 
to create a perpetual present -  as in Kafka -  the mystery inherent in 
the events seems to result not so much from their novelty as from the 
feeling that they have merely been forgotten, that they are in some 
sense ‘familiar,’ in the haunting sense which Baudelaire lent that 
word.35
The ability to synthesize habit in the midst of modem disorder and create the 
appearance of familiarity is a hallmark of Benjamin’s artistic heroes.
34 For a full treatment o f the theme of collecting in Benjamin’s writings, see Wolfgang Schliiter, 
Walter Benjamin: Der Sammler und das geschlossene Kastchen, Darmstadt, 1993.
35 Jameson, Marxism and Form, pp. 63-64.
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With Benjamin’s concern with ritual and habit, however, coexists an ever­
present emphasis on their other: shock and disruption. For habit deadens 
experience. In his ‘Berlin Chronicle’ (1932), Benjamin, reminiscing about his 
childhood experience of the city, writes: ‘Let no one think we were talking of a 
Markt-Halle. No: it was pronounced “Mark-Talle”, and just as these words were 
eroded by the habit of speech until none retained its original sense, so by the habit 
of this walk all the images it offered were worn away’ (GS VI475; SW I I 603). 
Benjamin champions childhood experience for its capacity to see everything as 
new, for its pre-habitual nature. He similarly champions Surrealism for its 
potential, through the ‘profane illumination’ of chance and unconscious energies, 
to disrupt the habitualized experience of modem life. It is the power of cinema to 
jolt the viewer into new ways of experiencing the world and to destroy, through 
shock, the aura that Benjamin celebrates in ‘The Work of Art in the Age of its 
Technological Reproducibility’. 36 It is the power of montage to bring deadened 
objects into new and revitalized constellations.
Benjamin’s attitude to habit, like Bakhtin’s, contains a high degree of 
ambivalence. Caygill notes that, in ‘On the Programme of the Coming 
Philosophy’, Benjamin warns of the conflation of the notions of freedom and 
experience:
This confusion [of freedom and experience] can occur in two ways, 
both of which threaten to qualify the concept of freedom to the point 
of abolishing it. The first reduces freedom to empirical experience by 
stripping it of any transcendental qualities while the second removes 
freedom from experience by making it purely ideal and far removed 
from the spatio-temporal world. [...] Benjamin’s adumbrated 
speculative concept of freedom/experience discerns freedom in the 
rhythms and patterns as well as the warps and distortions of 
experience.37
I read this as arguing that, for Benjamin, the habit of rhythm and patterns and the 
disruption of life must be arranged in ways that preserve the continuum of 
freedom and experience. Neither habit (Caygill’s ‘rhythms and patterns’) nor its 
opposite (the ‘warps and distortions of experience’) is sufficient alone. As far as
36 Henceforth, referred to in the text as ‘The Work o f Art’. See my comments below on the 
versions o f this text and their dates.
37 Caygill, Benjamin, p. 26.
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collecting is concerned, it is worth noting that the figures of the collector and the 
destructive character in Benjamin’s writings stand in antinomical relation to each 
other. In ‘The Destructive Character’ (cl931), Benjamin notes that the collector 
finds solace in the apparent order that habit discovers in the midst of disorder: ‘for 
what else is this collection but a disorder to which habit has accommodated itself 
to such an extent that it can appear as order?’ (GS IV 388; S W II486-87). The 
destructive character, however, represents the antithesis of habituation and exists 
in an environment that is the opposite of the collector’s book-lined interior: ‘The 
destructive character knows only one watchword: make room. And only one 
activity: clearing away. His need for fresh air and open space is stronger than any 
hatred’ {GS IV  396; S W II541). Thus habit and destruction, the collector and the 
destructive character, are dialectically dependent on each other.
Bakhtin’s and Benjamin’s conceptions of habit are ambivalent. Yet only an 
awareness of these forms of ambivalence can accomplish what proves otherwise 
to be a difficult task: the reconciliation of two seemingly incompatible models in 
the thought of both thinkers. In the case of Bakhtin, these are the championing of 
consummation in the early texts and the championing of dialogic dynamism in 
later texts. In the case of Benjamin, these are the celebration of auratic, traditional 
experience in texts such as ‘The Storyteller’ and the celebration of the destruction 
of the aura in ‘The Work of Art’.
The major difference between Bakhtin’s and Benjamin’s approach to 
habitualization lies in the differing development of their thinking. In the case of 
Benjamin, it is possible to discern positive and negative evaluations of different 
forms of habit simultaneously throughout his career. Most strikingly, ‘The 
Storyteller’ (published October 1936) and the second version of ‘The Work of 
Art’ (written December 1935-February 1936), which seem to present diverse
“J O
evaluations of habit, are composed more or less simultaneously. In the case of
38 The first version of ‘The Work o f Art’ was published in the journal o f the Institute for Social 
Research in 1936. At Horkheimer’s instigation from the Institute’s headquarters in New York, 
Benjamin’s text was significantly altered by the toning-down of its overtly Marxist terminology. 
The second version o f ‘The Work o f Art’ represents the version in which Benjamin intended to 
see the essay published. The third version, widely known because o f its inclusion in collections of
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Bakhtin, one finds a shift from a qualifiedly positive evaluation of certain forms 
of habit or rhythm in the early texts to a far greater emphasis on the breaking of 
habitualization in the later work, and finally a guarded rehabilitation of habit in 
the late notes. This assessment is, however, merely a general assessment of the 
shape of Bakhtin’s thought. It is clear that the early concern with the power of 
habitual form to provide a refuge from existential flux leaves its trace in the later 
writing. These traces are visible, above all, in Bakhtin’s seemingly paradoxical 
contention that the novel, whilst being the antithesis of all other genres, an anti­
genre, is nevertheless a genre, that is to say a form-giving gesture, rather than a 
principle of formlessness.39 Bakhtin’s and Benjamin’s ambivalent attitudes to 
habit express their quest for ways in which human experience and cultural forms 
can be brought together in relations that are appropriate to each other. This quest 
may entail the use of flexible tactics.
One way to understand Bakhtin’s and Benjamin’s thinking on the relation
between habit and disruption is to understand their positions as historically
situated in a specific modernity, and hence provisional and tactical. Hirschkop
thinks along these lines in his discussion of the question of relativism in Bakhtin.
Arguing that to see in Bakhtin’s theory of novelizing discourse the essence of all
language leads to a conception of Bakhtin as a proponent of pure relativism,
Hirschkop contends that:
What [such a view] misses is the political meaning of a historicizing 
and relativizing discourse when it opposes a discourse that presents 
itself as timeless, natural, and self-evident; dialogism, in its novelistic 
form, is itself defined by its opposition to monologism. Bertolt 
Brecht’s strategy was roughly similar: to dismantle a naturalizing 
ideology, one opposed it with a discourse which historicized life, 
revealing it as something produced and therefore changeable.40
Benjamin’s essays after his death, was composed in either in the spring o f 1936 or April 1939. It 
reflects Adorno’s criticisms and comments. My references are to this third version.
39 Bakhtin comments: ‘The novel, after all, has no canon o f its own. It is, by its very nature, not 
canonic. It is plasticity itself (D I 39). Todorov notes that Bakhtin’s description of the novel 
amounts, in this sense, to a ‘contradiction of the very notion o f genre’. He also points out 
Bakhtin’s debt in this conception of the novel as the modem anti-genre to the early German 
Romantics and to Friedrich Schlegel in particular. Tsvetan Todorov, Mikhail Bakhtin: The 
Dialogical Principle, trans. by Wlad Godzich, Minneapolis MN, 1984, p. 86. Tihanov makes the 
similar comment that the novel’s ‘generic identity is paradoxically couched in terms o f non­
identity and constant modification’. Tihanov, Master and Slave, p. 145.
40 Ken Hirschkop, ‘A Response to the Forum on Mikhail Bakhtin’, p. 76.
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This passage usefully reveals Bakhtin’s affinities with Brecht, Benjamin’s 
political and intellectual ally, and, thus, by association, accords with my 
arguments for affinities between Bakhtin and Benjamin. It also points out, 
however, that Bakhtin’s celebration of the disruption of the novel is the result of 
the nature of that disruption’s historically located target. This corresponds to 
Buck-Morss’s suggestion that Benjamin evaluates the loss of the aura in different 
ways according to what it affects: positively in regard of the work of art; 
negatively in regard of people. Buck-Morss thus implies that Benjamin’s 
evaluation of this phenomenon is not absolute but tactical and provisional.41 If 
this understanding of Bakhtin and Benjamin as tactical and flexible thinkers is 
correct, or at least admissible, it follows that an examination of the different 
targets is needed, hence my next section which deals with the variety of forms of 
habit.
3. Different Forms of Habit: Tradition and Modernity
It is possible to distinguish two different forms of habitualized and habitualizing 
behaviour that coexist and contend with each other in modem society. The first, 
one might term the tyranny of custom and authority. This applies to received, 
hierarchically valorized cultural forms that naturalize certain ways of viewing the 
world. In the face of these static and closed practices, Bakhtin and Benjamin seek 
out resources of resistance: what one can describe as dynamic openness, in the 
case of Bakhtin, and shock, in the case of Benjamin. In Bakhtin, the tyrannical 
force of custom is represented by the suffocation of dialogue in traditional genres 
or courtly culture. In Benjamin, it is to be seen in the authority of aura, for 
example, or the Schein of the symbol in the book on Trauerspiel.42
The second form of habitualization is brought into being by the abstracting 
and rationalizing modes of thought and behaviour associated with modernity and 
with the mode of calculation engendered by a capitalist society geared towards
41 Susan Buck-Morss, The Origin o f Negative Dialectics, New York, 1977, pp. 160-61.
421 discuss this in detail in the final chapter.
60
exchange-value. This universalizing approach to the world abstracts from the 
particular its particularity, thereby erasing the differentiated nature of experience 
and reducing experience to an endlessly repeated series of repeatable phenomena. 
In both the early Bakhtin and the early Benjamin, this form of habitualization is 
often associated with Kantianism. It is at the heart of Voloshinov’s critique of 
Saussure. In the later Benjamin it is associated with the ‘eternally the same’ {das 
Immer-gleiche) of commodity production; in the later Bakhtin, with modem 
monologism.
Bakhtin’s awareness of these two possible sources of habit reveals a
profound ambivalence towards modernity. The novel draws its essential
dynamism and open-endedness from its relation to modernity. In ‘Epic and
Novel’ (1941), Bakhtin speaks of the novel as ‘the vanguard of change’ {DI33),
whose modernity is ‘indestructible, and verges on an unjust evaluation of the
times’ and which develops its full potential only in the modem world {DI 31).
Nevertheless, in the Dostoevsky book he notes that this openness and dynamism
is threatened by two sources of habitualization: on the one hand, the source of
habit that is tradition, and on the other hand, by tendencies towards habitualization
that are inherent in modernity itself:43
The consolidation of monologism and its permeation into all spheres 
and ideological life was promoted in modem times by European 
rationalism, with its cult of a unified and exclusive reason and 
especially by the Enlightenment, during which the basic generic forms 
of European artistic prose took shape. [...] Semantic unity of any sort 
is everywhere represented by a single consciousness and a single point 
of view. This faith in the self-sufficiency of a single consciousness in 
all spheres of ideological life is not a theory created by some specific 
thinker; no, it is a profound structural characteristic of the creative 
ideological activity of modem times, determining all its external and 
internal forms. {DP 82)
The novel must combat both the habit that it inherits from the epic and also 
specifically modem habits (some that the novel may acquire in its combat with
43 Tihanov notes the problem in Bakhtin’s analysis o f the historical place of Dostoevsky that arises 
from Bakhtin’s identification o f both monologism and dialogism as expressions o f modernity: 
‘Rather than appear as the product o f specific capitalist developments affecting the fate o f a 
particular class in Russia, Dostoevsky’s oeuvre now has to be interpreted as the rejection of an all- 
pervasive and vague cultural pattern.’ Tihanov, Master and Slave, p. 194.
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tradition, for the novel ‘is ever questing, ever examining itself and subjecting its 
established forms to review’ (DI 39)) that represent a permanent threat of re- 
monologization. For, if monologism of this sort has come to be a ‘structural 
characteristic’ of modem ways of thinking, then it has only come to dominate by 
processes of habitualization. Bakhtin makes this connection clear at the end of the 
Dostoevsky book: ‘We must renounce our monologic habits so that we might 
come to feel at home in the new artistic sphere which Dostoevsky discovered, so 
that we might orient ourselves in that incomparably more complex artistic model 
o f the world which he created’ (DP 272). And yet, Bakhtin’s ambivalence 
towards habit persists in so far as the demand that we should come to ‘feel at 
home’ (osvoit sia) 44 suggests new and more benign forms of familiarity and 
habitualization.
Benjamin’s attitude to habit is also an indicator of his ambivalent attitude to
modernity. By way of example we may take Benjamin’s treatment of the concept
of ritual. Rituals are, as I have already argued, patterns of behaviour that have
become established over long periods of time until they have become part of
habit. In ‘On Some Motifs in Baudelaire’ (1939), Benjamin describes the
traditional amalgam of experience that is preserved by ritual:
Where there is experience [Erfahrung] in the strict sense of the word, 
certain contents of the individual past combine in the memory with 
material from the collective past. Rituals with their ceremonies, their 
festivals [...] kept producing the amalgamation of these two elements 
of memory over and over again. They triggered recollection at certain 
times and remained handles of memory for a lifetime. (GS 7611; SW  
7F316)
Furthermore, as the continuation of the quotation implies, ritual forms part of the
world of the storyteller and hence is explicitly linked to the mode of production
which is craftsmanship:
A story does not aim to convey an event per se, which is the purpose 
of information; rather it embeds the event in the life of the storyteller 
in order to pass it on as experience [.Erfahrung] to those listening. It 
thus bears the trace of the storyteller, much as the earthen vessel bears 
the trace of the potter’s hand. (G SI611; SW IV 316)
“^ Russian reference to M. M. Bakhtin, Problemy Poetiki Dostoevskogo, Moscow, 1972, p. 465.
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Here, in the traditional and transmissible world of the storyteller, the cycles of 
ritual and the rhythm of traditional forms of production, such as the repetitive 
coiling of a pot by hand or the turning of the potter’s wheel, embed the human 
being into an organic social and physical world. The whole of the person is 
preserved in all her or his actions. His historical being, his life, is preserved in 
transmission of the social material that is the story. His physical being, his body, 
is preserved in the marks that his hands leave in the clay. The story he tells is the 
same as the story he has heard but also slightly different because of the timbre of 
his voice and his individual turns of phrase. The repetition of manual production 
results not in identity but in difference as each earthen vessel will bear slightly 
different marks, making each pot an authentic and original expression of the 
whole being of its maker.
In contrast to this image, later in the essay, Benjamin describes the
experience of the worker in the modem factory:
In working with machines, workers learn to co-ordinate ‘their own 
movements with the uniformly constant movements of an automaton’.
[...] ‘All machine work,’ says Marx in the same passage cited above, 
‘requires prior drilling [.Dresseur] of the worker.’ This drilling must 
be differentiated from practice [Ubung]. [...] The unskilled worker is 
the one most deeply degraded by machine drilling. His work has been 
sealed off from experience; practice counts for nothing in the factory.
(GS 1 631-32; SW IV  328-29, translation modified)
This is habit of a different form. The regular whirring of the machine is not a 
human rhythm. Dresseur (a term normally used for animals and soldiers) implies 
that the worker is the passive object of an activity, not its subject as would be the 
case in Ubung. The worker’s physical experience of his work is also different. 
Rather than leaving his physical traces on the material world, the material world 
leaves its traces on him as he is transformed into part of the machine itself.45 His
45 This image makes one think o f the opening scenes o f Fritz Lang’s 1927 film, Metropolis, in 
which a group of workers stands in front o f an enormous machine, pulling levers. As the machine 
speeds up, the workers are forced to jerk their limbs faster and faster. Eventually, an accident 
occurs and many of the workers are killed. From the point o f view o f the hero o f the film who 
witnesses the events, the machine is transformed into the face of a giant monster, which the hero 
identifies with the Semitic god, Moloch, and which devours the workers in the fiery furnace which 
it has in place o f a mouth. I can find no evidence that Benjamin saw this film. Nevertheless, I am 
certain that Benjamin would have agreed with Lang’s association o f the capitalist mode of 
production and technology with archaic, cultic violence. More obviously, Benjamin draws here on
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social being is also annihilated in so far as experience that can be narrated is 
absent. The repetition of mechanical reproduction produces total identity, which 
relates nothing and tells no stories. Benjamin, then, outlines here two different 
forms of habit: a traditional form of ritualistic and rhythmic habit in which the 
tull subject-nature of the human being is integrated and preserved, and a modem 
technological form of habit in which the subject is alienated and reduced to an 
object. Put simply: traditional habit is a phenomenon which we shape as well as 
receive, and in which we express our full being; modem habit is something that 
we fall slave to. This is what Benjamin means when he writes of the bourgeois 
interior: ‘the interieur forces the inhabitant to adopt the greatest number of habits 
-  habits that do more justice to the interior he is living in than to himself (GS II 
217; SJT//734).46
The position that I have just described, however, represents only one part
of Benjamin’s attitude to modernity. Elsewhere, as in ‘The Work of Art’,
Benjamin thinks in a different vein:
As we know, the earliest artworks originated in the service of rituals -  
first magical, then religious. And it is significant that artwork’s 
auratic mode of existence is never entirely severed from its ritual 
function. In other words: the unique value of the ‘authentic’ work of 
art has its basis in ritual, the source of its original use value. This 
ritualistic basis, however mediated it may be, is still recognizable as 
secularized ritual even in the most profane forms of the cult of beauty.
[...] for the first time in world history, technological reproducibility 
emancipates the work of art from its parasitic subservience to ritual.
[...] But as soon as the criterion of authenticity ceases to be applied to 
artistic production, the whole social function of art is revolutionized. 
Instead of being founded on ritual, it is based on a different practice: 
politics. (GS I I 211; SW IV  256-57)
Lukacsian themes o f reification and its impact on consciousness. See Georg Lukacs, ‘Reification 
and the Consciousness of the Proletariat’, trans. by Rodney Livingston, in History and Class 
Consciousness (1923), London, 1971, pp. 83-222. Benjamin brings to Lukacs’s ideas, however, 
an extra insight into the impact o f commodity production on physical experience. Leslie gives a 
detailed analysis o f Benjamin’s use o f Lukacs’s concept o f reification and Marx’s concept of 
commodity fetishism (the source on which Lukacs draws) in Leslie, Benjamin, especially pp. 8-10 
and 105-16. She also notes Benjamin’s treatment o f the effect of reification on the body: ‘The 
body annihilated, petrified, subjected to attack, deformed by war weaponry, the body as alien, the 
skin of the self hardening, inorganic matter. A thing: such images litter Benjamin’s work. This 
person under onslaught is a person subject to commodification.’ p. 9.
46 In this essay, ‘Experience and Poverty’, Benjamin opposes the cluttered bourgeois interior, 
stuffed full o f collected objects, to the Modernist, glass building o f Loos and Le Corbusier that is 
more exterior than interior and whose functional minimalism is hostile to the collecting o f objects.
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In this essay Benjamin argues that ritual, in its original cultic forms as well as in 
its secularized courtly, exhibition and aesthetic forms, is a source of authority. 
Auratic works of art are embedded in rituals that operate within strict social 
hierarchies. So, magic rituals are dependent on the power of the magician; 
religious, on the hierarchy of the priesthood; courtly, on the institution of the 
Crown; exhibition, on the critic; aesthetic, on the poet. In this ritualistic 
hierarchy, the work of art wields power over its perceivers. This power is gained 
from the distance, historical, spatial and hierarchical, that separates it from its 
perceivers.47 The distance of ritual ensures that the work of art and the hierarchy 
within which it is embedded are perceived as untouchable and unchangeable 48 
The result is a perfect tradition of repetition that is authoritarian 49
In Benjamin’s historical schema, this process of seamless, authoritarian
tradition is disrupted by the development of techniques of reproduction, or rather,
more correctly, by the orientation of art towards its reproducibility:
It might be stated as a general formula that the technology of 
reproduction detaches the reproduced object from the domain of 
tradition. By replicating the work many times over, it substitutes a 
mass existence for a unique existence. And in permitting the
47 Stoessel comments on Benjamin’s formulation that the aura is ‘die einmalige Erscheinung einer 
Feme so nah sie sein mag’ (the unique appearance o f a distance no matter how close it may be), 
noting that the word einmalig contains a number o f senses: ‘Einmalig has a double meaning: the 
appearance of aura does not last, and it is unrepeatable [...]. It is independent of the conscious will 
of the subject. What appears may well appear again, but it cannot be captured by the subject or be 
consciously conjured up again’. Marleen Stoessel, Aura: Das vergessene Menschliche: Zu 
Sprache und Erfahrung bei Walter Benjamin, Munich, 1983, p. 47, quoted in Charles W. 
Haxthausen, ‘Reproduction/Repetition: Walter Benjamin/Carl Einstein, in October, 107, Winter 
2004, pp. 47-74 (54). This is another way in which the aura exerts power over the perceiver.
48 Mieszkowski’s comments are useful in elucidating the point that Benjamin is making, but does 
not elaborate in great detail, about social and political hierarchies o f perception: ‘Benjamin 
attempts to explain the aura in terms o f an artwork’s “authenticity, ” the here and now o f the work, 
its singular existence. The viewer o f the artwork does not, however, bask in the unmediated 
revelation o f its presence. Rather Benjamin describes an encounter with the authority that the 
work’s presence acquires from its position in the highly ritualized network that organizes models 
of tradition and cultural heritage. [...] In these terms, the experience o f the authenticity o f the work 
of art is as much a factor o f how the presence o f the work is framed or situated as it is an 
immediate experience o f that presence; it is in essence a social experience, and for this reason is 
always open to a political cooption over which the individual viewer may have little control.’ Jan 
Mieszkowski, ‘Art forms’, in David S. Ferris, The Cambridge Companion to Walter Benjamin, 
Cambridge, 2004, pp. 35-53 (39-40).
49 Whilst Benjamin notes that tradition may be ‘itself thoroughly alive and extremely changeable’ 
(GS 1 480; SW IV  256), in auratic transmission, the ‘authenticity o f a thing’ and its ‘historical 
testimony’ remain untouched (GS I A l l ; SW IV  254).
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reproduction to reach the recipient in his own situation, it reactivates 
the object reproduced. These two processes lead to a tremendous 
shattering of tradition which is the obverse of the present crisis and 
renewal of humanity. Both processes are intimately linked to the mass 
movements of our day. (GS/477-78; SW IV 254)
According to Benjamin’s argument, it is exactly those mechanical processes of 
production that he is so critical of in ‘On Some Motifs in Baudelaire’ and ‘The 
Storyteller’ that destroy the authoritarian power of tradition. Furthermore, the 
exact repetition of sameness that takes place in modem techniques of reproduction 
such as the rotary-press results in the production of difference: replacing a unique 
existence with a plurality of exact reproductions produces a plurality of possible 
appropriations by a multitude of receivers. The distance of tradition is broken 
down by the reproduction which travels across temporal, spatial and hierarchical 
boundaries to meet the perceiver in her or his specific location. In this process, 
the authoritarian frameworks of tradition are exploded. The perceiver ceases to be 
the passive recipient of a closed and unquestionable tradition, but, rather, becomes 
the active appropriator and reactivator of culture. This is the transformation of the 
ritualistic basis of art into a new form of democratic politics, for here is the link 
with the ‘mass movements of our day’ of which Benjamin speaks. Here, then, is 
the ambivalence of modernity: modernity’s new, authoritarian habits of 
commodity production, those that result in the ‘present crisis of humanity’ and 
whose negative effects we have seen in the essay on Baudelaire, are at the same 
time the liberating forces that enable a new and freer relationship to a once 
authoritarian tradition that, in the process of the establishment of this relationship, 
is both shattered and renewed.
Strangely, however, this revolutionary shattering of the habits of tradition is 
dependent on the creation of new forms of habit. This statement needs some 
explanation. Among the habit-breaking effects that Benjamin attributes to the 
impact of film, the phenomenon at the core of ‘The Work of Art’, is the cinematic 
opening up of what Benjamin terms the ‘optical unconscious’. The montage 
technique of film with its new perspectives and its ability to slow down and 
dissect reality reveals to us new, hidden details of what had previously been
66
familiar to us.50 What was previously unconsciously habitualized becomes
conscious. As Taussig puts it, through the opening of the optical unconscious ‘we
become aware of patterns and necessities that had previously ruled our lives’.51
Later in the essay, however, Benjamin, having ascribed such revolutionary power
to the optical and habit-breaking possibilities of film, appears to contradict
himself. Commenting on the fact that in our perception of architecture it is the
tactile and unconcentrated activity of habit that is equally important in our
reception of a building as optical reception, Benjamin states:
For the tasks which face the human apparatus of perception at 
historical turning points cannot be performed purely by optical means 
- that is, by way of contemplation. They are mastered gradually -  
taking their cue from tactile reception - through habit. Even the 
distracted person can form habits. What is more, the ability to master 
certain tasks in a state of distraction proves that their performance has 
become habitual. The sort of distraction that is provided by art 
represents a covert measure of the extent to which it has become 
possible to perform new tasks of apperception. (GS 1 505; SW IV  268)
This new form of habit which will be necessary for resolution of the ‘tasks which 
face the human apparatus of perception’ will bear a curious similarity to the old, 
integrated form of habit that I have described above in relation to the storyteller: 
its tactility links it to the bodily integrity of the figure of the storyteller. The same 
is true of distraction: Benjamin has argued earlier in the essay that the viewer of 
film, the mechanically reproducible medium par excellence, develops an attitude 
of distraction. The element of distraction is also present in the storyteller who
C l
distractedly tells his tale whilst working at the wheel or loom.
Far from being diametrically opposed, as some critics have claimed, it is 
now possible to see the common ground between Benjamin’s position in ‘The
50 This notion is closely related to the defamiliarization/ Verfremdungseffekt of the Formalists and 
Brecht.
51 Taussig, Mimesis and Alterity, p. 25.
52 The importance that Benjamin lends to distraction is evidence o f his debt to Brecht’s theory of 
epic theatre. Compare Benjamin’s ‘What is Epic Theatre’ with Bertolt Brecht, ‘Das modeme 
Theater ist das epische Theater’, in Schriften zum Theater, Frankfurt/Main, 1977, pp. 13-28.
53 Benjamin comments o f the world o f storytelling where those who listen are also those who 
retell: ‘the more self-forgetful the listener is, the more deeply is what he listens to impressed upon 
his memory’ (GS I I447; SW III 149).
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Storyteller’ and his position in ‘The Work of Art’.54 Orientation towards 
mechanical reproducibility shatters authoritarian tradition. Its new habits, 
however, revive certain features of integrated habit that modernity itself seemed to 
have destroyed.
Automatic and authoritarian habits have to be replaced by new habits in 
which the old quality of distraction reappears and ensures a critical stance. The 
opposite of distraction is cultic possession such as when a sacred song ‘possesses’ 
its singer, a notion that is analogous to Bakhtin’s idea of possession by rhythm in 
‘Discourse in the Novel’.55 Distraction (Zerstreuung) is a term that bears much of 
Benjamin’s ambivalence about habit. Distraction is a condition of habit 
formation. We have mastered a process when we can perform it ‘without thinking 
about it’. Distraction is also, however, what happens when habits are disturbed 
and interrupted by something new or something that momentarily appears 
unfamiliar.56 ‘Distracted habit’ is then the synthetical concept that conjoins 
Benjamin’s sense of positive, integrated habit and his sense of the needs for 
disruption and newness.
The creation of new habits, furthermore, is a vital and political task. Once
again Taussig’s comments are useful:
Habit offers a profound example of tactile knowing and is very much 
on Benjamin’s mind, because only at the depth of habit is radical 
change effected, where unconscious strata of culture are built into 
social routines as bodily disposition. The revolutionary task [...] could 
thus be considered as one in which ‘habit’ has to catch up with itself.
The automatic pilot that functions while asleep has to be awakened to 
its own automaticity, and thus go traveling in a new way with a new
54 So Wolin: ‘The exuberant acceptance o f the process whereby traditional aesthetic genres are 
sacrificed to the all-encompassing onslaught o f rationalization, characteristic o f “The Work of 
Art” essay, a process credited with opening up tremendous, heretofore untapped possibilities for 
the political employment o f art, is a sentiment totally absent from “The Storyteller”. In the Leskov 
essay, Benjamin has come round to a diametrically opposite assessment o f this trend.’ Wolin, 
Benjamin, p. 224.
55 Gilloch discusses this sense o f the term, ‘possession’, in Benjamin’s thought. See Gilloch, 
Benjamin, VP- 183-84.
56 Gilloch makes a similar point in Gilloch, Benjamin, pp. 190-91. Eiland also comments: ‘The 
opposition now would seem to be between mere distraction and, shall we say, productive 
distraction -  between distraction as a skewing of attention, or as an abandonment to diversion, and 
distraction as a spur to new ways o f perceiving.’ Howard Eiland, ‘Reception in Distraction’, in 
Andrew Benjamin (ed.), Benjamin and Art, pp. 3-13 (9).
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physiognomy -  bursting its ‘prison-world asunder by the dynamite of 
a tenth of a second.’57
As Taussig implies, the somaticity of habit means that this new form of critical
attitude will cany revolutionary intensity.58 Benjamin writes in his essay on
Surrealism (1929):
The collective is a body, too. And thephysis that is being organized 
for it in technology can, through its political and factual reality, only 
be produced in that image sphere to which profane illumination 
initiates us. Only when in technology body and image so 
interpenetrate that all revolutionary tension becomes bodily collective 
innervation, and all the bodily innervations of the collective become 
revolutionary discharge, has reality transcended itself to the extent 
demanded by the Communist Manifesto. (GS 7/310; SW 7/217-18)
For this to happen, habit must be deployed; there must be complex processes of 
destruction of the authoritarian habits of certain forms of tradition which also 
involve the renewal of other forms of integrated habits.59 ‘Distracted habit’ takes 
on political import.
In the position that reveals itself through a consideration of the sum of 
these essays, we can see that Benjamin’s thinking contains a similar structure to 
that of Bakhtin. Both thinkers have a similar view of the processes of repetition 
that inhere in life: repetition must produce difference not identity. We have seen 
above that Benjamin is against those forms of habit in which repetition results in 
the production of sameness and in favour of those forms of habit in which
57 Taussig, Mimesis and Alterity, p. 25.
58 In the context of a discussion o f Marx’s aesthetics, Eagleton provides a useful insight into what 
might be meant by this sort o f ‘body politics’: ‘Marx is most profoundly ‘aesthetic’ in his belief 
that the exercise of human senses, powers and capacities is an absolute end in itself, without need 
of utilitarian justification; but the unfolding o f this sensuous richness for its own sake can be 
achieved, paradoxically, only through the rigorously instrumental practice of overthrowing 
bourgeois social relations. Only when the bodily drives have been released from the despotism of 
abstract need, and the object has been similarly restored from functional abstraction to sensuously 
particular use-value, will it be possible to live aesthetically.’ Terry Eagleton, The Ideology o f the 
Aesthetic, London, 1990, p. 202. Benjamin’s point reverses the chain o f causes: bodily 
innervation is itself a necessary source o f revolutionary energy. Hitchcock uses Eagleton’s 
reading o f Marx’s aesthetic politics to argue for the political and materialist orientation of 
Bakhtin’s aesthetics in Peter Hitchcock, ‘The World according to Globalization and Bakhtin’, in 
Brandist and Tihanov (eds), Materializing Bakhtin, pp. 3-19 (10-13). The point o f convergence 
between Bakhtin and Benjamin on this matter might be that both think that aesthetics and politics 
must fully integrate the body.
59 There is an echo here o f Erasmus’ comment in the Diliculum: ‘Clavus clavo pellitur, consuetudo 
consuetudine vincitur’ (one nail is driven out by another nail; habit is overcome by habit).
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repetition results in the production of difference. In Bakhtin’s conception of
language in the Dostoevsky book we find an analogous view:
‘Life is good.’ ‘Life is good.’ Here are two absolutely identical 
judgments, or in fact one singular judgement written (or pronounced) 
by us twice; but this ‘twice’ refers only to its verbal embodiment and 
not to the judgement itself. We can, to be sure, speak here of the 
logical relationship of identity between two judgments. But if this 
judgment is expressed in two utterances by two different subjects then 
dialogic relationships arise between them (agreement and affirmation).
(DP 183-84)
Bakhtin resists the abstracting and reductionist viewpoint that sees, in apparent 
regularities of experience, logical relationships of identity rather than plurality and 
difference. He seeks out the seed of difference within the context of repetition 
and apparent identity.60 For both Bakhtin and Benjamin, a habit that reduces the 
world to identity is to be rejected in favour of forms whose apparent regularity 
nevertheless produces difference. Difference-producing repetition may be seen, 
like Benjamin’s distracted habit, as another synthetical unity of habit and its 
opposite.
There are, however, major differences between the two thinkers. In the
essay ‘The Problem of the Text in Linguistics, Philology and the Human
Sciences’ (1959-61), Bakhtin addresses mechanical reproduction:
Natural uniqueness (for example a fingerprint) and the semantic 
(signifying) unrepeatability of the text. All that is possible for a 
fingerprint is mechanical reproduction (in any number of copies); it is 
possible, of course, to reproduce a text in the same mechanical way 
(i.e. reprinting), but the reproduction of the text by the subject (a
60 In the context of a discussion o f Benjamin’s theory o f mimesis, Leslie suggests a precedent for 
Benjamin’s theory of different sorts o f imitation: ‘In the Kritik der Urteilskraft Kant makes a 
distinction between two types o f imitation: “nachfolgen” and “nachahmen”. The first type of 
imitation is creative, the second merely reproductive.’ Leslie, Benjamin, p. 117. This concept may 
also be a precedent for Bakhtin’s and Benjamin’s ideas o f repetition. There are also echoes of 
Bakhtin and Benjamin in the later French tradition. In their attitude to repetition, Bakhtin and 
Benjamin reveal a proximity to both Jacques Lacan and Gilles Deleuze. As Weber comments of 
Lacan: ‘The processes studied by psychoanalysis almost always involve repetition, not however 
as a return of the same, in any simple sense, but rather as the recurrence of a difference separating 
that which is repeated from its repetition.’ Samuel Weber, Return to Freud: Jacques Lacan’s 
Dislocation o f Psychoanalysis, Cambridge, 1991, p. 5. Lacan understands his own ‘retour’ to 
Freud as a repetition that produces difference. Similarly, Deleuze consistently argues that 
difference and repetition are linked in their hostility to the notion o f identity. See Ronald Bogue, 
Deleuze and Guattari, London, 1989, pp. 45-80. One might argue that Bakhtin, Benjamin and 
Deleuze coincide in their resistance to the hegemony of identity.
70
return to it, a repeated reading, a new execution, a quotation) is a new 
unrepeatable event in the life of the text, a new link in the historical 
chain of speech communication. (SG 106)
Bakhtin’s more technical focus on the linguistic nature of the text means 
that he stops one step short of the conclusion drawn by Benjamin: that the 
process of mechanical reproduction can, in itself, create new subject 
positions which represent new executions and new unrepeatable events in 
the life of the artwork. Benjamin’s response seems to emanate more 
directly from experience of the effect of mechanical reproduction, Bakhtin’s 
more from linguistic theory. Despite this, essential similarities remain 
between the two thinkers: within modernity there are opposing forces: on 
the one hand, modernity contains the sources of practices that can liberate 
subjects from a passive slavery to habit; on the other hand, there are 
opposing tendencies that lead to new, and yet more authoritarian habits of 
passivity. And yet, finally there may well be a need to create new forms of 
habits and to feel at home in a new sort of world. Where the two thinkers 
seem to differ, however, is in Benjamin’s more dialectical insistence that it 
might be in the very debased nature of the modem world (here, commodity 
production) that one might find sources of resistance to authoritarian 
practices, whether of the traditional or modem variant. As Benjamin puts it 
in another context: ‘And it is at the scene of the limitless debasement of the 
word -  the newspaper, in short -  that its salvation is being prepared’ (GS II 
629; S W II742). In my final chapter, I argue that there is less of a gulf that 
separates Bakhtin and Benjamin on this point than might appear here.
Tradition and Authority
It should be clear from my discussion of Benjamin’s attitude to ritual and pre­
modem and modem habits that another way of talking about the set of themes 
raised under the heading of habit is to examine questions of tradition. After all, 
tradition might be defined as the historically transmitted habits of a collective. As 
we have seen, in Benjamin’s writings the opposition of habit and the breaking of 
habit can be mapped onto another (perhaps more fundamental) opposition of 
tradition and destruction: the tradition of the storyteller versus the destruction of
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tradition by mechanical reproduction, for example.61 The aspect of Benjamin’s 
thought that is concerned with tradition has received a fair degree of attention 
from critics. In Bakhtin scholarship, the theme of tradition does not seem to be 
common. Nevertheless, it is my contention that at the heart of both writers’ 
thought is a meditation on the relationships between tradition, transmissibility and 
authority.62
Benjamin’s conception of tradition is unusual in that he emphasizes the 
necessary reliance of tradition not on conservation but on destruction. McCole 
notes: ‘What [Benjamin] meant by “tradition” was less a particular canon of texts 
or values than the very coherence, communicability, and thus the transmissibility 
of experience.’63 Transmissibility demands that the recipient of tradition is able to 
integrate the objects of tradition into her or his experience. This is the difference 
between the tradition of the storyteller and the authoritarian tradition of the aura, 
described above. In the first case, as I have shown, tradition is integrated into the 
person of the recipient and continuator of tradition, changing in the process; in the 
second, the hierarchical distance does not allow the integration of the person and 
tradition becomes an authoritarian transmission of identity. This second form of 
tradition is what Duttmann describes when he states that ‘a tradition which would 
have already set its standards once for all time would be one which delivered itself 
to oblivion’.64 Such a form of tradition destroys the very essence of tradition 
which consists in transmissibility. In the face of this form of tradition, it follows
61 The extreme poles of Benjamin’s thought are to be found in the study of Goethe’s 
Wahlverwandtschaften (composed 1919-22) and in the essay, ‘Experience and Poverty’. In the 
former, Benjamin argues that the destruction o f tradition does not result in emancipation and a 
clearer vision o f the world, but rather in new forms o f blindness: ‘Where does their freedom lead 
those who act in such a manner [who break with tradition -  TB-M]? Far from opening new 
perspectives for them, it blinds them to the reality that inhabits their fears’ (GS 1 132; SW 1 303). 
In the latter, Benjamin asks us, in the words o f Brecht’s slogan, to ‘Erase the traces!’ as part o f a 
new Barbarism.
62 Arendt neatly expresses the relationship between tradition and authority: ‘Insofar as the past has 
been transmitted as tradition, it possesses authority; insofar as authority presents itself historically, 
it becomes tradition.’ Arendt, ‘Introduction’, p. 43.
63 McCole, Benjamin, p. 2.
64 Alexander Garcia Duttmann, ‘Tradition and Destruction: Walter Benjamin’s Politics of 
Language’, in Andrew Benjamin and Osborne (eds), Benjamin’s Philosophy, pp. 32-58 (45). 
Duttmann’s article discusses Benjamin’s conception o f destruction and tradition in relation to the 
essays ‘On Language as Such and on the Language o f Man’ and ‘The Work o f Art’ and with a 
particular focus on the fight against fascism. He also sets these themes into the context o f a 
discussion o f the ideas o f Jacques Derrida and Maurice Blanchot.
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that, in the name of tradition, tradition must be destroyed: hence the dialectic of 
destruction and tradition that runs through Benjamin’s work. Benjamin’s search is 
for a tradition that will not destroy experience; or, put in other terms: a search for 
cultural forms that do not destroy life.
Bakhtin’s view on tradition reveals some similar themes. Bakhtin deals
with tradition in his essays of the 1930s and 1940s on the nature of novel. In
‘Epic and Novel’, he writes:
Let us move on to tradition. The epic past, walled off from all 
subsequent times by an impenetrable boundary, is preserved and 
revealed only in the form of national tradition. [...] By its very nature 
the epic world of the absolute past is inaccessible to personal 
experience and does not permit an individual, personal point of view 
or evaluation. One cannot glimpse it, grope for it, touch it; one cannot 
look at it from just any point of view; it is impossible to experience it, 
analyze it, take it apart, penetrate into its core. It is given solely as 
tradition, sacred and sacrosanct, evaluated in the same way and 
demanding a pious attitude toward itself. (DI 16)
Immediately it is possible to see features of Bakhtin’s conception of tradition that 
are analogous to Benjamin’s view of the authoritarian tradition of the aura in the 
‘The Work of Art’. ‘Discourse in the Novel’ had already outlined a similar 
conception. Here, like aura, the tradition of epic is characterized by a distance 
that is established between the objects of tradition and its recipient. First, the 
distance is hierarchical insofar as it demands our piety. Moreover, this hierarchy 
is also social in nature since the authoritative word is ‘indissolubly fused with its 
authority -  with political power, an institution, a person’ (DI 343). Second, this 
hierarchical distance is temporal: the inaccessibility of the epic is the result of its 
belonging to the walled-off past of the ancestors and in this sense is equivalent to 
Benjamin’s aura, which is dependent on the unique historical testimony of the 
artwork. For Bakhtin, too, the authoritative tradition of the epic is reliant on 
cultic forms of ritual that elevate the work into a sacrosanct sphere, just as is the 
case in Benjamin’s analysis of auratic works. Furthermore, epic tradition, like the 
aura, denies a physical integration of the object: ‘one cannot grope for it, touch it’. 
Finally, it denies a plurality of individual perspectives, for, Bakhtin argues, the 
epic word ‘enters our verbal consciousness as a compact and indivisible mass; one
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must either totally affirm it, or totally reject it’ (D I343). The epic word thus 
reduces the individual to a passive recipient and reduces subjects to objects.65
Just as Benjamin contends that the increasing orientation towards 
mechanical reproducibility is an historical process of the destruction of the 
authoritarian hierarchies of aura, so Bakhtin argues that the historical 
development of form contains an antidote to the distance and self-sufficiency of 
epic forms: ‘In the history of literary language, there is a struggle constantly being 
waged to overcome the official line with its tendency to distance itself from the 
zone of contact, a struggle against various kinds and degrees of authority. In this 
process discourse gets drawn into the contact zone’ {DI 345). His champion in 
this struggle is the polyphonic novel and the various forms of language 
consciousness which give rise to it from their birth in the Menippean satire and 
the Hellenistic romance, through the carnival form of Rabelais, to their full 
development in the polyphony of Dostoevsky.
Central discrepancies appear between Bakhtin’s view of the historical 
struggle between the authoritative word of the epic and the forces of novelness 
and Benjamin’s materialist account of the relationship between modes of 
production and the organization of perception in relation to works of art.66 The 
first major discrepancy is to be seen in the two thinkers’ understanding of 
causality. Bakhtin’s understanding of the struggle between epic and novel, 
dialogism and monologism, is an agonistic and almost Manichaean encounter 
between two forces which, at times, seem to move through history in a decidedly
65 Hirschkop comments: ‘The problem with authority, so far as Bakhtin is concerned, is not that it 
shuts people up, presents the false as true, or imposes an otherwise neutral language on 
downtrodden subjects; the problem with authority or power is that it distorts the natural 
intersubjectivity o f language, giving us meaning without voices.’ Hirschkop, Bakhtin, p. 87.
66 Benjamin’s materialism is, nevertheless, far from convincing and certainly not very dialectical 
or orthodox Marxist. Criticisms o f this kind form an important part of Adorno’s approach to 
Benjamin’s writings on Baudelaire in the Adomo/Benjamin correspondence , 1936-38.. The key 
letters o f the exchange are collected in Bloch et a l Aesthetics and Politics, pp. 110-14. Nagele 
has made a careful analysis o f Benjamin’s materialism in relation to the Adomian negative 
dialectics of the Frankfurt School and Brechtian method, conducted largely through a biographical 
prism. Rainer Nagele, ‘Body Politics: Benjamin’s Dialectical Materialism between Brecht and the 
Frankfurt School’, in Ferris (ed.), Companion to Benjamin, pp. 152-76.
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idealist fashion.67 Benjamin, in contrast, puts his faith in the effects of 
developments in the mode of production and, more specifically, in technology.68 
As he had already written in 1927 in an article that formed part of a public 
controversy over Eisenstein’s The Battleship Potemkin, ‘the vital, fundamental 
advances in art are a matter neither of new content nor of new forms -  the 
technological revolution takes precedence over both’ (G S II753; S W II17). The 
second major discrepancy is between Benjamin’s orientation towards visual 
perception and Bakhtin’s towards language. This discrepancy is, perhaps, more 
serious than the first. Whereas in the first it is possible either to make explicit 
material and historical determinations which Bakhtin only implies, or to minimize 
the determinist appearance of Benjamin’s account, the distance between 
perception and language is harder to bridge. As a possible solution one might 
appeal to the fact that Bakhtin’s use of the term ‘language’ is itself close to the 
notion of an ideological ‘world-view’. Nevertheless, alongside these 
discrepancies, central similarities also appear in the ways in which the counter­
forces of the novel and mechanical reproduction affect tradition.
In a central passage of ‘Discourse in the Novel’, Bakhtin opposes the 
‘authoritative discourse’ of tradition to the ‘internally persuasive word’ which is 
characteristic of the novel. Authoritative discourse, as we have seen, is defined by 
its closedness within a hierarchical context of distance. The internally persuasive 
word, on the other hand, is defined by:
67 Speaking o f these two forces, Tihanov comments: ‘Bakhtin never attaches a clearly defined 
social group or class to either force, any more than he presents the concrete historical dynamics o f  
this conflict, and this makes for the metaphysical resonance o f his account.’ Tihanov, Master and 
Slave, p. 143.
68 Geulen has argued against an understanding o f ‘The Work o f Art’ as a piece that describes a 
materialistically and technologically determined process, reading it instead as a programmatic 
piece: ‘One ought to view the text less as a description than as the production of a crisis in art.
The essay on the work o f art is not a descriptive text, not an analysis o f the status quo. Rather its 
theses are themselves the result o f that which, in a purely thematic perspective, appears to be its 
program.’ Eva Geulen, ‘Under Construction: Walter Benjamin’s “The Work of Art in the Age of 
Mechanical Reproduction’” , in Richter (ed.), Benjamin’s Ghosts, pp. 121-41 (123). Hirschkop 
discerns a similar oscillation between description and prescription in Bakhtin’s theory o f dialogue, 
as I note later. Leslie has also argued strongly against what she terms a ‘techno-determinist’ 
reading o f Benjamin. Her arguments, based on the distinction that Benjamin makes in the second 
version o f the essay between a ‘first’ and ‘second’ Technik, are convincing. Nevertheless, the 
appearance o f material and technological determination, which undoubtedly exists in Benjamin, 
continues to set him apart from the appearance o f metaphysics in Bakhtin. See Leslie, Benjamin,
p p .161-62.
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semantic openness to us, its capacity for further creative life in the 
context of our ideological consciousness, its unfinishedness and the 
inexhaustibility of our further dialogic interaction with it. We have 
not learned from it all it might tell us; we can take it into new 
contexts, attach it to new material, put it in a new situation in order to 
wrest new answers from it, new insights into its meanings, and even 
wrest from it new words of its own. {DI 346)
The internally persuasive word, then, opens up the closedness of traditional 
language, just as the sensibility of mechanical reproducibility, a sensibility 
marked by a ‘sense of the universal equality of things’, wishes to ‘pry an object 
from its shell, to destroy its aura’ {GS1479; SW IV  255-56, translation modified). 
Like mechanical reproduction, the internally persuasive word draws the object 
into the ‘familiar zone of contact’; in this ‘zone of familiar contact’ and in the 
physical implication of the term ‘contact’, as opposed to in opposition to the 
untouchability of the authoritarian word, we see Bakhtin’s concern with the 
somatic aspect of the breaking of tradition, a concern that is analogous to 
Benjamin’s. This zone of contact is also the site of an opening up of the 
singularity of tradition into the democratic plurality of new meanings. Bakhtin’s 
new contexts, new answers and new insights in the quotation above are the 
counterpart to the effect of Benjamin’s mechanical reproduction which 
‘substitutes a mass existence for a unique existence’ and which permits the object 
of tradition to ‘reach the recipient in his own situation’, hence reactivating the 
object. Finally, just as I have argued that, for Benjamin, mechanical reproduction 
reactivates the subject nature of the perceiver, so, for Bakhtin, the internally 
persuasive word does not treat its recipient as an object but rather as a co-equal 
subject with the capacity to answer back. It is ‘half ours and half someone else’s’ 
(DI 345). The internally persuasive word of the novel allows its recipient to enter 
into dialogue with it as an equally affirmed subject.
For Bakhtin, as we have seen, the constitutive feature of authoritative 
discourse is its historical distance; for Benjamin, the aura is reliant on its historical 
testimony. Both mechanical reproduction and the internally persuasive word of 
the novel bring the object of tradition into the zone of comtemporaneity. Bakhtin 
writes:
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The internally persuasive word is either a contemporary word, bom in 
a zone of contact with unresolved contemporaneity, or else it is a word 
that has been reclaimed for contemporaneity; such a word relates to its 
descendents as well as to its contemporaries; what is constitutive for it 
is a special conception of listeners, readers, perceivers. {DI 346)
In the case of mechanical reproduction this is effected by the ability of the
perceiver to take the mechanically reproduced work into his or her historical
context. The creation of an expanded present is also a constitutive feature of
cinema, just as the present of a dialogized interaction of voices is a constitutive
feature of the novel. Benjamin notes the extent to which the montage of film
presents things that in fact occur at different times as simultaneous events: ‘a leap
from a window, for example, can be shot in the studio as a leap from a scaffold,
while the ensuing fall may be filmed weeks later at an outdoor location’ (G SI
491; SW IV  261). The simultaneity towards which Benjamin’s theory of montage
strives is a spatialized zone in which everything is possible and nothing has been
decided in advance.69 The creation of spatialized simultaneity is also the goal of
the polyphonic novel of Dostoevsky. This is Bakhtin’s concept of the threshold -
the present conceived of not as the minimal passing point between past and future,
but rather as a moment of decision which expands to fill space and hence can
contain a plurality of perspectives:
Dostoevsky attempted to perceive the very stages themselves in their 
simultaneity, to juxtapose and counterpose them dramatically, and not 
to stretch them out into an evolving sequence. For him, to get one’s 
bearings on the world meant to conceive of all its contents as 
simultaneous, and to guess at their interrelationships in the cross- 
section of a single moment. {DP 28)
69 The simultaneity of montage is another variant o f Benjamin’s notion o f ‘dialectic at a standstill’. 
For this connection, see Geulen, ‘Under Construction’, p. 131. Andrew Benjamin treats 
Benjamin’s notion o f simultaneity and his ‘opening o f the present’ in Andrew Benjamin, ‘Time 
and Task: Benjamin and Heidegger showing the Present’, in Benjamin and Osborne, Benjamin’s 
Philosophy, pp. 216-50. The spatialization o f time which is treated by both Benjamin and Bakhtin 
is also an important feature o f avant-garde poetics, since it is both a revision of tradition and a site 
for the reformulation o f the subject. The founding gesture o f simultaneity as an aesthetic principle 
is perhaps Apollinaire’s ‘Zone’ where ‘meme les automobiles ont l ’air d’etre anciennes’. 
Guillaume Apollinaire, ‘Zone’ (1913), in Alcools, London, 1993, pp. 39-44 (39). For the 
importance of an aesthetic o f simultaneity to the Avant-garde, see Peter Nicholls, Modernism: A 
Literary Guide, London, 1995, pp. 112-24.
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Here we begin to see the kinship between Bakhtin’s theory of polyphony and 
Benjamin’s theory of montage which I discuss in more detail in chapter 3.70 
Interrelationships in the cross-section of a single moment are exactly what 
montage technique creates by ripping fragments out of temporally and spatially 
diverse contexts and reassembling them in a juxtaposition of equality. For the 
time being, however, I will only state that the simultaneity of Bakhtin’s novel and 
Benjamin’s montage serve the same purpose: they both disrupt the stately 
temporal progress of a tradition where, in Duttman’s formulation above, 
everything has been determined in advance, and replace it with a spatialized 
present, pregnant with multiple possibilities.
The novel’s and film’s cutting up of the seamlessness of tradition can be
viewed in another way. In ‘The Work of Art’, Benjamin draws an analogy
between the activity of the cameraman and the surgeon, on the one hand, and the
activity of the painter and the magician, on the other:
The surgeon represents the polar opposite of the magician. The 
attitude of the magician, who heals a sick person by a laying on of 
hands, differs from that of the surgeon who makes an intervention in 
the patient. The magician maintains the natural distance between 
himself and the person treated; more precisely, he reduces it slightly 
by laying on his hands, but increases it greatly by his authority. The 
surgeon does exactly the reverse; he greatly diminishes the distance 
from the patient by penetrating the patient’s body, and increases it 
only slightly by the caution with which his hand moves among the 
organs. Magician is to surgeon as painter is to cinematographer. The 
painter maintains in his work a natural distance from reality, whereas 
the cinematographer penetrates deeply into its tissue. The images 
obtained by each differ enormously. The painter’s is a total image, 
whereas that of the cinematographer consists of multiple fragments, its
70 Osbome also notes the similar temporal and spatial logic of the novel and of montage: ‘And if, 
as Bakhtin argued, all literary genres have increasingly been subject to novelization as a process of 
linguistic familiarization and the creation o f a certain semantic open-endedness, so, we might 
argue, all genres o f communication (including the novel) have subsequently been subject to 
cinematization, the logic o f montage and the image, and an intensification of that “revolution in 
the hierarchy o f times” whereby “the present becomes the center o f human orientation in time and 
in the world”, which Bakhtin associated with the novel.’ Peter Osbome, The Politics o f  Time: 
Modernity and Avant-Garde, London, 1995, p. 197. Leslie also implies an affinity between 
Benjamin’s theory o f montage and Bakhtin, as well as noting that montage is an assault on habit. 
She writes: ‘Two seemingly dissimilar things, word and image, are forced together in a montage, 
clashing and dialogically relaying back and forth. [...] This unfamiliar perspective [of montage], 
as imagined by the Russian constructivists, freezes the real, protecting it from habit and alienating 
the alienated.’ Leslie, Benjamin, p. 60.
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manifold parts being assembled according to a new law. (GS1495-96; 
SW IV  263-64)
Once again, we see the breaking down of hierarchical (and, here, specifically, 
cultic) distance. The surgeon delves into the patient’s body. To the magician, the 
body is a whole that cannot be penetrated. The surgeon shows it to be an 
assemblage that is constituted of organs. His clinical intervention in the body 
reveals that the seemingly closed unity of the body is the result of a coming- 
together of many different things, heart, brain, spleen and muscles.
The effect of an orientation towards mechanical reproducibility, then, is to
penetrate the surface of things and to reveal their essentially plural constitution.
This is also the effect of novelistic discourse. The opposite of novelistic
discourse, for Bakhtin, is poetry which entails a negation of the plural nature of
language: ‘the poet strips the word of other’s intentions’ (DI 291). The language
in a poetic work is a ‘unitary and singular Ptolemaic world outside of which
nothing exists and nothing else is needed. The concept of many worlds of
language, all equal in their ability to conceptualize and to be expressive, is
organically denied to poetic style’ (DI 286). The novel, by contrast, reveals the
fundamentally plural nature of language as the interrelation and intersection of
many individual and social languages and voices:
The novel orchestrates all its themes, the totality of the world of 
objects and ideas depicted and expressed in it, by means of the social 
diversity of speech types [raznorecie] and by the differing individual 
voices that flourish under such conditions. Authorial speech, the 
speech of narrators, inserted genres, the speech of characters are 
merely those fundamental compositional unities with whose help 
heteroglossia can enter the novel; each of them permits a multiplicity 
of social voices and a wide variety of their links and interrelationships.
(DI 263)
Like the surgeon/cameraman penetrating the body/the visual world, the novel 
penetrates into the complexity of the interrelated and interpenetrated world and 
represents it as a plurality rather than the false, abstracted, closed unity that is the 
object of poetry. Its constitutive language are utterances in which languages 
interpenetrate: double-voiced discourse, irony, stylization, the internally 
persuasive word, and so forth.
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The explosion of the apparent unity of tradition with the revelation that the 
world consists in plural interpenetration, however, is more than the mere 
shattering of tradition. In Bakhtin’s view, poetry’s sloughing of the traces of all 
languages other than its own is a mortification of living language. It produces the 
word as an inert thing: ‘Discourse lives, as it were, beyond itself, in a living 
impulse toward the object; if we detach ourselves from this impulse all we have 
left is the naked corpse of the word [...]’ {DI 292). This is exactly what poetry 
does, according to Bakhtin. Removing the word from the complex interaction of 
many languages in social life, it kills the word itself. It follows, then, that whilst 
the novel may be a bitter enemy of tradition, the effect of novelization is the 
revitalization of the word, that is to say of the essence of tradition: 
transmissibility. This, then, is Bakhtin’s version of the notion of the destruction 
of tradition that ends up renewing it.
Counter-traditions and the Task of the Critic
By way of a conclusion to this chapter, one might ask what alternative to 
authoritarian tradition Bakhtin and Benjamin propose. It is certainly not newness 
for newness’s sake. I have made clear enough the degree of ambivalence of 
Bakhtin and Benjamin towards the disrupting forces of modernity. Moreover, 
their central concern for the transmissibility of culture would prevent such a 
conclusion. The tendency of total newness -  total difference, as one might term it 
-  results only in the white noise of absolute intransmissibility. Furthermore, 
Bakhtin and Benjamin can both be characterized as cultural historians.71 Their 
interests do not lie in a wholesale jettisoning of the past. Rather, I contend that 
Bakhtin and Benjamin both may be seen to have as one of their underlying aims 
the establishment of various counter-traditions.
We see Bakhtin’s construction of a counter-tradition in, inter alia, the 
chapter on ‘Characteristics of Genre’ in the 1963 version of the Dostoevsky book, 
in the essays on the novel of the 1930s and 1940s, in particular ‘From the
71 This is despite Benjamin’s scathing assertion in One-Way Street that ‘the critic has nothing in 
common with the interpreter o f past cultural epochs’ (GS I V 108; SW 1460).
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Prehistory of Novelistic Discourse’ (1940), and in the Rabelais book. Here, a 
wide variety of cultural phenomena -  Menippean satire, the Hellenistic romance, 
folk culture and Rabelais, and, of course, Dostoevsky himself -  are presented as 
an alternative, vibrant counter-tradition to the authoritarian forms of official 
culture. This is a counter-tradition in which all the qualities of somaticity, 
intersubjectivity, familiar contact, dialogue and so forth, which I have discussed 
above, are preserved and transmitted. This is a form of anti-tradition which, in 
opposition to official tradition, preserves the essence of transmissibility.
In Benjamin’s work one can find something analogous to Bakhtin’s 
construction of a counter-tradition. In ‘Discourse in the Novel’, Bakhtin describes 
two lines of the novel’s development, one of which, often overlooked and 
neglected, leads to Dostoevsky. In the second version of ‘What is Epic Theatre?’ 
(1939), Benjamin similarly describes two traditions of drama, one of which leads 
to Brecht:
Plato long ago recognized the undramatic quality of that most 
excellent man, the sage. In his dialogues, he took this figure to the 
threshold of the drama; in his Phaedo, to the threshold of the Passion 
play. The medieval Christ who also represented the wise man [...] is 
the untragic hero par excellence. But in Western secular drama, too, 
the search for the untragic hero has been unceasing. In ways that are 
ever new, and frequently in conflict with its theoreticians, this drama 
has differed from the authentic -  that is ancient Greek -  form of 
tragedy. This important but poorly marked road, which may serve 
here as the image of a tradition, wound its way though the Middle 
Ages in the works of Roswitha and the mystery plays, and through the 
Baroque period in the works of Gryphius and Calderon; later it can be 
traced in Lenz and Grabbe, and finally in Strindberg. Scenes in 
Shakespeare are its roadside monuments, and Goethe crosses it in the 
second part of Faust. It is a European road, but a German one as well 
-  if indeed we can say that the legacy of medieval and Baroque drama 
has reached us by a road, and not by some obscure smugglers’ path. It 
is this mule track, neglected and overgrown, which in our day comes 
to light in the dramas of Brecht. {GS 7/534; SW IV  303-04)
Benjamin’s attempts to construct a counter-tradition are not, however, confined to 
a legitimization of Brecht. His life’s work can be construed as an attempt to wrest 
from historical obscurity and false readings a whole range of historical cultural 
phenomena in which he discerns the expressions of subjectivities that are
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continuously threatened with objectification and in danger of being forgotten. We 
see this in his reading of the neglected body of Trauerspiel against the grain of the 
hegemony of standard post-Romantic readings; in his attempt in the 
Wahlverwandtschaften study to wrest Goethe from the Georgist vitalism of 
Wundt; in his attempt to bring Schelling and Novalis out from under the shadow 
of Kant and Hegel in his work on the German Romantics; in his loving lament for 
the disappearing and overlooked figure of the storyteller; and in his location of the 
revolutionary potential of the cinema. This approach to tradition and counter­
tradition is summed up in ‘On the Concept of History’:
Articulating the past historically does not mean recognizing it ‘the 
way it really was’. It means appropriating a memory as it flashes up 
at a moment of danger. Historical materialism wishes to hold fast that 
image of the past which unexpectedly appears to the historical subject 
in a moment of danger. For both, it is one and the same thing: the 
danger of becoming a tool of the ruling classes. Every age must strive 
anew to wrest tradition away from the conformism that is working to 
overpower it. (GS 1 695; S W IV 391)
Benjamin’s imperative that one wrest tradition from conformism lest its content 
and its heirs become tools of the ruling class is an approach that Bakhtin’s work 
also adopts.
This reference to Benjamin’s writing on the task of the historian might 
help us understand the ontological status of the counter-traditions which he and 
Bakhtin construct. In the case of Bakhtin, the question might be put bluntly: are 
we really to believe in the existence of a counter-tradition that bubbles beneath the 
mainstream of monologic, official culture, surfacing occasionally in Menippean
nosatire, Rabelais and Dostoevsky? The answer is, surely, no. To believe in such 
a thing would be as crazy as to believe in the narrator of Eco’s Foucault’s 
Pendulum, Casaubon, and his construction of an occult tradition of ‘telluric 
currents’ in Europe running from Ancient Egypt, through the Templars, 
Rosicrucians and Masons, right up to the dimensions of the modem Paris
72 What Tihanov terms Bakhtin’s ‘metageneric’ theory of the novel, that comes to dominate in the 
1963 version of the Dostoevsky book, is, with its historical and sociological vagueness, something 
of a straw man. See Tihanov, Master and Slave, pp. 209-15.
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telephone kiosk. Such counter-traditions are constructed by critics like Bakhtin. 
To say this, however, is not to devalue the act of construction. The act of 
construction is the intervention of the historian who has the gift of ‘fanning the 
spark of hope in the past’ (GS 1 695; SW IV  391).
To make sense of this it is necessary to examine Bakhtin’s and Benjamin’s
conceptions of criticism. In the case of Benjamin, one finds a highly developed
notion of the role of criticism. Much of this is to be found in ‘The Concept of
Criticism in German Romanticism’. Here, Benjamin elaborates a literary theory
on the basis of the German Romantics, Novalis and Schelling, in which criticism
is the guarantor of the continued life of the artwork:
Criticism [Kritik] when confronting the work of art is like observation 
when confronting the natural object [...] Thus, criticism is, as it were, 
an experiment on the artwork, one through which the latter’s own 
reflection is awakened, through which it is brought to consciousness 
and to knowledge of itself. (GS 1 65; SW 1 151)
It follows from this that, far from being a secondary and parasitic phenomenon in
relation to the work of creation, criticism is a necessary ‘completion’ of the work
and, paradoxically, stands prior to it.74 This ‘completion’, however, does not
mean putting an end to the work, dotting its i’s and crossing its t’s, but rather
drawing it into a continuing after-life of ever-repeated and self-renewing
interpretation. Given this elevated role, criticism is productive not reactive, and
this applies as much to the whole tradition of literature as it does to the individual
work. As Comay puts it:
Abandoning its traditional legitimating or legislative role, Romantic 
criticism instead comes to realize itself as an inexhaustible process of 
supplementation of the individual work through the repetitive 
recycling of prior texts. Schlegel explicitly links such ‘unceasing, 
repeated reading’ to the very possibility of tradition. [...] For Schlegel, 
the ‘essence of critique’ is to link history and philosophy through the 
reconstruction, reinterpretation, and retransmission of lost, damaged,
73 See Umberto Eco, Foucault’s Pendulum, trans by William Weaver, London, 1990.
74 Benjamin, with the Romantics, seems to assert that criticism stands prior to literature. In this 
recognition Benjamin and the German Romantics pre-empt the reversal o f the traditional 
prioritization of author and critic by French thinkers such as Roland Barthes whose ‘birth of the 
reader’ might better be glossed as the ‘birth o f the critic’ who makes the scriptible text possible. 
See Roland Barthes, ‘La Mort de 1’auteur’, in Le Bruissement de la langue: Essais critiques IV, 
Paris, 1984, pp. 63-69.
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incomplete, inaccessible or otherwise absent (neglected, unread, 
unreadable) objects.
Given this notion of criticism, it is possible to understand how the conscious 
construction of counter-traditions becomes the foremost task of the critic; the 
critic must be able to discern the overgrown smugglers’ paths which run alongside 
the broad highway of official tradition.
Bakhtin has a much less developed conception of criticism. Nevertheless,
in 1970 in his ‘Response to a Question from the Novyi Mir Editorial Staff, he
sketches a conception of criticism that bears similarities to Benjamin’s. Bakhtin
shares with Benjamin a rejection of historicism:
Trying to understand and explain a work solely in terms of the 
conditions of its epoch alone, solely in terms of the conditions of the 
most immediate time, will never enable us to penetrate into its 
semantic depths. Enclosure within the epoch also makes it impossible 
to understand the work’s future life. (SG 4)
Rejection of the explanation of the work ‘solely in term of the conditions of its
epoch’ parallels Benjamin’s rejection of historicism’s ‘the way it really was’.
Historicism ‘completes’ the work in the bad sense of restricting it to its own
historical epoch and of cutting it off from its future life. What Bakhtin seems to
have in mind is rather a criticism which supplies the work with a constantly
renewed source of life, as in Benjamin’s and Schlegel’s sense o f ‘completion’:
Great works continue to live in the distant future. In the process of 
their posthumous life they are enriched with new meanings, new 
significance: it is as though these works outgrow what they were in 
the epoch of their creation. [...] [Shakespeare] has grown because of 
that which has actually been and continues to be in found in his works, 
but which neither he himself nor his contemporaries could consciously 
perceive and evaluate in the context of the culture of their epoch. (SG 
4)
It is the role, then, of the critic to be attentive to the ever-growing semantic 
richness of the great work, giving it life in his or her own time, rather than 
consigning it to oblivion:
75 Rebecca Comay, ‘Benjamin and the Ambiguities o f Romanticism’, in Ferris, Companion to 
Benjamin, pp. 134-51 (140).
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Semantic phenomena can exist in concealed form, potentially, and be 
revealed only in semantic cultural contexts of subsequent epochs that 
are favourable for their disclosure. The semantic treasures 
Shakespeare embedded in his works were created and collected 
through the centuries and even millennia: they lay hidden in the 
language [...]. (SG 5)76
What Bakhtin describes as a feature of the passage of great works through time 
also implies an imperative for the critic. The critic must uncover what has 
remained hidden, unleash potential, carefully wipe off the obscuring dust of time 
from the treasure, thereby revealing new facets visible only to the critic in the 
present.77
Benjamin makes a similar point in ‘The Task of the Translator’ (1924):
For in [the work’s] afterlife -  which could not be called that if it were 
not a transformation and renewal of something living -  the original 
undergoes a change. Even words with fixed meaning can undergo a 
maturing process. The obvious tendentiousness of a writer’s literary 
style may in time wither away, only to give rise to immanent 
tendencies in the literary creation. What sounded fresh once may 
sound hackneyed later; what was once current may someday sound 
quaint. To seek the essence of such changes, as well as the equally 
constant changes in meaning, in the subjectivity of posterity rather 
then in the very life of the language and its works -  even allowing for 
the crudest psychologism -  is to confuse the root cause of a thing 
with its essence. (GS I V 12-13; SW 1256)
From his or her later historical position, the task of the translator (or indeed the 
task of the critic, for Benjamin’s conceptions of translation and criticism are
76 In one of his fragments, Benjamin makes a similar point: ‘The survival of artworks should be 
represented from the standpoint of the struggle for existence. Their true humanity consists in their 
unlimited adaptability’ (GS F7/678; SW III 141).
77 It is possible to discern here the influence o f late Formalist theories o f literary evolution and 
their notion that great works’ survival through time can be attributed to their formal complexity 
which enable repeated processes o f deautomatization. See J. N. Tynjanov, ‘On Literary 
Evolution’ (1927), in Ladislav Matejka and Krystyna Pomorska (eds), Readings in Russian 
Poetics: Formalist and Structuralist Views, Cambridge MA, 1971, pp. 66-78. Bakhtin is 
particularly close here to Mukarovsky’s notion of the renewal o f the literary series. See Jan 
Mukarovsky, ‘Esteticka funkce, norma a hodnota jako socialni fakty’, in Studie I, ed. by Miroslav 
Cervenka and Milan JankoviC, Brno, 2000, pp. 81-148. Many areas o f connection between 
Bakhtin and Mukarovsky still need to be fully explored, Mukarovsky’s conception of dialogue not 
least among them. Holquist’s brief treatment o f the matter thoroughly misrepresents 
Mukarovsky’s thought for the sake o f preserving the ‘unique brilliance’ o f Bakhtin. See Holquist, 
Dialogism, pp. 57-59. Undoubtedly, however, Bakhtin’s ‘Response’ should also be seen as a 
contemporary engagement with the Structuralism o f the Tartu School.
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intimately linked78) is to release the living tendencies immanent in the work, what 
Bakhtin describes as concealed semantic phenomena. In so doing the 
translator/critic revives the work and rescues it from oblivion, not by virtue of 
mere historical changes in the socio-linguistic context, but by virtue of the living 
essence that has been slumbering in the work.79
At this point, it is worth juxtaposing an image that Benjamin draws in the
essay, ‘The Storyteller’:
In the fourteenth chapter of the third book of [Herodotus’] Histories 
there is a story from which much can be learned. It deals with 
Psammenitus. [...] This tale shows what true storytelling is. The 
value of information does not survive the moment in which it was 
new. It lives only at that moment; it has to surrender to it completely 
and explain itself to it without losing any time. A story is different. It 
does not expend itself. It preserves and concentrates its strength and 
is capable of releasing itself even after a long time. [...] Herodotus 
offers no explanations. His report is utterly dry. That is why this 
story from ancient Egypt is still capable, after thousands of years, of 
provoking astonishment and reflection. It is like seeds of grain which 
have lain for centuries in the airtight chambers of the pyramids and 
have retained their germinative power to this day. (GS I I 445-46; SW 
III 148)
A critic like Bakhtin and Benjamin must not see the stone facade of the 
mausoleum, but must penetrate the tomb and find in it the seed of grain that lies 
overlooked in the comer. Recognizing it as a seed, not mistaking it for a stone, he 
must allow it to germinate and come to life; it must, under his attentive gaze and 
in his loving hand, be drawn from the past into the present so that it can break out 
of the singular, inert and closed form of exterior and unfold into plural, living and 
open meanings.
78 Benjamin describes criticism as ‘another, if  a lesser, factor in the continued life of literary works 
(GS IV 15; SW 1 256)’. His comments on the translations of the Romantics in this essay point back 
to ‘The Concept of Criticism in German Romanticism’.
79 It is here that Bakhtin and Benjamin depart, at least in emphasis, from the late Formalist and 
Czech Structuralist view of literary evolution which, whilst arguing that the semantic and 
structural complexity o f great works is an important factor in their capacity for artistic survival, 
tends to put greater emphasis on the historical and social context o f reception as the necessary 
background for re-defamiliarization. Once again, it is Mukarovsky who comes closest to 
Bakhtin’s and Benjamin’s position. In his work of the 1940s, Mukarovsky rehabilitates the notion 
of intentionality in (Czech) Structuralist literary history, thereby diminishing what had previously 
been seen as the overriding importance o f the context of reception. Jan Mukarovsky, ‘Zamemost a 
nezamemost v umeni”, in Studie I, pp. 353-88.
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In his ‘Franz Kafka: On the Tenth Anniversary of his Death’ (1934),
Benjamin examines this notion of unfolding:
The word ‘unfolding’ has a double meaning. A bud unfolds into a 
blossom, but the boat which one teaches children to make by folding 
paper unfolds into a flat sheet of paper. This second kind of 
‘unfolding’ is really appropriate to parable; the reader takes pleasure 
in smoothing it out so that he has the meaning on the palm of his hand. 
Kafka’s parables, however, unfold in the first sense, the way a bud 
turns into a blossom. That is why their effect resembles poetry 
[Dichtung]. (GS II 420; SW I I 802-03)
The image of tradition that emerges from a consideration of this quotation in 
conjunction with the passage about Herodotus might illuminate Bakhtin’s and 
Benjamin’s understanding of tradition and the critic’s construction of counter­
tradition. Authoritarian tradition reduces plurality to unity in the manner of the 
second example of didactic unfolding, where the complexly constituted turns into 
the flatness of the sheet of paper. Bakhtin’s and Benjamin’s critical counter­
traditions are designed to unfold the cultural objects of the past in the first sense, 
the way a bud turns into blossom. In ‘Author and Hero’, we encounter a similar 
image; in intersubjective encounters, the other must not be reduced to a closed, 
dead object but rather must be enabled to blossom into living subjectivity. In this 
context, Bakhtin writes: ‘The excess of my seeing [vis-a-vis the other] is the bud 
in which slumbers form, and whence form unfolds like a blossom’ (AH 24).
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Chapter 2: Experience 
Diachronic Contexts from Hegel to Lebensphilosophie
In the previous chapter, I have explored the ambivalence of Bakhtin and Benjamin 
towards forms of habit and cognate phenomena such as ritual, tradition, and so 
forth, and their adequacy to the task of preserving the integrity of experience. In 
the nineteenth century, however, the influential figure of Hegel had been positive 
about the benefit, indeed the indispensability, of such customary cultural and 
social forms for the free development of the individual’s subjectivity.
In the second part of Elements o f the Philosophy o f Right (1822), Hegel 
launches a sustained attack on Kant’s resolution of the problem of what Hegel 
terms ‘abstract freedom’. Like Kant, Hegel argues that abstract freedom -  the 
unconstrained freedom to do what we want -  is illusory, since in acting according 
to our individual desires we are in thrall to those desires. Similarly, Hegel also 
argues that freedom is to be achieved in the acting out of our duty: ‘I should do 
my duty for its own sake, and it is in the true sense my own objectivity that I bring 
to fulfilment in doing so. In doing my duty, I am with myself [bei mir selbst] and 
free.’1 Against Kant, however, Hegel argues that the fulfilment of one’s duty 
towards an abstractly conceived categorical imperative is not sufficient for the 
realization of the individual’s freedom. Rather, Hegel contends, such a 
conception of freedom in duty towards an abstract rational imperative pits reason 
against desire and hence denies human beings the happiness produced by the 
satisfaction of their natural desires.
Hegel’s solution to this problem is ingenious and one in which the habits of 
cultural and social forms play a crucial role. He argues that unity of individual 
satisfaction and freedom can only be found in conformity to the social ethos and 
customs of the organic community. In the organic community individual desires 
and needs are shaped by social custom and hence the satisfaction of those needs
1 G. W. F. Hegel, Elements o f the Philosophy o f  Right, ed. by Allen W. Wood, trans. by H.B. 
Nisbet, Cambridge, 1991, p. 161.
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and desires benefits the community in a synthesis of the universal and the
particular. Hegel writes:
Just as nature has its laws, and as animals, trees, and the sun obey 
their law, so is custom the law appropriate to the spirit of freedom.
Custom is what right and morality have not yet reached, namely 
spirit... Education [Padagogik] is the art of making human beings 
ethical: it considers them as natural beings and shows them how they 
can be reborn and how their original nature can be transformed into a 
second, spiritual nature so that this spirituality becomes habitual to 
them.2
Conformity to custom and education into habit set subjects free.
At this point a caveat is necessary. Hegel’s position does not imply
unthinking allegiance to automatized habit. The modem organic society, unlike
the organic communities of the ancient world, must be organized according to
rational principles so that individuals can recognize the rationality of those
principles and hence freely choose to conform to them. If this is not the case, and
subjects cease using their capacity for reason and cease an active search for self-
realization and act according to blind, unthinking habit, then custom or social
habit [Sittlichkeit] can become empty habituality [Gewdhnlichkeit] with resultant
negative effects for individual and social development:
In habit [Gewdhnlichkeit], the opposition between the natural and the 
subjective will disappears, and the resistance of the subject is broken 
[...]. Human beings even die of habit -  that is, if they have become 
totally habituated to life and mentally and physically blunted, and the 
opposition between subjective consciousness and mental activity has 
disappeared. For they are active only in so far as they have not yet 
attained something and wish to assert themselves and show what they 
can do in pursuit of it. Once this is accomplished, their activity and 
vitality disappear, and the loss of interest which ensues is mental or 
physical death.3
Despite his awareness of the danger of the slipping of Sittlichkeit into 
Gewdhnlichkeit, for Hegel the rationally organized, modem organic community 
ensures the unity of individual and social interest through active participation in
2 Hegel, Philosophy o f Right, p. 195.
3 Hegel, Philosophy o f Right, p. 195.
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habitual social and cultural forms.4 Cultural forms and individual lives are 
adequate to each other and it is through customary cultural forms that individuals 
actualize themselves and their own freedom.
The latter part of the nineteenth century sees a qualitative shift away from 
Hegel’s benign view of the relationship between custom and the life of the 
individual. This reaction stems from an increasing inability of thinkers to 
recognize in a fast modernizing world the hallmarks of the organic community as 
described by Hegel. Contra the phrase of the introduction to Elements o f the 
Philosophy o f Right, the real no longer seemed to be rational. In his Community 
and Society (Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft) (1887), Friedrich Tonnies made a 
clear and influential distinction between traditional, organic communities 
(Gemeinschaften) where individual and communal interests stand in harmony and 
modem societies (Gesellchaften) marked by qualities of abstraction, alienation 
and specialization that obscure the possibility of such harmony.5 Max Weber, in 
his work on rationalization and bureaucracy in a disenchanted world, served 
further to underline the sense of a disjuncture between cultural forms and the life 
of the individual.6 Scepticism about the discrepancy between subjective 
experience and objective cultural forms becomes increasingly typical of the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. This scepticism finds powerful 
expression in the work of Georg Simmel, a figure who exercises direct influence 
on both Bakhtin and Benjamin.
In the winter semester of 1912/13, Benjamin attended SimmeTs lectures at 
the University of Berlin.7 Simmel’s influence was to continue in a quiet but often
4 Hegel’s distinction between Sittlichkeit and Gewdhnlichkeit is comparable to the distinction that I 
have introduced in the previous chapter between integrated and alienated habit.
5 ‘Gemeinschaft [community] should be understood as a living organism, Gesellschaft [society] as 
a mechanical aggregate and artefact.’ Friedrich Tonnies, Community and Association, trans. by 
Charles P. Loomis, London, 1955, p. 39.
6 See, for example, Max Weber, ‘Science as Vocation’ (1917), in From Max Weber: Essays in 
Sociology, ed. and trans. by H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, London, 1991, pp. 129-56.
7 Of Benjamin’s reaction to Simmel Brodersen comments: ‘Benjamin had a silent admiration for 
[Simmel], though not without certain reservations. Benjamin the student was fascinated by 
Simmel’s absolute precision in speech and writings, the diversity of topics in his lectures, his 
references to marginal cultural and historical phenomena, his inquiring scepticism. His admiration 
was shared by distinguished figures such as Stefan George, Charles du Bos, Ernst Bloch, Georg
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controversial fashion throughout Benjamin’s career.8 His work on Goethe 
provided Benjamin with a theory of the symbol that became central to the 
Trauerspiel book and, as Buck-Morss notes, survives on into the Arcades 
Project.9 It was Simmel, rather than Marx, who can be argued to have provided 
Benjamin with his fundamental understanding of modernity and commodity form. 
More than Marx, Simmel’s analysis of phenomena such as money and fashion 
informs Benjamin’s notion of the symbolic economy of capitalism and the impact 
of exchange-form on the structures of experience.10 This attachment to Simmel 
was to get Benjamin in trouble with his collaborators in the Institute for Social 
Research, and Adorno in particular. Adorno’s criticisms of Benjamin’s 
tendencies to undialectical and unmaterialist thinking in his work on the Paris of 
Baudelaire, stem, in part, from Adorno’s objection to Benjamin’s use of 
Simmel.11 Finally, Simmel’s account of the forms of modem (urban) experience
Lukacs, Gertrud Kantorowics, Margarete Susman, Ludwig Marcuse, and Gershom Scholem. 
Simmel was, as Albert Salamon once put it, “a genuinely philosophical spirit”, beside whom most 
other university lecturers paled by comparison. So it is doubtless no accident that the other 
professors whose lectures Benjamin attended during his five semesters in Berlin (the philosophers 
Ernst Cassirer and Benno Erdmann, the art historian Adolf Goldschmidt, the Germanists Max 
Hermann and Gustav Roethe) are scarcely mentioned in his writings, except in ironic or polemical 
allusions. ’ Brodersen, Benjamin, p. 46.
8 Smith argues for the substantial influence o f Simmel on Benjamin in Gary Smith, Thinking 
through Benjamin: An Introductory Essay’, in Gary Smith (ed.), Benjamin: Philosophy, History, 
Aesthetics, London, 1983, pp. vii-xlii (xxxii).
9 Buck-Morss, Dialectics o f Seeing, pp. 71-72.
10 See Benjamin’s use o f Simmel’s comments on fashion in The Arcades Project in GS V, p. 127; 
AP, pp. 76-77.
11 Adorno criticizes this aspect of ‘Paris o f the Second Empire in Baudelaire’, pointing out that the 
essay ‘not entirely by accident uses a quotation from Simmel’. Adorno, ‘Letters to Benjamin’, p. 
129. The quotation survives Adorno’s criticism and reappears in the text o f ‘On Some Motifs in 
Baudelaire’ as published by the Institute o f Social Research (GS 1 539-40; SW IV 19-20). 
Benjamin’s vigorous response to Adorno provides an interesting suggestion that, despite the 
distance between Simmel and Marx, Simmel’s thought could be rescued for the purposes of leftist 
cultural politics: ‘You look askance at Simmel: might it not be time to respect him as one o f the 
ancestors of cultural bolshevism (Kulturbolshevismus)? (Briefe 808)’ Benjamin, nevertheless, 
seems to have taken on board some of Adorno’s criticisms of Simmel. In his encyclopaedia article 
on ‘Jews in German Culture’, Benjamin makes the following, in general negative assessment: ‘His 
characteristic dialectic is employed in the service o f Lebensphilosophie and attempts a form of 
psychological impressionism which devotes itse lf- in a fashion that is hostile to systematic 
thought -  to the analysis of the being [ Wesenserkenntnis] of particular mental [geistiger] 
phenomena and tendencies’ (GS I I 810). Frisby suggests that Adorno’s hostility to Simmel’s 
writing may have stemmed from the fact that the essayistic form of Simmel’s writing, which 
Benjamin highlights in the above passage, might have been ‘rather too close to that o f Adorno’s’. 
David Frisby, Simmel, London, 1992. p. 148. The tendency o f writers of the left either to criticize 
Benjamin for his association with Simmel or to minimize this association persists. Esther Leslie’s 
book on Benjamin, written from a hard-left position, all but ignores Simmel’s influence, despite 
the fact that at its heart is a study o f Benjamin’s treatment of commodity capitalism, an area 
where, as I have argued, Simmel’s influence is unmistakable. Simmel receives only two
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as opposed to traditional (rural) experience, particularly as outlined in the essay, 
‘The Metropolis and Mental Life’ (1903), informs the structure of Benjamin’s 
meditation on the same themes.
As more recent critics of Bakhtin have recognized, Simmel was a central 
figure in Bakhtin’s intellectual make-up too.12 Previously, Bakhtin scholarship, 
focusing on Bakhtin’s neo-Kantian roots, has not paid attention to the connection 
with Simmel.13 Given that a superficial intellectual history would have neo- 
Kantianism and Lebensphilosophie, the movement which can be seen to culminate 
in the work of Simmel, in irreconcilable conflict, the lack of attention paid to 
Simmel is understandable. It has taken Tihanov’s painstaking work on Bakhtin 
and Lukacs to point out the convergences between these two trends, convergences 
that Bakhtin draws on.
Unlike Benjamin, Bakhtin does not quote Simmel. Of the Bakhtin Circle 
members treated here, only Voloshinov makes a direct and, moreover, guarded 
reference to him.14 There is no doubt, however, that Bakhtin was familiar with 
Simmel’s work. Simmel’s essays had appeared in the Russian edition of the 
journal Logos, a journal which Bakhtin seems to have read.15 These included
references, one of which refers to him, in passing, disparagingly as ‘the money-critic Georg 
Simmel’. Leslie, Benjamin, p. 9.
Tihanov and Brandist are foremost amongst these critics. See Tihanov, Master and Slave, and 
Brandist, The Bakhtin Circle. See also Greg Nielsen, ‘Looking Back on the Subject: Mead and 
Bakhtin on Reflexivity and the Political’, in Brandist and Tihanov (eds), Materializing Bakhtin, 
pp. 142-63 (161-62). Bonetskaia also treats the connection between Simmel and Bakhtin.
Natal’ia Bonetskaia, ‘Bakhtin’s Aesthetics as a Logic o f Form’, in David Shepherd (ed.), The 
Contexts o f Bakhtin: Philosophy, Authorship, Aesthetics, Amsterdam, 1998, pp. 83-94. Vorokhov 
seems to have been one of the first to have treated the connection. P. N. Vorokhov, ‘M. M. 
Bakhtin i G. Zimmel’, in N. I. Voronina et al. (eds), M. M. Bakhtin i gumanitamoe myshlenie na 
poroge XXI veka, 2 vols, Precis from the Third Saransk International Bakhtin Readings, 1995, 
referred to in Emerson, The First Hundred Years, p. 213.
13 See Michael F. Bemard-Donals, Mikhail Bakhtin: Between Phenomenology and Marxism, 
Cambridge, 1994, especially pp. 18-46. Clark and Holquist’s substantial biographical study, 
Bakhtin, pays attention to neo-Kantianism, especially pp. 57-61, but does not mention Simmel or 
Lebensphilosophie. In a similar vein, Roberts speaks o f ‘Bakhtin’s early “neo-Kantian” period’. 
Matthew Roberts, ‘Poetics Hermeneutics Dialogics: Bakhtin and Paul de Man’, in Morson and 
Emerson (eds), Rethinking Bakhtin, pp. 115-34 (118).
14 MPL, p. 39. I analyse Voloshinov’s use o f Simmel in the next chapter.
15 Logos was published simultaneously in Russian and German editions in Tubingen and Moscow. 
Hirschkop notes that it had on its joint editorial board figures such as Husserl, Weber, F. F. 
Zelinsky, Peter Struve and Heinrich Rickert, and that it published, amongst other things, articles 
by Simmel and Husserl’s ‘Philosophy as a Strict Science’. The appearance of articles by Simmel
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Russian translations of ‘Zur Metaphysik des Todes’ and ‘Der Begriff und die 
Tragodie der Kultur’, traces of both of which can be seen in Toward a Philosophy 
o f the Act and ‘Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity’. 16 Nevertheless, in 
following the connection between Bakhtin and Simmel, it is necessary to follow 
Bakhtin’s translations and appropriations, without acknowledgement, of Simmel’s 
ideas into his own language and idiom.
Simmel contests that modem life is characterized by a preponderance of
objective culture over the subjective culture of the individual.17 As modem
culture becomes more complex and developed, to a large degree as a result of
specialization, the individual is no longer capable of identifying him or herself
with this culture and its ‘law, language, methods of production, art, science and
household objects’. These are phenomena that were originally the products of
individual men and women like him or herself.18 According to Simmel, the birth
of objective cultural value, thus, has as its corollary the ‘death of the subjective
soul’ that invests itself in that process of creation.19 In the face of the increasingly
alien domain of objective culture values, the essence of the individual comes
under threat. In the modem metropolis, for example:
such an overwhelming fullness of impersonal Spirit is on offer in 
buildings, institutions of learning, in the wonders and conveniences of 
a technology that can defeat space, in the forms of social life and in 
the visible institutions of the state that the individual [Personlichkeit] 
cannot, so to speak, keep his own identity in the face of them.20
and Husserl in a journal that was meant to be an organ of neo-Kantianism displays the dialogue 
and convergence o f neo-Kantianism, Lebensphilosophie and phenomenology at the time. See 
Hirschkop, Bakhtin, p. 100.
16 See Bonetskaia, ‘Bakhtin’s Aesthetics as a Logic o f Form’, p. 94.
17 None the less, as Leger points out, Simmel sees the tragedy of culture as a result not merely of 
modernity but also as an epistemological constant as a result o f the transformation -  exacerbated 
by the conditions of modernity, nevertheless -  that life undergoes when it creates a cultural value. 
See Francis Leger, La Pensee de Georg Simmel, Paris, 1989, p. 326. This process, however, is an 
eternal phenomenon. Simmel’s ahistoricism here is the target of Adorno’s criticism.
18 Georg Simmel, ‘Die Gross-Stadte und das Geistesleben’, in Das lndividuum und die Freiheit, 
ed. by Michael Landmann and Margarete Susman, Frankfurt/Main, 1993, pp. 192-204 (202). See 
also Georg Simmel, ‘Der Begriff und die Tragodie der Kultur’, in Aufsatze und Abhandlungen
1909-1918, Gesamtausgabe vol. 12, ed. by Otthein Rammstedt, Frankfurt/Main, 2001, pp. 194- 
223.
19 In essence, Simmel transfers to the sphere o f culture and history the Kantian dualism of subject 
and object.
20 Simmel, ‘Die Gross-Stadte’, p. 203.
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Culture and the life of the individual have suffered a separation that is no less than 
tragic, following which forms and experience no longer equate to each other.
This is central to both Benjamin and Bakhtin. Their world is no longer a
world in which custom is seen unproblematically as a facilitator of individual
experience. It is a world where form, whether the habits and cultural forms of
tradition or the new habits of rationalizing, industrialized societies and commodity
exchange, can increasingly also be viewed as alien and authoritarian. The
question posed by Benjamin and Bakhtin, following Simmel, is the extent to
which the cultural modes of expression, created by the collective activity of men
and women, are adequate to the experience of men and women themselves. The
same essential tension that Tihanov identifies as common to Lukacs and Bakhtin
might be transferred to the comparison of Bakhtin and Benjamin:
the tension between subject and object, author and hero, culture and 
civilization as variations of the fundamental conflict of modernity -  
that between the maturing powers of men and women to master nature 
and the outer world and their growing enslavement at the hands of 
their own creations.21
Lebensphilosophie, as represented by Simmel, casts life and cultural form in terms 
of an opposition of ‘life as something heterogeneous, unorderly, and almost 
anarchic and form as homogeneity and law’. 22 The importance of Bakhtin’s and 
Benjamin’s thought lies in what they do with this opposition. Lebensphilosophie 
can, in general, be characterized by a tendency to prioritize life over form.23
■'> j 4
' Tihanov, Master and Slave, p. 16.
22 Kai Hammermeister, The German Aesthetic Tradition, Cambridge, 2002, p. 161. Here, we may 
also consider the figure of Nietzsche. In his authoritative study Schacht argues that Nietzsche is 
perhaps best understood as one of the inaugurators of Lebensphilosophie. Richard Schacht, 
Nietzsche, London, 1983, p. 531. Nietzsche’s image o f the world as a state o f flux in which 
tendencies to coagulation contend with the dynamism of the will-to-power stands in close 
proximity to the themes of this chapter. Amongst the many of Nietzsche’s ideas that would also 
be relevant to this chapter are his criticism of mechanism and causalism and his treatment of Kant 
in The Will to Power (notes from the 1880s, published posthumously), and the distinction between 
Apollonian art of image and form and Dionysian art o f direct experience and intoxication in The 
Birth o f Tragedy (1872). See Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power, ed. and trans. by Walter 
Kaufinann and R. J. Hollingdale, New York, 1968, and Friedrich Nietzsche, The Birth o f Tragedy, 
ed. by Michael Tanner, trans. by Shaun Whiteside, London, 1993.
23 Sandywell comments: ‘One reaction to [the] totalization [of objective culture] is the revolt 
against form as such and the reversion to an imaginary state of formlessness -  leading Simmel to 
the resigned conclusion that formlessness was itself the appropriate form of modernity. ’ This 
statement is something of a caricature but captures well the opposition o f form and culture and 
formlessness and life. Sandywell, ‘Memories ofNature’, p. 96.
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Benjamin and Bakhtin’s position is not as simple although their starting point is 
similar.
Modes of Experience: Erlebnis and Erfahrunz
Simmel’s thinking on the disjuncture between form and life, that was to be so
important for Bakhtin and Benjamin, draws on and is part of a debate in
nineteenth-century philosophy on the nature of experience which stems from
Kant. Kant had argued that experience comes about through the synthetic process
that joins the subject’s sense perceptions with a priori concepts in objectively and
universally valid judgements.24 At the heart of Kant’s epistemology is the
conviction that subjective intuition alone does not provide the basis for
meaningful experience, indeed, for experience of any sort at all.
For experience [Erfahrung] it is not, as is commonly believed, 
sufficient to compare perceptions and to connect them in one 
consciousness by means of judging; from that there arises no universal 
validity and necessity of judgement, on account of which alone it can 
be objectively valid and so can be experience.25
The idea of experience without synthetic judgement (and it can be no more than
an idea since Kant’s categories are a priori and universal) is an illusion. Such
experience, were it possible, would be no more than a contingent, disordered and
incomprehensible multiplicity. Whilst intuition and perception of concrete,
empirical particulars are necessary components of experience, they are only able
to enter the realm of experience if they are combined synthetically with universal,
general and abstract categories:
A completely different judgement therefore occurs before experience 
can arise from perception. The given intuition must be subsumed
24 ‘Experience consists in the synthetic connection o f appearances (perceptions) in a 
consciousness, in so far as this connection is necessary.’ Furthermore, necessity is a concept that 
pertains only to a priori knowledge. Immanuel Kant, ‘Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics’ 
(1783), in Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics with Selections from the Critique o f Pure 
Understanding, ed. and trans. by Gary Hatfield, Cambridge, 1997, pp. 3-137 (58).
25 Kant, ‘Prolegomena’, pp. 53-54.
26 See Immanuel Kant, Critique o f Pure Reason (1781), ed. by Vasilis Politis, trans. by J. M. 
Meiklejohn, London, 1993, p. 165.
27 Any tendencies in Kant to abstraction do not occlude the importance o f empirical perception. 
As Kohnke notes: ‘Kant indicates again and again that every act of the subject in the process of 
cognition can only be effectual through an actual application to real or in the event thinkable 
experience.’ Klaus Christian Kohnke, The Rise o f Neo-Kantianism: German Academic 
Philosophy between Idealism and Positivism, Cambridge, 1991, p. 181.
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under a concept, which determines the form of judging in general with 
respect to the intuition, connects the empirical consciousness of the 
latter in a consciousness in general, and thereby furnishes empirical 
judgments with universal validity.
Thus, Kant’s theoretical framework prioritizes all that is regular, necessary, 
homogeneous, universal and objective over all that is irregular, contingent, 
manifold, particular and subjective, defining experience (Erfahrung) as only that 
in which the latter categories are subsumed by the former. Kant establishes, then, 
an opposition between the ‘manifold of empirical intuition’ of particular 
experiences (Erlebnisse) and the homogeneity and universality of a priori 
categories through whose offices alone true experience or Erfahrung can come 
into being.29
In the course of the nineteenth century, this opposition of Erfahrung and 
Erlebnis and the evaluative accent that Kant had put on the former was revisited 
by a range of thinkers. At the beginning of the century, the main approach of 
philosophers was an attempt to overcome the range of Kantian dualisms, such as 
the dualisms between subject and object, Erfahrung and Erlebnis, by means of the 
construction of systems of various forms of holistic idealism, culminating in the 
‘absolute idealism’ of Hegel.30 Towards the end of the century, however, a group 
of thinkers who can be associated with Lebensphilosophie and phenomenology 
took a different approach, accepting, in essence, Kantian dualisms, but subjecting 
them to different characterizations and evaluations.31 Thus, Wilhelm Dilthey
28 Kant, ‘Prolegomena’, p. 58.
29 The basic dualism from which the opposition of Erlebnis and Erfahrung proceeds is Kant’s 
distinction between concepts and sensible representations or intuitions. See J. Michael Young, 
‘Functions of Thought and the Synthesis o f Intuitions’, in Paul Guyer (ed.), The Cambridge 
Companion to Kant, Cambridge, 1992, pp. 101-22.
30 For details of Hegel’s rejection o f Kantian dualism, see Paul Guyer, ‘Absolute Idealism and the 
Rejection of Kantian Dualism’, in Karl Ameriks (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to German 
Idealism, Cambridge, 2000, pp. 37-56. Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre (1794), with its doctrine of the 
absolute ego which includes, through reflection, both self and not-self, is an equally important 
moment in the rejection of the Kantian bifurcation o f experience that is influential for the early 
Benjamin. See Johann Gottlieb Fichte, The Science o f  Knowledge, ed. and trans. by Peter Heath 
and John Lachs, Cambridge, 1982.
31 Rousseau’s influence was also important. Rousseau had argued that the transition from the 
happy state of nature to a state o f inequality and servitude is made possible only by the 
development of calculation and abstraction, particularly through the invention o f language. A 
theory of experience constructed on the basis o f Rousseau’s thinking here bears strong similarities 
to the position o f Lebensphilosophie. See Jean-Jacques Rousseau, A Discourse on the Origin o f
96
contrasts the intensity of Erlebnis (inner lived experience), to the shallowness of 
mere aussere Erfahrung (outer sensory experience).32 Similarly, Husserl 
objected to the scientific and abstract aspects of Kantian notions of Erfahrung 
prioritizing, instead, an investigtion of the structures of pre-reflexive, inner 
experience. As Jay notes, in these cases ‘Erlebnis was an honorific term for 
subjective, concrete intuitive responses to the world that were prior to the 
constructed abstractions of science or the intellect’.34 In this tradition, then, both 
the evaluation and the content of the concepts, Erfahrung and Erlebnis, have been 
substantially modified, whilst retaining their connection back to Kant. Returning 
to Simmel: it is in this context that it is possible to understand the tragedy of 
culture. Simmers split between objective and subjective culture, culture and life, 
represents a split between two modes of experience, that of Erfahrung and that of 
Erlebnis. These two modes of experience become important principles in 
Bakhtin’s and Benjamin’s thought: in Bakhtin implicitly, in Benjamin much more 
explicitly.
Beyond the German tradition, Henri Bergson, also a thinker of the loose 
movement of Lebensphilosophie and a thinker who exerted influence on Bakhtin 
and Benjamin,36 makes a similar distinction between different modes of
Inequality (1754), in The Social Contract and Discourses, ed. by P. D. Jimack, trans. by G. D. H. 
Cole, London: Everyman, 1993, pp. 31-126 (63-70). Rousseau’s revolutionary investigation of his 
own inner experience in the Confessions had a profound influence on Dilthey.
32 Wilhelm Dilthey, Poetry and Experience: Selected Works (1906), vol. 5, ed. by Rudolf A. 
Makkreel and Frithjof Rodl, Princeton NJ, 1996.
33 See Edmund Husserl, ‘Philosophy and the Crisis o f European Man’ (1935), in Phenomenology 
and the Crisis of Philosophy, trans. by Quentin Lauer, New Tork, 1965, pp. 149-92. Husserl’s 
objections to Kant are similar to those raised by Bakhtin that I discuss below. ‘According to Kant, 
transcendental subjectivity is a transpersonal abstractly deduced principle of justification, whereas 
for Husserl it is a concrete and finite subject.’ Dan Zahavi, Husserl’s Phenomenology, Stanford 
CA, 2003, p. 108.
34 Jay, ‘Experience without a Subject’, p. 195.
35 In this context one should not ignore Bakhtin’s place within the Russian philosophical tradition 
(and particularly in relation to trends emerging from Slavophilism), with its tendency to oppose a 
(Western, rationalist) concern with ‘abstract’ truth to a (Russian, irrationalist) concern with ‘lived’ 
truth. Emerson notes possible affinities between Bakhtin and the thought of Soloviev and Ivanov 
and their ‘blurring and rubbing out o f fundamental categories of rationality’ in Emerson, The First 
Hundred Years, p. 258. Similarly, Emerson and Morson locate Bakhtin in a tradition of Russian 
‘anti-ideological’ thinkers such as Herzen, Tolstoy and Chekhov who see the answers to life’s 
questions in life itself rather than in abstract thought. See Emerson and Morson, Bakhtin, pp. 23- 
24.
36 Bergson is a reference point for Bakhtin in Toward a Philosophy o f the Act. Benjamin engages 
intensively with Bergson in his reading o f Proust and Baudelaire.
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experience that can be seen to correspond to Erlebnis and Erfahrung. Bergson 
posits two separate categories: temps, time as it is measured by science, divisible 
and repeatable, subject to analytical categories of space and language; and duree, 
time, continuous and changing, as it is experienced by the subject in the flux of 
inner life, prior to such analytical categories. For Bergson, reality is a matter of 
duree. In this reality, immediately experienced, exist not ‘completed things 
[choses faites] but only things that are in the process of being completed, not
I T
states that endure but only states that change’. Nevertheless, subjects need 
stable fulcra (points d ’appui) in this flux of becoming and representations of states 
and things for thoroughly practical purposes. Hence they abstract from the flux of 
becoming fixed sensations and ideas, by substituting the discontinuous for the 
continuous, stability for mobility, and temps for duree.
In consequence, Bergson posits two radically different modes of thought
and experience, intuition and intelligence, that refer respectively to the direct
experience of duree and the abstracted cognition of temps. Intuition, on the one
hand, captures the fluidity of becoming, ‘an uninterrupted continuity of
unpredictable novelty’.38 Intelligence provides access only to reconstructed
abstractions of repeatable stability that effaces novelty in presenting the new as ‘a
new arrangement of pre-existing elements’.39 For Bergson, true experience is
accessible only to intuition and its true nature is subject to misrepresentation by
the application of analytical intelligence.
Experience is, shall we say, the indivisible and indestructible 
continuity of a melody where the past enters the present and forms 
with it an undivided whole that remains undivided and indivisible 
despite what is added to it at every moment, or rather, because of 
what is added to it. We are able to gain an intuition of it, but, as 
soon as we seek an intellectual representation of it, we immediately 
put together, one after another, a series of states that have become 
distinct from each other like the pearls which make up a necklace, 
and that thus need a thread to hold them together, a thread that is 
neither one thing or the other, that in no way resembles the pearls, 
that in no way resembles anything at all, but, rather, is an empty
37 Henri Bergson, ‘Introduction a la metaphysique’, in La Pensee et le mouvant [1907], Paris, 
1999, pp. 177-227 (211).
38 Henri Bergson, ‘De la position des problemes’, in La Pensee et le mouvant, pp. 25-98 (31).
39 Bergson, ‘De la position des problemes’, p. 30.
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entity, a mere word. Intuition gives us something of which 
intelligence grasps only a spatial transposition and a metaphorical 
translation.40
The abstracted object of intelligence -  the pearls of the necklace and most 
importantly the imputed string that holds the pearls together41 -  is no more than a 
transposition: a translation of experience into a set of terms that are alien to the 
nature of experience itself. The objects of intelligence, the only objects that 
thought can subject to analysis, are, as a result of this process, no more than 
illusions, and Kant’s giving precedence to Erfahrung, no more than falling prey to 
illusion42
The application of intelligence results in failure: ‘Intelligence inhabits 
completed concepts and attempts to seize thereby, as if with a net, something of 
the reality that passes by [...] But, as a result, it allows to escape from reality that 
which in which its essence consists.’43 But its failure is made more serious by the 
fact that it results in a beautiful illusion, a transfiguration and falsification of the 
nature of experience that allows the true nature of life to slip by. This idea, that 
abstracting forms of representations of experience as Erfahrung not only fail to 
capture the fragmented immediacy of Erlebnis but may also transfigure and 
falsely represent it, is central to Bakhtin and Benjamin.44 The desire to abstract 
closed units from the flux of experience is, perhaps, necessary for practical 
purposes as Bergson has it. Bakhtin and Benjamin, however, are always aware of 
the dangers of transfiguration and falsification inherent in representations of this 
form: in the aura of the traditional art-work or the seductive lure of the commodity 
for Benjamin, or in the finality of the monologic utterance for Bakhtin. In this 
sense, Erfahrung may be associated with habitualized form; it is experience that 
has been ordered, made repeatable, a form created out of the flux of a disordered
40 Bergson, ‘De la position des problemes’, p. 76.
41 The string that holds the pearls together alludes to Kant’s investigation of the transcendental 
categories.
42 Bergson, ‘De la position des problemes’, p. 69.
43 Bergson, ‘Introduction a la metaphysique’, p. 212.
44 ‘Transfiguration’ ( Verklarung) is a Benjaminian term, a Bakhtinian analogy of which is 
‘transcription’ as he uses it in Toward a Philosophy o f the Act (for example, TPA 39), or in M. M. 
Bakhtin, ‘The Problem of Content, Material, and Form in Verbal Art’, in Art and Answerability, 
pp. 257-325 (285). I discuss Benjamin’s use o f the term ‘transfiguration’ in my final chapter.
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world of immediate experience (.Erlebnis). But as we have already seen in the 
previous chapter, habitualized forms of experience contain their own dangers. For 
Bakhtin and Benjamin, an awareness of these dangers only complicates their task 
as they seek to negotiate the question of how cultural forms might be adequate to 
experience.
For all Bakhtin’s and Benjamin’s common ground with certain aspects of 
Lebensphilosophie and their use of parts of its conceptual basis, both thinkers see 
problems inherent in the split that it establishes between Erfahrung and Erlebnis. 
The championing of Erlebnis, particularly in those quarters of Lebensphilosophie 
associated with irrationalism, could have a dark side. Bakhtin and Benjamin who 
were nineteen and twenty-two respectively at the outbreak of the First World War 
must have been aware of this. Italian Futurism with the notorious ninth slogan of 
its manifesto - ‘We will glorify war -  the world’s only hygiene -  militarism, 
patriotism, the destructive gesture of ffeedom-bringers, beautiful ideas worth 
dying for, and scorn for woman’45 -  had drawn explicitly on Bergson. They 
found in his thought inspiration for their own championing of raw and irrational 
experience over exhausted civilized rationality 46 In the German context, Ernst 
Junger had described a similar position in his tellingly entitled, long essay on the 
First World War, Der Kampf als inneres Erlebnis (‘Combat as inner experience’, 
1926):
There is still much of the animal in man who slumbers on the 
comfortable, woven carpets of a polished, honed, and silently intricate 
civilization, wrapped up in habit and pleasant formality; and yet when 
the pointer on the dial of life swings back to the red line of the 
primitive, the mask falls; naked as ever, he breaks out, primal man, the 
cave-dweller, in the full unruliness of his unchained instincts.
Whenever life reverts to its primal functions, his blood, which up until 
then has flowed coolly and regularly though his veins in the 
mechanistic activity of his stony, urban skeleton, foams up, and the
45 Filippo Marinetti, ‘The Founding and Manifesto of Futurism’ (1909), in Vassiliki Kolocotroni, 
Jane Goldman and Olga Taxidou (eds), Modernism: An Anthology o f Sources and Documents, 
Edinburgh, 1998, pp. 249-53 (251).
46 On the connection between Bergson, Italian Futurism and war, see Mark Antliff, Inventing 
Bergson: Cultural Politics and the Parisian Avant-garde, Princeton NJ, 1993, pp. 157-66. A 
similar connection between Bergson and war can be seen in Vorticism. See Natan Zach, ‘Imagism 
and Vorticism’, in Malcolm Bradbury and James McFarlane (eds), Modernism: A Guide to 
European Literature 1890-1930, Harmondsworth, 1991, pp. 228-42.
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ancient rock which has lain for long ages, cold and rigid, in hidden 
depths, melts once again into white-hot lava.47
Here, Jlinger opposes the polished, silent mask of the civilization that one can 
associate with Erfahrung, ‘covered up in habit and pleasant forms’, with the 
bestial blood lust of the primal sphere of Erlebnis.
For Benjamin, as I shall show, a mythical hypostatization of Erlebnis such 
as Junger’s is one of the pillars of fascism. Bakhtin, too, as I argue below, seems 
to discern the bleak and possibly violent consequences of a one-sided celebration 
of sheer Erlebnis. An underlying argument in favour of a more dialectical 
understanding of the relationship between Erfahrung and Erlebnis is common to 
both thinkers. Both are concerned with combating abstracting and authoritarian 
forms of Erfahrung without falling prey to the dangers of a hypostatization of 
Erlebnis and without surrendering the principle of benign form.
Bakhtin and Beniamin: Culture and Experience
1. Bakhtin’s Tragedy of Culture
Bakhtin wrote his extensive fragment, Toward a Philosophy o f the Act, in difficult
material circumstances in Nevel and Vitebsk between 1920 and 1924. This text
echoes the concerns of many of the thinkers discussed above in connection with
Lebensphilosophie. It describes a situation in which human existence is scarred
by a rupture between the experience of life and the systems whereby subjects
register and give form to that experience:
The moment which discursive theoretical thinking (in the natural 
sciences and philosophy), historical description-exposition, and 
aesthetic intuition have in common [...] is this: all these activities 
establish a fundamental split between the content or sense of a given 
act/activity and the historical actuality of its being, the actual and 
once-occurrent experiencing of it [...]. And as a result, two worlds 
confront each other, two worlds that have absolutely no 
communication with each other and are mutually impervious: the 
world of culture and the world of life, the only world in which we 
create, cognize, contemplate, live our lives and die or -  the world in 
which the acts of our activity are objectified and the world in which
47 Erast Junger, Der Kampf als inneres Erlebnis, Berlin, 1926, p. 41.
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these acts actually proceed and are actually accomplished once and 
only once. (TPA 1-2)
The strains of a lament over the tragedy of culture can be heard as Bakhtin 
establishes a by now-familiar opposition: life as it is experienced, or Erlebnis, on 
the one hand, an open, transient and concrete process of becoming; and life as it is 
systematized in cultural and intellectual forms, or Erfahrung, repeatable, 
abstracted and objectified. Bakhtin, like Simmel, highlights the paradoxical 
nature of cultural forms that both make life meaningful but also, in the very 
movement of transferring meaning, remove themselves from life itself. Like 
Simmel, Bakhtin captures the sense of self-alienation that men and women 
experience in becoming meaningful selves.
Bakhtin’s portrayal of the tragedy of culture, however, differs from the
standard view of Lebensphilosophie in some important aspects. Simmel contends
that the tragedy of culture results in our alienation from ourselves in culture in so
far as we are not able to recognize ourselves as the authors of objective cultural
values. Thus, Simmel gives precedence to life as the sphere of the subject’s
authentic being as opposed to culture which is described in terms of alienation.
Bakhtin’s description is, however, of a more complex situation:
Contemporary man feels sure of himself, feels well-off and clear­
headed, where he is himself essentially and fundamentally not present 
in the autonomous world of a domain of culture and its immanent law 
of creation. But he feels unsure of himself, feels destitute and 
deficient in understanding, where he has to do with himself, where he 
is the center from which answerable acts or deeds issue, in actual and 
once-occurrent life. That is, we act confidently only when we do so 
not as ourselves, but as those possessed by the immanent necessity of 
the meaning of some domain of culture. (TPA 20)
Here, Bakhtin also prioritizes the sphere of life, the place where contemporary 
man ‘has to do with himself that is ‘actual and once-occurrent life’. But, for 
Bakhtin, the subject does not feel at home in this sphere of authenticity that, 
paradoxically, becomes a site of the experience of alienation. On the contrary, 
where the subject feels at home is where s/he is not present -  that is, in the sphere 
of culture. This results in a more problematic sense of tragedy than Simmel’s. 
Simmel’s tragedy lies in the fact that the subject as authentic being is alienated
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from the objective cultural products of his spirit. Bakhtin locates the tragic divide 
within the subject itself, insofar as her or his sense of being-at-home takes place 
beyond her- or himself.
Bakhtin’s thought in Toward a Philosophy o f the Act is much more, then, 
than a regurgitation of the basic tenets of Lebensphilosophie, and its underlying 
structure deserves close attention. Bakhtin establishes a distinction between two 
modes of activity and being: a distinction between the ‘given’ {dannyi) and 
‘posited’ (zadannyi)48 modes of reality. The ‘given’ mode, is complete 
{zavershennyi) and self-sufficient (samovol ’nyi), characterized by causality, 
autonomy, and closure. The posited mode is open, in a state of development, and 
seeks relations and self-confirmation beyond itself. There are three levels on 
which this opposition operates. The first two are familiar from theories of the 
tragedy of culture: the split between the given world of general culture and the 
posited world of life; and the lower level split between the given product of a 
subject’s activity and the posited activity itself -  what Simmel terms the 
objectification of spirit and the subjective spirit that goes into the making of it.
The third level represents something new that Bakhtin brings to this debate. This 
is the level of intersubjectivity. According to Bakhtin, a subject’s mode of being 
can be classified according to categories of passivity and activity, depending on 
the relations with other subjects. These categories, too, can be understood in 
terms of the opposition of ‘given’ and ‘posited’. In Coates’s interpretation: ‘I 
perceive myself as incomplete and developing, but other people perceive me as 
completed and whole. Likewise, in my nature as agent I am active and posited, 
whereas in my capacity as object I am passive and given.’ 49 In addition, one can 
subsume Bakhtin’s distinction of the two modes of truth to this same basic 
opposition between given and posited. Bakhtin distinguishes between truth 
(istina) that tends towards universality and is constant and repeatable and the truth 
of an event {pravda).
48 Dannyi and zadannyi are the Russian equivalents o f gegeben (given) and aufgegeben (set as a 
task), standard terms in the German tradition which go back to Kant.
49 Coates, Christianity in Bakhtin, p. 27.
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Bakhtin does not view these sets of oppositions in neutral terms. He
presents the image of a world in which the openness and dynamism of the posited
is threatened by the finality and ossification of the given, in which the particular is
excluded by the universal, in which difference and heterogeneity is in danger of
being swallowed up by equivalence and homogeneity.50 Toward a Philosophy o f
the Act is a trenchant critique of what Bakhtin terms the ‘fatal theoreticism’ (TPA
27) that we may associate with (neo-)Kantianism.51 Theoreticism, in its
concentration on the universal and abstract rather than the particular, produces a
world which excludes life as a unique and open process of becoming in which
particular subjects participate. It produces a world in which:
we would find ourselves to be determined, predetermined, bygone, 
and finished, that is essentially not living. We would have cast 
ourselves out of life -  as answerable, risk-fraught, and open becoming 
through performed actions -  and into an indifferent and, 
fundamentally, accomplished and finished theoretical Being. (TPA 9)
In theoreticism, which, with Kant, values only what is universal in a particular act, 
the existence of a particular subject becomes a matter of indifference.52 Kant’s 
focus is on ‘possible experience’, not the actual experience of concrete subjects.53 
As Bakhtin comments: ‘The theoretical world is obtained though an essential and 
fundamental abstraction of the fact of my unique being and from the moral sense 
of that fact -  “as if I did not exist’” (TPA 9). What results is a self-enclosed and 
repeatable sphere of culture which is characterized by concepts of norm and law 
that have been emptied of practical meaning.
50 Coates comments: ‘The world o f givenness, if it is allowed to, will dominate and sterilize the 
open event of being. Bakhtin is convinced that the given aspects o f reality, however they are 
conceived, may always potentially erode or devour the posited aspects, which for him constitute 
the life-force of being.’ Coates, Christianity in Bakhtin, p. 30.
51 Holquist is correct in observing that Toward a Philosophy o f the Act is concerned more with 
Kant than with neo-Kantianism. Michael Holquist, ‘Foreword’, in TPA, pp. vii-xv (ix).
52 This is the essence of Kant’s categorical imperative which focuses only on what tends to 
universal validity in a particular act. As Kant formulates it: ‘I ought never to act except in such a 
way that I could also will that my maxim should become a universal law.’ Kant, Metaphysics of 
Morals, p. 15. Toward a Philosophy o f  the Act contains a sustained critique of Kantian ethics. 
Bakhtin argues as follows: ‘The categorical imperative determines the performed act as a 
universally valid law, but as a law that is devoid o f a particular, positive content. ’ As a 
consequence, this ‘law of conformity-to-the-law’ becomes an ‘an empty formula of pure 
theoreticism’ that ‘excludes the actual — individual and historical -  self-activity of the performed 
act (TPA 25-26)’.
53 For Kant’s discussion of the possibility o f experience, see Kant, Critique o f Pure Reason, pp. 
151-53.
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Nevertheless, Bakhtin does not hypostatize the posited mode of reality. He
makes it clear that a resort to lebensphilosophische stalwarts such as intuition or
immediate experience that prioritize the posited is no solution.54 Contemporary
philosophy is in a ‘state of crisis’:
The performed act or deed is split into an objective content/sense and 
a subjective process of performance. Out of the first fragment one 
creates a single systemic unity of culture that is really splendid in its 
stringent clarity. Out of the second fragment, if it is not discarded as 
completely useless (it is purely and entirely subjective once the 
content/sense has been subtracted) one can at best extract and accept a 
certain aesthetic and theoretical something, like Bergson’s duree or 
elan vital [12 illegible words]. But neither in the first world nor in the 
second is there room for the actual and answerable performance of a 
deed. (TPA 21)
For Bakhtin, Bergson’s aestheticization of immediate experience effected by
Lebensphilosophie does no more than reproduce the split between content and
deed in a covert form. Similarly, in Bakhtin’s reading of Nietzsche, a Dionysian
surrender to the intoxication of immediate experience is also not an option, since
from this gesture of surrender to being ‘possessed by Being’, it follows that ‘the
passive moment in participation is moved to the fore, while my to-be-
accomplished self-activity is reduced’ (TPA 49). Thus, Bakhtin’s understanding
of Nietzsche is that his emphasis on the posited aspect of life in fact results in a
production of givenness.55 Against these proposals, Bakhtin makes it clear that
theoretical modes that deal with the given cannot simply be jettisoned:
Theoretical cognition of an object that exists by itself, independent of 
its actual position in the once-occurrent world from the standpoint of a 
participant’s unique place, is perfectly justified. But it does not 
constitute ultimate cognition; it constitutes only an auxiliary, technical 
moment of such ultimate cognition. (TPA 48)
54 Roberts seems wide of the mark when he argues that Bakhtin was following the lead of Dilthey 
and his conception of subjective verstehen (understanding), which he opposes to the objective 
knowledge of the sciences. Verstehen, like Bergson’s intuition, prioritizes immediate experience. 
See Roberts, ‘Poetics Hermeneutics Dialogics’, p. 119.
55 Bakhtin’s reading presents a somewhat caricatured and reductionist notion that does not do 
justice to Nietzsche’s understanding o f the interdependence of Apollonian and Dionysian modes. 
Bakhtin is more on target in his assessment of then modish Dionysianism: ‘The aspiration of 
Nietzsche’s philosophy reduces to a considerable extent to this possessedness by Being (one-sided 
participation); its ultimate result is the absurdity o f contemporary Dionysianism’ {TPA 49).
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Insufficient in itself, theoretical cognition is, nevertheless, an indispensable part of 
experience. What is needed, instead is a plane of higher unity that joins these 
fragmented aspects of activity.
Bakhtin’s method is simpler than it at first seems. He confronts two trends 
of thought. As we have seen, the first trend is the theoreticism that favours theory 
over practice, the universal over the particular, the abstract over the specific, the 
objective over the subjective and certainly the primacy of the former categories in 
comprehending the latter. The second, Lebensphilosophie and what Bakhtin 
describes, perhaps simplistically, as the irrationalism of Nietzsche and the 
pessimism of Spengler, is a reaction against the excesses of rationalism and 
abstraction of the first trend that simply reverses its evaluations. Whilst the brunt 
of Bakhtin’s attack is directed against the first trend, Bakhtin is not content simply 
to reverse the evaluation and champion life over culture in an unreflexive fashion. 
Rather, Toward a Philosophy o f the Act aims at a synthesis of the two trends. It is 
only a synthesis of these oppositions that will take philosophy beyond what 
Bakhtin sees as false dichotomies, and hence produce a new way to act. This will 
be a synthesis that is not transcendental, but rooted in the process of 
experiencing.
2. Bevond Tragedy: Responsible Participation
The synthesis that Bakhtin proposes is to be found in responsible participation.
By responsible participation Bakhtin means that form of activity in which subjects
recognize their participation in life in a particular and concrete temporal and
spatial context. Here subjects exist in relation to other subjects towards whom
they necessarily adopt emotional and evaluative attitudes.
What does it mean to assert that historical mankind recognizes in its 
history or in its culture certain things as values? It is an assertion of 
an empty possibility of content, no more. Of what concern is it to me 
that there is an a in Being for whom a b is valuable? Insofar as I 
affirm my own unique place in the unitary Being of historical 
mankind, insofar as I am its own non-alibi, i.e., stand in an active 
emotional-volitional relationship to it, I assume an emotional- 
volitional position in the values it recognizes. {TPA 47)
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Bakhtin’s point here is that Being is not a neutral state but an evaluative event of a 
subject’s self-activity. Participation here means the action of assuming an 
evaluative stand towards other subjects.56 This is what Bakhtin means by the 
‘non-alibi in Being’. We cannot pretend that we are not there and do not have a 
view. Bakhtin asks us to take a stand, in the double sense of that phrase: both to 
accept our position in a real and concrete world, and also to accept that we thereby 
take an evaluative position towards our environment. When we take a stand the 
world that seems to be made of abstract, universal, equivalent and repeatable 
identities becomes one that is filled with concrete, individual, variegated and 
unique elements that are distinguished by subtle shades of evaluation. The 
abstract and empty categories of space and time thicken and become heavy, and, 
in Bakhtin’s evocative description, ‘blaze up with the light of value’ (TPA 59).57
If we act in this fashion and take a stand, then we also take responsibility
for our being. The implications of this can be seen by analysing a metaphor that
Bakhtin uses to describe this situation:
Being that is detached from the unique emotional-volitional center of 
answerability is a rough draft, an unacknowledged possible variant of 
once-occurrent Being; only through the answerable participation 
effected by a unique act or deed can one get out of the realm of 
endless draft versions and rewrite one’s life once and for all in the 
form of a fair copy. (TPA 44)
Theoretically a draft could be replaced by a different version of which there might 
be many. A draft offers its writer an alibi: ‘Don’t take that statement seriously; 
that isn’t what I mean; I’ll say it differently in the next draft.’ A fair copy, 
however, is not hypothetical. It is unique and occurs only once. When we offer a 
document as a fair copy we have to stand by what we have written; we have to
56 Bakhtin is close here to the thought o f Aristotle and his understanding of man as the zoon 
politikon whose essence is to be found in activity and participation in a plural, public sphere. 
Furthermore, Bakhtin’s thought would bear comparison with Hannah Arendt who draws 
substantially on Aristotle. Many of her key themes -  her preference for activity over 
contemplation, for becoming over being, her emphasis on participation in the public sphere and on 
the nexus between freedom and speech — resonate with Bakhtin’s ideas. See Hannah Arendt, The 
Human Condition, London, 1998. Attention to Arendt might usefully supplement Hirschkop’s 
analysis of Bakhtin as a thinker of the public sphere in Hirschkop, Bakhtin.
57 This phrase makes one think of Benjamin’s concept o f illumination, a connection that I discuss 
below.
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make ourselves publicly responsible for it in a more binding sense than when we 
present a draft.
If we accept the responsible nature of our situatedness in life, our non-alibi
in once-occurrent being, if we produce our life in a fair copy, we take
responsibility for it and cannot pretend that it is something provisional and
hypothetical, as happens in the ‘possible experience’ of Kant. This intersubjective
act of responsibility (it is an intersubjective act, since it assumes the presentation
of our life to others in the same way as we present a document) subsumes the
hypothetical and theoretical to the particular and concrete, thereby reconfiguring
the spheres of culture and life in the unity of our human activity. Only the
responsible act, thus conceived, can reunite the two faces of the totality of
experience, ‘the objective unity of culture’ (characterized by Erfahrung) and ‘the
never-repeatable uniqueness of actually lived and experienced life’ {Erlebnis):
It is only the once-occurrent event of Being in the process of 
actualization that can constitute this unique unity; all that is theoretical 
or aesthetic must be determined as a constituent moment in the once- 
occurrent event of Being, although no longer, of course, in theoretical 
terms. An act must acquire a single unitary plane to be able to reflect 
itself in both directions -  in its sense or meaning and in its being: it 
must acquire the unity of two-sided answerability. {TPA 2)
Toward a Philosophy o f the Act sets out a thesis according to which the split 
spheres of culture and life, given and posited, Erfahrung and Erlebnis might be 
reunited in responsible human activity. Bakhtin’s text, however, fails to raise the 
important question of the ontological status of the responsible act as he describes 
it. That is to say: it is not clear whether the responsible act belongs to the 
category of what is or the category of what ought to be, whether it is a descriptive
f O
or a deontological category.
58 Here Hirschkop’s comments on the similar lack of clarity over the status of the notion of 
dialogue are relevant: ‘ fDialogism] is both the natural state o f being o f language as such and a 
valorized category of certain discourses. It has a role in the theoretical critique of Saussurean 
linguistics and in the evaluative literary history Bakhtin narrates. When these two senses of the 
term are conflated, the specific form dialogism takes in the novel is assumed to be the 
manifestation of the true essence o f language, an essence somehow repressed in the monological. 
In fact it is the status of monologism which is most problematic: if dialogism is the nature of all 
language, then what gives rise to monologism? For monologism is not merely an illusion or an 
error, it is a form of discourse with real, if  mystifying, effects, which must be accounted for in a 
theory of language. It is this reality, or effectivity, o f an illusionary or mystifying language which
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The answer would seem to be that it is both. Responsible participation is
an element of our activity. Nevertheless, it is an element that is constantly
threatened by erosion in the face of tendencies inherent in modernity. On the one
hand, one can concur with Hirschkop, one of the few critics to attempt a serious
historicization of Bakhtin’s thought, who argues convincingly that the Bakhtin of
Toward a Philosophy o f the Act can be read as a critic of modernity.59 Despite
some infelicities, his general picture rings true:60
It required no special power of analysis to see that, in the wake of the 
First World War, Europe’s traditional sources of obligation and its 
corresponding subjective attribute, ‘responsibility’, were drying up 
[...]. In Bakhtin’s account, ‘oughtness’ and ‘responsibility’ constitute 
an original dimension of all culture which disappears from view when 
modem science and juridical thought force it into their two- 
dimensional frame.61
On the other hand, one can also concur with Tihanov that Bakhtin’s early work 
represents ‘phenomenological ahistoricism which seeks to grasp the eternal
fS)elements of the human condition’. In order to grasp the full force of Bakhtin’s
text, it is necessary to see that it is Janus-faced, looking both at the eternal nature 
of the human condition and at Bakhtin’s own modernity.
The face that stares disconsolately at the fragmented modem world is 
viewed in its most powerful form on the last pages of the first of the two sections 
of Bakhtin’s essay. Here, Bakhtin begins a lament that echoes the nostalgia of the 
cultural conservatives of his day for a world unafflicted by the fragmentation of 
modernity:
is evaded when the monological is treated as a theoretical error.’ Hirschkop, ‘A Response to the 
Forum on Mikhail Bakhtin’, p. 75. Hirschkop develops this and related ideas in such a way as to 
highlight the political dimension o f Bakhtin’s thought as one of the central themes o f his later 
monograph. See Hirschkop, Bakhtin, for example, pp. 55-57. Hirschkop’s ‘Is Dialogism for 
Real?’ also explores the double nature o f dialogue as description and political imperative. Ken 
Hirschkop, ‘Is Dialogism for Real?’, in Shepherd (ed.), The Contexts o f Bakhtin, pp. 183-95.
59 Tihanov also effects a certain historicization o f Bakhtin by virtue of the comparative angle 
gained from his study o f Lukacs. General historicization is not, however, his major aim. 
Hirschkop’s work, by contrast, in its desire to present the ‘actuality o f Mikhail Bakhtin’ considers 
historicization to be one o f its major tasks. See Tihanov, Master and Slave, and Hirschkop, 
Bakhtin.
60 For example, ‘modem science’ is his consistent and infelicitous gloss on Kantian theoreticism.
61 Hirschkop, Bakhtin, p. 51.
62 Tihanov, Master and Slave, p. 293.
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The contemporary crisis is, fundamentally, a crisis of contemporary 
action. An abyss has formed between the motive of the actually 
performed act or deed and its product. But in consequence of this, the 
product of the deed, severed from its ontological roots, has withered 
as well. (TPA 54)
This lament ascribes a role to economic development in the process in which the
forces of responsible activity are eroded, arguing that the money-economy may
have become the structuring principle of modem morality:
In relation to the present moment, economic materialism is in the 
right, although not because the motives of the actually performed act 
have penetrated inside the product but rather the reverse: the product 
in its validity walls itself off from the actually performed act in its 
actual motivation. (TPA 54-55)
One may put this passage in the context of Marx’s analysis of commodity 
fetishism. Bakhtin’s notion that the product comes to enjoy an existence 
independent of its producers bears similarities to Marx’s views. Another likely 
source, however, for this insight is Simmel’s Philosophy o f Money (1900). Like
63 •Lukacs, Simmel highlights the way in which the development of the money-
economy exacerbates tendencies to calculation and abstraction in human activity;
he also argues that it fosters indifference and characterlessness:64
This relationship between the significance for life of the intellect and 
the significance of money leads one, first of all, to a negative 
characterization of those epochs and areas of activity in which these 
two things dominate: they have a certain characterlessness. If 
character always means that people and things are differentiated from 
other people and things on the basis of their individual form of 
existence, the intellect is ignorant of this. For the intellect is the 
indifferent mirror of reality in which all elements are seen as 
equivalent [...]. This phenomenon can also be seen in the 
characterlessness of money. Just as money is the mechanical reflex of 
the values of things according to which all parties are treated the 
same, so in money-society all people have the same value -  not 
because every person has worth, but rather because no person has 
worth since the only thing that has worth is money.65
63 Simmel’s philosophy of money shares substantial ground both with Marx’s theory of alienation 
and with Lukacs’s theory o f reification. For a detailed analysis of this, see Gianfranco Poggi, 
Money and the Modem Mind: Georg Simmel’s Philosophy o f Money, Berkeley CA, 1993.
64 The indifference that he attributes to money is linked to the blase character of the modem city- 
dweller that he describes in ‘The Metropolis and Mental Life’. Simmel, ‘Die Gross-Stadte’, pp. 
192-204.
65 Georg Simmel, Philosophie des Geldes, ed. by David Frisby and Klaus Christian Kohnke 
Frankfurt/Main, 1989, pp. 594-95.
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Whether or not Bakhtin draws on Simmel, the terms of Simmel’s critique of 
money-society fit Bakhtin’s view of a modernity from which participative 
thinking has been exiled.66 Characterlessness, which can be glossed as a failure to 
assume one’s own responsible individuality, intellectuality, which one might 
understand as the hallmark of theoreticism, indifference and the tendency to treat 
other subjects as equivalent; all these are hallmarks of the world in which 
responsible activity is alien.
Bakhtin takes the notion of the tragedy of culture to its logical and
pessimistic conclusion. On the one hand, Bakhtin accepts the
lebenphilosophische idea that theory and culture have become detached from life
and form an autonomous, hermetic realm to which subjects have no authentic
access. Earlier in the text, Bakhtin sees in the immanent development of
technology the ultimate and terrifyingly destructive expression of this detachment:
Thus [technological] instruments are perfected according to their own 
inner law, and, as a result, they develop from what was initially a 
means of rational defence into a terrifying, deadly, and destructive 
force. All that which is technological, when divorced from the once- 
occurrent unity of life and surrendered to the will of the law immanent 
to its won development, is frightening; it may from time to time irrupt 
into this once-occurrent unity as an irresponsibly destructive and 
terrifying force. (TPA 7)
On the other hand, Bakhtin demonstrates none of the lebensphilosophische belief
in the redeeming potential of pure lived experience. The ultimate consequence of
the tragedy of culture is that, as culture, by losing touch with life, becomes
ossified and loses its human aspect, so lived experience begins to deteriorate,
reverting to pure biological, non-human nature. The later passage continues with
an image of a thorough-going and brutal degradation of experience:
All the energy of answerable performing is drawn off into the 
autonomous domain of culture, and, as a result, the performed act, 
detached from that energy, sinks to the level of elementary biological
66 Bakhtin’s insight into the connection between (Kantian) theoreticism and the exchange- 
economy is echoed by Eagleton: ‘The qualities o f the Kantian moral law are those of the 
commodity form. Abstract, universal and rigorously self-identical, the law of Reason is a 
mechanism which, like the commodity, effects formally equal exchanges between isolated 
individual subjects, erasing the difference o f their needs and desires in its homogenizing 
injunctions.’ Eagleton, The Ideology o f  the Aesthetic, p. 83.
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and economic motivation, that is, loses all its ideal moments: that is 
precisely what constitutes the state of civilization. The whole wealth 
of culture is placed in the service of the biological act. {TPA 55)
This result of this is a world of death and a world that is all but dead; a world 
reduced to the biological and material minimum; a natural world without subjects; 
the ravaged landscape of trench warfare. 67
With his use of the term ‘civilization’, Bakhtin appears to refer directly to 
Oswald Spengler, and the distinction that Spengler makes between culture and 
civilization in The Decline o f the West.68 Begun in 1911, but first published in 
1918 to enormous acclaim, Spengler’s monumental account of the decline of the 
West was widely seen as having received prophetic vindication in the destruction 
of European culture on the battlefields of the First World War.69
67 Brandist suggests, correctly it seems, that ‘this Bakhtin presumably saw manifested in the wars 
and revolutions that had gripped Russia and much of Europe in the years before the composition of 
his essay’. Brandist, The Bakhtin Circle, pp. 36-7.
68Elias gives an account of the development o f the antithesis of culture and civilization in Norbert 
Elias, The Civilizing Process, Oxford, 1994, especially, ‘Part One: On the Sociogenesis o f the 
Concepts of “Civilization” and “Culture”’, pp. 5-42. One source of this distinction is Kant: ‘We 
are cultivated to a high degree by art and science. We are civilised to the point of excess in all 
kinds of social courtesies and proprieties. But we are still a long way from the point where we 
could consider ourselves morally mature. For while the idea of morality is indeed present in 
culture, an application of this idea which only extends to the semblances of morality, as in love of 
honour and outward propriety, amounts merely to civilisation.’ Immanuel Kant, ‘Ideas on a 
Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose’ [1784], in Kant, Political Writings, ed. by Hans 
Reiss, trans. by H. B. Nisbet, Cambridge, 2002, pp. 41-53 (49). Another source is Rousseau. Both 
Rousseau and Kant, in their negative description o f civilization, emphasize the way in which it 
induces men and women to act insincerely. Rousseau’s comments on this matter raise a number of 
themes of relevance here: custom, ritual, system, and insincerity: ‘Before art had moulded our 
behaviour, and taught our passions to speak an artificial language, our morals were rude but 
natural [...]. In our day, now that more subtle study and a more refined taste have reduced the art 
of pleasing to a system, there prevails in modem manners a servile and deceptive conformity; so 
that one would think every mind had been cast in the same mould. Politeness [...] decorum [...] 
ceremony [...] fashion [...] these we must always follow, never the promptings of our own 
nature.’ Jean-Jacques Rousseau, ‘A Discourse on the Moral Effects of the Arts and Sciences’ 
(1750), in The Social Contract and Discourses, pp. 1-29 (6). Similarly, Bakhtin stresses the link 
between ritual and insincerity as a mark o f deadened, theoretical being with his notion of the 
impostor: ‘In attempting to understand [...] every act we perform -  as a ritual act, we turn into 
impostors or pretenders (TPA 52)’.
69 See Spengler’s comments on the writing o f his book and its connection with the war in Oswald 
Spengler, Der Untergang des Abendlandes, 2 vols, Munich, 1923, vol. 1, pp. 62-67. On the 
reception of Spengler in Germany Hawthorn comments: ‘[German] wartime propaganda had 
portrayed the battle as an heroic struggle between culture and civilization, between the high ideals 
of Germany and the crass materialism o f England. The defeat appeared to mean that culture and 
with it the whole humanist Weltanschauung had apparently gone down [...] to civilization. The 
despair which this induced accounted immediately after 1918 for the extraordinary popularity of 
Spengler’s The Decline o f the West in which the distinction between culture and civilization was 
most dramatically drawn and in which the transition from the one to the other, from the summer to
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What is civilization, understood as the organico-logical sequel, 
fulfilment and finale of a culture? For every Culture has its own 
Civilization. In this work, for the first time the two words, hitherto 
used to express an indefinite, more or less ethical, distinction, are used 
in a periodic sense, to express a strict and necessary organic 
succession. The Civilization is the inevitable destiny of the Culture, 
and in this principle we obtain the viewpoint from which the deepest 
and gravest problems of historical morphology become capable of 
solution. Civilizations are the most external and artificial states of 
which a species of developed humanity is capable. They are a 
conclusion, the thing-become [das Gewordene] succeeding the thing- 
becoming [dem Werden], death following life, rigidity following 
expansion, intellectual old-age and the stone-built, petrifying world- 
city following mother-earth and the spiritual childhood of Doric and 
Gothic. They are an end, irrevocable, yet by inward necessity reached 
again and again.70
In the face of this prospect, Bakhtin does not directly contradict Spengler’s view
of the decline of Western culture. Spengler had conceived of history in terms of
cycles of decline and fall. Hence, despite his overwhelming pessimism about the
West, he thought that the Faustian culture which constituted our Western
modernity would, passing through the moribund stage of civilization, eventually
give way to a new and vital cultural epoch.71 Bakhtin’s criticism is reserved for
this: Spengler’s faint glimmer of optimism in the possibility of historical renewal.
History, Bakhtin argues, as a force conceived of as outside lived-experience,
cannot save the contemporary act. The first section, then, ends with a plea for
individual subjects to foster in their active existence the responsible participation
that alone will keep life alive.
Life can be consciously comprehended only in concrete answerability.
A philosophy of life can only be a moral philosophy. Life can be 
consciously comprehended only as an ongoing event, and not as Being 
qua a given. A life that has fallen away from answerability cannot 
have a philosophy; it is, in its very principle, fortuitous and incapable 
of being rooted. {TPA 56)
the autumn of Faustian culture, was projected in a way that even now one has to admit, for all its 
faults, is remarkably plausible.’ Geoffrey Hawthorn, Enlightenment and Despair: A History of 
Social Theory, Cambridge, 1976, pp. 178-79.
70 Spengler, Untergang, p. 41.
71 Spengler’s ideas on the cyclical nature o f history contain strong echoes of the thought of Vico 
and Herder. See Isaiah Berlin, Three Critics o f  the Enlightenment: Vico, Hamann, Herder, 
Princeton, 2000.
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Bakhtin’s solution in the face of the degradation of experience in the wasteland of 
modem existence is a moral imperative. This imperative, distinct from Kant’s 
moral imperative, is rooted in the event of being, and hence it is non-categorical, 
since it is not interested in universally applicable laws but in specific situations.72
We must not allow our lives to fall away from answerability. Despite the
apparent hopelessness of the situation of contemporary culture, this seems a
simple solution. Furthermore, the situation is not so hopeless as at first it may
seem. Bakhtin argues, as I have shown above, that the unity of culture and life
can only be recreated in the unity of human activity. It follows from Bakhtin’s
argument that every subject can participate -indeed is obliged to participate -  in
the recreation of that unity. Where history, as Spengler conceives of it, is
powerless, responsible human participation holds the key to the renewal of life.
This imperative is, moreover, modest in its demands. A change from an attitude
of pride to an attitude of humble responsibility will reverse the eroding effect of
inauthentic habitualization:
The tacit presupposition of life’s ritualism is not humility, but pride.
One has to develop humility to the point of participating in person and 
being answerable in person. In attempting to understand our whole 
life as secret [Coates translates this as ‘masked’ which seems to make 
more sense] representation and every act we perform -  as ritual act, 
we turn ourselves into impostors or pretenders. (TPA 52)
Bakhtin’s modest imperative does not ask us to do different things from what we 
do anyway; it simply asks us to do those things in a certain fashion. Thus, it is 
concerned with a way of acting rather than acts, with the process of positing rather
72 Brandist argues that Bakhtin’s ethics in Toward a Philosophy o f the Act come about, in part, 
through the appropriation of Simmel’s critique of the categorical imperative: ‘Simmel had 
transformed the Kantian concept of duty [...] into the structure o f individual experience.
Rationally discerned obligation was now replaced by the sentiment, or feeling of obligation. This 
allowed Simmel to argue that what one is morally obliged to do is dependent on historical 
circumstances and that the “sentiment o f obligation”, conscience, is the internalized promptings of 
social discipline.’ Brandist, The Bakhtin Circle, p. 37. Bakhtin’s objections to the abstract nature 
of the categorical imperative for the concrete individual do echo Simmel when the latter speaks of 
the ‘the indifference of the law for the individual’. Georg Simmel, ‘Das individuelle Gesetz: Em 
Versuch iiber das Prinzip der Ethik’, in Aufsatze und Abhandlungen 1909-1918, pp. 417-70 (425). 
Bakhtin also stresses the situational nature o f ethics. It should, nevertheless, be clear that Bakhtin 
would object to the idea that the lebensphilosophische notion of empathetic sentiment [Einfuhlung] 
could be the basis of ethics or that ethical obligation could be given by internalized social norms. 
This last suggestion would be an abdication of responsibility. Responsibility is a principle, even if 
it is not one that tends towards universal laws.
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than the act of the given. Bakhtin asks us to act in a manner that recognizes 
difference. Bakhtin asks us to act with love.73
Bakhtin speaks of love in the following terms:
The valued manifoldness of Being as human (as correlated with the 
human being) can present itself only to a loving contemplation. Only 
love is capable of holding and making fast all this multiformity and 
diversity, without losing and dissipating it, without leaving behind a 
mere skeleton of basic lines and sense-moments. Only un-self- 
interested love on the principle of “I love him not because he is good, 
but he is good because I love him,” only lovingly interested attention, 
is capable of generating a sufficiently intent power to encompass and 
retain the concrete manifoldness of Being, without impoverishing and 
schematizing it. An indifferent or hostile reaction is always a reaction 
that impoverishes and decomposes its object; it seeks to pass over the 
object in all its manifoldness, to ignore it or to overcome it. The very 
function of indifference biologically consists in freeing us from the 
manifoldness of Being, diverting us from what is inessential for us 
practically -  a kind of economy or preservation from being dissipated 
in the manifoldness. And this is the function of forgetting as well.
{TPA 64)
The loving attitude does not impoverish or schematize the loved one. ‘I love him 
not because he is good.’ If one loves someone because he is good, one asserts the 
primacy of a general category over the specific particularity of the loved one.74
73 An interpretation of Bakhtin’s conception o f love from a theological standpoint runs though 
Coates, Christianity in Bakhtin. Coates also discusses Kagan’s conception o f love and its relation 
to Bakhtin in Ruth Coates, ‘Two of a Small Fraternity? Points o f Contact and Departure in the 
Work of Bakhtin and Kagan up to 1924’, in Shepherd (ed.), The Contexts o f Bakhtin, pp. 17-28. 
Palmieri discusses Bakhtin’s conception o f love and notes its debt to Scheler in Giovanni Palmieri, 
“‘The Author” According to Bakhtin... And Bakhtin the Author’, in Shepherd (ed.), The Contexts 
of Bakhtin, pp. 45-56 (54-55). Brandist also reveals the extent o f the influence o f Max Scheler on 
Bakhtin as regards the conception o f self-other relations. Brandist makes frequent reference to 
this, particularly the conception of self-other relations, but does not say very much about Bakhtin’s 
conception of love. He is even able to refer to the notes that Bakhtin made on Scheler’s work. See 
Brandist, The Bakhtin Circle, pp. 36-52. Certainly, Scheler’s influence was strong. Scheler objects 
to those trends that see the essence o f loving as a merging with the loved object. Instead, he 
describes love as an intersubjective act. The following, for example, is his interpretation of 
Augustine which also reflects his own views: ‘The appearance o f an image or meaning in the 
intellectual act, even in the simplest perception, is for him not merely an activity of the knowing 
subject that penetrates the completed object. Rather an image is simultaneously an answering 
reaction of the object itself, a “giving o f itself’ or a “self-revealing'’ of the object. An image is a 
consequence of a “question” asked with “love” that the world answers and in so doing reveals 
itself. In this revelation the world comes to its full existence and value.' Max Scheler, ‘Love and 
Knowledge’, in On Feeling, Knowing and Valuing, ed. and trans. by Harold Bershady, Chicago, 
1992, pp. 147-65 (163-64). This passage contains a position that is close to Bakhtin’s.
74 Bakhtin’s conception o f love is not subordinated to morality. Morality may be understood as a 
grouping of general categories. The maxim, ‘I love him not because he is good but he is good
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The particularity of the loved one is seen through the prism of the general and the 
result is a flattening of that particularity. The difference that is inherent in that 
particularity is converted into the equivalence of a general value and hence erased. 
Love does not do this; it values difference and particularity. Indifference, then, is 
love’s opposite: ‘Lovelessness, indifference, will never be able to generate 
sufficient power to slow down and linger intently over an object, to hold and 
sculpt every detail and particular in it, however minute’ {TPA 64). For 
indifference is the lovelessness, the unwillingness to participate, that erases 
difference.
Earlier in the essay Bakhtin has a passage in which the themes of love and
indifference are bound together in a striking fashion:
That he is mortal, for example, acquires its value-sense only from my 
unique place, inasmuch as I die, my fellow-being dies, and all 
historical mankind dies. And, of course, the emotional-volitional, 
valuative sense of my death, of the death of an other who is dear to 
me, and the fact of any actual person’s death are all profoundly 
different in each case, for all these are different moments in once- 
occurrent Being-as-event. For a disembodied, detached (non­
participating) subiectum, all deaths may be equal. No one, however, 
lives in a world in which all human beings are -  with respect to value 
-  equally mortal. {TPA 48)
In so far as I accept my participation in the world, I must accept the responsibility 
that I am not indifferent and that I engage evaluatively with others. I recognize 
my different evaluative and emotive responses to the imagined and real deaths of 
those around me. This is an attitude of love since it takes as its criterion of 
valuation those who are dear to me. Love produces a world that is variegated. 
Lovelessness, however, erases this difference. It transforms variegated deaths that 
are distinct in the evaluations attached to them into a series of undifferentiated 
equivalent units to which I am indifferent. Lovelessness and theoreticism are 
shown by Bakhtin as part of the same continuum. The link that Bakhtin makes 
between lovelessness, theoreticism and indifference to the particularity of deaths
because I love him’, allows the possibility that love might not conform to standard moral 
categories.
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makes him a modem thinker of a century that, in theoreticism turned to radical 
evil, put technology in the service of genocide.75
The loving attitude does not objectify the loved one. Love is interested, in 
one sense, as Bakhtin states, but it is also disinterested, (or rather, un-self- 
interested). Indifference objectifies the other; it also instrumentalizes the other, 
ignoring what is ‘inessential practically’. If I love someone because s/he is good 
then a possible implication is that I approach her as good for something, for some 
purpose that is external to her. If I love him or her and then, secondarily find that 
s/he is good, my focus remains on him or her. Love does not instrumentalize in 
this fashion, nor does it not seek to possess the other as an object.77 Rather, it 
respects the other as a subject. I, as a subject, am concrete and manifold. When I 
love, I do not reduce the loved one to an object; hence I preserve his or her 
subject-nature, that is, his or her concrete and manifold nature. This gives another 
dimension to the three architectonic categories that Bakhtin gives earlier in the 
essay. When, unlovingly, I act as I-for-myself, I encounter other subjects as
750nce again, Arendt offers a point o f comparison with Bakhtin’s thought. Arendt argues in The 
Human Condition that human beings should not limit themselves to the abstraction of 
contemplation but rather at cultivating a vita activa, since it is only in participation and action that 
we are capable of moral responsibility. Understood in this fashion, her account of Adolf 
Eichmann shows that the banality of evil is possible when human beings do not participate 
actively. For Arendt, Eichmann allowed what Bakhtin would term the pride of ritualism to 
overcome his individuality and hence he never thought critically - or did anything - about his 
complicity in the massacre of millions. See Arendt, The Human Condition, and Hannah Arendt, 
Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality o f  Evil, London, 1998. Mihailovic performs a 
more immediate contextualization o f Toward a Philosophy o f the Act and the link between 
theoreticism and indifference to death, noting that it was written ‘in the aftermath of the Russian 
Civil War when thousands perished or gave their own lives for inflexibly held political principles’. 
Mihailovic, Corporeal Words, p. 64.
76 It is the disinterested nature o f aesthetic activity, in the sense meant by Kant with the term 
interessenlos, that brings it close to loving activity.
77 This is one of the points where Bakhtin parts company with the existentialist ethics with which -  
in, for example, his emphasis on authentic being -  he may seem to share common ground. Coates 
notes, for example, that ‘Bakhtin’s description of the pretender bears a striking resemblance to 
Sartre’s person living in bad faith’. Coates, ‘Bakhtin and Kagan’, p. 23. Sartre, however, 
conceives of love (on the analogy of sexual love) as the desire to possess, hence he conceives of 
love as an oscillation between love and hatred, of the desire to be possessed and to possess. See 
Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology, New York, 
1954, pp. 339-430. For a discussion o f this and, in particular, the lack of a Sartrean conception of 
shame in Bakhtin, as well as an assessment o f hierarchy in ‘Author and Hero’, see Ann Jefferson, 
‘Bodymatters: Self and Other in Bakhtin, Sartre and Barthes’, in Hirschkop and Shepherd (eds), 
Bakhtin and Cultural Theory, pp. 152-57. The ultimate point of conflict between Bakhtin and 
Sartre must be, however, as Clark and Holquist point out, Sartre’s maxim that ‘hell is other 
people’. Clark and Holquist, Bakhtin, p. 94.
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objects, as others-for-me. When I love, however, I act as I-for-the other, 
preserving what is subject within the other. Nor do I lose my own subjectivity 
since I do not merge with him or her. This is the basis of Bakhtin’s inter­
subjective ethics: the world as a world made up of a multitude of different 
subjects rather than as a world made up of a mass of equivalent objects.
Loving the other in a humble and responsible fashion, not as an object but in
such a fashion that her or his subjectivity is preserved and her or his manifold and
concrete nature is recognized, means that I must adopt an attitude towards the
other that is as close as possible to the attitude that I adopt towards my own
subjectivity. This precept has a simple transcription: love your neighbour as
yourself. Bakhtin makes this explicit in the final paragraph of the essay:
The concrete ought is an architectonic ought: the ought to actualize 
one’s unique place in once-occurrent Being-as-event. And it is 
determined first and foremost as a contraposition of the I and the 
other... Whence it does not follow at all, of course, that the 
contraposition of I and the other has never been expressed and stated -  
this is, after all, the sense of all Christian morality, and it is the 
starting point for altruistic morality. But this [3 illegible words] 
principle of morality has still not found an adequate scientific 
expression, nor has it been thought through essentially and fully. {TPA 
75)
The theological readings of Coates and Mihailovic do not draw this conclusion. 
Both are concerned to put Bakhtin’s ethics in the Christological setting of
7 Rincarnation. Nevertheless, it seems inescapable that the whole thrust of 
Bakhtin’s essay is a secularized philosophical argument for a Christian ethics in a 
modem world.79
78 Coates, Christianity in Bakhtin, for example, pp. 32-35. The whole of Mihailovic’s Corporeal 
Words reads Bakhtin with reference to the notion of incarnation. He deals with Toward a 
Philosophy o f the Act on pp. 51-85.
79 Emerson and Morson dismiss a theological reading o f Toward a Philosophy o f the Act: ‘In 
contrast to those Russian -  and Russian Orthodox -  admirers of Bakhtin (including his editor 
Sergei Bocharov, and those Western commentators who have seen Bakhtin’s thought as essentially 
religious) the work barely touches on theology, except in one passage. [...] It would seem hard to 
justify the notion that Bakhtin’s works are, at least in the Western sense of the term, really a 
theology in code.’ Gary Saul Morson and Caryl Emerson, ‘Introduction: Rethinking Bakhtin’, in 
Morson and Emerson (eds), Rethinking Bakhtin, pp. 1-60 (6). I argue that Bakhtin’s secular 
Christian ethics are plain to see here and not in code.
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A key for understanding Bakhtin’s thinking here may be found in a thinker
whose work seems, so far, not to have found resonance in Bakhtin scholarship:
Thomas Hobbes. Given Bakhtin’s extreme disdain for acknowledgement, the fact
that Bakhtin mentions Hobbes is striking. Bakhtin gives a brief but accurate
summary of the central thrust of Hobbes’s Leviathan (1660):
At one time man actually established all cultural values and now is 
bound by them. Thus the power of the people, according to Hobbes, 
is exercised at one time only, in the act of renouncing themselves to 
the ruler; after that the people become slaves of their own free 
decision. {TPA 35)
Bakhtin clearly objects to Hobbes’s notion of sovereignty. The Leviathan stands 
as the result of the final objectification of the cultural and theoretical sphere into a 
authoritarian political realm whose subjects, having relinquished all activity and 
all responsibility once and for all, are mere slaves. Nevertheless, Bakhtin’s and 
Hobbes’s thought display a similar structure, despite radical dissimilarities.80
Like Bakhtin, Hobbes’s work has as its basis an examination of
O 1
experience. From his theoretical investigations into the nature of experience, he 
concludes that man lives in a fragmented and divided world.82 He argues from 
this that subjects must find some way of establishing a unity.83 The means by 
which Hobbes argues that such a unity can be established is by following an
80 The link that Hobbes makes between authorship and authority, in Chapter XVI, ‘Of Persons, 
Authors and Things Personated’, finds a resonance in Bakhtin’s thinking on the same themes in 
‘Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity’. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. by Richard Tuck, 
Cambridge, 1996, pp. 111-15. One might also argue for the importance of Hobbes’s philosophy of 
language to Bakhtin and, perhaps, Voloshinov. Using arguments that bear comparison with 
Voloshinov’s distinction between theme and meaning (which I discuss in the next chapter),
Hobbes argues that meaning is not a fixed property of words but rather that speakers’ evaluative 
judgements, based on their desire for power and their own gain, are the basis of signification. See 
Hobbes, Chapter IV, ‘Of Speech’, Leviathan, pp. 24-31, where Hobbes develops a theory of 
language in which signification is determined by evaluation.
81 Hobbes, Leviathan, Chapters I-XI.
82 Such is Hobbes’s ‘naturall condition o f mankind’ in which we find ‘three principall causes of 
quarell. First, Competition; Secondly, Diffidence; Thirdly, Glory’; these result in life being 
characterized by ‘continuall fear, and danger o f violent death; And the life of man, solitary, poore, 
nasty, brutish, and short.’ Hobbes, Leviathan, Chapter XIII, pp. 88-89. Like Bakhtin, Hobbes 
makes his argument entirely on an ahistorical analysis o f experience. Like Bakhtin, however, one 
can easily contextualize Hobbes’s thought in terms o f contemporary concerns -  in Hobbes’s case 
the crisis of authority in the English Civil War period - rather than Bakhtin’s Russian civil war.
See Johann P. Sommerville, Thomas Hobbes: Political Ideas in Historical Contexts, London,
1992.
83 Hobbes, Leviathan, Chapter XVIII, ‘The Establishment of the Commonwealth’.
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imperative, the central, second law of nature from which all the other laws are 
derived:
From this Fundamentall Law of Nature, by which men are 
commanded to endeavour Peace, is derived this second Law; That a 
man be willing, when others are so too, as farre-forth, as for Peace, 
and defence ofhimselfe he shall think necessary, to lay down this right 
to all things; and be contented with so much liberty against other men, 
as he would allow other men against himselfe... This is the Law of 
the Gospell; Whatsoever you require that other should do to you, that 
do ye to them. And that Law of all men, Quod tibi fieri non vis, alteri 
nefeceris.84
Hobbes, whose narrative of human nature has nothing to do with a biblical 
narrative, manages to bring the ‘Law of the GospelT and the ‘Law of all men’ into 
a relationship of concordance without inserting a theological element into his
Of
secular argument. In a similar fashion, Bakhtin’s Toward a Philosophy o f the 
Act attempts to give Christ’s new commandment an ‘adequate scientific 
expression’ and to think it through ‘essentially and fully’ on a secular basis.
There is, however, a profound difference between Hobbes and Bakhtin on 
this point. Whilst Hobbes’s law of nature does not have the force of a law of 
nature as the terms would be used by Kant, it is nevertheless, Hobbes implies, a 
maxim or imperative that men and women will, in the course of time and with 
experience, see that it is in their best interest to follow. Thus, Hobbes, despite his 
initially negative characterization of human nature, can be seen to contain an 
unexpected optimism. This is not the case for Bakhtin. In Bakhtin’s tragedy of 
culture as described in the admittedly unfinished work, Toward a Philosophy o f 
the Act, his imperative for responsible activity remains no more than a plea.
84 Hobbes, Leviathan, Chapter XIV, p. 92.
85 For a discussion of the relationship between Hobbes’s theology and what Overhoff terms his 
materialism, see Jurgen Overhoff, ‘The Theology o f Thomas Hobbes’s Leviathan (Examining the 
antagonism between materialist philosophy and traditional Christian eschatology)’, Journal of 
Ecclesiastical History, 51, 2000, 3, pp. 527-55.
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3. Beniamin’s Crisis of Experience
Many critics have noted Benjamin’s use of the terms Erlebnis and Erfahrung.86 
Few, however, have recognized the extent to which Benjamin develops a theory 
of different modes of experience that emerges from his early engagement with 
Simmel and notions of the tragedy of culture. Jay, however, traces this heritage 
and comments, in such a way that Benjamin’s kinship with Bakhtin should be 
immediately clear, that what set Benjamin apart from his immediate predecessors 
in German thought, people like Dilthey and Husserl, ‘was his disdain for both the 
alleged immediacy and meaningfulness of Erlebnis and the overly rational, 
disinterested version of Erfahrung defended by the positivists and the neo- 
Kantians’.87 One reason for critics’ slowness to point out this connection is that 
Benjamin’s use of these terms can be confusing. Benjamin takes from Simmel 
and the lebensphilosophische tradition a notion of the split between Erlebnis and 
Erfahrung. The confusion arises from the fact that the synthetic mode of 
experience that Benjamin proposes as a solution to this tragedy is itself termed by 
Benjamin a qualified form of Erfahrung. This, however, should not blind the 
reader to the fact that Benjamin shares with Bakhtin the same view on the limits 
of Erfahrung in the traditional, Kantian sense. In its place, Benjamin seeks a 
variety of forms of Erfahrung which are qualified in various ways, depending on 
the context in which he is writing: as ‘future’, ‘higher’, ‘absolute’, ‘disappearing’, 
and ‘narratable’.
86 See, for example, Beatrice Hansen, ‘Language and Mimesis in Walter Benjamin’s Work’, in 
Ferris (ed.), Companion to Benjamin, pp. 54-72 (70-71); Thomas Weber, ‘Erfahrung’, in Michael 
Opitz and Erdmut Wizisla (eds.), Benjamins Begriffe, Frankfurt/Main, 2000, pp. 230-59; taking 
one example: in his generally perspicacious study, McCole devotes seven pages to the question of 
‘just what is actually responsible for the mutual exclusivity of Erlebnis and Erfahrung', without 
exploring the intellectual-historical context o f the ‘tragedy of culture’ which would provide much 
in the way of an answer. McCole, Benjamin, pp. 272-79.
87 Jay, ‘Experience without a Subject’, p. 195. Plate is another critic who, apparently 
independently of Jay, recognizes this aspect of Benjamin’s thought and its debt to the 
confrontation o f Kantianism and Lebensphilosophie: ‘Benjamin was not content with either 
[Erfahrung or Erlebnis] -  the former being too rationalistic and pragmatically impossible to render 
in a modem age of shock, the latter being too immediate and individualistic -  and so instead he 
sets up a dialectic between the two varieties o f experience, attempting to overcome the subject- 
object distinction’. Plate, Benjamin, Religion, and Aesthetics, p. 4.
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Whilst Benjamin rejects much of Kant, then, he still uses Erfahrung as the 
term for a synthesis of the particularity of Erlebnis with some other quality, as had 
Kant. The difference lies in Benjamin’s rejection of the notion that this other 
quality in Erfahrung is universality. Benjamin tends to substitute for Kant’s 
‘universality’ the term ‘narratable’ (mitteilbar). Narratability lies somewhere 
between the particular and the universal: it is common to a number of subjects as 
communication, hence not particular, but restricted historically and culturally, 
hence not universal. It is the notion of narratability that explains Benjamin as the 
philosopher of language and the literary and art critic; an analysis of historically 
and culturally located artistic works yields a view of the central quality of 
narratability.
In the academic year 1912-13, Benjamin was, as we have seen, at the
University of Berlin. Here, as well as attending the lectures of Simmel and others,
he became deeply involved in a wide range of student and youth associations.88 It
was in this context that he contributed to the journal, Der Anfang. In the opening
paragraph of an article in the August 1913 issue, Benjamin writes as follows:
The present accuses those whose souls are most powerfully inhabited 
by a feeling of a future task [Aufgabe] of being ‘lacking in a sense of 
history’. For this is what they call a sense of the definite, not the 
indefinite, a sense of the given [das Gegebene], not the posited [das 
Aufgegebene]. So strong is its sense of history, this sense of facts, 
restraint and caution, that the present is probably most especially poor 
in actual ‘historical ideas’. These it generally calls ‘Utopias’ and has 
them fail in the face of the ‘eternal laws’ of nature. It rejects a task 
that cannot be contained by a programme of reform, a task that 
demands a new movement of spirits and a radical new way of seeing.
0GSII51)
This was followed by a piece, more a manifesto of the youth movement than an
article, in the October issue. The piece bears the title ‘Erfahrung’:
In our fight for responsibility, we fight against someone who is 
masked. The mask of the adult is called experience [Erfahrung]. It is 
expressionless, impenetrable, and ever the same. The adult has 
already experienced [erlebt] everything [...] We have not yet
88 Benjamin was one o f the founder members o f the ‘Detachment for School Reform’, on the 
committee of the Free Students’ Union, lecturing on behalf o f the ‘League for Free School 
Communities’ and still in regular contact with his mentor, the educational reformer, Gustav 
Wyneken (1875-1964). See Brodersen, Benjamin, pp. 46-49.
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experienced [erfuhren\ anything. [...] That is what they have 
experienced, this one thing, never anything different: the 
meaninglessness of Life. Its brutality. Have they ever yet encouraged 
us to anything great or new or forward-looking? Oh no, precisely 
because these are things one cannot experience. (G S II54; SW 13)
Beneath the youthful, provocative rhetoric of these two statements, which one can 
take together, lie the germs of Benjamin’s life-long meditation on the nature of 
experience. Furthermore, we notice some points in common with Bakhtin’s 
notion of experience in Toward a Philosophy o f the Act.
As in Bakhtin’s critique of theoreticism in the contemporary crisis of the 
act, Benjamin describes a form of experience (Erfahrung) that is characterized by 
its regularity and repeatability, its habitual nature, its conformity to ‘eternal laws’, 
and its sense of the given (das Gegebene). This experience erases difference, 
representing always the one thing {das Eine), and never anything different {das 
Andere). This experience is expressionless (ausdruckslos) and unchanging like a 
mask. Thus, like the ritualism of Bakhtin’s impostor, the mask of Erfahrung is a 
way of disclaiming responsibility. Similarly, Erfahrung is impenetrable 
(undurchdringlich); it neutralizes participation. Benjamin’s conception of 
Erfahrung brings to our attention an aspect of Bakhtin’s notion of theoreticism 
which I have not yet commented on. Erfahrung is characterized by restraint 
{Gebundenheit) and caution ( Vorsicht). Bakhtin argues similarly that if we are 
governed by theoreticism ‘we would have cast ourselves out of life -  as 
answerable, risk-fraught, and open becoming’ {TPA 9). The theoreticism of 
Erfahrung excludes the risk of life. Finally, Benjamin argues that Erfahrung 
results in the acceptance of brutality -  an idea that is close to Bakhtin’s idea that 
theoreticism is indifferent to death. Benjamin also brings new themes to this 
discussion. First, Benjamin establishes a parallel between ontogenesis and 
phylogenesis. Erfahrung is the experience of the adult. The process of becoming 
adult is a process of the ossification of true experience, just as there is a historical 
ossification of experience.89
89 The themes o f childhood, youth, and the nature o f experience - which seem not to have a 
parallel in Bakhtin’s writings - are a feature o f Benjamin’s entire career which occur for example, 
in his writings on toys, on childrens’ literature, on mimesis, and in his autobiographical texts.
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This early Benjamin differs radically from Bakhtin, however, in his vitalism
and, indeed, Decadence:
Nothing is so hateful to the philistine as the ‘dreams of his youth’ [...].
And most of the time sentimentality is the protective camouflage of 
his hatred. For what appeared to him in his dreams was the voice of 
the spirit [Geist], which once called him just as it calls every man.
Youth is the eternal, reproachful reminder of this. That is why he 
combats it. He tells the young of that grim, overwhelming experience 
[Erfahrung] and teaches the young man to laugh at himself [...].
Again: we know of another experience [Erfahrung]. It can be hostile 
to spirit and destructive to many blossoming dreams [Blutentraume]. 
Nevertheless it is the most beautiful, most intangible, most 
incommunicable, since it can never be without spirit as long as we 
remain young. As Zarathustra says, the individual can experience 
[erlebt] himself only at the end of his wanderings. The Philistine has 
his ‘experience’ [Erfahrung]; it is the eternal one of spiritlessness 
[Geisteslosigkeit]. The young man will experience [erleben] Spirit 
[...]. (G SII56; S W I4-5)
This passage, in its celebration of the possibility of destruction of illusion (the 
Blutentraume), in its hostility to spirit (Geist) that paradoxically preserves spirit 
from the spiritlessness (Geisteslosigkeit) of the Philistine, and in its rejection of 
sentimentality, strongly echoes Nietzsche. It echoes not only Nietzsche’s Thus 
Spake Zarathustra (1883-85) but also The Genealogy o f Morals (1887) and its 
noble barbarian, free from social constraints, who constitutes the antithesis to 
nihilistic, ressentiment-bound, mediocre, contemporary humanity.90 Thus, whilst 
he speaks of the youth movement’s need for ‘another form of experience’ (eine 
andere Erfahrung), Benjamin here, in Nietszchean and lebensphilosophische 
mode, may be seen to be championing Erlebnis.
90 See Friedrich Nietzsche, ‘The Genealogy o f Morals’, in Basic Writings o f Nietzsche, ed. and 
trans. by Walter Kaufmann, New York, 1992, 451-599, especially pp. 475-80. This is the passage 
that discusses the infamous blonde Bestie. One can discern in Benjamin’s text not only the 
influence of Nietzsche but also perhaps o f Decadence. The opposition of the destructive and 
rejuvenating Barbarian and enervated and sterile philistine civilization is a standard topos of 
Decadence from Verlaine’s ‘La Langueur’ onwards.
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Benjamin’s uncritical enthusiasm for Erlebnis will be subjected to 
thoroughgoing revision.91 One point remains, however, to be drawn from this 
essay on experience. In this essay, Benjamin draws out of the term Erfahrung a 
shade of meaning that becomes central to his later thinking on experience. The 
German word Erfahrung carries a sense of the transmissibility of experience.
What one has learned [erfahren], one can also teach or pass on as tradition.92 In 
the example here, the adult generation attempts to pass on its experience in the 
form of Erfahrung. This is the bitter and conservative ‘experience’ of the adult 
who, in saying, ‘don’t attempt to change anything; I thought about trying as a 
young man and I failed’, presents the world as immutable. Here, the form of 
tradition that is passed from adults to the younger generation is authoritarian. In 
the face of this authoritarian conservative tradition of Erfahrung, the necessary 
force of destruction is represented by the barbarous revolt of youth and the 
vitalism of Erlebnis.
Benjamin revises this position in his later critique of Lebensphilosophie, 
an expression of which can be found in a review-article, ‘Theories of German 
Fascism’. Published in 1930, it deals with a collection of rightist memoires of the 
experience of the First World War, edited by Ernst Jiinger. As we have seen, 
Jiinger and his comrades had seen in war the expression of a vibrant if brutal 
Urerlebnis and a radical rejection of the ossified and exhausted forms of modem, 
bourgeois experience. They implicitly identify with the aristocratic barbarian of 
the Decadent and Nietzschean imagination. Benjamin recognizes this association: 
‘The most rabidly decadent origins of this new theory of war are emblazoned on 
their foreheads: it is nothing other than an uninhibited translation of the principles 
of / 'art pour I ’art to war itself (GS III 240; S W II314).93 The celebration of the
91 Benjamin revisits the notion o f a positive barbarism in the essay o f 1933, ‘Experience and 
Poverty’. By this point, however, his ideas have been purged o f vitalism. See GS 7/213-29; SW II 
731-36.
92 This sense o f Erfahrung is already implicit in Kant’s use of the term: Kant’s Erfahrung is 
universal as opposed to the singularity o f Erlebnisse; hence it must be communicable.
93 Here, then, Benjamin first introduces the idea, to be worked out more fully in the ‘The Work of 
Art’, that fascism is the aestheticization o f politics. Benjamin points to the connection between 
Jiinger’s celebration o f experience and an aristocratic standpoint with a quotation: ‘With the 
mobilization o f the masses, o f worse blood, o f those with a bourgeois sensibility, in short o f the 
common man, especially into the ranks o f the officers, more and more of the eternally aristocratic 
elements o f the soldierly craft have been destroyed’ (GS III 240-41; S W II314). As Benjamin
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rawness of life, then, in Benjamin’s reading, results in fact in a transfiguration of
life into the aesthetic. Benjamin makes a similar criticism of Lebensphilosophie
in ‘On some Motifs in Baudelaire’:
Since the end of the last century, philosophy has made a series of 
attempts to lay hold of ‘true’ experience as opposed to the kind that 
manifests itself in the standardized, denatured life of the civilized 
masses. These efforts are usually classified under the rubric of 
Lebensphilosophie. Their point of departure, understandably enough, 
was not the individual’s existence in society. Instead, they have 
evoked poetry [Dichtung], or preferably nature, and, most recently, 
the age of myths. Dilthey’s book Das Erlebnis und die Dichtung 
represents one of the earliest of these efforts, which culminate with 
Klages and Jung, who made common cause with fascism. (GS 1 608;
SWIV  314)
Lebensphilosophie, by ignoring ‘the individual’s existence in society’, ends in a 
conception of life as a hypostatized mythical nature which, paradoxically, 
excludes life itself. This constitutes its kinship with fascism. Similarly, the 
vitalist Jiinger believes that he is celebrating the life of man. In reducing his 
conception of the life of man to the biological and animal, however, the true 
essence of life escapes him and the experience which he champions is no more 
than aesthetically produced illusion.
Benjamin argues that these rightist theorists of war have failed to understand 
the true nature of their subject. In their focus on the archetypal, aristocratic 
individual warrior who rediscovers in war a lost Urerlebnis, they fail to capture 
the specificity of this war with its massed ranks of modem men. In their emphasis 
on the eternal nature of war, which they wrap up in archaic, cultic rhetoric, Jiinger 
et al. fail to recognize the essentially historical and modem nature of war. The 
historical and modem nature of war is to be found in its relationship to 
technology:
War -  the ‘eternal war’ that they talk about so much here, as well as 
the most recent one -  is said to be the highest manifestation of the 
German nation. It should be clear that behind their ‘eternal’ war is 
concealed the idea of cultic war, just as behind the most recent war 
hides the idea of technological war; and it should also be clear that
comments, this is at best a tactless thing to say in view o f the numbers of ordinary soldiers who 
died.
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these authors have had little success in perceiving these relationships.
(G S M 241-42; SWII3>\A-\5)
The relationship of technology to modem (‘imperialist’) war is described by
Benjamin as follows:
Without going too deeply into the significance of the economic causes 
of war, one might say that the harshest, most disastrous aspects of 
imperialist war are in part the result of the gaping discrepancy 
between the gigantic means of technology and the miniscule moral 
illumination it affords. Indeed, according to its economic nature, 
bourgeois society cannot help insulating everything technological as 
much as possible from the so called spiritual, and it cannot help 
resolutely excluding technology’s right of determination in the social 
order. Any future war will also be a slave revolt [Sklavenaufstand] of 
technology. (GS77/238; SW II 313)
Here we see a creative synthesis of Simmel’s notion of the tragedy of culture and 
Marx’s theory of the fetish-character of the commodity.94 Benjamin attributes the 
particular, modem, brutal power of war to two, mutually reinforcing sources: the 
crushing weight of an objective culture that has been divorced from the subjective 
realm, and a commodity society where fetishized products control their creators. 
As for Bakhtin in Toward a Philosophy o f the Act, so for Benjamin, technology, 
the product of objective culture, has become separate from human beings’ 
subjective and volitional activity with devastating consequences.
The abyss between subjective and objective culture neutralizes subjective
activity in such a way that any objections we might have to make, whether about
the forms of social organization or the moral justification for war, are irrelevant.95
Hence, just as Marx argues that in commodity form, which determines the
capitalist mode of production, the products of our collective activity come to be
animated and exercise control over their creators, so here in war technology rebels
against its owners. The correct relationship between man, technology and nature
has been violently inverted. As Benjamin puts it in the ‘The Work of Art’:
[...] the destruction caused by war furnished proof that society was 
not sufficiently developed to master the elemental forces of society.
94 There is also, in the term Sklavenaufstand, an implied reference to Nietzsche.
95 Benjamin may echo here Lukacs’s identification o f the static attitude o f contemplation - which 
he attributes both to Kant’s philosophy and the attitude of the worker in front of a machine -  as a 
defining feature o f reified consciousness. See Lukacs, ‘Reification’.
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[...] Imperialistic war is an uprising on the part o f technology, which 
demands repayment in ‘human material' for the natural material 
society has denied it. Instead of draining rivers, society directs a 
human stream into a bed of trenches; instead of dropping seeds from 
airplanes, it drops incendiary bombs over cities. (GS 1 507-08; SW IV  
270)
Jiinger’s celebration of the subjective sphere gives a mythologizing justification to 
this total and annihilating victory of objective culture as technology. With 
technology set free for barbarism, modem war, in the age of technological 
capitalism, is the final act in the tragedy of culture.
In his essay on theories of fascism, Benjamin does not attack simply the
mythologizing forces of Jiinger’s vitalism. Benjamin also locates what Leslie
terms an ‘ethical aporia’ in the Idealist philosophy that Benjamin treats as
capitalism’s philosophical counterpart and that we might associate with Bakhtin’s
theoreticism.96 The generalizing and abstracting forces of Idealism are held
responsible for their complete inability to account for the material aspect of
existence, a material aspect which comes shockingly to the fore in the ripped-open
bodies of the battlefield:
It should be said as bitterly as possible: in the face of this ‘landscape 
of total mobilization’, the German feeling for nature has had an 
undreamed-of upsurge. The pioneers of peace, who settle nature in so 
sensuous a manner, were evacuated from these landscapes, and as far 
as anyone could see over the edge of the trench, the surrounding had 
become the terrain of German Idealism; every shell crater had become 
a problem, every wire entanglement an antinomy, every barb a 
definition, every explosion a thesis. (GS III 247; SJT7/318-19)
Kantian idealism cannot account for the brutally material nature of this world. It 
transforms it into an abstract language of ethical justification which bypasses its 
intense materiality. The categorical imperative with its emphasis on universal 
laws does not deal with a concrete war, hence it can be complicit in allowing it to 
happen and even in justifying it on abstract ethical grounds. The ravaged 
landscape of the trenches is a transformed but familiar version of Kant’s ethical
96 Leslie, Walter Benjamin, p. 33. Leslie’s study contains a sustained reading o f Benjamin’s 
theory of fascism which seeks to explain Benjamin’s turn to Marxist materialism. Whilst I agree 
with Leslie’s reading in a number o f respects, I seek to emphasize that Benjamin’s concern with 
the concrete nature o f experience is more than simply part o f a turn to a necessarily Marxist 
materialism.
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landscape. Benjamin stresses the compatibility of Kantian ethics and totally 
mobilized war in the continuation of the words quoted above: ‘by day the sky 
was the cosmic interior of the steel helmet, and at night the moral law above’ (GS 
III 247; SW II319) - a bitter travesty of Kant.97
This image of the desolate landscape of the trenches where Kant’s starry
firmament has become the inside of a helmet and the moral law is suspended in
the fearful night of the battlefield is a prelude to a passage in ‘The Storyteller’:
Experience [.Erfahrung] has fallen in value. [...] Was it not 
noticeable at the end of the war that men who returned from 
the battlefield had grown silent - not richer but poorer in 
communicable experience? What poured out in the flood of 
war books ten years later was anything but experience that 
can be shared orally. And there was nothing remarkable 
about that. For never has experience been more thoroughly 
belied than strategic experience by tactical warfare, economic 
experience by inflation, bodily experience by mechanical 
warfare, moral experience by those in power. A generation 
that had gone to school on horse-drawn streetcars now stood 
under the open sky in a landscape where nothing remained 
unchanged but the clouds, and, beneath those clouds, in a 
force-field of destructive torrents and explosions, the tiny, 
fragile human body. (GS 7/439; SW III 143-44)
Modem war with its bombardment of shock and its flood of fragmented bodily 
experience (Erlebnis) displaces the subject and brings about an absolute break 
with tradition and the possibility of communicable experience (mitteilbare 
Erfahrung). The mechanism whereby the psyche transforms that which has been
97The passage to which Benjamin refers here is the opening lines o f the conclusion to Kant’s 
Critique o f Practical Reason (1788): ‘Two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing 
admiration and awe, the oftener and the more steadily we reflect on them: the starry heavens above 
and the moral law within. ’ The passage continues with a striking description o f the way in which 
the synthetic activity o f practical reason conjoins the universal and the particular; on the one hand, 
in practical reason our sense experience and animal being are validated in universal terms; and the 
realm of the universal receives the weight o f actual experience. My orientation towards the laws 
of nature ‘begins from the place I occupy in the external world o f sense, and enlarges my 
connection therein to an unbounded extent with worlds upon worlds and systems of systems’. My 
orientation towards universal moral laws ‘exhibits me in a world which has true infinity, but which 
is traceable only by the understanding, and with which I discern that I am not in a merely 
contingent but in a universal and necessary connection’. Kant, thus, establishes a harmonious and 
dynamic relationship of communication between the realm of universal laws o f nature, the realm 
of universal laws o f morality and the individual cognizing consciousness that inhabits a sensual 
world. Immanuel Kant, Critique o f  Practical Reason and Other Moral Writings (1788), trans. by 
Lewis White Beck, Chicago IL, 1948, p. 351.
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lived through (erlebt) into experience that can be communicated (Erfahrung) has 
ceased to function as a result of an overload of the sensory apparatus. In ‘On 
Some Motifs in Baudelaire’, Benjamin expands this notion to account for the role 
of shock experience in urban life. Drawing on Freud’s theory from Beyond the 
Pleasure Principle on the psychical mechanism for dealing with trauma, he 
suggests that:
the greater the share of the shock factor in particular impressions, the 
more constantly consciousness has to be alert as a screen against 
stimuli; the more efficiently it does so, the less do these impressions 
enter experience [Erfahrung], tending to remain in the sphere of a 
certain hour of one’s life [Erlebnis]. Perhaps the special achievement 
of shock defence may be seen in its function of assigning to an 
incident a precise point in time in consciousness at the cost of the 
integrity of its contents. (GS 7615; SW IV 319)98
Nevertheless, it is not only the change in the nature of Erlebnis, the material and 
random shocks of life, that makes communicable experience impossible.99 The 
objective structures of the modem world themselves have been transformed by 
technology in the broadest sense. Technology transforms strategy into tactics and 
economic experience into inflation. Processes of urbanization and the 
development of increasingly complex structures of social organization create the 
environment of urban shock. Thus, it is also the changed, organized structures of 
objective culture that displace the subject.
The contrast between the human, whose frail physicality in a world of 
violent flux is highlighted in ‘The Storyteller’, and the unchanging heavens is an 
absolute contrast between the particular and the general. That is to say: a 
participative relationship between man and nature has been recast in terms of 
fixed antinomies between the given realm of nature and the posited fragility of 
being. Hence, Benjamin’s statement on the uselessness of modem Erlebnis for 
communicable experience is also a statement on the powerlessness of Kantian 
Erfahrung: whilst the tripartite structure of Kantian experience [Erfahrung] 
persists -  sense experience, universal law and the embodied subject -  the
98 Another source o f this insight is Simmel’s theory o f the modem, urban blase attitude in ‘The 
Metropolis and Mental Life’.
99 Wolin makes this point in Wolin, Benjamin, p. 218.
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communication between these three coordinates no longer functions. Sense 
experience and abstract cognition have been forced apart and a synthesis of the 
two in the mitteilbare Erfahrung of narrative is impossible.
This is a crisis of experience, a division between two modes of experience 
which cannot be brought together. In the modem world, sources of an experience 
that would make sense of the world in a universal and communicable fashion 
{Erfahrung), whether these be the communal, narratable experience of storytelling 
or the theoretical, moral experience of the Kantian tradition, are no longer 
accessible and no longer relevant. The structure of experience of this sort has 
dissolved in the incomprehensible workings of technological capitalism. On the 
contrary, Erlebnis (now transformed by those same workings of technological 
capitalism into the mere shock of isolated and apparently unrelated events that act 
directly on the body) has become the norm. This is, in Benjamin’s various 
descriptions, the experience of the trenches, the syncopated, dislocating rhythm of 
the factory, the jostle of the crowd and the rush of traffic in the big city, the swift 
inter-cutting of images in the montage technique of cinema, the click of the 
camera that isolates a moment, the flare of a match, or the juxtapositions of 
articles on the page of a newspaper. The increase in the power and frequency of 
Erlebnisse qua shock and the subsequent development of mechanisms to combat 
shock bring about what Benjamin diagnoses as the modem atrophy of experience 
{Erfahrung).
In their treatment of Benjamin’s conception of experience, critics do not 
focus on the fact that the atrophy of Erfahrung is paralleled by a degradation of 
Erlebnis. Nevertheless, both facets of experience have been flung apart and both 
have suffered in the process. If we look back to Lebensphilosophie, we shall 
remember that Erlebnis constituted for thinkers such as Simmel, Dilthey and 
Bergson a form of intense subjectivity. Bergson’s intuition, for example, might 
be loosely paraphrased as what one ‘knows in one’s bones’, one’s ‘gut feelings’, 
before one subjects it to the faculty of reason. If we compare this notion of 
intense subjectivity with Benjamin’s notion of Erlebnis, it will be clear that, in 
Benjamin’s analysis, an immense historical shift has occurred. Intense
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subjectivity has been replaced by intense objectivity; the body, far from ‘knowing 
things in its bones’ or having ‘gut feelings’ as a pre-rational form of subjectivity, 
has become an object, buffeted about by the shocks prepared for it by the modem 
world. The new forms of Erfahrung, that are the object of Benjamin’s search, can 
never be Erfahrung in the Kantian sense of the term, however, as will be made 
clear in the next section.100 They will have to be capable of avoiding the pitfalls 
of Kant as well as capable of assimilating this new and degraded form of Erlebnis.
4. Beyond Crisis: A New and Higher Form of Experience
Benjamin’s most systematic treatment of the limitations of Kantian experience is
to be found in his early text, ‘On the Programme of the Coming Philosophy’
(1918). This essay bears many similarities with Bakhtin’s Toward a Philosophy
o f the Act, being both an attempt to go beyond the dominant Kantian tradition and
searching for a philosophy yet to come.101 Unlike Bakhtin, Benjamin does not
rework Kant by countering Kant’s analysis of experience and cognition with a
phenomenological account of the experience of the subject; rather, Benjamin
works from within and attempts to expand Kant’s framework. This essay is more,
however, than a critique of Kant. McCole comments:
[Benjamin’s] interest in systematically extending Kant’s theory of 
experience aimed not only at overcoming Kant’s exclusive orientation 
of epistemology toward the mathematical natural sciences but also -  
perhaps more so -  at recapturing the full range of experience from the 
monopoly being surrendered by default to the vitalist right.102
The ‘coming philosophy’ that Benjamin calls for here is a philosophy that will go 
beyond the tragedy of culture as represented by the split between Kantianism and 
vitalist irrationalism.
100 Gasche, however, makes a case for the presence o f Kantian motifs in the ‘The Work o f Art’, 
commenting: ‘Benjamin’s borrowings from Kant [in the ‘The Work of Art’] do not exclude his 
rejection of major aspects o f Kant’s doctrine. [...] The contention that Benjamin objected to the 
unifying gesture of transcendental deduction, to what he called Kant’s despotism, in other words, 
to his transcendentalism, is highly suggestive o f what sort o f Kant -  a Kant folded back into the 
empirical, a criticist economy without transcendentalism -  is operative in Benjamin’s work.’ 
Rodolph Gasche, ‘Objective Diversions: On Some Kantian Themes in Benjamin’s “The Work of 
Art in the Age o f its Mechanical Reproduction’”, in Andrew Benjamin and Osborne (eds), 
Benjamin’s Philosophy, pp. 183-204 (201-02).
101 Hirschkop mentions, in passing, the similarity between Bakhtin and Benjamin’s ‘On the 
Programme of the Coming Philosophy’ in Hirschkop, Bakhtin, p. 100.
102 McCole, Benjamin, p. 76.
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In Benjamin’s view, Kant’s fundamental mistake is to be traced to the
unconscious historical parochialism that undermines his claim to construct a
theory of knowledge that would be universally valid. Kant’s epistemology is
defined in relation to a distinct form of experience, which Benjamin describes in
the following terms as:
the conception of the naked, self-evident experience, which for Kant, 
as a man who somehow shared the horizon of his times, seemed to be 
the only experience given, indeed, the only experience possible. This 
experience, however, [...] was unique and temporally limited. (GS II 
158; S W I\  01)
Kant defines knowledge in relation to his own epoch’s narrow notion of 
Newtonian mathematical and scientific empirical experience. Hence, he limits 
himself to an equally narrow conception of the world accessible to knowledge. 
The notion of experience that results is, in Benjamin’s view, impoverished.103 
‘The very fact that Kant was able to commence his immense work under the 
constellation of the Enlightenment indicates that his work was on the basis of an 
experience virtually reduced to a nadir, to a minimum of significance.’ This 
Newtonian conception of experience in which the world is law-bound and 
calculable is, in Benjamin’s view, ‘one of lowest forms of experience or views of 
the world’ (GS I I 159; SW 1 101). Kant had excluded knowledge of the noumenal 
from his epistemology, since, in so far as the noumenal transcends the bounds of 
Newtonian experience, claims to knowledge of this sphere must remain hollow 
and ungrounded, a succumbing to metaphysical illusion. Yet, for Benjamin, any 
theory of knowledge that relinquishes its claim to metaphysics and knowledge of 
the noumenal is not worth its name. A theory of knowledge based on the prosaic
103 Hermann Cohen, the leading Marburg neo-Kantian, whose Kants Theorie der Erfahrung (1918) 
was a source for both Bakhtin and Benjamin, only underlined the Kantian mathematical bias. In 
Jennings’s words: ‘Cohen attempted to confirm the continuing validity of Kant’s description of the 
structure of the understanding. For Cohen, however, modem philosophy could “delineate in a 
positive manner the horizons of knowledge” only by severely restricting “the concept of the 
possibility of experience,” for example, by limiting the data o f experience to a model o f the world 
based solely on verifiable mathematical and scientific evidence.’ Jennings, Dialectical Images, p. 
84. For Cohen’s influence on the early Bakhtin, see Nikolai Nikolaev, ‘The Nevel School of 
Philosophy (Bakhtin, Kagan and Pumpianskii) between 1918 and 1925: Materials from 
Pumpianskii’s Archives’, in Shepherd (ed.), The Contexts o f Bakhtin, pp. 29-41. Brandist also 
deals frequently with Bakhtin’s debt to Cohen in Brandist, The Bakhtin Circle.
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regularities of the phenomenal world promotes a conception of existence that 
Benjamin dubs inferior.
Benjamin’s criticisms of Kant’s theory of experience, then, are, in part, 
similar to Bakhtin’s critique of theoreticism. Benjamin also criticizes the 
abstracted and repeatable nature of Kant’s image of experience. Similarly, 
Benjamin criticizes the inability of Kantian philosophy to account for the inter- 
subjective nature of being. Benjamin argues that Kant’s desire to move 
epistemology away from the slippery ground of metaphysical speculation is itself 
prey to what he terms a ‘metaphysical blindness’. This metaphysical blindness of 
Kant stems, in Benjamin’s view, from his assumption that knowledge can only be 
conceived of in terms of the relation between subject and object. This 
assumption, Benjamin argues, is a result of Kant’s bias towards a human 
empirical consciousness that encounters the world as a knowing subject 
confronted with the objects of its knowledge: ‘The subject nature of this cognizing 
consciousness stems from the fact that it is formed in analogy to the empirical 
consciousness, which of course has objects confronting it’ (GS I I 161; SW 1 103).
In Benjamin’s view, for philosophy to do justice to the fullness of being,
what is necessary is a ‘new and higher form of experience that is yet to come
[einer noch kommenden neuen und hohern Art der ErfahrungY (GS I I 161; SW I
103). By way of an anticipation of such a form of experience, Benjamin describes
modes of experience in which subjects encounter the world in a fashion in which
the boundary between subject and object is not rigidly patrolled:
We know of primitive peoples of the so-called preanimistic stage who 
identify themselves with sacred animals and plants and name 
themselves after them; we know of insane people who likewise 
identify themselves in part with objects of their perception, which are 
thus no longer objects placed before them; we know of sick people 
who do not relate the sensations of their bodies to themselves, but 
rather to other beings, and of clairvoyants who at least claim to be able 
to feel the sensations of others as their own. (GS I I 161-62; SW 1 103)
These modes of experience are modes which do not comply with the precepts of 
modem reason, least of all modem empirical science. Modem (Kantian) reason 
would classify these ways of viewing the world as mythologies. And yet,
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Benjamin argues, in so far as a modem, rational worldview is blind to its own 
limitations, it is as much a mythology.104 These non-rational modes of 
experience, however, imply a possible approach with which to challenge narrowly 
instrumental reason that conceives of a strict boundary between the knowing 
subject and the objects of that knowledge. Benjamin’s new and higher form of 
experience shares the same aim as Bakhtin’s responsible activity: it resists the 
reduction of the world to a series of passive and repeatable objects; rather, it seeks 
to preserve the subject-nature of both knowing subject and the subjects which that 
subject confronts.
In this early essay, exactly what this new and higher form of experience
might be is not precisely defined; it is, after all, only ‘coming’ and Benjamin is
clearer on what it is not and what it should be able to encompass, than on positive
definitions. One remembers, similarly, that Bakhtin’s early essay is less than full
in his description of the practical sources which human beings may draw on to
engage in responsible participation. Benjamin gives us an indication, however,
towards the end of the essay: ‘the great transformation and correction which must
be performed upon the concept of experience [Erfahrung], oriented so one-sidedly
along mathematical-mechanical lines, can be attained only by relating knowledge
to language [...]’ (GS I I 168; S W 1 107-08). Benjamin’s argument is that Kant’s
mathematical bias and his desire for the abstract universality and certainty of the
mathematical formula means that he ignores the fact that human experience is
always articulated in language:
For Kant, the consciousness that philosophical knowledge was 
absolutely certain and a priori, the consciousness of that aspect of 
philosophy in which it is fully the peer of mathematics, ensured that 
he devoted almost no attention to the fact that all philosophical 
knowledge has its unique expression in language and not in formulas 
or numbers. (GS I I 168; SW 1 108)
104 Wolin reads ‘On the Programme of the Coming Philosophy’ as a proto-Surrealist text that 
points to Benjamin’s later work, and there is no doubt that this passage can be read as an example 
of that tendency. It shows Benjamin’s continuing preoccupation with phenomena which cannot be 
subsumed to a Western rationalist viewpoint. See Richard Wolin, ‘Benjamin, Adorno and 
Surrealism’, in Tim Huhn and Lambert Zuidervaart (eds), The Semblance o f Subjectivity: Essays 
in Adorno’s Aesthetic Theory, London, 1999, pp. 93-122. Nevertheless, Benjamin is not 
proposing irrationalism; his concern is that philosophy’s understanding o f the rational must expand 
to take into account what is normally dismissed as irrational.
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Bakhtin has a similar insight into the importance of language to responsible 
participation. ‘Historically language grew up in the service of participative 
thinking and performed acts, and it begins to serve abstract thinking only in the 
present day of its history’ {TPA 31). Bakhtin argues, similarly to Benjamin, that 
there is an aspect of language that resists abstraction and might be the source of 
responsible participation.
In the next chapter, I shall show how both Bakhtin and Benjamin come to 
seek in language the model for what they have termed respectively ‘responsible 
participation’ and a ‘higher form of experience’. First, however, I shall examine 
the extent to which Benjamin’s responses to the crisis of experience may be 
compatible with Bakhtin’s ethics of a non-categorical imperative, discussed 
above.
Politics and Ethics
Unlike the early Bakhtin, Benjamin is not obviously a philosopher of ethics. 
Rochlitz sums up the debate over the ethical dimension of Benjamin’s thought as 
follows:
In Benjamin’s work, the contemporary debate on ethics is confronted 
with a mode of thought situated to one side of what seems to have 
become its immutable framework, the opposition between Kantians 
and Aristotelians or Hegelians. Here again, Benjamin occupies a 
peculiar place: he is claimed both by thinkers who, like Ricoeur, lean 
toward a neo-Aristotelian philosophy and an anchoring of ethics in 
narration, and by those who, like Habermas, defend a procedural 
ethics of narration. How are such contradictory claims possible? We 
find very little moral theory in Benjamin; thus the two sides can draw 
support only from his intuitions and implicit presuppositions.105
Benjamin’s thought seems to contain so little moral theory because of the 
perspective of actuality that Benjamin assumes.106 The demand of actuality is that 
we must not forget our relationship to our present. From the standpoint of
105 Rochlitz, The Disenchantment o f Art, p. 253.
106 Wohlfarth describes Benjamin’s notion of actuality as the utopian mean between journalism 
and philosophy: ‘The philosopher’s spurious claim “to master from lofty vantage-point, the 
intellectual horizon of the times”, does no more justice to true actuality, in Benjamin’s view, than 
does the journalist’s unconditional surrender to passing fashion.’ Irving Wohlfarth, ‘The Measure 
of the Possible, the Weight o f the Real and the Heat o f the Moment: Benjamin’s Actuality 
Today’, in Marcus and Nead (eds), The Actuality o f  Walter Benjamin, pp. 13-39 (17).
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actuality, overtly ethical thinking may tend towards the abstraction of unsituated
philosophy. Hence, in Benjamin’s work ethical ideas tend to dissolve into
political activity. Furthermore, Benjamin’s work seems to claim that his
particular actuality does not allow the luxury of expressly ethical behaviour;
rather, it demands political commitment. In ‘The Storyteller’, he speaks of the
righteous man who has disappeared from the world with the narrative community
of storytelling: ‘The hierarchy of the creaturely world, which has its apex in the
righteous man, reaches down into the abyss of the inanimate by many gradations’
(GS I I 460; SW III 159). In a modem world whose landscape has been
transformed by the forces of modernity, the righteous man has no place.
Benjamin implies this at the end of ‘Theories of German Fascism’:
Until Germany has exploded the entanglement of such Medusa-like 
beliefs that confront it in these essays, it cannot hope for a future.
Perhaps the word ‘loosened’ would be better than ‘exploded,’ but this 
is not to say it should be done with kindly encouragement or with 
love, both of which are out of place here; nor should the way be 
smoothed for argumentation, for that wantonly persuasive rhetoric of 
debate. Instead, all the light that language and reason still afford 
should be focused upon that ‘primal experience’ [Urerlebnis] from 
whose barren gloom this mysticism of the death of the world crawls 
forth on its thousand unsightly conceptual feet. (GS III 249; SW II 
320-21)
The emptiness of love and wise words are not sufficient here to the actual threat 
of fascism. It seems that we are a long way from Bakhtin and his imperative to 
love.
A closer examination, however, exhibits a different situation. Bakhtin’s 
form of ethics is also against a conception of love that is general. For Bakhtin, 
love must be specific and located. Any other form of love would similarly be 
empty and powerless. Bakhtin’s ethics, then, are concerned with actuality. 
Furthermore, Benjamin’s ‘On the Concept of History’ contains an implicit ethical 
dimension that may usefully be compared with Bakhtin. Here, Benjamin argues 
that the task of the historical materialist is to fight on behalf of the vanquished of 
the past in a form of historiography that seeks to rescue the tradition of the 
oppressed. The historical materialist must not be indifferent to the past: ‘for it is 
an irretrievable image of the past which threatens to disappear in any present that
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does not recognize itself as intended in that image’ (GS 1 695; SW IV  391). Rather
the historical materialist participates with the past -  not as something that is given,
but as something that is still posited. Here, Benjamin contrasts the approach of
the historical materialist with that of the historicist:
Universal history has no theoretical armature. Its procedure is 
additive; it musters a mass of data to fill the homogeneous, empty 
time. Materialistic historiography, on the other hand, is based on a 
constructive principle. Thinking involves not only the flow of 
thoughts, but their arrest as well. When thinking suddenly stops in a 
configuration pregnant with tensions, it gives that configuration a 
shock, by which it crystallizes into a monad. The historical materialist 
approaches a historical subject only where he encounters it as a 
monad. In this structure he recognizes the sign of a messianic 
cessation of happening, or (to put it differently) a revolutionary 
chance in the fight for the oppressed past. (GS 1 702-03; SW IV  396)
The indifference of the historicist reproduces history as a sequence of equivalent 
and abstract units all of which add up to a closed conception of history as an 
inevitable progression towards a given present. The historical materialist who is 
not indifferent but stops to linger over the past preserves the specific nature of 
past moments and hence produces an open history of difference that preserves the 
posited nature of temporal experience. Time here is no longer homogeneous and 
empty, but filled with the bodily presence of subjects.
Similarly Bakhtin’s love is able to ‘slow down and linger intently over an
object, to hold and sculpt every detail and particular in it, however minute’ (TPA
64). In this way, Bakhtin’s loving attention transforms the nature of time:
Only the value of mortal man provides the standards for measuring the 
spatial and the temporal orders: space gains body as the possible 
horizon of mortal man and as his possible environment, and time 
possesses valuative weight and heaviness as the progression of mortal 
man’s life, where, moreover, the content of the temporal 
determination as well as its formal heaviness possess the validity of 
rhythmic progression. If man were not mortal, then the emotional- 
volitional tone of this progression of life -  of this ‘earlier’, ‘later’, ‘as 
yet’, ‘when’, ‘never’ and the tone of the formal moments of rhythm 
would be quite different. If we annihilate the moment constituted by 
mortal man, the value of what is actually experienced will be 
extinguished: both the value of rhythm and the value of content. (TPA 
65)
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Without love, time is mathematically identical, homogenous and empty. With 
loving attention to the value of mortal man, time gains weight and space gains 
body. Bakhtin’s loving attention is also an activity that is directed towards 
history. Indifference ‘is the function of forgetting as well’ {TPA 64). The 
paradigm of love, for Bakhtin, seems to be loving remembrance of the dead. 
Benjamin demands the same ethics of memory. In The Arcades Project Benjamin 
comments:
The corrective to this line of thought lies in the reflection that history 
is not simply a science but also and not least a form of remembrance 
[eine Form des Eingedenkens]. What science [ Wissenschaft] has 
‘determined’, remembrance can modify. Remembrance can make the 
incomplete (happiness) into something complete, and the complete 
(suffering) into something incomplete. {GS V 589; AP 471)
(Loving) remembrance, for both Bakhtin and Benjamin, is a weapon against a 
forgetful science that presents past suffering as given, necessary and hence 
repeatable. Remembrance attempts to complete happiness whilst not taking 
suffering for granted. In its emphasis on the necessity of remembrance, 
Benjamin’s notion of critical attentiveness and commitment (a term that is 
common to the vocabulary of both love and political struggle) comes to be the 
political corollary to Bakhtin’s ethical notion of love.107 Both point beyond the 
tragedy of culture.
1071 am proposing here that the conjunction of Bakhtin and Benjamin might help us to discern a 
political ethics in Bakhtin and an ethical politics in Benjamin. The question of whether Bakhtin 
should be read as primarily an ethical thinker or a political thinker is contested. Bakhtin has 
certainly provided a rich source for the many thinkers o f the recent ‘ethical turn’. In particular the 
comparison o f Bakhtin and Emmanuel Levinas has been fruitful. See, for example, Michael J. 
Gardiner, ‘Alterity and Ethics: A Dialogical Perspective’, in Theory Culture and Society, 13, 1996, 
2, pp. 121-43, and Jeffrey T. Nealon, ‘The Ethics o f Dialogue: Bakhtin and Levinas’, in College 
English, 59, 1997, 2, pp. 129-48. Nevertheless, some scholars, notably American liberals, have 
displayed a tendency to focus on the ethical aspect o f Bakhtin’s thought with the result that they 
depoliticize it entirely. Representative o f this trend is Emerson’s comment: ‘It could be argued 
that the most enduring lesson Bakhtin offered his Soviet era was this: Do not conflate the ethical 
with the political [...] for the time honoured reason that the ethical realm, if politicised, is 
prevented from functioning as an autonomous check on the political.’ Emerson, The First Hundred 
Years, p. 22. Brandist has argued powerfully against this collapsing o f the political into the ethical 
in his work, particularly in Craig Brandist, ‘Ethics, Politics and the Potential o f Dialogism’, in 
Historical Materialism, 5, 1999, 1, pp. 231-53. As indicated above, my position is to refuse a 
separation o f the two spheres.
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Chapter 3: Language 
Language, the Tragedy of Culture and Intersubiectivitv
In Toward a Philosophy o f the Act, Bakhtin writes:
I think that language is much more adapted to giving utterance 
precisely to that truth [the pravda of responsible activity], and not to 
the abstract moment of the logical in its purity. That which is abstract, 
in its purity, is indeed unutterable: any expression is much too 
concrete for pure meaning -  it distorts and dulls the purity and 
validity-in-itself of meaning. That is why in abstract thinking we 
never understand an expression in its full sense. (TP A 34)
Bakhtin’s point here is that language cannot be reduced to abstract, logical, or 
mathematical expression alone. The utterance always bears some of the traces of 
its genesis in a particular, historically and socially located context. The corollary 
of this is that attempts at stating only the logical purity of the given, utterances 
such as mathematical equations, are unutterable in language.1 In ‘On the 
Programme of the Coming Philosophy’, Benjamin similarly argues that Kant’s 
inability to account for the fullness of possible experience is the result of his 
tendency to seek the model of knowledge not in language but in mathematical 
formulae. For both thinkers, language contains a fuller form of experience than 
the minimal experience that is grasped by abstract thinking.
Language, one might suggest, contains a double orientation: on the one 
hand, as a medium of communication between different subjects in different 
situations, language must contain an orientation towards abstraction, generality 
and repeatability. On the other hand, as the medium of expression for specifically 
located subjects and their evaluative positions and itself emerging from such 
positions and evaluations, it must contain an orientation towards the concrete and 
must be able to express the unrepeatability of actual being. Hence, language 
might be the site of participative action by virtue of this double orientation 
towards both the sphere of the given and the sphere of the posited. It might bear
1 An intriguing point o f comparison is provided by the Viennese Circle of logical positivists and 
their desire to reduce language and knowledge to a series of mathematical propositions. There is 
an interesting reversal here, in Bakhtin’s assertion that logical purity is unutterable, of 
Wittgenstein’s definition o f silence and the utterable at the end of the Tractatus, a work which it is 
not clear whether Bakhtin could have known during this period. See Ludwig Wittgenstein, 
Tractatus Logico-philosophicus [1921], London, 1999, pp. 187-89.
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the marks of a higher experience that the abstraction of mathematical formulae 
fails to grasp.
This seems to be the insight that is common to both Bakhtin in Toward a 
Philosophy o f the Act and Benjamin in ‘On the Programme of the Coming 
Philosophy’. Nevertheless, at this early point, neither thinker has developed a 
conceptual vocabulary that articulates such an idea with any degree of clarity. 
During the course of the 1920s, however, Bakhtin, in association with other 
members of his circle, turns his attention increasingly towards the philosophy of 
language and develops a conceptual vocabulary that enables him to put language 
at the heart of his search for paths beyond the tragedy of culture.2 As a result, we 
can turn to another member of the Bakhtin Circle, Valentin Voloshinov and his 
text of 1929, Marxism and the Philosophy o f Language, where this conception of 
language is expressed in a more detailed and explicit fashion.
Voloshinov’s Marxism and the Philosophy o f Language represents a 
reformulation of Bakhtin’s concerns in Toward the Philosophy o f the Act. 
Furthermore, it is characterized by the same structure. Where Bakhtin seeks a 
synthesis between Kantian theoreticism and Lebensphilosophie, Voloshinov, 
likewise, seeks a synthesis between opposing trends.3 In the first part of his study, 
Voloshinov describes the split between what he terms psychologists and anti­
psychologists over the relationship between the psyche and ideology. 
Psychologists are individualistic subjectivists who maintain that ideology is the 
product of individual psychical activity. Psychologists, then, give precedence to 
the posited sphere of life. Anti-psychologists are abstract objectivists who
2 In their periodization o f Bakhtin’s work, Morson and Emerson see the period 1924-29 as the 
period in which Bakhtin shifts towards a more explicitly linguistically orientated philosophy. 
Morson and Emerson, Bakhtin, pp. 83-86. This is also the period in which, after the Bakhtin 
group’s move to Leningrad, Voloshinov studies with the linguist, Lev Iakubinskii. See Brandist, 
The Bakhtin Circle, pp. 9-11.
3 Matejka points out the dialectical structure o f Marxism and the Philosophy ofLanguage and 
interprets it as Voloshinov’s attempt to be or at least to appear to be a good Marxist dialectician. 
Nevertheless, as noted above, one can observe an analogous dialectical approach in Toward a 
Philosophy o f the Act where Bakhtin is making no attempt to appear to be a Marxist. Ladislav 
Matejka, ‘On the First Prolegomena to Semiotics’, Appendix I, iaMPL, pp. 161-74 (169).
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maintain that the psyche is derived from ideology. They, then, give precedence to 
the given sphere of culture.
Voloshinov argues that the inability of thinkers to bring these two positions
together represents SimmePs tragedy of culture in which the product of psychical
activity (ideology, or, in SimmePs terms, objective culture) has become divorced
from the psyche (or in SimmePs terms, life). Voloshinov, who observes
admiringly that SimmePs analysis of the tragedy of culture ‘contains no small
number of acute and interesting observations’, describes the basic deficiency of
SimmePs conception:
For Simmel, an irreconcilable discrepancy exists between the psyche 
and ideology: he does not know the sign o f a form o f reality common 
to both psyche and ideology [...]. Moreover, though a sociologist, he 
utterly fails to appreciate the thoroughgoing social nature o f the 
reality o f ideology, as well as the reality o f the psyche [...]. As a 
result the vital dialectical contradiction between the psyche and 
existence assumes for Simmel the shape of an inert, fixed antinomy by 
resorting to a metaphysically colored dynamics of the life process.
(MPL 40)
For Voloshinov, the underlying unity of meaningful existence is the social realm
of ideological signification. Conceptions of the individual and the social are
secondary abstractions from this fundamental unity and result in a fixed and tragic
antinomy.4 As Voloshinov concludes on Simmel:
Only on the grounds of a materialistic monism can a dialectical 
resolution of all such contradictions be achieved. Any other grounds 
would necessarily entail either closing one’s eyes to these
4 This reversal of the liberal, Anglo-American account o f the relationship between individual and 
society where individuals come together and constitute society aligns Voloshinov with the broad 
tradition of French Structuralism from Durkheim to Lacan, Althusser and Foucault. According to 
this tradition, ‘collective representations’ (Durkheim), Tangue’ (Lacan), ‘ideology’ (Althusser) 
and ‘discourse’ (Foucault) are the fundamental social unities out o f which the individual constructs 
her- or himself. In particular, the parallels with Lacan have been used by Bakhtin scholars as a 
means to present Bakhtin and the Bakhtin circle as ethical proto-deconstructionists. See, for 
example, William Handley, ‘The Ethics o f Subject Creation in Bakhtin and Lacan’, in Shepherd 
(ed.), Bakhtin, Carnival and Other Subjects, pp. 144-62. Williams seizes on Voloshinov’s 
prioritizing o f the collective over the individual in order to support his notion of the collective 
nature of ‘structures o f feeling’ in Williams, Marxism and Literature, pp. 35-43. For a critique of 
this on the grounds o f Williams’s misreading o f Voloshinov’s notion o f consciousness, with 
reference to Althusser and Lacan, see Antony Easthope, ‘The Bakhtin School and Raymond 
Williams: Subject and Signifier’, in Shepherd (ed.), Bakhtin, Carnival and Other Subjects, pp. 
115-24.
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contradictions or transforming them into a hopeless antinomy, a tragic 
dead end. {MPL 40)
One must not be put off by the rather dourly Marxist-sounding term ‘materialistic 
monism’. This monism is the plural and concrete sphere of intersubjective 
interaction to be found in social communication. Simmel’s anxiety at the tragedy 
of culture, according to Voloshinov, is no more than the anxiety that results from 
the bourgeois attitude that is unable to see the social significance of all 
phenomena, including the individual psyche, and that instead wishes to see the 
individual as the fundamental building block.
Like Bakhtin, Voloshinov’s answer to Simmel and the tragedy of culture is 
to be found in the intersubjective aspect of experience. Unlike Bakhtin, however, 
Voloshinov’s linguistic approach gives him a set of terms with which to describe 
this form of intersubjectivity, the essence of which he finds in language. Marxism 
and the Philosophy o f Language describes two trends in linguistic thought that 
correspond to the psychologists and the anti-psychologists: the individualistic 
subjectivism of the Vossler school and others and the abstract objectivism of 
Saussure and the Geneva school. These two trends can likewise be mapped onto 
the opposition between the posited and the given respectively.5 Drawing on 
Wilhelm von Humboldt and the distinction he draws between ergon and energeia, 
Voloshinov notes that individualistic subjectivism, on the one hand, conceives of 
language as the expression of the subject {energeia), that is to say, language as 
concrete, posited activity. Abstract objectivism, on the other hand, conceives of 
language as an inert objective system {ergon), that is to say, language as abstract, 
given product.6
5 See MPL, pp. 45-63. Voloshinov’s reading o f Saussure is polemical and produces an image of 
his thought that is reduced to the abstracting gesture that distinguishes between langue and parole. 
Thibault argues against the understanding o f the opposition o f langue and parole as an inert binary 
in Paul J. Thibault, Re-reading Saussure: The Dynamics o f Signs in Social Life, London, 1997. He 
demonstrates some of the reductionist character o f Voloshinov’s reading o f Saussure, particularly 
the doctrine of the arbitrary nature o f the sign, pp. 251-54.
6 Humboldt holds that the primary and original aspect o f language was energeia, activity. As 
languages develop and stabilize, however, linguistic forms accrue to language and it takes on the 
aspect of ergon, an inert product. Humboldt describes the individual speaker and the relationship 
of energeia to ergon as follows: ‘in the influence exerted on him lies the regularity o f language 
and its forms; in his own reaction, a principle o f freedom’. Alexander von Humboldt, On 
Language: The Diversity o f  Human Language-Structure and its Influence on the Mental
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Voloshinov characterizes these trends by means of an analysis of their 
differing preferences for what he terms ‘meaning’ and ‘theme’. Meaning, on the 
one hand, the focus of abstract objectivism, consists in ‘signification without 
regard to the concrete situation of utterance in life. It is those aspects of the 
signification of an utterance that are most abstract and general, reproducible and 
self-identical in all instances of repetition’ {MPL 100). It is the word of 
dictionaries and grammar that, abstracting from lived speech, aims at the inert 
stability and repeatability of signification. Theme, the focus of individualistic 
subjectivism, on the other hand, is the expression of the concrete temporal 
situatedness of the utterance in the mouth of a speaking subject in the midst of 
life: ‘The theme of an utterance is concrete -  as concrete as the historical instant 
to which the theme belongs’ {MPL 100). Theme is the subject’s expression of 
concrete relations to and evaluations of the temporal, spatial and social 
environment. This split between a focus on theme and a focus on meaning 
constitutes an articulation of the tragedy of culture.
Voloshinov’s insight is that both theme and meaning are contained in the
primary unity of language as social and inter-subjective activity. The bifurcation
of language into the individual aspect of theme and the objective aspect of
meaning results from a failure to recognize this fundamental unity. Voloshinov,
and subsequently Bakhtin, view language as, in essence, inter-subjective:
Any true understanding is dialogic in nature. Understanding strives to 
match the speaker’s word with a counter word [...]. There is no reason 
for saying that meaning belongs to a word as such. In essence, 
meaning belongs to a word in its position between speakers; that is, 
meaning is realized only in the process of active, responsive 
understanding. Meaning does not reside in the word or in the soul of 
the speaker or in the soul of the listener. Meaning is the effect of 
interaction between the speaker and listener produced via the material 
of a particular sound complex. {MPL 103)
Development o f Mankind (1836), trans. by Peter Heath, Cambridge, 1989, p. 37. Humboldt notes 
the tendency o f languages to develop in terms o f the complexity o f grammatical forms with the 
result that the quality o f language as ergon comes to predominate over energeia. Whilst Humboldt 
noted that this could lead to degeneracy o f a linguistic culture, he also saw this in terms o f a 
narrative of progress whereby a language develops from the poetry-dominated state of primitive 
cultures to the prose-dominated state o f culture capable o f philosophical discourse. These ideas 
are pertinent not only to Voloshinov but also to Bakhtin’s theory o f the novel.
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The primary focus of the Bakhtin Circle’s philosophy of language is neither the 
individual utterance nor the system of language but rather the interaction of 
utterances, the utterance in reaction to, with reference to, or in pre-emption of 
another’s utterance: (free) indirect discourse (Voloshinov), the word with a side­
ways glance, the internally dialogized word (Bakhtin).
In a sense that seems at first glance paradoxical, the word of the other must
always precede the word of the self Deleuze and Guattari, drawing on
Voloshinov, make explicit something of the strange nature of this situation:
Language in its entirety is indirect discourse. Indirect discourse in no 
way supposes direct discourse; rather, the latter is extracted from the 
former, to the extent that the operations of significance and 
proceedings of subjectification in an assemblage are distributed, 
attributed, and assigned, or that the variables of the assemblage enter 
into constant relations, however temporarily. Direct discourse is a 
detached fragment of a mass and is bom of the dismemberment of the 
collective assemblage; but the collective assemblage is always like the 
murmur from which I take my proper name, the constellation of 
voices, concordant or not, from which I draw my voice [...]. My 
direct discourse is still the free indirect discourse running through me, 
coming from other worlds or other planets.7
Just as we have seen that, for Voloshinov, the individual psyche is constituted 
secondarily out of the ideological material of social life, so it follows that the 
individual word, conceived of in isolation is a secondary abstraction from the 
essence of language which is to be found in the other’s word. This theory allows 
Voloshinov and Bakhtin to replace a primary division between subject and object 
with a primary unity of intersubjectivity in language, from which subject and 
object are falsely abstracted. We now see, then, the reason for the significance 
that Bakhtin, and, I shall argue, Benjamin ascribe to language. Language 
becomes the medium in which the fundamental schism opened up in Western
7 Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. 
by Brian Massumi, London, 1992, p. 84. Deleuze and Guattari make explicit the extent to which 
Voloshinov’s ideas attack -  in Derrida's term - the ‘logocentrism’ o f Western culture that views 
the individual speaking subject as the guarantor o f meaning. The paradox that direct follows 
indirect speech is analogous to Derrida’s assertion that speech follows writing. Both Derrida and 
Voloshinov elevate what Derrida terms a ‘supplement’ (writing, indirect discourse) to the position 
of primary term. Both Derrida and Voloshinov use their theory of their respective ‘supplements’ 
to make an assault on Western culture’s rigid modes o f subject construction. See Jacques Derrida, 
Of Grammatology, trans. by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, London, 1998.
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philosophy since Descartes, the schism between cognizing subject and cognized 
object-world, is revealed as already healed. As Williams comments of 
Voloshinov’s conception of language: ‘It is of and to this experience -  the lost 
middle term between the abstract entities, “subject” and “object”, on which the 
propositions of idealism and orthodox materialism are erected -  that language 
speaks.’8
For Voloshinov, indirect discourse is the phenomenon in which the true
nature of language is to be observed:
As we know now, the real unit of language that is implemented in 
speech {Sprache als Rede) is not the individual, isolated monologic 
utterance, but the interaction of at least two utterances -  in a word 
dialogue. The productive study of dialogue presupposes, however, a 
more profound investigation of the forms used in reported speech, 
since these forms reflect basic and constant tendencies in the active 
reception of other speakers’ speech [...]. What we have in the forms 
of reported speech is precisely an objective documentation of this 
reception. {MPL 117)
Bakhtin, in his study of the novel, in particular, seeks to isolate the artistic use of
linguistic forms in which the essentially intersubjective, dialogic nature of all
language is preserved and allowed to flourish, rather than being reduced to the
monologic word which renders mute the word of the other that resides in the word
of the self -  hence reproducing the fixed antinomies of subject and object. In his
note of 1970-71, however, Bakhtin makes an intriguing comment that suggests
that an understanding of language as the lost middle term between the antinomies
of subject and object can be gained in other ways as well:
Quests for my own word are in fact quests for a word that is not my 
own, a word that is more than myself; this is a striving to depart from 
one’s own words, with which nothing essential can be said. [...] This 
is now the most critical problem of contemporary literature, which 
leads many to reject the genre of the novel altogether, to replace it 
with a montage of documents, to bookishness [lettrism], and, to a 
certain degree, also to the literature of the absurd. In some sense [...] 
these [quests] can be defined as various forms of silence. These 
quests led Dostoevsky to the creation of the polyphonic novel. He 
could not find the word for the monologic novel. A parallel path led 
Leo Tolstoy to folk stories (primitivism), to the introduction of
8 Williams, Marxism and Literature, p. 37.
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biblical quotations (in the final parts of his novels). Another route 
would be to cause the world to begin speaking and to listen to the 
word of the world itself (Heidegger) (SG 149)
Dostoevsky’s quest for his own word in the word that was not his own, his desire 
to reproduce and honour the intersubjective nature of language and, indeed, 
existence per se, led him to the complex forms of the polyphonic novel.
Benjamin, as we shall see, is largely concerned with the other possible paths that 
Bakhtin identifies. In what follows I shall examine the ways in which Benjamin’s 
theory of language may be seen to approximate Bakhtin’s philosophy of language 
in these other paths: the word of the world, quotation, montage, and silence.
Jay, in his article ‘Experience without a Subject’, suggests that Benjamin’s
search for higher experience ‘without a subject’ in language might have, but did
not, lead him to a theory of indirect discourse such as that of Voloshinov and
Bakhtin.9 Jay traces the development of the concept of indirect discourse and its
variants from Lorck’s erlebte Rede through Voloshinov to Benveniste’s similar
concept of the ‘middle voice’.10 He argues that in both indirect discourse and the
middle voice Benjamin’s longed-for sphere of neutrality towards both subject and
object can be achieved, quoting Derrida to the effect that ‘the middle voice, a
certain nontransivity, may be what philosophy, at its outset, distributed into an
active and a passive voice, thereby constituting itself out of this repression’.11
Furthermore, Jay notes the importance of Voloshinov’s dialogical and
intersubjective understanding of this sphere of ‘experience without a subject’. For
Jay, the notion of the middle voice in which subject and object are subsumed in
undifferentiated unity carries a certain threat and ‘may even prove an unwitting
hand-maiden of an authoritarian politics, as Heidegger’s philosophy itself based
12on a search for experience without a subject, unfortunately did’. Instead, Jay
9 Jay, ‘Experience without a Subject’.
10 Emile Benveniste, ‘Active and Middle Voice in the Verb’, in Problems in General Linguistics, 
translated by Mary E. Meek, Coral Gables FL, 1971, pp. 145-51. Lock provides an account of the 
development of the theory o f free indirect speech and its connection to the Bakhtin Circle in 
Charles Lock, ‘Bakhtin's Dialogism and the History o f the Theory o f Free Indirect Discourse’, in 
Jorgen Bruhn and Jon Lundquist (eds), The Novelness o f Bakhtin, Copenhagen, 2001, pp. 71-87.
11 Jacques Derrida, ‘Difference’, in Margins o f  Philosophy, trans. by Alan Bass, London, 1984, pp, 
1-28 (9).
12 Jay, ‘Experience without a Subject’, p. 205.
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sees the more open space of Bakhtin and Voloshinov’s indirect discourse as ‘a 
less settled notion of a unity prior to a split into direct and indirect discourse, 
active and passive voice’ where ‘experience without the subject turns out to be 
experience with more than one subject inhabiting the same space’.13
According to Jay, the question of indirect discourse is something that 
Benjamin happens not to notice. Benjamin ‘failed to appreciate’ the confirmation 
of his conception of absolute experience by the linguistic evidence of indirect 
discourse in the novel.14 The contention of what follows is first, that Benjamin 
does have an approach to the notion of intersubjective, indirect discourse -  even if 
he never calls it this by name; and second, that Benjamin even displays this in his 
reading of the modem novel. As well as looking at the extent to which Bakhtinian 
ideas of indirect discourse can shed light on Benjamin, however, this chapter will 
also try and show how Benjaminian ideas such as quotation, montage and mutism 
can shed light on Bakhtin.
‘The Word of the World’ and Translation
In order to understand Benjamin’s philosophy of language and its affinities with 
Bakhtin, we have to move a long way from Voloshinov and his Marxist and 
semiotic vocabulary. For the primary engagement of the young Benjamin’s 
theory of language is with the very different world of German Romanticism. 
Nevertheless, Benjamin shares the same concerns as Voloshinov: the desire to 
transcend the fixed antinomies of subject and object by coming to an 
understanding of the nature of language.
As we have seen, Benjamin’s criticism of Kant’s theory of experience is, to 
a large extent, directed at Kant’s inability to conceive of the world other than in 
terms of the division between cognizing subject and cognized object. In this, 
Benjamin echoes the concerns of the German thinkers following Kant (Schiller, 
Fichte, Schlegel, Schelling, Novalis, Holderlin, Hegel) who likewise realized that 
the world as represented by Kant is split by a set of dualisms — reason and nature,
13 Jay, ‘Experience without a Subject’, p. 205.
14 Jay, ‘Experience without a Subject’, p. 206.
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duty and inclination, freedom and necessity, and so forth -  that stem from the 
fundamental dualism of subject and object. In particular, Benjamin has great 
affinities with Holderlin, hence, for example, his 1914 essay, ‘Two Poems of 
Friedrich Holderlin’.
In a fragmentary text of 1795, Holderlin addresses the question of subject
and object. His text is a dialogue not so much with Kant directly, but rather with
Fichte, who, in the Wissenschaftslehre (1794), had proposed that Kantian dualism
can be overcome by positing an absolute ego in which, through reflection, both
subject and object are contained.15 Holderlin maintains, contra Fichte, that no
sort of ‘I’, absolute or not, can precede a division between subject and object,
since, in so far as it is capable of judging, it must always be defined in relation to
an object that is distinct from it. He makes this point with a piece of word-play:
Judgement -  is in the highest and most strict sense the original 
separation, that separation which makes object and subject first 
possible, the judgement [Ur -  theilung, original -  separation]. The 
concept of judgement already contains the concept of the reciprocal 
relation of object and subject to each other, as well as the necessary 
precondition of a whole of which object and subject are the parts.16
On the verso of the scrap of paper on which this fragment appears, Holderlin
addresses, in distinction to judgement, the question of Being. Being is the
standpoint of unity of subject and object that precedes the judging I:
Where subject and object simply are, and not just partially, united, 
such that no separation can take place without injuring the nature of 
that which is to be divided, only there and nowhere else can there be
1 7talk of being as such, the same is the case in intellectual intuition.
Subjectivity, for Holderlin, is a breaking up of this underlying unity of ‘absolute 
Being’ as opposed to the ‘absolute I’. Absolute being, however, is necessarily 
unknowable. As Holderlin writes to Schiller a few months later: ‘the unity of 
subject and object is possible aesthetically, but, in the intellectual way of seeing 
things [in der intellectualen Anschauung] of theory, possible only through infinite
15 See Fichte, The Science o f  Knowledge.
16 Friedrich Holderlin, ‘Being Judgement Possibility’ (also known as ‘The Thalia Fragment’), in J. 
M. Bernstein (ed.), Classical and Romantic German Aesthetics, Cambridge, 2003, pp. 191-92 
(191-92). Whilst his German etymology is wrong here, he is thinking o f the meanings o f the 
Greek, kritein: to separate and to judge.
17 Holderlin, ‘Being Judgement Possibility’, p. 191.
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approximation [unendliche Annaherung]\ 18 Aesthetically, however, such a unity 
may be more approachable.
Increasingly, Holderlin abandons philosophy for poetry and, by giving
voice to nature, attempts in his verse to reconstitute the broken ground of being.
For here, in poetic inspiration, when the subject is ‘alone and less conscious of
himself [...] what is speechless gains speech by him and through him, and what is
general and unconscious achieves the form of particularity and consciousness’.19
When he is ‘less conscious of himself, the subject nature of the poet begins to
recede. Accordingly, the object nature of the natural world also falls away.
Nature finds voice as a subject. We approach a mode of neutrality vis-a-vis
subject and object, exactly the situation which Benjamin describes as necessary
for higher experience in ‘On the Programme of the Coming Philosophy’. This
must be an ‘absolute’, non-subjective experience:
All genuine experience rests upon the pure ‘epistemological 
(transcendental) consciousness’, if this term is still usable under the 
condition that it be stripped of everything subjective. [...] The task of 
future epistemology is to find for knowledge the sphere of total 
neutrality in regard to the concepts of subject and object; in other 
words, it is to discover the autonomous, innate sphere of knowledge in 
which this concept in no way continues to designate the relation 
between two metaphysical entities. (GS 7/163; S W 1 104)
This sphere of neutrality is what is achieved by the poet who, as Bakhtin puts it 
above (with reference to Heidegger), causes ‘the world to begin speaking’ and 
listens ‘to the word of the world itself.20
18 Friedrich Holderlin, letter to Schiller o f September 4 1795, in Friedrich Holderlin, Sdmtliche 
Werke und Briefe, ed. by Michael Knaupp, 3 vols, Munich, 1992, pp. 595-96 (595).
19 Friedrich Holderlin, ‘Empedokles’ (1797), in Holderlin, Sdmtliche Werke und Briefe, pp. 763- 
881 (870).
20 Bakhtin’s reference to Heidegger is surely to the Heidegger who draws his inspiration from 
Holderlin. See Heidegger’s reading o f Holderlin’s poetry and the relation of language and being 
in Martin Heidegger, ‘... Poetically, Man dwells...’, trans. by Albert Hofstadter, in Martin 
Heidegger, Philosophical and Political Writings, ed. by Manfred Stassen, London, 2003, pp. 265- 
78. In ‘The Origin of the Work o f Art’, Heidegger writes: ‘Projective saying is poetry: the saying 
of the world and earth. Poetry is the saying o f the unconcealment o f beings... Projective saying is 
saying which, in preparing the sayable, simultaneously brings the unsayable as such into the 
world’. Martin Heidegger, ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’, in Basic Writings, ed. by D. F. Krell, 
London, 1993, pp. 140-212 (198-99). Steiner comments: ‘Heidegger finds in Holderlin one of 
those very rare, immeasurably important expressions o f man’s fallenness, o f his ostracism from 
Being and the gods, and, simultaneously, a statement o f this very condition, whose truth and lyric 
power give assurance o f rebirth.’ George Steiner, Heidegger, London, 1992, pp. 141-42. The
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In Holderlin’s conception, the poet must receive and transmit the speech of 
nature. Thus, subject and object are reunited in language.21 We can now see how 
Holderlin can be brought alongside Bakhtin. Despite the vast difference in 
approach, despite his resolute emphasis on the ‘holy’ sphere of poetry not the 
‘profane’ sphere of prose, Holderlin’s aesthetics are, at base, comparable with 
Bakhtin’s insistence on the importance of indirect discourse in the novel: at the 
heart of both there is a search for the other’s word as the ground of a wholeness of 
being that does not know of the antinomies of subject and object. Benjamin’s 
early thinking on language is exceedingly close to Holderlin’s. Whilst Holderlin’s 
thinking on being and language bears certain broad similarities to Bakhtin’s own 
approach, in Benjamin’s adaptation of it even greater affinities become apparent.
We see the outlines of Benjamin’s theory of language in his essay of 1916, 
‘On Language as Such and on the Language of Man’. This essay is dauntingly 
theological, if not straightforwardly mystical. As well as drawing on his study of 
Holderlin, the essay represents a creative synthesis of the long tradition of 
language mysticism and ontologies of linguistic being that stretches from Boehme
99to Hamann and Schlegel. It seems curious that a few years after Saussure has 
given his ground-breaking lectures in general linguistics in Geneva, establishing a 
radically modem linguistics, and at the same time as the Vienna Circle is 
developing its mathematically orientated philosophy of language, Benjamin is 
delving back into what seems to be mediaeval obscurantism in order to construct a
9 "Xmystical theory of language.
nexus that I establish here between Heidegger, Holderlin, and Benjamin should be viewed in the 
light of my comments on the Heideggerianization o f Benjamin in the Introduction.
21 Larmore points out the extent, however, that poetry is not omnipotent in this respect and is 
restricted in its temporal dimension: ‘Strain as it may against the division between subject and 
object, poetry remains an act o f reflection. The poet must step back from whatever inkling he has 
of the unity o f being in order to put it into words. For Holderlin, the moments of vision are 
therefore never in the present. They are always past or future, remembered or anticipated.’
Charles Larmore, ‘Holderlin and Novalis’, in Karl Ameriks (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to 
German Idealism, Cambridge, 2000, pp. 141-60 (152). This temporal restriction of true 
experience is echoed throughout Benjamin’s work, as shall become clear in the final chapter.
22 For a detailed study o f Benjamin’s relationship to the German tradition o f language mysticism 
and Hamann in particular, see Menninghaus, Benjamins Theorie der Sprachmagie, pp. 9-50.
23 As Munster comments: ‘At the moment when logical positivism starts out during the 1920s, this 
essay o f Benjamin’s might be considered to be the very last expression of the philosophical
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How does this affect our reading of the essay? One does not have to accept 
or reject the essay in toto on the basis of an acceptance or a rejection of 
mysticism. The essay contains fundamental insights into the relationship between 
Man, nature and language that can be understood in secular terms.24 Benjamin’s 
language-mysticism can, in part, be explained by his inability to present his 
underlying intuition of the nature of language in any other way. For all the 
importance that he accords to language in his thinking, Benjamin does not engage 
thoroughly with theoretical linguistics. One need only read his 1935 review 
article, ‘Problems in the Sociology of Language: An Overview’, which deals with, 
amongst others, Biihler, Bally, Vygotsky, Piaget, and Marr and hence provides a 
point of contact with the world of the Bakhtin Circle, to see Benjamin’s inability 
to deal with what was then the cutting edge of linguistics without the intrusion of 
his own agenda to the detriment of the coherence of the subject that he 
discusses.25 Pensky suggests that Benjamin simply lacks a linguist’s conceptual 
vocabulary, and that this might be an additional explanation for his recourse to 
mysticism.26
idealism o f language o f the 18th and 19th centuries.’ Munster, Progres et catastrophe, p. 124. 
Munster also discusses Benjamin’s reading o f Carnap and attempts to construct a possible 
dialogue of Benjamin with the Vienna Circle, pp. 139-41.
24 Pensky and Menninghaus make similar points. Pensky, Melancholy Dialectics, pp. 47-48; 
Menninghaus, Benjamins Theorie der Sprachmagie, p. 16. Benjamin himself also implies as 
much: ‘If in what follows the nature o f language is considered on the basis of the first chapter of 
Genesis, the object is neither biblical interpretation, nor subjection of the Bible to objective 
consideration as revealed truth, but the discovery o f what emerges o f itself from the biblical text 
with regard to the nature o f language; and the Bible is only initially indispensable for this purpose 
because the present argument follows it in presupposing language as an ultimate reality, 
perceptible only in its manifestation, inexplicable and mystical’ (G S II147; SW 167). The Bible is 
essential to Benjamin because only through its myth of origin is language explicable as the 
‘ultimate reality’.
25 Pressler, whose study consists o f a close reading and contextualization of Benjamin’s review- 
article, is forced, time and time again, to acknowledge Benjamin’s wilful misreading o f his 
material. For example, on Biihler: ‘Benjamin does not show the least inclination to deal with the 
rich empirical proofs for Biihler’s axioms nor to work through the axioms themselves.’ Gunter 
Karl Pressler, Vom mimetischen JJrsprung der Sprache: Walter Benjamins Sammelreferat 
‘Probleme der Sprachsoziologie ’ im Kontext seiner Sprachtheorie, Frankfurt/Main, 1992, p. 34.
26 ‘Benjamin’s earliest systematic attempt to ground the objectively existing truth elements 
residing within quotidian language takes the form of theological doctrine because the arbitrary- 
nonarbitrary distinction upon which such attempts must test themselves could not, at least in 1916, 
be itself grounded without resort to axiomatic, and hence indisputable theology. ’ Pensky, 
Melancholy Dialectics, p. 56.
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The position of Bakhtin and Voloshinov is different.27 They live in an 
environment in which linguistics is, arguably, the model discipline for the 
humanities. Here, a strong domestic linguistic tradition fuses with the new 
linguistics from Geneva;28 Soviet thinkers are well-informed abouth the most 
recent developments in the French- and German-speaking world. As a result, 
Bakhtin and Voloshinov possess a set of linguistic terms and concepts that
• • 29Benjamin does not. A reader with an awareness of the linguistic concepts and 
terminology found in Bakhtin and Voloshinov can re-assess Benjamin’s theory of 
language.
A central matter in this context lies in the fact that Benjamin repeatedly 
speaks of Man’s relation to nature, whereas Bakhtin repeatedly speaks of the 
relation of one subject to another.30 This appears to constitute a fundamental 
difference between the two thinkers. Rochlitz argues that ‘Benjamin discovers 
intersubjectivity, which has very little place in his thinking, only through the 
detour of the mystical or poetic relation to nature’.31 In this chapter I disagree 
with Rochlitz and contend that Benjamin’s thinking has a form of intersubjectivity 
at its very heart. Nevertheless, Benjamin’s immersion in the German Romantic
27 Nevertheless, in his notes from 1970-71, Bakhtin has recourse to a nature mysticism that is not 
dissimilar to Benjamin’s thinking, speculating that ‘when consciousness appeared in the world 
(existence) and, perhaps, when biological life appeared (perhaps not only animals, but trees and 
grass also witness and judge) the world (existence) changed radically (SG 137). This and the notes 
in the same passage on the ‘witness and judge’ and the emergence o f what Bakhtin terms the 
‘supraexistence’ are intriguing for a comparison with Benjamin, but the context is perhaps too 
fragmentary to allow much comment. Morson and Emerson interpret this passage as Bakhtin’s 
development o f a Stoical conception o f freedom. Morson and Emerson, Bakhtin, p. 453.
28 Voloshinov claims, in 1929, that ‘the majority o f Russian thinkers in linguistics are under the 
determinative influence o f Saussure and his disciples, Bally and Sechehaye’ (MPL 59). Alpatov 
discusses the context o f Soviet and pre-Soviet linguistics and Voloshinov’s ‘marginal’ position in 
Vladimir Alpatov, ‘The Bakhtin Circle and Problems in Linguistics’, in Craig Brandist, David 
Shepherd and GalinTihanov (eds), The Bakhtin Circle: In the M aster’s Absence, Manchester, 
2004, pp. 70-96. The full story o f Russian linguistics o f the period will only become clear upon 
the completion of the Bakhtin Centre’s project, ‘The Rise o f Sociological Linguistics in the Soviet 
Union, 1917-1938: Institutions, Ideas and Agendas’. See
<<http://www.shef.ac.uk/uni/academic/A-C/bakh/sociolinguistics.html>>. accessed 13 August 
2004.
29 A comparison with Voloshinov’s work, which engages in thorough and well-informed detail 
with material similar to the material o f Benjamin’s article, makes this clear. Nevertheless, Alpatov 
raises doubts over Bakhtin and Voloshinov’s credentials in his examination o f the early notes for 
Marxism and the Philosophy o f Language. (Alpatov views Bakhtin and Voloshinov as co-authors.) 
See Alpatov, ‘The Bakhtin Circle and Problems in Linguistics’, pp 75-83.
30 In the remainder o f this chapter I shall follow Benjamin’s (biblical) diction in using the term 
‘Man’ to speak o f humanity in general.
31 Rochlitz, The Disenchantment o f  Art, p. 218.
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tradition, on the one hand, and his lack of linguistic expertise, on the other hand, 
result in his being able to come close to a theory of intersubjectivity only through 
the detour of Man’s relation to nature. It is precisely at this limit of Benjamin’s 
approach that a comparison with the thought of Bakhtin is so valuable.
In ‘On Language as Such and on the Language of Man’, Benjamin argues
that since God created the world through the word, so he necessarily implanted
language within things. Nature is possessed of its own linguistic being which is
the residue of the Word of God. Man, however, was created differently.
Benjamin points out that God created man out of earth: ‘God did not create man
from the word, and he did not name him. He did not wish to subject man to
language, but in man God set language which had served Him as medium of
creation, free’ (G S II149; SW 168). Language, originating in God, is present first
in nature and not, as such, in Man. God gives Man the capacity of language, but
he does not give Man language itself which is to be found instead in nature. Man
finds language already inhabited. As Bakhtin comments in the Dostoevsky book:
When a member of a collective comes upon a word, it is not as a 
neutral word of language, not as a word free from the aspirations and 
evaluations of others, uninhabited by others. No, he receives the word 
from another’s voice and filled with that other’s voice. [...] His own 
thought finds the word already inhabited. {DP 202)
In Bakhtin’s theory, the word is already inhabited by the subjectivity of the other. 
So it is with Benjamin. Nature has its own share of subjectivity in so far as it is 
possessed of language.32 Man, too, however, possesses a share of subjectivity, 
albeit a different form of subjectivity granted by the freedom of the faculty for 
language.
For Benjamin, unlike Rousseau, Eden is not characterized by an 
unmediated relationship between Man and nature; Man is not nature, but is 
already, by virtue of his language-faculty, separate from it. Nor does Benjamin’s
32 Brocker gives a parallel explanation for nature’s subjectivity which relies on the fusion of 
creation and naming which is inherent in the creation o f things through the word: ‘because God 
did not first create mere matter which he then called something, but rather expressed the things [of 
creation] in the word, the cognition o f these things cannot be reduced to subject-object relations’. 
Michael Brocker, ‘Sprache’, in Opitz and Wizisla (eds), Benjamins Begriffe, pp. 740-73 (745).
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image, despite an outward similarity, tally with the medieval philosophy of the
‘book of the world’, as described by Foucault:
In its original form, as it was given to men by God, language was a 
sign of things that was absolutely certain and transparent because it 
resembled them. Names were imprinted on the things that they 
designated, just as strength is inscribed on the body of the lion and 
royalty is inscribed in the gaze of the eagle.33
Man does not possess the absolute lordship of subject over object that would be 
contained in a ready-made, God-given language. His lordship resides merely in 
the capacity to respond to the language that already inheres nature.
Man’s relation to the sphere of nature is, as a result, the relation of one sort 
of subject to a subject of another sort. As Brocker comments: ‘The language of 
man is bound to the object-world but man does stand in a subject-relation to it [the 
world]. [...] In the paradisiac state of creation, subject and object do not face each 
other as alien.’34 The relation between Man and nature is, then, analogous to a 
relation of intersubjectivity. This notion of intersubjectivity is a departure from 
Holderlin’s poetic absolute. In Holderlin’s theory, the boundaries of subject and 
object are abolished in a moment of undifferentiated unity of being, whereas, in 
Benjamin’s image, relations persist as relations between subjects without 
objects.35
Benjamin makes clear his objections to a philosophy of language based on
the relation between a subject and an object-world, in his criticisms of what he
terms the ‘bourgeois conception of language’:
Anyone who believes that man communicates his mental being by 
names cannot also assume that it is his mental being that he 
communicates, for this does not happen through the names of things, 
that is, through the words by which he denotes a thing. And, equally,
33 Michel Foucault, Les Mots et les choses, Paris, 1966, p. 51.
34 Brocker, ‘Sprache’, pp. 746-47.
35 My argument here, then, differs from that o f Thornhill who contends that ‘influenced by both 
Klages and Cassirer, Benjamin conceives the initial period of history as a state o f 
undifferentiation, a state o f  unruptured mimesis in which no distinction is made between subject 
and object. This is for Benjamin the state o f Erfahrung, continuous ontological experience, a form 
of experience which is replaced by the sporadic, fractured Erlebnis o f modem existence.’ 
Christopher Thornhill, Walter Benjamin and Karl Kraus: Problems o f a Wahlverwandscha.fi, 
Stuttgart, 1996, p. 87.
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the advocate of such a view can only assume that man is 
communicating factual subject matter to other men, for that does 
happen through the word by which he denotes a thing. This view is 
the bourgeois conception of language, the invalidity and emptiness of 
which will become increasingly clear in what follows. It holds that 
the means of communication is the word, its object factual, its 
addressee a human being. (G S II143-44; SW 164-65)
Language is not an instrument. In essence, for Benjamin, ‘all language
communicates itself and only secondarily any particular content. As Rochlitz has
pointed out, Benjamin’s resistance to the instrumentalization of language shows
his affinities with the Symbolist thinking of Stefan George and Stephane
Mallarme.36 Yet, in so far as a non-instrumental conception of language does not
reduce the world to an object, it is clear that the effect of Benjamin’s conception
of language also relates to his criticism of Kant’s concept of experience: As
Kather comments:
Language is the medium of unity that transcends the duality of subject 
and object, the medium that contains within it the structural potential 
for unlimited knowledge and that gives the capacity of communication 
to the material world as object. Through the expansion of the concept 
of language to include all areas of being, an expansion of [Kant’s] 
concept of experience [.Erfahrung] is achieved in respect of 
perceptions of and dealings with the sensuous world.
This then is Benjamin’s ‘higher experience’. Language is the intersubjective 
unity - understood as a plural rather than an undifferentiated phenomenon -  that 
precedes the tragic antinomies of the division into subject and object. We may 
recall here Jay’s comments, referred to above, on Bakhtin’s notion of indirect 
discourse as ‘a less settled notion of a unity prior to the split into direct and 
indirect discourse, active and passive voice’ where ‘experience without the
36 Rochlitz, The Disenchantment o f  Art, p. 12. The ‘aesthetic aristocratism’ o f George and 
Mallarme helps us understand Benjamin’s use o f the term, ‘bourgeois’, which has, as yet, nothing 
to do with Marxism. McCole discusses the ambivalent attitude o f Benjamin to George in McCole, 
Benjamin, pp. 79-80. As I show in the next chapter, Benjamin criticizes what he terms George’s 
Sprachkultus (cult o f language) in his essay on Kraus (GS I I 359). Brocker also points out the 
influence of Wyneken’s youth movement and its anti-modem stance on Benjamin’s ‘anti- 
bourgeois’ conception o f language: ‘The concept o f the “divine”, the “absolute” which is free 
from empirical aims and motivations and which stands in opposition to the notion o f language as a 
system of instrumentally oriented signs, points back to the intellectual milieu o f the Youth 
movement which must be understood not only as a limited reaction to the crisis o f the Gymnasium 
and the University but also as a resistance to the modernization o f German society. ’ Brocker, 
‘Sprache’, p. 742.
37 Regine Kather, “Uber Sprache iXberhaupt und iiber die Sprache des Menschen Die 
Sprachphilosophie Walter Benjamins, Frankfurt/Main, 1989, p. 77.
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subject turns out to be experience with more than one subject inhabiting the same
» 38space .
Benjamin’s theory of the internally differentiated unity of Man and nature is
grounded in a theory of translation.39 Man is not given language, merely the
capacity of language. Hence, in expressing his own essence as the one with the
capacity for language, he must orientate himself outside himself towards the
language that is immanent in nature as the residue of God’s creative word. He
does this by translating the mute language of things into his own language in the
process of naming:
In name the word of God has not remained creative; it has become in 
one part receptive, even if  receptive to language. Thus fertilized, it 
aims to give birth to the language of things themselves, from which in 
turn, soundlessly, in the mute magic of nature, the word of God shines 
forth. (GS I I 150; SW 169)
Man’s search for his own word is a search for the word of the other, albeit in a 
rather different sense from that of Bakhtin. Nevertheless, this form of translation 
is analogous to indirect discourse. It must be double-voiced, fulfilling the same 
role as indirect discourse in Bakhtin and Voloshinov: it must preserve the subject 
nature of the other, giving birth to the language of nature rather than reducing it to 
an object.
Benjamin, like Bakhtin and Voloshinov, raises a secondary activity, 
translation, to the status of a primary activity. As Fenves suggests in his comment 
on this essay, this means that ‘the original [...] is derivative at the origin’.40 
Translation becomes the foundation for all language: ‘Translation attains its full
38 Jay, ‘Experience without a Subject’, p. 205.
39 Benjamin draws here on Hamann in whose ‘Aesthetica in mice’ we read: ‘Speak, that I may see 
Thee! This wish was answered by the Creation, which is an utterance to created things through 
created things... [...] The fault may lie where it will (outside us or within us): all we have left in 
nature is fragmentary verse and disjecta membra poetae. To collect these together is the scholar’s 
modest part; the philosopher’s to interpret them; to imitate them, or -  bolder still -  to adapt them, 
the poet’s. To speak is to translate -  from the tongue o f angels into the tongue o f men, that is to 
translate thoughts into words -  things into names -  images into signs.’ J. G. Hamann, ‘Aesthetica 
in nuce: A Rhapsody in Cabbalistic Prose’, in Bernstein (ed.), Classical and Romantic German 
Aesthetics, pp. 1-23 (4).
40 Peter Fenves, ‘The Genesis o f  Judgement: Spatiality, Analogy, and Metaphor in Benjamin’s 
“On Language as Such and on Human Language’” , in David S. Ferris (ed.), Walter Benjamin: 
Theoretical Questions, Stanford CA, 1996, pp. 75-93 (88).
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meaning in the realization that every evolved language [...] can be considered as a 
translation of all the others’ (GS 7/151; SW 169-70). At first sight paradoxically, 
translation, which is ‘much too far-reaching and powerful to be treated in any way 
as an afterthought, as has happened occasionally’ {GS I I 151; SW 1 69) becomes 
the primary means whereby the subject finds his own words, and hence comes to 
a subjectivity that does not sacrifice the subjectivity of the other.
Benjamin develops his theory of translation in his 1924 essay, ‘The Task of 
the Translator’. This essay opposes a number of commonly received ideas about 
translation. It opens by stating that no art-work is intended for the recipient and 
no translation is intended for a reader who does not understand the language of the 
original.41 This contradicts Benjamin’s position elsewhere, particularly in the 
‘The Work of Art’, on the role o f the recipient of the art-work. But Benjamin’s 
intention here is different: the idea that translation does not serve a reader 
reinforces Benjamin’s insistence on the non-instrumental nature of language:
‘Any translation which intends to perform a transmitting function cannot transmit 
anything but information -  here, something inessential. This is the hallmark of a 
bad translation’ (GS IV  9; SW 1253). A translation is not a tool by means of 
which the reader gains mastery over the object that is contained in the original.
Benjamin counters two standard views of translation: the first, the theory of 
the translator’s licence, holds that a translation should be as free as possible in 
order to preserve the meaning of the idea that the original expresses; the second, 
the theory of the translator’s fidelity, holds that the translation should be as literal 
as possible in order to preserve the original itself. The problem of the first is that 
it assumes that the meaning of the original is not present in its language and hence 
reduces meaning to information. The problem of the second is that, as Tackels 
puts it, ‘by translating word for word the idioms and structures of the original the 
translator inevitably reinforces the thesis according to which a translation is an
41 Rochlitz points out the extent to which Benjamin draws on modem creeds of I ’artpour I ’art, 
quoting Diderot: ‘If in drawing a picture, one imagines a beholder, all is lost.’ Rochlitz, The 
Disenchantment o f Art, p. 23.
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imitation, a copy’.42 In both instances, translation attempts mere reproduction of a 
fixed and inert object, whether this be some absolute meaning conceived of as 
lying beyond the text, or the corporeal matter of the original language itself.
Again, we see Benjamin’s objection to processes of reproduction that result in, or 
aim at, the repetition of inert identity.
Instead, translation is, as I have already argued, a form of indirect or double­
voiced discourse:
The task of the translator consists in finding the particular intention 
toward the target language which produces in that language the echo 
of the original. This is a feature of translation that basically 
differentiates it from the poet’s work, because the intention of the 
latter is never toward the language as such, at its totality, but is aimed 
solely at specific linguistic contextual aspects. Unlike a work of 
literature, translation finds itself not in the center of the language 
forest but on the outside facing the wooded ridge; it calls into it 
without entering, aiming at that single spot where the echo is able to 
give, in its own language, the reverberation of the work in the alien 
one. {GS I V 16; SW 1 258-59)
Translation aims to allow the original language to reverberate and echo in its own 
language. Unlike the language of original poetry which is focused on specific 
contexts, translation is focused on another’s language. It is a word that looks at a 
referential context, but by means of a ‘sideways glance’ at the language of 
another, a search for the other’s word. In notes for a broadcast that Benjamin 
planned in the mid-1930s, ‘Translation -  For and Against’ (1935 or 1936), 
Benjamin makes this point again: ‘Stresemann’s dictum (intended as a bon mot) 
that “French is spoken in every language” is more serious than he thought, for the 
ultimate purpose of translation is to represent [reprasentieren] the foreign 
language in one’s own’ {GS V I159-60; SW III 251).
In the image of the language forest above, it is possible to see affinities with 
Bakhtin’s distinction between poetry and dialogized discourse in ‘Discourse in the 
Novel’:
The trajectory of the poetic word toward its object and toward the 
unity of language is a path along which the poetic word is continually
42 Bruno Tackels, Petite Introduction a Walter Benjamin, Paris, 2001, p. 52.
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encountering someone else’s word, and each takes new bearing from 
the other; the records of the passage remain in the slag of the creative 
process (as scaffolding is cleared away once construction is finished) 
so that the finished work may rise as unitary speech, one co-extensive 
with its object, as if it were speech about an ‘Edenic’ world. (D I331)
The poet, according to Bakhtin, must studiously ignore and clear away the traces
of the social complexity of intersecting voices in his language in order to find his
own voice which is stripped of all intentions but his own. This is possible, in the
terms of Benjamin’s image, from within the depths of the language forest. In
these depths, poetry, according to Bakhtin, cultivates wilful ignorance of a
language other than its own:
Poetry behaves as if it lived in the heartland of its language territory 
and does not approach too closely the borders of this language, where 
it would inevitably be brought into dialogic contact with 
heteroglossia; poetry chooses not to look beyond the boundaries of its 
own language. (DI 399)
Poetic language attempts to ignore the existence of other languages. Ignoring the 
existence of other languages is not possible for the translator who stands outside 
the language of the text that he translates. His ‘outsidedness’ -  to use a term of 
Bakhtin -  means that he must direct his own language at the language of the other, 
at the language forest itself.
Translation is, for Benjamin, an interaction between two languages which
revives both the language into which the text is translated but also the language
from which it is translated:
While a poet’s words endure in his own language, even the greatest 
translation is destined to become part of the growth of its own 
language and eventually be absorbed by its renewal. Translation is so 
far removed from being the sterile equation of two dead languages 
that of all literary forms it is the one charged with the special mission 
of watching over the maturing process of the original language and the 
birth pangs of its own. (GS IV  13; SW I  256)
In translation, historical sterility, deadness, and even the monumentality of 
‘endurance’ are rejected in favour of a historicized, nascent, growing and 
maturing sense of language as alive and new. Translation is also (returning to the 
themes of the first chapter) a means of keeping tradition alive as the production of
160
difference rather than the tradition of inert objects that remain the same. Like the 
critic whose task it is to release the meaning of the cultural object for the present 
that is concealed within it, the task of the translator is a task of liberation: ‘It is 
the task of the translator to release in his own language that pure language which 
is exiled among foreign tongues, to liberate the language imprisoned in a work in 
his re-creation of the work’ (GS I V 19; SW 1 261).
We see here the extent to which Benjamin’s notion of the effect and role of
translation is not so far removed from Bakhtin’s notion of the power and effect of
heteroglossia. There are clearly substantial differences between Bakhtin’s
heteroglossia and Benjamin’s translation. In his essay, Benjamin is describing
what he thinks good translation is and how translations should be. In his work on
heteroglossia, Bakhtin purports to describe an historical and social phenomenon
that manifests itself in language. Nevertheless, both ideas express Bakhtin’s and
Benjamin’s views on what language is, in its essence, as well as what it should
be.43 In heteroglossia:
The new cultural and creative consciousness lives in an actively 
polyglot world. [...] Languages throw light on each other: one 
language can, after all, see itself only in the light of other languages.
[...] All this set into motion a process of active, mutual cause-and- 
effect and inter-illumination. Words and language began to have a 
different feel to them; objectively they ceased to be what they had 
once been. Under these conditions of external and internal inter­
illumination, each given language -  even if its linguistic composition 
(phonetics, vocabulary, morphology, etc.) were to remain absolutely 
unchanged -  is, as it were, reborn, becoming qualitatively a different 
thing for the consciousness that creates in it {DI 12)
Similarly, the interaction of language in translation is the guarantee of newness 
and creativity as opposed to the sterility of the language that stands alone and does 
not look out of the darkness of its solitary language-forest.
Towards the end of the essay on translation, Benjamin produces a quotation 
from Pannwitz:
43 See my comments above on the tension between description and prescription in Bakhtin’s 
thought.
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Our translations, even the best ones, proceed from a wrong premise.
They want to turn Hindi, Greek, English into German instead of 
turning German into Hindi, Greek, English. Our translators have a far 
greater reverence for the usage of their own language than for the 
spirit of the foreign works [...]. The basic error of the translator is that 
he preserves the state in which his own language happens to be instead 
of allowing his language to be powerfully affected by the foreign 
tongue. [...] He must expand and deepen his own language by means 
of the foreign language. It is not generally realized to what extent 
language can be transformed, almost the way dialect differs from 
dialect. (GS IV  20; SW  7 261-62)
A good translation would be the double-voiced discourse implied in the 
transformation of German into Hindi. This is the interaction of the other in the 
word of the subject. It is also heteroglossia in action, one language being deeply 
affected by another. Pannwitz’s reference to dialect at the end of the quotation 
also points to an awareness of the existence not only of ‘national’ languages but 
also of the internal stratification of languages into dialects, idiolects, argots, and 
so forth, which also may be the subject of ‘translation’. Additionally, however, 
Pannwitz notes that most translation is bad translation.
Whilst Benjamin’s essay is, in one part, a blueprint for what the translator
should do, in another significant part, it is a polemic against bad translation. The
epitome of bad translation is the paradox that is aimed at by the majority of
translators: that the free translation should read as if it were originally written in
the language into which the text has been translated. This would be an
appearance of originality which would represent a falsification. In such a
translation, the language of the original has been obliterated. The word of the
other has been reduced to silence. In ‘Translation - For or Against’, Benjamin
describes a confrontation with such a translation:
As I was passing an open-air bookstall a few days ago, I came across a 
French translation of a German philosophical book. Looking through 
it, as one does with books on the quais, I looked for the passages 
which had often engrossed me. What a surprise -  the passages were 
not there. You mean, you didn’t find them? Oh yes, I found them 
alright. But when I looked them in the face, I had the awkward 
feeling that they no more recognized me than I did them. (GS V I157- 
58; SW III 249)
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Here the language of the original no longer speaks through the translation. There 
is no friendly greeting. Translation has become what Bakhtin terms in his early 
works, transcription, a process in which concrete subjectivity is erased through a 
process of abstraction, the form of translation of which Bakhtin speaks in his 
notes towards a reworking of the Dostoevsky book: ‘I translate into the language 
of an abstract worldview that which was the object of concrete and living artistic 
visualization and which then became a principle of form. Such a translation is 
inadequate’ {DP 288).
There is, however, more in Benjamin’s dialogue. In the ‘awkward feeling’
the translation ‘no more recognizes’ Benjamin than he it, one can discern an echo
of Benjamin’s statements on the nature of the aura in ‘On Some Motifs in
Baudelaire’. The first incarnation of this theory is to be found in Benjamin’s
essay, ‘A Short History of Photography’ (1931). In early photography, Benjamin
notes, the long exposure times meant that the person being photographed had to
concentrate in a way which the more modem snap-shot does not require: ‘The
procedure itself caused the subject to focus his life in the moment rather than
hurrying on past it; during the considerable period of the exposure the subject as it
were grew into the picture’ {GS I I 373; SW 7/514). This concentration of the
subject’s gaze is one of the reasons for the aura which we experience when
looking at early photographs. Speaking of an early portrait of Kafka, dressed up
in a ‘humiliatingly tight child’s suit’ in the bizarre artificial environment of the
photographer’s studio, Benjamin comments:
This picture in its infinite sadness forms a pendant to the early 
photographs in which people did not look out at the world in so 
excluded and god-forsaken a manner as this boy. There was an aura 
about them, an atmospheric medium, that lent fullness and security to 
their gaze. (GSI I 375-76; S W II515)
Aura here is the ability of the subject’s gaze to survive the process of 
objectification that is inherent in having one’s photograph taken. Auratic 
experience is a form of, or intimation of, intersubjectivity.44 As Habermas 
comments: ‘the auratic appearance can occur only in the intersubjective
44 Benjamin’s conception o f aura, then, has a great many of the attributes o f Bakhtin’s conception 
o f dialogue.
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relationship of the I with its counterpart, the alter ego’.45 Put simply: auratic 
experience is a form of dialogue.
What we see in the image of the translation encountered on the quai is a
translation in which the subjectivity of the original has been erased and from
which the original subject can no longer look out. A further definition of the aura,
this time from ‘On Some Motifs in Baudelaire’, serves to put Benjamin’s thinking
into perspective:
Experience of the aura thus arises from the fact that a response 
characteristic of human relationships is transposed to the relationship 
between humans and inanimate or natural objects. The person we 
look at, or who feels he is being looked at, looks at us in turn. To 
experience the aura of an object we look at means to invest it with the 
ability to look back at us. (GS 1 646-47; S W IV 338)
If the aura is experiencing the object as subject, in bad translation the subject of 
the original text is experienced as an object that cannot look back at the reader of 
the translation and recognize him.
Bad translation is the practice of the majority of translators 46 Benjamin
comments in the notes for the radio broadcast: ‘The fact that a book is translated
already created a certain misunderstanding of it. Jean Christophe: what is selected
is usually what could also be written in the translator’s own language’ (GS V I159,
SW III 250-51). Translation usually focuses only on those texts which do not
require the complex interaction of languages. Benjamin’s theory of good and bad
translation implies that there are two different ways of translating, two different
forms of linguistic practice that are opposed to each other, but both equally
possible. Caygill remarks:
Human language is equivocal: it can either reduce all other linguistic 
surfaces to its own level, confining them within its limits at the price
45 Habermas, ‘Walter Benjamin: Consciousness-Raising or Rescuing Critique’, p. 107.
46 Typically, however, Benjamin is able to see seeds o f hope, even in a degraded phenomenon such 
as bad translation. His notes read: ‘The value o f bad translations -  productive misunderstandings’ 
(GS V I159; SW III 250). Whilst bad translation (in Benjamin’s special sense) objectifies and does 
not produce the newness o f a good translation, errors in bad translations (here, ‘bad’ I take to 
imply the conventional sense o f containing errors) can help create something new.
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of exclusion and distortion, or it can transform the character and limits 
of its own surface in the translation of other languages.47
These two tendencies are, in the terms of Bakhtin’s Dostoevsky book, the
tendencies towards monologization and dialogization:
Whatever discourse types are introduced by the author-monologist, 
whatever their compositional distribution, the author’s intentions and 
evaluations must dominate all the others and must form a compact and 
unambiguous whole. Any intensification of others’ intentions in a 
certain discourse is only a game, which the author permits so that his 
own direct or refracted word might ring out all the more energetically.
[...] The artistic task Dostoevsky takes on is completely different. He 
does not fear the most extreme activization of vari-directional accents 
in double-voiced discourse; on the contrary, such activization is 
precisely what he needs to achieve his purpose. {DP 203-04)
Where monologic language excludes, distorts and confines the other within its 
own limits, dialogic language is itself transformed by the language of the other. 
Monologue is German making Hindi German. Dialogue is German being 
powerfully affected by Hindi. There is a great difference between Bakhtin and 
Benjamin, however: Benjamin expresses his idea of translation with the powerful 
but vague image of the good translation that is German being affected by Hindi. 
Bakhtin, in the chapter on ‘Discourse in Dostoevsky’, by contrast, has a highly 
sophisticated linguistic analysis of the different ways in which dialogic discourse 
can function in the novel.48
Quotation and Montage
Benjamin’s use of quotation is at the core of all his writing 49 It finds its fullest 
expression in The Arcades Project, much of which is no more than lists of 
quotations. Here, Benjamin indicates that quotation is a form of montage, forms 
that share an intimate kinship: ‘This work has to develop the highest degree of 
citing without quotation marks. Its theory is intimately related to that of montage’ 
{GS V 572; AP 458). In the same section, he elaborates:
47 Caygill, Benjamin, p. 19
48 This is the analysis o f different forms o f discourse from direct unmediated discourse, through 
objectified discourse to various forms o f discourse with an orientation towards someone else’s 
discourse. Bakhtin gives a diagrammatic presentation o f the scheme that results. See DP, p. 199.
49 Voigts argues for the central place o f quotation in Benjamin’s thought in Manfred Voigts, 
‘Zitat’, in Opitz and Wizisla (eds), Benjamins Begriffe, pp. 826-50.
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Method of this project: literary montage. I needn’t say anything.
Merely show. I shall purloin no valuables, appropriate no ingenious 
formulations. But the rags, the refuse -  these I will not inventory but 
allow, in the only way possible, to come into their own: by making 
use of them. (GS F 574; AP 460)
The montage of quotations is a means of seeking the other’s word. Benjamin 
need not speak, may allow the other’s voice to be heard.
Bakhtin is also a writer who uses quotation. Often, in the early work, this is
quotation without acknowledgement; in his work more generally, quotation
frequently takes the form of the use of many different variations and
reformulations of similar arguments, a phenomenon which constitutes a form of
hidden self-quotation, a technique also employed by Benjamin.50 His work, then,
is also akin to a montage of quotations.51 He remarks in his notes from 1970-71:
The unity of the becoming (developing) idea. There is also a certain 
internal unfinishedness in many of my thoughts. But I do not wish to 
make a vice into a virtue: in my works there is good deal of external 
unfinishedness, an unfinishedness not of thought itself, but of its 
expression and exposition. Sometimes it is difficult to separate one 
kind of unfinishedness from the other [...]. My love for variations 
and for a multiplicity of terms for a single phenomenon. A 
multiplicity of perspectives. A bringing close of the distant without an 
indication of mediating links. (SG 155)
50 Benjamin’s incessant self-quotation has practical grounds. Given that for much o f his life he 
was a freelance writer and critic, often in acute financial difficulties, self-quotation proved a means 
o f producing more copy. This can be seen in his recycling o f fundamentally the same material for 
different commissioners. Nevertheless, this does not go against the fact that Benjamin sees (with 
Bakhtin) the importance o f variations o f the same material that produce new formulations and new 
ideas in their new contexts. This is another area where the themes o f repetition and difference 
emerge in both thinkers.
51 Gardiner has some perspicacious comments on Bakhtin’s similarity to Ernst Bloch, someone 
with whom Benjamin also has many similarities. ‘[ . ..] one could mention Bloch’s fragmentary 
and elliptical prose style which, by drawing on expressionist techniques (including Brecht’s 
“alienation effect”), attempts to induce a defamiliarization o f the taken-for-granted in order to 
generate an awareness o f alternative possibilities. This recalls Bakhtin’s confessed “love for 
variations and for a diversity o f terms for a single phenomenon [and the] multiplicity o f focuses”.’ 
Gardiner, ‘Bakhtin’s Carnival’, p. 42. Whilst he does not say it, Gardiner seems to have noticed 
the kinship between Bloch’s Expressionist technique o f montage and Bakhtin’s method of thinking 
and writing. For the connections between Bloch and Benjamin, see Wolin, Benjamin, pp. 16-17 
and 23-27. Brodersen gives biographical details o f Benjamin and Bloch’s friendship in Brodersen, 
Benjamin, pp. 99-100. Bloch discusses his wary friendship with Benjamin in Ernst Bloch, 
‘Recollections o f Walter Benjamin’, in Smith (ed.), On Walter Benjamin, pp. 338-45. Specifically 
he discusses Benjamin's use o f montage on pp. 341-42.
166
Bakhtin’s ‘bringing close of the distant without an indication of mediating links’ 
is analogous to Benjamin’s ‘citing without quotation marks’.52 Variations are, as 
already argued, forms of quotation; multiple perspectives and unfinishedness are 
all hallmarks of montage. One need only think of montage in cinema to see that 
Bakhtin’s ‘multiple perspectives’ are a form of montage. The same holds for 
‘unfinishedness’: the piece of montage is cut (once again we can hear the 
association with cinema) from a larger whole to which it still points; it is, then, 
necessarily unfinished, just as a quotation is a fragment of a larger context and is 
hence also, in this sense, unfinished. Finally, Bakhtin’s ‘bringing close’ is also a 
function of montage which takes material from different and distant contexts and 
brings them together on one plane. One thinks of the montage of Dada or 
Surrealist collage which takes cuttings and scraps from different sources and 
juxtaposes or overlays them in proximity on the canvas.53
Bakhtin’s thought demonstrates a concern with forms of language that are 
comparable to the montage of quotations. In his theory of the polyphonic novel, 
Bakhtin champions the fragmentation of perspective and voice which the novel 
effects on what he terms ‘unitary languages’. In the face of the unities which 
come into being through the centripetal forces of monologic discourse, Bakhtin is 
concerned with the plurality of polyphony: ‘alongside verbal-ideological
52 Both thinkers could be construed as ideologues o f plagiarism. Their attitude to quotation 
resembles the medieval. A good number o f the quotations produced by Benjamin in the 
Trauerspiel book cannot be traced to any verifiable sources.
53 Burger develops his theory o f the Avant-garde on the basis o f Benjamin’s theory o f montage, 
suggesting that montage is the main weapon o f the Avant-garde's attack on organic works o f art in 
the name of the sublation o f art and life. Despite my criticisms o f Burger below, seeing a theory 
o f montage in Bakhtin allows one to think o f him as a much more modernist thinker and writer 
than he might at first seem, given his apparent lack o f interest in the historical Avant-garde 
movements o f which he was a contemporary. See Peter Burger, Theory o f the Avant-Garde, trans. 
by Michael Shaw, Minneapolis MN, 1984, particularly pp. 73-82. The question of Bakhtin's 
relation to the Avant-garde is contested. I have already made some comments on this in relation to 
Bakhtin and Russian Formalism. Tiupa implies that Bakhtin’s aesthetics are necessarily hostile to 
the Avant-garde’s ‘radical pessimism' in Valerii Tiupa, ‘The Architectonics o f Aesthetic 
Discourse’, in Shepherd (ed.). The Contexts o f Bakhtin, pp. 95-107. In the same volume, however, 
Pechey, arguing for Bakhtin’s modernity and seeing a possible reincarnation o f Bakhtin’s Rabelais 
in James Joyce, contends that ‘Bakhtin’s modernist critique o f modernity [...] is achieved by the 
simple and yet astonishingly creative gesture o f projecting the story o f the European avant-garde 
back into the continent’s past’. Graham Pechey. ‘Modernity and Chronotopicity in Bakhtin’, in 
Shepherd (ed.), The Contexts o f Bakhtin, pp. 173-82 (180). Benjamin explicitly associates himself 
with the Avant-garde. Jennings traces in an elegant fashion Benjamin's ‘waking up’ to the Avant- 
garde ‘sometime in 1924’. Michael Jennings, ‘Walter Benjamin and the European Avant-garde’, in 
Ferris (ed.), Companion to Benjamin, pp. 18-34.
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centralization and unification, the uninterrupted processes of decentralization and 
disunification go forward’ {DI 272). The plurality of the novel -  ‘the dispersion 
into the rivulets and droplets of social heteroglossia’ {DI 263) - is a plurality of 
fragments. The world of the polyphonic novel of Dostoevsky, then, is a montage 
of perspectives and voices, quoted directly and indirectly. Nevertheless, just as 
Benjamin insists that the montage of quotations in the Arcades Project retains a 
relation to the totality of nineteenth-century Paris, so Bakhtin insists that the 
fragmented voices of polyphony retain a complex relation to ‘social totality’.
I have argued in Chapter 1 that montage and dialogized discourse are both 
ways of opening up the closedness of authoritarianism, whether this be the 
authority of the aura and tradition or the authority of the monologic utterance. 
Both forms, then, have an ideological import. Both thinkers, however, insist on 
the historical specificity of their particular forms. These are not forms of which 
they merely approve because of their innovative or ideological effects; both grow 
necessarily out of their social and historical circumstances. Buck-Morss points 
out the extent to which montage in the Arcades Project was more than just a 
formal principle:
Crucial is Benjamin’s understanding of ‘montage’ as a form which, if 
already visible in the early arcades, in the kaleidoscopic, fortuitous 
juxtaposition of shop sign and window displays, was raised by 
technology during the course of the century to the level of a conscious 
principle of the nineteenth century.54
Montage is both the form of construction of nineteenth-century Paris and the only
way to represent it without distorting it. Something similar holds for Bakhtin’s
treatment of Dostoevsky in a passage that I have quoted above:
By relativizing all that was eternally stable, set and ready made, 
camivalization with its pathos of change and renewal permitted 
Dostoevsky to penetrate into the deepest layers of man and human 
relationships. It proved remarkably productive as a means for 
capturing in art the developing relationships under capitalism, at a 
time when previous forms of life, moral principles and beliefs were 
being turned into ‘rotten cords’ and the previously concealed and 
unfinalized nature of man and human thought was being nakedly 
exposed. [...] Capitalism, similar to that ‘pander’ of Socrates on the
54 Buck-Morss, Dialectics o f Seeing, p. 74.
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market square in Athens, brings together people and ideas. (DP 166- 
67)
In this passage, Bakhtin asserts both the emergence of dialogue from the spirit of 
capitalism and its status as the only faithful means of its representation.55
There are, however, marked central differences between Bakhtin and 
Benjamin. Benjamin’s employment of montage is linked to a much more 
explicitly political task than Bakhtin’s theory of polyphony. Jennings comments: 
‘Benjamin’s practice [of montage] stems from the Dadaist conviction that it is 
only that which lies unused or already discarded that is free of the ideological 
contamination of the ruling formation.’56 Thus it is not merely the form of 
montage that is political but also its content. Benjamin’s montage, as practised in 
‘One-Way Street’ and the Arcades Project, elevates to the level of attention all 
that is unsuccessful, marginal, misused, obsolescent, forgotten or overlooked.57 
Bakhtin does not explicitly address this aspect of polyphony in his theory of the 
novel. Such an attitude, it might be argued, is more strongly present, less in 
Bakhtin himself than in his model Dostoevsky, whose fiction gives voice to the 
unsuccessful, the obsolescent, the misused, and the overlooked.
Some of the general connections between Benjamin’s notions of quotation 
and montage and Bakhtin’s theory of the polyphonic novel should now be clear. 
To examine this in more detail, I turn to a review of Alfred Doblin’s novel of 
1930, Berlin Alexanderplatz, which Benjamin published under the title ‘The Crisis 
of the Novel’. This review also reveals the extent to which Benjamin comes close 
to the formulation of a theory of the polyphonic novel. Benjamin writes:
55 Montage and polyphony, then, are both forms of mimesis and are not opposed to it, as might be 
assumed. The deconstruction o f traditional mimetic forms is carried out both in response to a 
radically new reality and for the sake o f a new form of mimesis. Adorno makes a similar point in 
his interpreation of Baudelaire’s poetry as a disruption o f traditional mimetic forms: ‘The new is 
the aesthetic seal o f expanded reproduction, with its promise of undiminished plenitude. 
Baudelaire's poetry was the first to codify that, in the midst of the fully developed commodity 
society, art can ignore this tendency only at the price o f its powerlessness. [...] Art is modem art 
through mimesis o f the hardened and alienated; only thereby, and not by the refusal o f a mute 
reality, does art become eloquent; this is why art no longer tolerates the innocuous.’ Theodor W. 
Adomo, Aesthetic Theory\ ed. and trans. by Robert Hullot-Kentor, London, 1997, p. 21.
56 Jennings, ‘Walter Benjamin and the European Avant-garde’, p. 30.
57 Here, we see again the themes of memory and attentiveness, raised at the end of the previous 
chapter.
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The stylistic principle governing this book is that of montage. Petty- 
bourgeois printed matter, scandal-mongering, stories of accidents, the 
sensational incidents of 1928, folk songs and advertisements rain 
down in this text. The montage explodes the framework of the novel, 
bursts its limits both stylistically and structurally, and clears the way 
for new epic possibilities. (GS III 232; S W II301)
The technique of montage, as, for example, pioneered in Dadaism, is the taking of 
fragments of the real world and incorporating them in the work of art. These are 
the ticket-stubs and scraps of newspaper stuck onto Dadaist paintings that 
Benjamin refers to in ‘The Work of Art’. In literary form, montage consists of the 
direct quotation of fragments of reality such as the songs and advertisements 
referred to in Benjamin’s review. Just as Benjamin argues in ‘The Work of Art’ 
that montage destroys the art-work’s aura of authenticity and originality, so here 
he argues that the montage of quotations ‘explodes the framework of the novel’ 
that consists of authorial authority.
Montage of quotation subverts the authority of the author and pushes him to
the edge of his own work:
The texture of [Doblin’s] montage is so dense that we have difficulty 
hearing the author’s voice. He has reserved for himself the street- 
ballad-like epigraphs to each character; otherwise, he is no great hurry 
to make his voice heard. (Even though he is determined to have his 
say in the end.) It is astounding how long he trails behind his 
characters before risking any challenge to them. (GS III 233; SW II 
301)
The characters gain independence from the authorial context to the extent that the 
author ‘trails behind them’ not daring to challenge them. What we observe here is 
an explosion of the framework of the novel and a clearing of the way for new 
narrative possibilities that is analogous to the Copemican revolution that Bakhtin 
claims Dostoevsky effects in the creation of the polyphonic novel: as the world 
takes on a whole ‘new look’, ‘not only the reality of the hero himself, but even the 
external world and the everyday life surrounding him are drawn into the process 
of self-awareness, are transferred from the author’s to the hero’s field of vision’ 
(DP 49). According to Bakhtin, Dostoevsky renounces his position of authority 
above his characters and descends to a plane on which he is, in certain respects,
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their equal. In Benjamin’s analysis of Doblin, the author is also reduced to a 
peripheral figure who ‘trails behind his characters’.
Benjamin’s characterization of Doblin’s novel as montage derives from a
saying of Doblin himself that Brecht was fond of quoting. Brecht’s own
formulation of this bears examination:
[Actually, there is a] dramatic element in epic works, and an epic 
element in the dramatic. The bourgeois novel in the [nineteenth] 
century developed much that was dramatic, by which one means the 
strong centralization of the story, a momentum that drew the separate 
parts into a common relationship. [...] The epic writer Doblin came up 
with an excellent characterization when he said that with an epic, as 
opposed to a dramatic, work you can as it were take a pair of scissors 
and cut it into individual pieces which remain fully capable of life.58
Brecht recognizes the aspect of the dramatic, traditional novel that centralizes and 
draws separate parts into a common relationship. This common relationship is 
analogous to what Bakhtin describes as the single consciousness of the monologic 
author. The epic writer, however, according to Brecht, produces a form of 
montage which consists of parts that can be cut up. This sort of cutting-up into 
fragments is one in which, perhaps paradoxically, the individual pieces ‘remain 
fully capable of life’. Hence, just as Doblin’s characters are able to walk in front 
of their author, so, in Brecht’s and Benjamin’s theory, montage does not kill the 
‘life’ in the material. It is the closedness of authoritarian forms that does that.59 
Similarly, Bakhtin writes concerning the polyphonic novel: ‘In Dostoevsky’s 
larger design, the character is a carrier of a fully valid word, and not the mute,
58 Bertolt Brecht, ‘Vergnugungs-Theater oder Lehrtheater’, in Schriften zum Theater, pp. 60-74 
(61-62). Brecht uses the term ‘epic’ in a completely different sense from Bakhtin. His opposition 
of ‘epic’ and ‘dramatic’ is the cornerstone o f his theory o f theatre. Benjamin appropriates and 
expands this theory in his various writings on Brecht.
59 One might, with Burger, map Brecht’s distinction between dramatic and epic art onto a 
distinction between organic and inorganic art, a distinction that Burger develops on the basis of 
Benjamin’s theory o f allegory. Burger describes this distinction as follows: ‘Artists who produce 
an organic work (in what follows we shall refer to them as classicists...) treat their material as 
something living. They respect its significance as something that has grown from concrete life 
situations. For avant-gardistes, on the other hand, material is everything. Their activity initially 
consists in nothing other than in killing the ‘life’ o f the material, that is, in tearing it out o f its 
functional context that gives it meaning. Whereas the classicist recognizes and respects in the 
material the carrier o f a meaning, the avant-gardistes see only the empty sign, to which they can 
impart significance. The classicist correspondingly treats the material as a whole, whereas the 
avant-gardiste tears it out o f the life totality, isolates it, and turns it into a fragment.’ Burger, 
Theory> o f the Avant-garde, p. 70. Nevertheless, Burger seems to miss the point that, for Benjamin, 
montage preserves the life o f its material.
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voiceless object of the author’s discourse’ {DP 63). The monologic approach that 
stems from a sense of a false wholeness kills life, reducing it to a series of mute 
objects. It is precisely because Bakhtin insists that the world be conceived of as a 
unity of living subjects who are carriers of meaning that it must be represented in 
the form of a montage of multiple perspectives and voices.
Benjamin goes on to characterize Doblin’s mode of narration:
He approaches things in a relaxed way as befits an epic writer.
Whatever happens -  even when it happens suddenly -  seems to have 
been prepared for well in advance. In this attitude, he has been 
inspired by the spirit of Berlin dialect -  a dialect that moves at a 
relaxed pace. For the Berliner speaks as a connoisseur, in love with 
the way things are said. [...] The book is a monument to the Berlin 
dialect because the narrator makes no attempt to enlist our sympathies 
for the city based on any regional loyalty. He speaks from within 
Berlin. It is his megaphone. His dialect is one of the forces that turn 
against the reserved nature of the old novel. {GS III 233; SW II 301)
We may first note the theme of habit that re-emerges in the notion of Doblin’s
relaxed attitude. This is the relaxation that comes from a sense of familiarity.
More important in this context, however, is Benjamin’s discussion of the role of
dialect. When Benjamin says that Doblin ‘speaks from within Berlin’, it might be
argued that he means that Berlin speaks from within Doblin. Doblin’s text is
inter-penetrated with different forms of language: thieves’ cant, the biblical,
prostitutes’ slang, the Yiddish-influenced German of newly-arrived Ostjuden, and,
above all the heterogeneous, linguistic monster that is berlinerisch. This is akin to
Bakhtin’s description of heteroglossia in ‘Discourse in the Novel’:
Languages do not exclude each other, but rather intersect with each 
other in many different ways: the Ukrainian language, the language of 
the epic poem, or early Symbolism, of the student, of a particular 
generation of children.... [...] as such these languages live a real life, 
they struggle and evolve in an environment of social heteroglossia.
{DI 292-93)
Specifically, Doblin achieves this not merely by dialogue and by the montage of
direct quotation but also by indirect quotation, that is, a variety of different forms
of double-voiced discourse. This can be seen in the following passage:
Dann wird mit einemmal die Unterhaltung am Nebentisch laut, der 
eine Neue fuhrt das grosse Wort. Der will singen, dem ist es hier zu
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ruhig[....] Franz kaut denkt: die meinen mir. [...] DaB der alter Georg 
Dreske sich mit solchem Griinzeug zusammensetzt und nicht mal zu 
ihm ruberkommt, hatt er auch nicht fur moglich gehalten. Son oiler 
Stiebel, ist verheiratet, n ehrlicher Stiebel, und sitzt bei det junge 
Gemiise und hort sich die ihr Geschnatter an.60
The standard German of the first clause represents authorial direct discourse 
which is lightly inflected by the discourse of Franz in the second half s 
colloquialisms (‘der eine Neue’, ‘das grosse Wort’). The next sentence is double­
voiced, free indirect discourse of Franz’s thoughts which gradually becomes more 
and more inflected by Franz’s speech patterns (although these are already present 
in the dialect use of the dative for the accusative in the sentence, ‘die meinen 
mir’). Finally, authorial discourse is almost forced out entirely in the strong 
dialect forms (‘oiler’, ‘det’) and slang expressions (‘det junge Gemiise’, ‘Stiebel’) 
of the last sentence which is heavily stylized discourse.
It is in the range of forms of double-voiced discourse that Doblin speaks 
from within Berlin and Berlin speaks from within him. Benjamin performs no 
such analysis of Doblin’s prose and nor did he possess the technical vocabulary to 
do so. Nevertheless, Doblin’s narrator finds the other’s word and achieves the 
sphere of neutrality vis-a-vis subject and object that has been the goal of 
Benjamin’s philosophy since his early writings. One might suggest that Jay’s 
judgement of Benjamin above is incorrect: Benjamin seems at least to have 
intuited that the indirect discourse of the polyphonic novel transcends the 
antinomies of subject and object; he simply does not enunciate it thus.61
60 Alfred Doblin, Berlin Alexanderplatz, Frankfurt/Main, 1980, pp. 92-93. A rough translation, 
which unfortunately preserves little o f the complexity o f  different registers and dialect forms, 
reads as follows: ‘When all o f a sudden the conversation on the neighbouring table grows louder, 
the one newcomer starts talking big. He wants to sing, it’s too quiet for him here. Franz chews, 
thinks: they mean me. He wouldn’t have believed it possible that old Georg Dreske sits with 
younguns like that and doesn’t even come over to his table. What an old boot, married, a right old 
boot, and sits by that kid and listens to her nattering. ’
61 Doblin himself preferred to call his novel ‘homophonic’, as opposed to the ‘polyphonic’ novel 
o f Dos Passos, since his novel is focused on its protagonist, Franz Biberkopf. This view does not 
seem to contradict my argument. See ‘Alfred Doblin’, in Rudolf Raddler et al, Kindlers neues 
Literaturlexikon, 22 vols, Munich, 1988-98, vol. 4, pp. 739-52 (743).
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Silence
In May 1916, Buber wrote to the young Walter Benjamin asking him to contribute
an article to the first issue of a new journal, Der Jude. In effect, Buber was asking
Benjamin to take a political position within the current debates on Zionism and
the position of the Jews in Germany. Benjamin refused in a letter that reflects his
emerging philosophy of language:
There is a widely accepted, indeed almost commonsensical, opinion 
that writing is capable of influencing the ethical world and human 
actions, in so far as it can provide actors with motives. [...] It is 
characteristic of this view that it is wholly incapable of conceiving of 
a relation between language and deed in which the former would not 
be the means to the latter. This relation presents language and writing 
as powerless, and diminished to the role of a pure medium; thus a 
weakened act whose source lies not in itself, but in this or that 
speakable, expressible motive. (Briefe 125-26)
Benjamin goes on to oppose this debased form of language to what he calls the
‘essential being’ of language and writing:
I can understand writing in general, whether poetic, prophetic, or 
objective in its effect, only magically, that is, only immediately.
Every sound and healthy effect of language - indeed every effect that 
does not represent a self-demolition of language, touches upon 
mystery (of the word, of language). Whatever the form in which 
language is capable of proving itself effective, this cannot be through 
communication of its contents, but rather through the purest revelation 
of its own worth, and its own essence. [...] My conception of 
straightforward and at the same time highly political style and writing 
is to indicate that which fails words; only there, only where the sphere 
of wordlessness reveals itself in its pure power can the magic spark 
between word and deed arise. (Briefe 126)
If language is to go beyond its ‘self-demolition’, it must not limit itself to an 
auxiliary role as the instrument of communication. Effective language must 
reveal that aspect of itself that is incommunicable and express the unsayable {Das 
Unsagbare) which cannot be assimilated to the mere communication of content. 
Here, language finds the expression of its ‘essential being’. Many of the 
concerns of this chapter are recognizable here. The rejection of an instrumental 
conception of language may be political insofar as it resists the reduction of the 
world into manipulating subjects and manipulated objects. Nevertheless, its claim
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of absolute political significance does not prevent it from falling into the apolitical 
abyss of silence.
Benjamin abandons this theory of silence in favour of a study of literary 
and artistic forms in which language is not reduced to mere instrumentality. 
Nevertheless, the search for the other’s word through silence is something that 
reappears sporadically. It is there in the statement on montage that I have given 
above, where Benjamin claims that he need not speak but merely allow the rags 
and refuse of montaged quotations to come into their own. It is there in 
Benjamin’s approving comment on Kraus: ‘Kraus has written articles in which 
not a single word is his own’ (G S I I 1093). The sacrifice of one’s own voice may 
sometimes be necessary if one is to find the voice of the other.
Bakhtin’s theory of silence is to be found in his essays on the novel.
During the course of Bakhtin’s work it is possible to observe a gradual shift in his
formulation of the ideal position of the author in relation to his work. In the early
work, the author is a benign but over-reaching, all-encompassing figure whose
creative word shapes his hero. In Bakhtin’s writing on Dostoevsky this position
has changed; here, the author has relinquished the position of absolute authority
and has descended to the level of his characters and the author’s word is to be no
more authoritative than those of his characters. By the time of the essays on the
novel, this position has changed yet again. Here, ‘it is as if the author has no
language of his own’:
The author is not to be found in the language of the narrator, not in the 
normal literary language to which the story opposes itself [...] but 
rather the author utilizes now one language, now another, in order to 
avoid giving himself up wholly to either of them. (D I311)
The author’s unwillingness to speak in his own voice is another way of allowing 
the other to come to voice. His silence is an act of self-renunciation and a quest 
for the other’s word.62
62 My argument here coincides with that o f Coates who notes the withdrawal o f the author into 
silence over the course o f Bakhtin’s work. See Coates, Christianity in Bakhtin, particularly pp. 
116-18. Lock also treats the theme of silence in Bakhtin. His focus, however, is on a Derridean 
reading o f the fact that Bakhtin favours the silently-read genre o f the novel to voiced genres. See
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The History of Language: Fail. Monologism and Mutism
Bakhtin and Benjamin see language as a practice that is rooted in history and the 
nature of which changes historically. Furthermore, we have seen that they both 
conceive of language as the site of opposing tendencies and phenomena - 
instrumental and non-instrumental language, bad and good translation, the 
authoritative and the internally persuasive word, monologue and dialogue - in 
which one side of the opposition is generally preferred. These tendencies and the 
relationships between them also develop historically.
As we have seen, in Toward a Philosophy o f the Act Bakhtin writes: 
‘Historically language grew up in the service of participative thinking and 
performed acts, and it begins to serve abstract thinking only in the present day of 
its history’ {TPA 31). In this early text, Bakhtin is perhaps thinking ahead of 
himself to the theory of language discussed above according to which language is 
the site of intersubjective unity which precedes the antinomies of subject and 
object. Language, Bakhtin argues, emerges from responsible participation but, in 
the face of modem forces of theoreticism, becomes degraded and 
instrumentalized. In his work taken as a whole, however, Bakhtin has a 
contradictory account of the historical fate of language: on the one hand, modem 
theoreticism and monologism, sometimes explicitly associated with the 
Enlightenment and the modem era, threaten to obliterate the participative nature 
of language as dialogue. On the other hand, dialogue itself seems to grow out of 
the very social and historical forces of modernization. In essence, the 
contradiction is to be found between the narrative of the liberation of the 
dialogized word from authoritarian contexts in Bakhtin’s theory of the 
development of the novel and the narrative of the decline of the participative word 
and the threat of monologization.63
Charles Lock, ‘Bakhtin and the Tropes o f Orthodoxy’, in Felch and Contino (eds), Bakhtin and 
Religion, pp. 97-119, especially 112-14.
63 One may also consider here Voloshinov’s chronology o f reported and reporting speech as the 
increasing decomposition o f the authorial context. See MPL, pp. 120-23. I discuss Voloshinov’s 
history o f language in the next chapter.
176
Benjamin’s work also contains a history of the fate of language. To 
discuss this most effectively, I return to ‘On Language as Such and on the 
Language of Man’ whose narrative of the Fall nevertheless contains the essence of 
Benjamin’s ideas about the historical existence of language in the secular world. 
The Fall is brought about by Adam and Eve’s seduction by the serpent into eating 
of the fruit of the tree of knowledge of good and evil. Benjamin points out that 
since God created the world and saw that it was good, the knowledge of good and 
evil is worthless and vain (nichtig). Such knowledge’s vanity has two sources: 
first, knowledge of good and evil stands beyond the created world, which is of 
itself good, and is hence meaningless (Benjamin uses Kierkegaard’s term, prattle 
[Geschwatz]); second, in attempting to replace God’s judgement of the world as 
good, it becomes a parody of God’s creative word.
By establishing himself as subjective judge, man brings evil into the 
world. Pensky comments: ‘subjectivity is the origin of evil, the source of 
meaninglessness of “chatter”’.64 As the knower of good and evil, man abandons 
the language of name in which he knew an intersubjective unity with God and 
nature and enters the sphere of judgement: ‘this judging word expels human 
beings from paradise; [...] In the Fall, since the eternal purity of names was 
violated, the sterner purity of the judging word arose’. (G SII \ 53; SW 11\)  Here 
is Holderlin’s Ur-theilung. In setting himself up as autonomous judge of the 
external world, man is separated from it and is condemned, by his own actions, to 
the mediated existence of a subject in an alien world of objects.65 This is how 
Benjamin understands the expulsion from Paradise. Benjamin draws further 
consequences from the introduction of the prattle of judgement. First, ‘man 
makes language a means (that is knowledge inappropriate to him), and therefore 
also, in one part, a mere sign’ (GS I I 153; SW 1 11 ).66 Language comes to be
64 Pensky, Melancholy Dialectics, p. 54. ‘Chatter’ is Pensky’s translation o f Geschwatz.
65 Benjamin’s ingenious response to the question o f why the tree o f good and evil is planted in the 
garden runs as follows: ‘The tree o f knowledge did not stand in the garden in order to dispense 
information on good and evil, but as an emblem o f judgment over the questioner’ (GS I I 154; SW 1 
71).
66 He adds that ‘this results later in the plurality o f languages’. This point is a reversal of 
Saussure’s argument for the arbitrary nature o f the linguistic sign. Saussure argues that the sign 
must be arbitrary on the basis o f the existence o f different words in different languages for the 
same concept. ‘No reason can be given for preferring sister to soeur, Ochs to boeuf, etc.’
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dominated by its instrumentality, which is intimately linked to its acquiring an 
arbitrary nature. Second, the Fall is the origin of abstraction in so far as its 
knowledge is unnameable, whereas name is rooted in the concrete.67
Benjamin’s narrative of the Fall brings us, once again, to Bakhtin. As 
Coates has pointed out, there is a theme of the Fall that runs through Bakhtin’s 
work. In her reading of ‘Author and Hero’, the Fall is the result of Man’s attempt 
to claim self-sufficiency from God.68 This is analogous to Benjamin’s 
understanding of the Fall as the imposition of human terms of judgment. In both 
cases, man attempts to speak his own definitive word without listening to the 
voice of God. The fallen word, for both Bakhtin and Benjamin, one might 
suggest, is the self-sufficient word that is deaf to the word of the other.
The theme of judgement as a consequence of the Fall forms a further bridge 
between Benjamin and Bakhtin. Brandist has argued forcefully for the influence 
of the Marburg School’s theory of law and the juridical person on Bakhtin.69 
Whilst it is difficult to accept many of his arguments for the extent of this 
influence, his observation that Bakhtin’s thinking often carries a framework of
70judgement seems correct. We might explain this by noting that in Dostoevsky’s 
novels characters are always on trial. Bakhtin does not share with Benjamin an
Saussure, Course in General Linguistics, p. 73. Benjamin argues that different languages have 
come into being because the sign has become arbitrary.
67 Benjamin sums up his position as follows: ‘The immediacy in the communication o f abstraction 
came into being as judgement when in the Fall, man abandoned immediacy in the communication 
o f the concrete, name, and fell into the abyss o f the mediatedness o f all communication, o f the 
word, as means, o f the empty word, into the word o f prattle’ (GS 1 154; SW I 72).
68 ‘Bakhtin claims that to pretend to axiological self-sufficiency is to fall into a state o f profound 
self-contradiction and self-negation, to live a lie: “We may say that this is the fall [grekhopadenie] 
which is immanent to being and experienced from within it; it lies in the tendency o f being 
towards self-sufficiency.’” Coates, Christianity in Bakhtin, pp. 44-45. Coates gives her own 
translation here which makes clear Bakhtin’s reference to the theological concept o f the Fall, a 
reference which is obscured in Liapunov’s translation.
6g See Craig Brandist, ‘The Hero at the Bar o f Eternity: The Bakhtin Circle’s Juridical Theory of 
the Novel’, Economy and Society, 30, 2001, 2, pp. 208-28.
70 Brandist’s arguments on this point can be over-dogmatic. He gives, for example, the following 
reductionist reading o f Bakhtin’s analysis o f Dostoevsky: ‘[Bakhtin] follows the neo-Kantian trend 
of treating individuals not as concretely singular and embodied beings subjected to material 
economic and social influences, but as juridical persons who are exclusively considered as bearers 
of rights and responsibilities. [..] This inevitably imposes a particular character on work that 
adopts such a principle and this should be clearly recognized before Bakhtin’s categories are 
employed in literary analysis today.’ Brandist, The Bakhtin Circle, p. 94.
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aversion to the notion of judgement on the philosophical grounds that I have 
discussed above; indeed right from his early work he insists that every act has an 
evaluative, that is to say, a judging function. Nevertheless, Bakhtin is always 
keen to stress that the act of judgement must be just. If in the dialogic utterance, 
the position of the other being judged is taken into account (his specific 
circumstances, his possible excuses), the monologic utterance is an unjust 
judgement that imposes the judgement without regard for the position of the 
judged and judges an inert object. The former may be approximated to the act of 
Benjamin’s namer who listens to the language of God in nature and knows it. The 
latter may be approximated to the arbitrary judgement that fallen Man imposes on 
the object world.
Benjamin contends that the original language is not utterly destroyed. 
Language itself has become fractured in the same way that Man’s relationship 
with God and nature has been fractured. In the damaged and distorted state of 
fallen language, traces of the language of names survive. Benjamin notes such a 
trace in the act of naming children. In a fallen world, instrumental and non­
instrumental aspects, signs and names, concrete and abstract, judgement and 
knowledge co-exist. Benjamin’s essay here deals with the mythical time of 
Genesis. His account of the fate of language, however, holds relevance for a 
modernity that is increasingly characterized by abstraction and instrumentality.
It is here that the realm of the aesthetic is of importance. For, Benjamin 
implies, the fracturing of language can be seen in the division of linguistic 
practice into the mimetic language of art and the discursive language of 
communication.71 Benjamin writes: ‘The language of poetry is partly, if not 
solely, founded on the language of names’ (GS I I 156; SW 1 73). The language of 
poetry strives, despite the fallen state of language, to draw closer to the original 
language. In this way, poetry seeks to be a profane echo of the primordial
71 In the formulation o f this split we see the influence that Benjamin has on the thought of Adorno. 
The notion o f a dialectic of mimetic behaviour that approximates to, but does not dominate the 
object and rejects end-means rationalization that seeks to subsume the object to itself, forms the 
core o f Adorno and Horkheimer’s collaboration. As they put it: ‘Mimesis imitates the 
environment but false projection makes the environment like itself.’ Theodor W. Adorno and Max 
Horkheimer, Dialectic o f Enlightenment, trans. by John Cumming, London, 1997, p. 18.
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language of names, and ultimately it seeks to restore by human means the unity of 
Man, God and nature destroyed by the Fall. This view of the language of poetry 
is not a mere repetition of the view of Holderlin, for Benjamin concedes that ‘it is 
certain that the language of art can be understood only in the deepest relationship 
to the doctrine of signs’ (GS I I 156; SW 1 73). Poetry, then, contains both name 
and sign. More generally, language, as what Benjamin calls elsewhere an 
‘archive of non-sensuous similarities’, even in its corrupt form, bears the traces of 
the relation of name.
Before I move on to a discussion of the special language of art in the next
chapter, I wish to consider a final effect of the Fall of language, namely the
muteness and melancholy of nature:
After the Fall, however, when God’s word curses the ground, the 
appearance of nature is changed. Now begins its other muteness, 
which we mean by the deep sadness of nature. It is a metaphysical 
truth that all nature would begin to lament if it were endowed with 
language. [...] This proposition has a double meaning. It means, first: 
she would lament language itself. Speechlessness: that is the great 
sorrow of nature (and for the sake of her redemption the life and 
language of man -  only, as is supposed, of the poet -  are in nature).
This proposition means secondly: she would lament. Lament, 
however, is the most undifferentiated, impotent expression of 
language; it contains scarcely more than the sensuous breath; and even 
where there is only a rustling of plants, in it there is always a lament.
(GS 7/155; SW 1 72-73)
Once again, the problem arises of how this powerful and eloquent image is to be 
read outside its theological framework. At the simplest level, this passage is 
driven by a pathetic fallacy: in his separation from nature, man laments the 
essential alienness to him of the natural world. This is the melancholy of 
alienation.
Another way of looking at this is provided by Bernstein in the context of a 
discussion of German Romantic aesthetics. Bernstein describes the changed 
relations between man and the natural world that arise with Descartes’s
72 The term, ‘archive o f non-sensuous similarities’(G5 I I 209; S W II697), comes from Benjamin’s 
‘The Doctrine o f the Similar’, part o f his writings on mimesis which are closely related to the 
philosophy o f language o f ‘O f Language as Such and o f the Language o f Man’.
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establishment of the cogito as the fundamental principle of knowledge and that are
underscored by Kant’s critiques. With the establishment of the enquiring and
analytical cogito, nature loses its self-evidence. Sensuous nature is replaced by
the immaterial and mechanical forms of physics. Bernstein gives as a
paradigmatic example of this Descartes’s image of the dissolution of the
sensuously resplendent piece of wax into its physical properties (malleability,
extension) that are comprehensible only to abstract thought.73 He continues:
This dematerialization denies that there might be a unique, irreducible 
language of nature, and this is equivalent to the delegitimation of the 
authority of nature in favour of the authority of scientific reason.
Thus the disenchantment of nature, which included the human body, 
its pains and pleasures, leaves it dispossessed of voice or meaning, 
since all meaning is given to nature by (mathematical) reason. To say 
that reason delegitimates the authority of nature means at least that the 
promptings of the body come to lack normative authority, that is they 
no longer operate as reasons, and so cannot be thought of as raising 
claims and demands that should (or should not) be heeded. Such 
items become causal facts no different in kind than those of dead 
nature.74
This is a useful approach. First, it makes clear the extent to which thinking about 
nature, particularly in the German Romantic tradition, is necessarily a meditation 
on human beings understood as part of nature, a meditation on human nature 
(menschliche Natur). The alienation from nature that the Romantics and 
Benjamin often describe in terms that today sound mystical might be as much 
about the relationship of the subject with the body as they are about mountains 
and trees. Second, this passage brings us back to the concerns of Benjamin’s ‘On 
the Programme of the Coming Philosophy’. The rationalist and mathematical 
standards of the Enlightenment do, indeed, deny normative authority to the 
promptings of the body. They impoverish a conception of experience -  not only 
for ‘primitive people’ who identify with sacred animals or the mentally ill who 
feel that the objects of their perception are parts of their body -  but also for the 
average person who no longer thinks that it is legitimate to feel things in her or his 
‘bones’ or who has to ascribe the melancholy of November to Seasonally Affected
73 See Rene Descartes, ‘Meditations on First Philosophy’ (1641), in Key Philosophical Writings, 
ed. by Enrique Chavez-Arvizo, trans. by Elizabeth S. Haldane and G. R. T Ross, Ware, 1997, pp. 
121-90(144-47).
74 J. M. Bernstein, ‘Introduction’, in Bernstein (ed.), German Aesthetics, pp. vii-xxxiii (ix).
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Disorder. Third, Bernstein’s use of the terms, ‘promptings’, ‘reasons’, ‘demands’, 
leads us to understand how this is a problem of language: modem rationalism no 
longer allows nature to speak to us.
The melancholy of nature is the result of the imposition of Man’s arbitrary
subjectivity on a world that is thereby reduced to an object, and hence is denied a
voice. Bakhtin’s thought contains a similar insight of the muteness that the
monologic utterance imposes on its object. In the totally instrumental, discursive
and monologic form of the language of the natural sciences the world is mastered
and deprived of voice:
The entire methodological apparatus of the mathematical and natural 
sciences is directed toward mastery over mute objects, brute things, 
that do not reveal themselves in words, that do not comment on 
themselves. Acquiring knowledge here is not connected with 
receiving and interpreting words or signs from the object itself under 
consideration. (D I351)
So too, in the monologic novel, characters are denied a voice, they are objectified,
and fall silent. As I noted in the Introduction, Bakhtin, however, often seems to
be lacking the dimension of melancholy that Benjamin is so painfully aware of.
Pensky has a sensitive insight into the impression that the reader receives at the
end of ‘On Language as Such and on the Language of Man’.
[NJature is mute, but it mutters. Nature’s muttering: the image leads 
us into the curiously frozen dialectic that structures the language 
essay. Speaking and writing subjects, people who use language, who 
discover things in and about it, barely exist in the essay; ‘On 
Language as Such and on Human Language’, notwithstanding the 
disturbing mythic image of the world as a twittering cacophony of 
words, rustles, murmurs, and sighs, is a depopulated discourse. [...]
[T]he subjectivist, romantic emotive atmosphere has been pumped out 
of the essay by the catastrophic weight of nature’s moumfulness.75
Benjamin’s mournful nature is a landscape emptied of people and frozen in 
melancholy. This image of the muteness of alienation makes clear the absolute 
need for the construction of a new relationship towards the object world and the 
absolute need for the invigoration of intersubjectivity. If Bakhtin’s life-affirming 
world of the novel is a modem world of dynamic possibilities, Benjamin’s image
75 Pensky, Melancholy Dialectics, p. 57.
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of a depopulated, mute nature is also a modem landscape. Bakhtin’s and 
Benjamin’s theories of language and muteness present conflicting yet coexistent 
aspects of modernity: landscapes of desolation as well as of possibility. Bakhtin 
and Benjamin, however, are thinkers of hope. We have seen their assertions of 
the possible sources of hope that are found in the activity of language. The next 
chapter will examine in greater detail the sources of hope that they identify in the 
languages of art.
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Chapter 4: Totalities
The preceding chapters have discussed Bakhtin’s and Benjamin’s analysis of a 
world of human experience which is split. In their eyes, divisions have opened up 
between the central categories of the posited and the given, Erlebnis and 
Erfahrung, subject and object. In the face of this situation, Bakhtin and Benjamin 
are concerned with the overcoming of these divisions in order to bring about a 
restoration of a wholeness of experience. Following the theological strand which 
runs through both Bakhtin’s and Benjamin’s thought, a strand on which I enlarge 
in this chapter, one can speak of Man as fallen. The task that Bakhtin and 
Benjamin set themselves is the task of discerning how the restoration of totality 
and the redemption of a fallen world might best be served.1
If this is the case, Clark and Holquist’s statement on Bakhtin needs revision:
Bakhtin’s ideas about language parallel ideas held by German thinkers 
of the Romantic period such as Wilhelm von Humboldt. But Bakhtin 
is utterly opposed to the Romantic longing for wholeness, that 
homesickness which produced the German vision of an ancient Greek 
Gemeinschaft from which all subsequent history has been a falling 
away, a second exile from Eden into a world of fatally split 
consciousness in the self and alienation in society. Dialogism, by 
contrast, celebrates alterity: it is a merry science, a frohliche 
Wissenschaft of the other.’ 2
Clark and Holquist are, only in part, correct. Bakhtin is not in line with the early 
Romantic philosophy of language in so far as, in his view, the fundamental 
wholeness of language is a complex wholeness of social plurality and alterity 
rather than the wholeness of the unmediated relationship of the pre-social 
individual with nature.3 Bakhtin’s wholeness is not the totality of identity
1 Habermas highlights the importance o f the concept o f Rettung (rescuing, redemption) in 
Benjamin’s thought, with the complex o f theological associations that such a concept brings to 
mind. Habermas sees Benjamin’s rescuing-critique as orientated towards a restoration o f what he 
described as ‘unmutilated experience’, a ‘continuum o f experience’. Habermas, ‘Walter 
Benjamin: Consciousness-Raising or Rescuing Critique’, especially p. 106.
“ Clark and Holquist, Bakhtin, p. 65.
3 The Romantic tradition sees the source o f the original wholeness o f language in an unmediated 
relationship between pre-social (natural) man as individual and the natural world. Thus, Rousseau 
-  often nominally an Enlightenment thinker but one whom one may co-opt as a thinker whose 
views on language are influential in informing the Romantic sensibility o f language -  is keen to 
stress that language does not emerge as the communication o f needs by one social man to another.
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between man and nature that we find in the early Lukacs where ‘the mind’s 
attitude [...] is a passively visionary acceptance of ready-made, ever-present 
meaning’.4 Nevertheless, contrary to Clark and Holquist, this study not only 
contends that Bakhtin’s theory of alterity is thoroughly serious, but also that 
Bakhtin’s thought retains a conception of a wholeness from which man has fallen 
away. Bakhtin’s explicit concern with openness from his work on Dostoevsky 
onwards can only be understood in relation to a tacit concern with the 
completeness of totality.
Benjamin’s thought contains a similar relation to the notion of an original 
totality. Thornhill has discussed the relationship between the early Benjamin’s 
thought and the rightist Ursprungsphilosophie of the period with its emphasis on a 
lost original wholeness, and Benjamin’s move away from such ideas during the 
1930s.5 Benjamin’s subsequent emphasis on fragmentation is such that Gilloch 
comments: ‘The world is splintered into fragments, is legible only in fragments, 
and is representable solely through fragments -  these are axiomatic for 
Benjamin.’6 Nevertheless, as Jameson comments, ‘Benjamin’s work seems [...] 
to be marked by a painful straining toward a psychic wholeness or unity of
• j
experience which the historical situation threatens to shatter at every turn.’ Thus, 
Benjamin’s explicit preoccupation with fragmentation can only be understood in 
relation to the tacit notion of totality that continues to structure his work.
On the contrary, it is the expression o f the passions o f the pre-social homme sauvage in 
unmediated response to the nature around him o f which he is still a relatively undifferentiated part. 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Essai sur I ’origine des langues (published posthumously), ed. by 
Catherine Kintzler, Paris, 1993, pp. 61-64. Similarly, whilst Herder argues strongly against 
Rousseau’s conception o f the origin o f language in man’s animal nature, proposing instead the 
basis o f language in reason, he nevertheless considers the origin o f language as a function o f man 
as an individual being and not as a social being: ‘Man is a creature who hears and notices, 
naturally orientated to language. Were one to put a man onto a desert island in comfort and 
leisure, nature would open his ears!’ Johann Gottfried Herder, Abhandlung iiber den Ursprung 
der Sprache [1772], Stuttgart, 1993, p. 45.
4 Lukacs, The Theory o f the Novel, p. 32. Clark and Holquist clearly have Lukacs in mind in the 
above quotation, echoing his opening quotation from Novalis on the homesickness o f modem 
man.
5 Thornhill, Benjamin and Kraus, pp. 7-9.
6 Gilloch, Benjamin, p. 237.
7 Jameson, Marxism and Form, p. 61.
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Negative Totalities
Art, for Bakhtin and Benjamin, may be, at its best, a sphere of benign form- 
giving, in which the unruly activity of life is gathered up without sacrificing the 
integrity and specificity of its contents. Artistic form is to be form that does not 
violate life, that does not attempt to achieve mastery over life as an object but 
rather preserves and promotes the complexity of life as the experience of inter­
connected subjectivity. Andrew Benjamin and Osborne’s comment is valid as 
much for Bakhtin as it is for Benjamin: ‘It was in works of art that Benjamin 
found the self-contained form of totality he thought necessary for experience to 
participate in truth.’ 8 Artistic form goes some way to being the totalizing solution 
to the problems that emanate from the fractured nature of existence.
There are three main reasons for art’s special status in Bakhtin’s and 
Benjamin’s thought. First, returning to the topic of the first chapter: artistic forms 
may, on the one hand, provide benign models of habitualization and tradition, and 
on the other hand, provide the tools for challenging authoritarian forms of habit 
and tradition. Second, returning to the conclusion of the second chapter: art 
provides a model of the loving attention and remembrance that may be a possible 
way out of the tragedy of culture. By virtue of its orientation towards the specific, 
art expresses and preserves plural participative activity in the face of abstraction 
and indifference. This notion is at the heart of Bakhtin’s theory of polyphonic 
prose that ‘recreates not a world of objects, but precisely these other 
consciousnesses with their worlds’ {DP 68). A similar notion forms the core of 
Benjamin’s analysis of the synthetic production of something that equates to 
Erfahrung from fragments of Erlebnis in writers such as Proust and Baudelaire. 
Bakhtin’s and Benjamin’s thinking centres on the ways in which art might 
preserve and promote ‘responsible activity’ and ‘higher forms of experience’ in a 
situation where these phenomena are under permanent threat. Third, returning to 
the topic of the previous chapter: we have seen that Bakhtin and Benjamin share a 
view of language as the original and/or potential, if endangered, site of unity 
where the poles of the given and the posited, the general and the particular, object
8 Andrew Benjamin and Osborne, ‘Introduction’, p. ix.
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and subject, are held together. Bakhtin’s and Benjamin’s focus on the forms of 
art, and on verbal art in particular, stems from an understanding that art is the 
testing-ground on which language strives to capture and recapture its own essence 
as the site of this unity. In artistic forms, such as dialogic prose for Bakhtin and 
montage for Benjamin, language claims and reclaims its power.
The importance that the two thinkers accord to the aesthetic is neither
surprising nor original. Since Kant’s Critique o f Judgement and the revisions of
Kant in the aesthetics of the Romantic movement, the German philosophical
tradition had seen aesthetic experience as the realm in which the antinomies of
subject and object, general and particular might be overcome. In Toward a
Philosophy o f the Act, Bakhtin makes such special claims for aesthetic activity:
The world of aesthetic seeing -  the world of art. In its concreteness 
and its permeatedness with an emotional-volitional tone, this world is 
closer than any of the abstract cultural worlds (taken in isolation) to 
the unitary and unique world of the performed act. An analysis of this 
world should help us to come closer to an understanding of the 
architectonic structure of the actual world-as-event. (TPA 61)
This position seems to be a mere reformulation of a standard position of German
Idealist aesthetics. Hirschkop is perhaps correct in arguing that Bakhtin’s
philosophy of art ‘appears to be the old wine of German idealist aesthetics in a
new intersubjective bottle’:
As in Kant, aesthetic form heals the rift between the lawfulness of that 
which we know through natural science (which Bakhtin calls 
cognition) and the orientation towards ends characteristic of morality: 
in art we experience something both sensual and apparently 
purposeful: in Bakhtin’s words, existence as ‘beautiful givenness’, 
self-sufficient and needing no justification.9
As in Kant, aesthetic activity provides a ground on which we may develop 
responsible and participatory activity that, in turn, may serve indirectly to heal the 
rifts encountered in the contemporary non-aesthetic sphere. Similarly,
Benjamin’s career-long search for the higher experience of the ‘Programme on the 
Coming Philosophy’ in literary and artistic forms may seem to do little more than 
refine and give new emphasis to familiar themes in the main strand in German
9 Hirschkop, Bakhtin, p. 58.
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aesthetics from Kant onwards. Thus, Benjamin’s statement, in ‘On Language as 
Such and on the Language of Man’, that the language of poetry is partly founded 
on name, seems to imply that the original relationship of wholeness between God, 
man and nature may survive in the aesthetic realm, and hence that this realm may 
provide a resource for the reinstitution of totality. In this way, Benjamin is close 
to thinkers such as Schiller for whom art is a means ‘to restore by means of a 
higher Art the totality of our nature which the arts themselves have destroyed’.10 
Both thinkers, then, stand in the tradition that thinks of art as a sphere for 
education understood as Bildung: the cultivation of the aesthetic will help to 
educate ourselves into a more harmonious relationship with ourselves and our 
world.11
Nevertheless, whilst there is no doubt that Bakhtin and Benjamin work 
within this tradition, their conclusions on the role of aesthetic experience and on 
those artistic forms that best promote it go beyond and significantly alter that 
same tradition. Most notably, their contribution to this tradition lies in their 
parallel recognition that art, in the cause of permanent and transcendent wholeness 
and completion, must adopt a provisional aesthetics of fragmentation and
17openness. For both thinkers, in the end, celebrate not artistic forms that produce 
images of totality, forms such as the traditional organic art-work whose parts 
combine into a harmonious whole, but rather forms such as the polyphonic novel 
and montage which present the world in terms of open fragmentation. As a result, 
Bakhtin and Benjamin seem to be going beyond what Eagleton terms the
10 Friedrich Schiller, On the Aesthetic Education o f  Man (1794), ed. and trans. by E. M. Wilkinson 
and L. A. Willoughby, Oxford, 1967, p. 43.
11 Tihanov has drawn attention to the importance o f the notion o f aesthetic Bildung in Bakhtin’s 
work, particularly in Bakhtin’s texts on Goethe and in the first version o f the Dostoevsky book.
For both thinkers, the Bildung o f aesthetic experience acts equally on both creators and 
contemplators o f art. As Bakhtin notes: ‘In form I find myself, find my own productive, 
axiologically form-giving, activity, I feel intensely my own movement that is creating the object, 
and I do so not only in primary creation, not only during my own performance, but also during the 
contemplation o f the work o f art. I must to some extent experience myself as the creator o f form, 
in order to actualize the artistically valid form as such’ {AH 304). Benjamin’s preoccupation with 
both creator and contemplator is more consistently noticeable.
12 Bakhtin uses the opposition o f open and closed; Benjamin prefers the opposition o f fragment 
and whole. Despite this different conceptual vocabulary, both thinkers seem to be concerned with 
totality and its opposite (openness/fragmentation). The matter is complicated by the fact that one 
can present the terms o f these oppositions positively ( ‘completeness’ and ‘openness’, for example, 
tend to carry positive associations) or negatively (similarly, ‘closedness’ and ‘incompleteness’ 
tend to carry negative associations).
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‘ideology of the aesthetic’. According to Eagleton, the emergent middle class, 
wishing to define itself as the universal subject of history without sacrificing the 
sense of particularity that is part of its individualistic ideology, finds in the 
aesthetic a ‘dream of reconciliation’. Here is a sphere in which individuals are to 
be ‘woven into intimate unity with no detriment to their specificity’ whilst the 
‘abstract totality’ of art is ‘suffiised with all the flesh-and-blood reality of 
individual being’. 13 The aesthetics of openness and fragmentation that Bakhtin 
and Benjamin embrace are not to be domesticated into a dream of easy resolution.
1. Allegory and Dialogue
Here, I turn to Benjamin’s Habilitationsschrift, written 1924-25, On the Origin o f  
the German Play o f Lamentation.14 This work is not just a contribution to the 
literary history of the German Baroque. Benjamin’s Trauerspiel book keeps an 
eye on its own present and is, in significant measure, a justification of the 
aesthetics of the Avant-garde.15 The allegorical mode of thinking which 
Benjamin sees at work in Trauerspiel is to recur in his analysis of commodity 
form and of modernist figures such as Baudelaire and Brecht. The Trauerspiel 
text, hence, represents a crucial moment in Benjamin’s thought, insofar as it 
conjoins the early language mysticism of ‘On Language as Such and on the 
Language of Man’ (a text that is drawn on substantially and, indeed, in part, 
reproduced in the Trauerspiel book) with his later work which is committed to the 
aesthetics and politics of the Avant-garde.16
13 Eagleton, The Ideology o f the Aesthetic, p. 25.
14 The German title is Tiber den Ursprung des deutschen Trauerspiels. It has been translated by 
John Osborne as The Origin o f  German Tragic Drama. ‘Trauerspiel'. however, is best translated 
as ‘play o f lamentation’. For convenience I shall continue to refer to it as the Trauerspiel book. 
Whilst it failed to win Benjamin a university position, the Trauerspiel study came out as a book in 
1928.
15 Gilloch comments: ‘[Benjamin’s] interest in the Trauerspiel, in particular, was sparked by the 
recognition that the bleak, broken world o f the baroque might have a special significance for, an 
“elective affinity’’ with his own time, convulsed as it was by the carnage o f the Great War, the 
financial turmoil and inflation o f the Weimar years, and a sense o f cultural crisis.’ Gilloch, 
Benjamin, p. 237.
16 The Trauerspiel book also forms a bridge between Benjamin’s theologically oriented writings 
and his Marxist writings, since a formative influence on the writing o f the book was his discovery 
o f Lukacs’s History and Class Consciousness. Benjamin spent the summer o f 1924 on Capri, 
writing the bulk o f the Trauerspiel book, and it was here that he also read History and Class 
Consciousness. Lukacs’s work was to provide Benjamin with a theoretical armature for the
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The first section of the work, ‘ Trauerspiel and Tragedy’, sets out to 
establish the autonomy of the Baroque tragic drama in the face of the tyranny of 
classical models. According to Benjamin, Ancient Greek tragedy must not be 
seen as a universal, transhistorical genre; on the contrary, tragedy arises from a 
specific historical moment: humanity’s struggle against myth, as exemplified by 
the tragic hero who battles the forces of Fate in order to assert his or her ethical 
autonomy. Trauerspiel had traditionally been viewed by scholars as a degenerate 
form of tragedy. Benjamin insists, however, that Trauerspiel also corresponds to 
its own, completely distinct historical moment and must not be judged by the 
terms of tragedy. What organizes Trauerspiel is not the conflict of the tragic hero, 
but history, understood by the Baroque sensibility in terms of the inescapable 
transience and fragmentation of worldly things that finds its expression in 
lamentation. Far from seeing it as a degenerate and fragmented form of tragedy, 
Benjamin reads an internal, formal coherence into Trauerspiel which is provided 
by its very fragmentation.17
Benjamin’s choice and definition of Trauerspiel as subject matter bears
comparison with Bakhtin’s approach to the polyphonic novel and to Dostoevsky’s
work in particular. In the opening chapter of the Dostoevsky book Bakhtin
reviews the work of Dostoevsky’s critics who stress the contradictory,
heterogeneous, plural, fragmentary and unresolved nature of Dostoevsky’s world.
Bakhtin quotes Komarich, for example:
Snatching [...] chunks of reality, extending empiricism to its utmost 
extreme, Dostoevsky does not for a single moment permit us to lose 
ourselves in joyous recognition of that reality (as Flaubert does, or 
Leo Tolstoy); instead he frightens us, and this is precisely because he 
snatches and rips everything out of the normal and predictable chain 
of the real; in transferring these chunks to himself, Dostoevsky does 
not transfer along with them the predictable links familiar to us from
analysis o f commodity form. Eventually, in his work on Baudelaire and the Paris arcades, 
Benjamin marries his analysis o f Trauerspiel and his analysis of capitalism; both contain 
allegorical modes o f thinking.
17 As Leslie points out: ‘Benjamin was frequently able to employ the concept of decline ( Verfall) 
positively, and to perceive in decay historical truth.’ Leslie, Benjamin, p. 43. This goes as much 
for the supposedly degenerate era o f the Weimar Republic as for the supposedly degenerate form 
of Trauerspiel.
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our experience: the Dostoevskian novel is bound up in an organic 
unity that has nothing to do with plot. {DP 20)
One notes here the attributes of montage, shock and renewal of the familiar -
integral aspects of Benjamin’s aesthetics -  which occur in Komarich’s
characterization of Dostoevsky’s art. Bakhtin’s comments reinforce a sense of
these characteristics:
Indeed, the monologic unity of the world is destroyed in a 
Dostoevskian novel, but those ripped-off pieces of reality are in no 
sense directly combined in the unity of the novel: each of these pieces 
gravitates toward the integral field of vision of a specific character; 
each makes sense only at the level of a specific consciousness. If 
these chunks of reality, deprived of any pragmatic links, were 
combined directly as things emotionally, lyrically or symbolically 
harmonious in the unity of a single and monologic field of vision, then 
before us would be the world of the Romantic, the world of 
Hoffmann, for example, but in no way could it be the world of 
Dostoevsky. {DP 20-21)
Bakhtin asserts here the impossibility of judging Dostoevsky’s polyphonic novel 
by the standards of the totalizing forms of the realist novel or Romanticism. 
Dostoevsky’s novel of chunks and ripped-off pieces of reality must be judged in 
its own terms. As in Benjamin’s approach to Trauerspiel, Bakhtin sets himself 
the task of seeing an internal coherence to Dostoevsky’s work that emerges from 
its very lack of coherence. Both thinkers refuse to see the fragmented form only 
in the light of the tyranny of totalization.
The second section of Benjamin’s Trauerspiel book is devoted to allegory. 
Benjamin approaches this through an immanent critique of the Romantics’ 
characterization of the relationship between symbol and allegory. For the 
Romantics, the orthodox conception of the symbol was ‘the appearance of the 
Idea in the artwork’ {im Kunstwerk die Erscheinung einer Idee) {GS 1 336; OGTD 
160). The term ‘Idea’ here carries the full Idealist sense of a transcendent, 
absolute, and timeless value. Appearance implies that the idea does not merely 
occur in a work of art, which serves as an incidental vehicle, but shines forth in 
and through the work, lending it beauty and totality. Through the symbol, works 
of art entail a claim to totality, to an unmediated communion with the absolute in
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and of themselves: ‘as a symbolic construct, the beautiful is supposed to merge 
with the divine in an unbroken whole’ (GS 1 336; OGTD 160).
Benjamin objects to the notion of the aesthetic symbol because of a
conviction that the doctrine of the symbol implies a falsification of human,
historical experience. For Benjamin, the philosophy of art since Romanticism has
suffered under ‘the tyranny of a usurper’ in the form of the Romantic symbol (GS
7336; OGTD 159). The symbol, Benjamin argues, falsifies. In a deconstructive
play on the terms that ground the Romantic doctrine of the symbol, Benjamin’s
critique reveals the semantic richness and resultant ambiguity of Romantic theory.
The symbol is said to transfigure (verklaren) its object. As McCole puts it:
Verklarung suggests first of all a transformation in which an object 
takes on a certain radiance. The object glows; it beams, like a face 
transfigured by bliss, or shines, as does the beautiful appearance 
(schdner Schein) of the work of art. Transfiguration often involves an 
exaltation into the transcendent [...]. But finally, Verklarung may also 
mean an idealization of something in the negative sense of distortion 
or even falsification [...]. The aesthetic symbol’s transgression, in a
1 fiword, is Verklarung, a falsifying transfiguration.
At the heart of this is the double meaning of the word, Schein. Schein, like the 
English ‘appearance’, carries two meanings: on the one hand, it means 
appearance, in the sense of actual manifestation; on the other hand, it means 
appearance in the sense of illusion. The symbol’s insistence on the Schein of the 
transcendent transfixes men and women with its seductive glow and blinds them 
to the transient reality of their profane existence. Benjamin here objects to a false 
or premature projection of totality.
For the Romantics, the arbitrary and conventional nature of allegorical 
expression was a testament to its degeneracy. These critics denigrated allegory in 
their keenness to exalt the aesthetic symbol. Schopenhauer, for instance, contends 
that allegory was, like script, a mere conventional relationship between a 
signifying image and its meaning. Reading the Romantic critics against 
themselves, however, Benjamin contends that allegory is indeed like script and
18 McCole, Benjamin, p. 137-38.
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bears the marks of its origin in convention; yet this, he argues, is its distinctive 
strength.19 Allegory, like script, ‘immerses itself in the abyss between pictorial 
being and meaning’ (GS 1 342; OGTD 165). In so doing, it probes the inevitable 
discrepancy between arbitrary signs and absolute, stabilized significance.
Allegorical expression bears witness to the failure of human language and
signification to capture and stabilize that which is intended. Allegory flaunts its
own fragmentation and asserts the fundamentally unsuccessful and fragmented
nature of human existence. As opposed to the symbol’s image of harmonious
totality, allegorical expression transforms all it touches into fragments and ruins:
Whereas romanticism inspired by its belief in the infinite, intensified 
the perfected creation of form and idea in critical terms, at one stroke 
the profound vision of allegory transforms things and works into 
stirring writing. [...] In the field of allegorical intuition the image is a 
fragment, a rune. Its beauty as a symbol evaporates when the light of 
divine learning falls upon it. The false appearance of totality is 
extinguished. (GS 1352; OGTD 176)
An allegorical mode of thinking, then, acts as a critical and deconstructive weapon 
against the false totalizing of the symbolic mode.
By virtue of its unmediated access to the transcendent, the symbol lays
claim to absolute stability and immunity to history. For Benjamin:
The temporal measure of symbolic experience is the mystical instant 
(the nunc stans). [...] Whilst in the symbol with the transfiguration of 
decay the transfigured countenance of nature reveals itself fleetingly 
in the light of salvation, in allegory the death-mask of history lies 
before the observer as a frozen landscape. History in all that is 
untimely, sorrowful, unsuccessful from the beginning of time 
expresses itself in this countenance - no, in this death’s head. (GS I  
342-43; OGTD 166-67)
Where the symbol embodies momentary totality with the absolute, allegory has 
the discontinuous and fragmented structure of a series of moments, of transitory,
19 This is one of the many aspects in Benjamin’s work that has drawn the attention o f thinkers of 
deconstruction. Certainly Benjamin’s theory o f the primacy of script is similar to that o f Derrida 
in O f Grammatology: ‘there is nothing subordinate about written script; it is not cast away in 
reading, like dross. It is absorbed along with what is read as its “pattern”’ (GS I 388; OGTD 215). 
Likewise, the effect o f script-based allegory on the symbol might well be described as 
deconstructive o f a metaphysics o f presence. Eagleton’s reading of allegory runs along these lines. 
See Eagleton, Benjamin, especially pp. 20-23.
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failed attempts to capture meaning. It follows from this that allegory, which is 
rooted in the profane course of human history, has access to a facet of experience 
inaccessible to the symbol: the experience of all that is untimely, sorrowful and 
unsuccessful; the mournful transience of the play of lamentation is also the 
transience of our unfulfilled, profane existence.
In the symbol, sign and meaning are unmediated. There is, in the symbol,
an indivisible unity of form and content, even if this unity represents a falsified
image of the world. In contrast, allegory is characterized by a conventional and
arbitrary relationship between sign and meaning which is semiotic in character.
It is this semiotic character of allegory that allows for a reconstituted, open-ended
relationship between the sacred and the profane that recognizes the unbridgeable
gap between the two realms, yet calls all the more painfully for its abolition.
Benjamin writes:
Any person, any object, any relationship can mean absolutely 
anything else. With this possibility a destructive, but just verdict is 
passed on the world in which the detail is of no great importance. But 
it will be unmistakably apparent, especially to anyone who is familiar 
with allegorical textual exegesis, that all of the things which are used 
to signify derive, from the very fact of pointing to something else, a 
power which makes them appear no longer commensurable with 
profane things, which raises them onto a higher plane, and which can, 
indeed, sanctify them. Considered in allegorical terms, then, the 
profane world is both elevated and devalued. (GS/351; OGTD 175)
The arbitrary nature of allegory means that it continually fails to capture its object. 
In this failure lies a truthful, but negative relation between the transient world of 
the profane and the eternal realm of the sacred. If allegory rips the totality of the 
symbol out of the illusory site of transparent meaning, and thereby destroys the 
false experience of the world which the symbol contains, it goes on to create a 
new relation to the object, preserving something of the relation to a world beyond 
that the symbol claimed to represent.
20 In the terms o f ‘Of Language as Such and of the Language o f Man’, symbol corresponds to 
name, allegory to fallen sign. What we see in the Trauerspiel book is Benjamin’s reevaluation of 
the opposition o f name and sign through his discovery o f new potentialities in the debased nature 
o f the sign.
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By refusing to present the false reconciliation of the symbol, allegory 
projects a higher, transgredient perspective from which this world can be judged 
and justified. In so doing, it contains within its world of mournful fragments of
9 1history a negated image of a higher, ahistorical totality. An analogous notion
can be observed many years later in Benjamin’s analysis of Baudelaire:
If Baudelaire, in the ‘Spleen’ and in ‘Vie anterieure’ holds in his 
hands the scattered fragments [auseinandergesprengten 
Bestandsstiicke] of genuine historical experience, Bergson has 
alienated himself from history much more with his notion of the duree 
[...]. It [the duree] is the quintessence of an Erlebnis that parades in 
the borrowed robe of Erfahrung. The spleen in contrast, exhibits the 
Erlebnis in all its nakedness [stellt das Erlebnis in seiner Blosse aus]
(G S1643; SW 336).
Unlike Bergson’s vitalism, Baudelaire’s poetry of the fragments of urban
99experience (Erlebnis) refuses false totalizing. The result is that his poetry
creates a negative relation to the experience (.Erfahrung), the disintegration of
which his verse demonstrates so clearly:
Of all the experiences which made his life what it was, Baudelaire 
singled out his having been jostled by the crowd as the decisive, 
unmistakable experience. [...] Baudelaire battled the crowd -  with 
the impotent rage of someone fighting the rain or the wind. This is the 
nature of the immediate experience (Erlebnis) to which Baudelaire has 
given the weight of long experience (Erfahrung). (GS 1 652-53; SW  
343)
It is in the most debased and fragmented of phenomena (the shock experience 
[ Chokerlebnis] of urban life) that a negative image of totality that bears the weight 
of Erfahrung may come into being.
Bakhtin shares with Benjamin a fear of false totalization. Just as Benjamin 
contends that the symbol lays claim to an untimely confidence in the totality of
21 As Andrew Benjamin and Osborne comment: ‘in The Origin o f German Tragic Drama, allegory 
is seen to destroy the deceptive totality o f the symbol, wrenching it out o f context and placing it in 
new, transparently constructed, configurations o f meaning’. Benjamin and Osborne,
‘Introduction’, p. xi.
"  As Nagele comments: '’Erfahrung is laid bare as Erlebnis. Yet it is the gesture o f laying bare the 
Erlebnis without any borrowed robe o f Erfahrung that gives the Erlebnis the weight of 
Erfahrung.' Rainer Naegele, ‘The poetic ground laid bare (Benjamin reading Baudelaire)’, in 
Ferris (ed.), Benjamin: Theoretical Questions, pp. 118-38 (138).
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transcendence, so Bakhtin finds and condemns a pretence of and confidence in its
own finality and self-sufficiency in monologue:
Monologism denies that there exists outside of it another 
consciousness, with the same rights, and capable of responding on an 
equal footing, another and equal I (thou). For a monologic outlook (in 
its extreme form) the other remains entirely and only an object of 
consciousness, and cannot constitute another consciousness. No 
response capable of altering everything in the world of my 
consciousness, is expected of this other. The monologue is 
accomplished and deaf to the other’s response; it does not await it and 
does not grant it any decisive force. Monologue makes do without the 
other; that is why to some extent it objectivizes all reality. Monologue 
pretends to be the last word. {DP 292-93)
Monologue shares, then, a number of characteristics with the symbol: its 
imperviousness corresponds to the imperviousness of the untouchable symbol; its 
claim to finality and direct signification corresponds to the symbol’s claim to 
eternal value. Monologue, like the symbol, presents itself as being outside the 
course of history, hence it represents a falsification of human experience. 
Furthermore, it is worth considering Benjamin’s description of the rule of the 
symbol as the ‘tyranny of a usurper’ in relation to Bakhtin. Hirschkop comments 
of monologue:
In fact poetic discourse and all the variants that it spawns in the course 
of ‘Discourse in the Novel’ (different species of monologism,
‘serious’ discourse, authoritarian discourse, myth) are worth 
polemicizing with precisely because they represent a kind of false, 
official transcendence of the individual, a transcendence which offers 
power as a substitute for fulfilment and redemption. 23
Hirschkop is right to emphasize the connection between monologue’s false 
transcendence and power. The ‘tyranny of a usurper’ neatly sums up Bakhtin’s 
sense of the twin threats that are posed by the violence and self-appointed 
authority of the monologic utterance.24 Monologue, in its claim to the final word, 
like the symbol in its claim to transcendence, pretends to a position of power. In 
so doing, both phenomena pretend to a throne that is not theirs.
23 Hirschkop, Bakhtin, p. 87.
24 Benjamin’s phrase, ‘the tyranny of a usurper’, is reminiscent o f Bakhtin’s conception o f the 
‘pretender’, already referred to.
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Just as Benjamin favours the failed and permanently deferred mode of 
allegorical representation, so Bakhtin favours the ever-provisional and open form 
of dialogic discourse. Once again, dialogue shares many of the characteristics of 
allegory. Dialogue, like allegory, bears the imprint of its own failure. In its 
expectation of an answer back, dialogue recognizes its inherent instability and 
incapacity for absolute signification. Dialogue is thorough-goingly historical, 
immersed in the concrete language of social reality. With the development of 
dialogic discourse, ‘for the first time in artistic-ideological consciousness, time 
and the world become historical’. (D I30). The essence of dialogue is indirect 
discourse, a word directed at the other’s word. Allegory, too, whose signifier 
must always refer to other signifiers and not to the concrete being of the signified, 
is a word with a sideways glance. The dialogic word is polyvalent since its 
meaning is contested and it is subject to competing evaluations, like allegory 
whose conventional and arbitrary nature opens it up to plural meanings and plural 
accents.
Like allegory, moreover, dialogue possesses a double orientation. First, it
possesses a critical function in relation to the pretence of totalizing monologue;
second, by virtue of this function, it retains a negative relation to the totality to
which monologue lays claim. Both these aspects are present in the following
observations on dialogic discourse in the Dostoevsky book:
We might add that Rabelais taunts the deceptive human word by a 
parodic destruction of syntactic structures, thereby reducing to 
absurdity some of the logical and expressively accented aspects of 
words. [...] Turning away from language (by means of language of 
course), discrediting any direct or unmediated intentionality and 
expressive excess (any “weighty” seriousness) that might adhere in 
ideological discourse, presuming that all language is conventional and 
false, maliciously inadequate to reality -  all this achieves in Rabelais 
the maximum purity possible in prose. But the truth that might 
oppose such falsity receives almost no direct intentional and verbal 
expression in Rabelais, it does not receive its own word -  it 
reverberates only in the parodic unmasking accents in which the lie is 
present. Truth is restored by reducing the lie to an absurdity, but truth 
itself does not seek words; she is afraid to entangle herself in the 
word, to soil herself in verbal pathos. (DI 307)
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On the one hand, the dialogic discourse of Rabelais acts deconstructively on 
monologic claims to an unmediated form of signification: in Bakhtin’s view, the 
parodic laughter exposes the conventional and arbitrary nature of monologic 
seriousness for what it is, and, hence, such laughter is able to dethrone the 
pretender. On the other hand, this movement of deconstruction restores -  albeit 
negatively -  a relation to truth. Truth here does not speak her name (once again, 
we see Bakhtin’s recourse to silence) but is nevertheless restored to her throne.
2. Theology and Politics
Benjamin’s allegorical mode of thinking structures his work. It is at the heart of
his conception of theology, rooted in Jewish conceptions of the
incommensurability of the realm of the sacred and the profane, the unutterability
of God’s name and the prohibition of graven images.25 In the apocalyptic strand
of this tradition, the more catastrophic and the more negative the nature of
historical life, the more forceful the testament to the need for and imminence of
the abolition of historical life which will be brought about by the Messiah.26
Benjamin displays a strong affinity with this tradition. In the ‘Theological-
Political Fragment’ (written either 1920-21 or 1937-38), he writes:
Only the Messiah himself consummates all history, in the sense that 
he alone redeems, completes, creates its relation to the Messianic. For 
this reason nothing that is historical can relate, from its own ground, to 
anything Messianic. Therefore the Kingdom of God is not the telos of 
the historical dynamic; it cannot be established as a goal. From the 
standpoint of history, it is not the goal but the terminus [Ende]. (GS II 
203; S W III305)
The historical and messianic realms are discrete. The Messiah is not the telos, 
that is to say the fulfilment and coming-into-fruition of tendencies immanent to
25 Meschonnic charts this tradition and the utopian images that it contains in biblical texts, 
medieval Cabalistic literature, as well as in twentieth-century thinkers such as Rosenzweig, 
Levinas, and Benjamin, to whom the last third o f his book is dedicated. Meschonnic also points to 
the connection between Jewish negative theology and the apophatic tradition which, critics have 
argued, is influential in Orthodoxy and thus on Bakhtin. See Henri Meschonnic, L 'Utopie du Juif, 
Paris, 2001, particularly, on negative theology, pp. 189-227.
26 Scholem notes: ‘Beginning at the moment of the deepest catastrophe there exists the chance of 
redemption.’ He goes on to quote the Midrash Tehillim to Psalm 43: ‘Israel speaks to God: When 
will you redeem us? He answers: When you have sunk to the lowest level, at that time I will 
redeem you.’ Gershom Scholem, ‘Towards an Understanding o f the Messianic Idea in Judaism’, 
in The Messianic Idea in Judaism, New York, 1971, pp. 1-36 (11-12).
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history. Rather the completion and perfection ( Vollendung) and redemption of
history consists in its destruction. And yet, in Benjamin’s allegorical mode of
thought, the very debased nature of the profane in all its transience carries an
index to the Messianic.
The profane, therefore, though not itself a category of [the Messianic 
Kingdom], is a decisive category of its most unobtrusive approach.
For in happiness all that is earthly seeks its downfall [Untergang], and 
only in happiness is its downfall destined to find it. [...] For nature is 
messianic by reason of its eternal and total passing away 
[ Vergangnis]. To strive for such a passing away -  even the passing 
away of those stages of man that are nature -  is the task of world 
politics, whose method must be called nihilism. (G S II203-04; SW III 
305, translation modified)
It follows from this that the task of the writer and the critic is not to attempt to 
construct visions of a better world of transcendence, for this is impossible and 
ultimately mythic. Rather, he is to reveal the broken nature of the world of 
history and transience in anticipation of the word of God that will come as 
abolition or, as we shall see, in anticipation of the voice of revolution that will 
come as destruction.
In his essay on Karl Kraus (1931), Benjamin quotes one of Kraus’s poems
from 1929, which is an attack directed at Stefan George. Here, Kraus confronts
George, the ‘object of worship’:
Who in the temple dwells from which 
He never had to drive the traders and the lenders,
Nor yet the Pharisees and scribes
Who, therefore, camped about the place, describe it.
(GS 7/359; SW 7/451)
In Kraus’s polemical poem and in Benjamin’s reading of it, George’s error is two­
fold: first, George’s hieratic ‘cult of language’ lays claim to the language that can 
describe the temple. His poetic mystifications are, as Britt puts it, ‘a kind of 
linguistic idolatry’. Second, George occupies the space of the temple. In 
opposition to the Messiah who comes and clears the holy place of the money­
lenders and traders, George’s blasphemous claim to occupy the holy space 
presents an obstacle to Messianic happening.
27 Brian Britt, Walter Benjamin and the Bible, New York, 1996, p. 105.
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The words that prepare the way of the Messiah must not be prematurely full
of the mere appearance of the divine, but empty and emptying. Such are the
words of allegorical form. In their arbitrary emptiness they make space for the
authentic, full word of the Messiah. This is the significance of Kraus and his
liberation of language through destruction. Kraus is one of the incarnations of
Benjamin’s destructive character. In the wilderness of fallen language, Kraus
cries ‘make way for the Lord! ’. For it is in the space that has been cleared away
that the Messiah can come and speak. Breithaupt comments:
[The destructive character] makes space [...] only because it was 
thought to be occupied by some phenomenon or fiction. When this 
fiction is emptied out, the space remains. In this space, the future is 
not blocked. Someone or something could arrive. Benjamin says:
“There will be someone who might need this place without occupying 
it.” The empty space is the podium for possible speakers. For 
Benjamin, this empty space is the only sphere for politics, a politics of 
advent. Benjamin does not make an image of this person who might 
come and need this space. Every image or phenomenon would only 
occupy the space and thereby block the future. Sometimes, Benjamin
? o
calls this coming and space-needing person the Messiah.
Just as at the Passover Seder a cup of wine is poured for the prophet Elijah (and 
indeed, as in certain extreme forms of Protestantism a space is left at table for an 
always-expected Christ), so the forms of language that carry an index to 
redemption and authentic totality are those that make space, those that, in their 
brokenness, are empty and emptying.
This negative, allegorical mode of thinking need not, however, operate on 
the theological plane alone. It is at work in Benjamin’s adherence to the dictum 
of Brecht (another of Benjamin’s destructive characters) that the cause of political 
change is best served by starting with the bad, new things, rather than with the 
good, old ones. It is to be found in his argument that mechanical reproduction 
which, on the one hand, destroys benignly auratic modes of experience, such as
28 Fritz Breithaupt, ‘History as the Delayed Disintegration o f Phenomena’, in Richter (ed.), 
Benjamin’s Ghosts, pp. 191-203 (199). More problematically, Breithaupt goes on to argue: ‘this 
Messiah can only arrive in strict imagelessness. He or She does not need to come because the 
empty space is the condition o f possibility o f his or her arrival and that is all that is needed.’ This 
seems to me to be a reduction of Benjamin’s serious theological and political meditations to the 
dimension o f mere possibility for its own sake.
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those, for example, inherent in storytelling, also fashions, on the other hand, a new 
and liberated organization of collective subjects. Such a mode of thinking, then, 
is at the heart of Benjamin’s appropriation of revolutionary Marxism.
Benjamin’s Marxism is a rejection both of the vulgar form of Marxism 
that sees the revolution as the natural and inevitable result of economic and 
technical progress, and of the view of so-called progressivists in the Social 
Democratic parties who conceive of the cause of social justice proceeding by step- 
by-step reform. Both positions project a political situation (revolution, a just 
position for the working classes) as the goal and fulfilment of historical 
tendencies. Rather Benjamin conceives the revolution as the interruption of a
9 Qhistorical evolution which otherwise leads to catastrophe. As Benjamin puts it 
in a striking reworking of Marx: ‘Marx says that revolutions are the locomotive of 
world history. But perhaps it is quite otherwise. Perhaps revolutions are an 
attempt by the passengers on this train -  namely, the human race -  to activate the 
emergency brake’ (GS 1 1232; SW IV  402). It is the sight of the catastrophe ahead 
on the railway line of history -  the boulders that block the track -  that forces the 
proletariat to pull the revolutionary emergency brake and bring history to an end.
It is this form of Marxism that leads Benjamin to put his faith not in Stalinist 
optimism but in what he terms, in the essay on Surrealism, the ‘organization of 
pessimism’:
Surrealism has come ever closer to the Communist answer. And that 
means pessimism all along the line. Absolutely. Mistrust in the fate 
of literature, mistrust in the fate of freedom, mistrust in the fate of 
European humanity, but three times mistrust in all reconciliation: 
between classes, between individuals, between nations. And 
unlimited mistrust only in I. G. Farben and the peaceful perfection of 
the air force. (GS I I 308; S W II216-17)
Benjamin’s argument is that precisely in the most debased phenomena of 
capitalist society are to be found both an unmasking of false freedoms and a
29 As Tiedemann and others have pointed out, however, this conception of revolution as 
catastrophe owes perhaps more to Blanqui and anarchism than it does to Marx. See Rolf 
Tiedemann, ‘Historical Materialism or Political Messianism? An Interpretation of the Theses “On 
the Concept o f History’”, in Smith (ed.), Benjamin: Philosophy, Aesthetics, History, pp. 175-209.
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negative relation to true freedom. This view is an alternative form of Marxism 
that nevertheless stays close to Marx. For Marx argues that, for example, the very 
nature of commodity, the separation of buying and selling, which makes 
capitalism possible, contains the seed of the economic crises which are to bring 
about capitalism’s downfall.30 Likewise, he asserts that the progressive 
immiseration of the proletariat, the most brutal and negative effect of advanced 
capitalism, is the process by which capitalism produces and increases its own 
gravediggers, the revolutionary proletariat. For Marx, as for Benjamin, hope is to 
be found in the most negative of phenomena.
In this optimistic pessimism, Benjamin moves sharply away from any 
tendencies in his work towards cultural conservatism. Benjamin’s silence in 
response to Buber had been a resignation in the face of the impossibility of saying 
anything meaningful in a fallen, instrumentalized and alienated language. 
Benjamin’s theological-political convictions, however, lead him beyond this 
position. Far from rejecting modernity in a nostalgic lamentation of all that has 
disappeared, Benjamin’s embrace of modernity in all its degeneracy constitutes an 
act of theological and political responsibility. So too, in the sphere of art, 
Benjamin, on the one hand, turns to champion those artistic forms that reveal the 
nature of fallen experience, and, on the other hand, directs his destructive critical 
powers at those forms that seek to falsify the transience and brokenness of 
historical life. Revolutionary forms are those such as montage or Brecht’s 
political theatre that interrupt and create space for political action.
In the case of Bakhtin, it is, perhaps, less clear that his celebration of open 
form is, in a measure equal to that of Benjamin, a provisional gesture which is 
predicated on the projection of some future totality. Many critics insist on 
Bakhtin’s absolute resistance to the form of finalization that this would imply:
Dostoevsky’s text is presented as a confrontation of discursive
instances: an opposition of utterances, a contrapuntal, polyphonic
30 ‘Buying and selling can be separated. They are, then, crises in potential.’ Marx, Theories o f  
Surplus Value, quoted in Christoph Turcke and Gerhard Bolte, Einfuhrung in die kritische Theorie, 
Darmstadt, 1994, p. 6. Turcke and Bolte provide a lucid account o f the relation between 
commodity and crisis in Marx’s thought and the influence o f this aspect o f his thought in Germany 
following the First World War.
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ensemble. It does not form a totalizable structure: without unity of 
subject or meaning, anti-totalitarian and anti-theological, the 
Dostoevskian model has nothing in common with Hegelian dialectic.31
Despite the undoubted attraction of such a view with its utopian projection of a 
world of possibility, this conception of Bakhtin’s thought gravely impoverishes it, 
reducing it to a mere openness for its own sake. An emphasis on eternal openness 
in Bakhtin would imply that he supports a denial that one is responsible for one’s 
utterances, a form of alibi. Hirschkop comments: ‘Discourse is historical; it lacks 
theological certainty. But this does not mean that its essence is to lack any form 
of certainty and therefore every statement is equally, and hence absolutely, 
provisional.’ To claim otherwise is, in a curious fashion, to erase difference 
from Bakhtin’s thought. If all statements, though contradictory, retain equal 
rights, then their difference evaporates and the result is an eternal continuum of 
undecidability.
One way of approaching this problem is to turn to Bakhtin’s collaborator, 
Voloshinov. Voloshinov argues that utterances gain their signification in a 
dialogic interaction that is social and open-ended. The vision of signification is 
one that appears to be explicitly anti-authoritarian and democratic. No utterance 
is immune to a potential answer back. The dialogic nature of language itself 
means that evaluative meaning cannot be permanently fixed within the flux that is 
language. Voloshinov contrasts the closed forms of monologic utterance that seek 
to have the final word with the open forms of indirect discourse which remain true 
to the nature of language.
Voloshinov’s historical narrative is a narrative of liberation. It begins with
the enslavement of the native word at the hands of the conquering foreigner and
his ideology-transmitting counterpart, the priest.
[One’s native word] contains no mystery; it can become a mystery 
only in the mouths of others, provided they are hierarchically alien to 
us -  in the mouth of the chief, in the mouth of priests. But in that 
case, it has already become a word of a different kind, externally
31 Julia Kristeva, ‘Une poetique ruinee’, Preface to M. M. Bakhtine, La Poetique de Dostoievski, 
Paris, 1975, pp. 5-27(14-15).
32 Hirschkop, ‘A Response to the Forum on Mikhail Bakhtin’, p. 76.
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changed and removed from the routine of life (taboo for usage in 
ordinary life, or an archaism of speech); that is, if it had not already 
been from the start a foreign word in the mouth of a conqueror chief.
[...] This grandiose organizing role of the alien word [...] led to its 
coalescence in the depths of historical consciousness of nations with 
the idea of authority, the idea of power, the idea of holiness, the idea 
of truth, and dictated that notions about the word be preeminently 
oriented toward the alien word. (MPL 75)
The word described here is closed: closed off by the hierarchical distance that I 
have discussed in Chapter 1. It is wrapped up in an impenetrable aura of holiness, 
power and unfamiliarity. It is the word of a tradition that strives to stay forever 
the same and seeks to organize and subordinate its community in fixed relations 
of power.
Voloshinov charts the unravelling of this form of monologic discourse 
through dialogization in the development of genres of indirect speech. This 
process is an opening up of the closed word of the philologist and priest into the 
plural world of modernity. It is a process that is characterized by the 
relativization of the word that results from the intrusion of varied, individual 
points of view. It is a process of secularization and demystification in which the 
hieratic speech of the priest becomes the demotic speech of the people, a process 
of democratization in which the authoritarian word of the single chief is wrested 
from his mouth for the many mouths of competing classes, a process of the 
opening up and dissolution of a single, immutable truth into the plural sphere of 
many claims to truth. It is, then, once again, the ‘profaning of all that is holy’, the 
‘disturbance of social relations’, the melting of the solid into air, that we have 
already seen in the Communist Manifesto.
Just as in Marx, however, Voloshinov’s narrative of the liberation of the
word does not end here. The dialogization of monologic discourse is not to be
celebrated per se but only in so far as it is a necessary precondition for a higher
form of freedom:
The victory of extreme forms of the picturesque style in reported 
speech is not, of course, to be explained in terms either of 
psychological factors or the artist’s own individual stylistic purposes, 
but is explainable in terms of the general, far-reaching subjectivization
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of the ideological word-utterance. No longer is it a monument, nor 
even a document, of a substantive ideational position; it makes itself 
felt only as the expression of an adventitious state. [...] The utterance 
has virtually ceased to be an object for serious ideational 
consideration. The categorical word, the word ‘from one’s own 
mouth,’ the declaratory word remains only alive in scientific writings.
In all other fields of verbal-ideological creativity, what predominates 
is not the ‘outright’ but the ‘contrived’ word. All verbal activity in 
these cases amounts to piecing together ‘other persons’ words’ and 
‘words seemingly from other persons.’ [...] All this bespeaks an 
alarming instability of the ideological word. (MPL 158-59)
Here we see the other face of the liberation of modernity: instability, insincerity, 
inauthenticity, anxiety, a crippling of the faculties of expression, an ‘adventitious 
state’ of flux. Voloshinov’s emphasis on dialogue and unfinalizability is, then, 
merely a precondition of and clearing of the ground for the categorical and final 
utterance of proletarian revolution. His use of a quotation from Lorck makes this 
clear. ‘There is only one possibility for [language’s] rejuvenation: the proletariat 
must take over command of the word from the bourgeoisie’ (MPL 154). In 
Voloshinov’s view, dialogue is the precondition of the silencing of all dialogue by 
the authoritative word of revolution; open form is the precondition of a future 
completion.33
In Voloshinov’s philosophy of language, a form of negative politics is at 
work. Voloshinov does not himself explicitly call for the proletariat to come to 
voice, but leaves this to his quotation. Similarly, his concentration is on the 
provisional, if liberating, form of dialogization, not on the forms that will be taken 
by the authoritative word of the proletariat. Despite the fact that he is writing 
twelve years after the October Revolution, he seems not to allow himself to 
speculate about a future that ought to be so close at hand. Perhaps he stands in
33 It is in this context that we can understand statements such as the one that Voloshinov makes 
about Freud. In his essay on Freudism, Voloshinov argues that the unconscious is simply the 
unofficial conscious, that which bourgeois society cannot accept. He goes on to assert: ‘In a 
healthy social body, just as in a socially healthy individual, everyday ideology, established on the 
socio-economic basis, is coherent and solid, without any divergence between the official and 
unofficial consciousnesses.’ Valentin Voloshinov, ‘Freidism: Kriticheskii ocherk’ (Freudism: a 
criticial sketch) [1927], in Filosofiia i sotsiologiia gumanitamykh nauk, ed. by D. A. Iunov, St 
Petersburg, 1995, pp. 87-189 (167). This statement seems to concord with some of the most 
extreme Stalinist positions on the need for an absolute lack o f divergence between the private and 
the public.
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accord with Hegel, for whom ‘the owl of Minerva begins its flight only with the 
onset of dusk’;34 perhaps he also stands in accord with Trotsky. For Trotsky, 
writing in 1923:
There is no revolutionary art as yet. There are the elements of this art, 
there are hints and attempts at it [...]. Revolutionary art which 
inevitably reflects all the contradictions of a revolutionary social 
system, should not be confused with Socialist art for which no basis 
has as yet been made. [...] Not for nothing did Engels speak of the 
Revolution as a leap from the kingdom of necessity to the kingdom of 
freedom. The revolution itself is not as yet the kingdom of freedom.
On the contrary, it is developing the features of necessity to the 
greatest degree. Socialism will abolish class antagonisms, as well as 
classes, but the Revolution carries the class struggle to its highest 
tension. [...] Revolutionary literature cannot but be imbued with a 
spirit of hatred, which is a creative historical factor in an epoch of 
proletarian dictatorship. Under Socialism, solidarity will be the basis 
of society. Literature and art will be tuned to a different key.35
The signs of freedom are to found in the development of their opposites: the
realm of freedom is prefigured by the intensification of necessity and the
establishment of dictatorship; classlessness is prefigured by the intensification of
class struggle; solidarity is prefigured by the intensification of hatred. Just as
Trotsky predicts that culture will be ‘tuned to a different key’ and yet does not
claim to be able to sing in it, and just as he sees signs of solidarity in the
development of hatred, so Voloshinov sees in the decadent, open forms of indirect
speech the signs of a future final word. Other critics, such as Emerson and
Morson, have made similar points about Voloshinov’s thought:
Whereas Bakhtin celebrates intense dialogization and double-voicing, 
Voloshinov, writing as a Marxist, describes such phenomena 
disapprovingly. The forms so central to Bakhtin’s ideas of 
unfinalizability and so characteristic of his prosaic approach to the 
cultural world are regarded by Voloshinov as symptoms of decadent 
“relativistic individualism”. Voloshinov expects and calls for the 
decay, if not the abolition, of these forms of speech, and he believes 
that the triumph of the working class is the death knell of these 
forms.36
34 Hegel, Philosophy o f Right, p. 23.
35 Leon Trotsky, Literature and Revolution (1923), trans. Rose Strunsky, London, 1991, pp. 258- 
59
36 Morson and Emerson, Bakhtin, p. 124-25.
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Nevertheless, it is possible to see a compatibility rather than divergence between 
Bakhtin and Voloshinov. It is possible to discern a similar notion of open form as 
the necessary precondition of a future completion that, however, operates within 
the context of a different narrative, and hence according to a radically different 
temporal model. Where the future, final word, in Voloshinov’s account, is to 
resound within history as the utterance of the victorious proletariat, one can 
speculate that in Bakhtin’s thought the future, final word is to come from without 
history as the word of God.
Here is not the place to reconstruct in great detail the fate of the
conception of God and his relation to his world throughout Bakhtin’s career. This
has, in any event, already been undertaken by Coates in her book. Nevertheless, it
is possible to argue, more or less in accordance with Coates, that the overall shape
of Bakhtin’s thought may be conceived of as follows: in the early work (Toward
a Philosophy o f the Act, ‘Author and Hero’), the author exists as a figure who,
from a position of outsidedness, lovingly bestows form upon the hero as an act of
benign consummation. Subsequently, however, beginning with the Dostoevsky
book and culminating most radically in the essays on the novel, Bakhtin adopts an
aesthetic of radical openness. Here, the author gives up his privileged position
outside the world of his heroes and descends onto their plane as an equal
participant in the dialogue of the novel:
The new artistic position of the author with regard to the hero in 
Dostoevsky’s polyphonic novel is a fully realized and thoroughly 
consistent dialogic position, one that affirms the internal freedom, 
unfinalizability, and indeterminacy of the hero. For the author the 
hero is not “he” and not “I” but a fully valid “thou”, that is, another 
and autonomous “I” (thou art) [...] And this “great dialogue” of the 
novel [...] is no stenographer’s report of a finished dialogue, from 
which the author has already withdrawn and over which he is located 
as if in some higher decision-making position: that would have turned 
an authentic and unfinished dialogue into an objectivized and finalized 
image of dialogue, of the sort usual for every monologic novel. {DP 
63)
Now, the gift that the author grants his heroes is not the gift of finalization but the 
gift of the sacrifice of her or his being as a higher principle. Through this gift, her 
or his heroes are set free.
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Critics such as Coates have usefully pointed out the similarity of Bakhtin’s
thought here with the Christian theological doctrine of kenosis.37 This doctrine is
expressed in the Christ-hymn cited by Paul in Philippians:
[Let the same mind be in you that was in Christ Jesus] who, though he 
was in the form of God, did not regard equality with God as 
something to be exploited but emptied himself [alia heauton 
ekenosen], taking the form of a slave [morphhn doulou labwn], being 
bom in human likeness. And being found in human form he humbled 
himself and became obedient to the point of death - even death on a 
cross. Therefore God also highly exalted him and gave him the name 
that is above every name, so that at the name of Jesus every knee 
should bend, in heaven and on earth and under the earth, and every 
tongue should confess that Jesus is Lord, to the glory of God the 
Father. (Philippians 2, 6-11)
In the incarnation, the word gives up its equality with God; it empties itself of its 
divine plenitude. This abasement in kenosis, however, is merely the precondition 
for Christ’s rising again to higher glory. Similarly, the abasement and emptying 
of the word (as, for example, in Benjamin’s conception of allegory), its temporary 
enslavement in earthly conditions, is the precondition for its exaltation in an 
eternal song of praise.
Kenosis in Bakhtin is a concept that stands in a relation of analogy to
Benjamin’s negative theology of destruction. In the following passage from the
Dostoevsky book, it is possible to see Bakhtin struggling to express the apparent
paradox of kenosis in relation to the author of the polyphonic novel:
This interaction [of several consciousnesses in the polyphonic novel] 
provides no support for the viewer who would objectify an entire 
event according to some ordinary monologic category [ . . . ] -  and this 
consequently makes the viewer also a participant. Not only does the 
novel give no firm support outside the rupture-prone world of 
dialogue for a third, monologically all-encompassing consciousness -  
but on the contrary, everything in the novel is structured to make 
dialogic opposition inescapable. Not a single element of the work is 
structured from the point of view of a nonparticipating “third person.”
In the novel itself, nonparticipating “third persons” are not represented 
in any way. There is no place for them, compositionally or in the
37 Coates suggests that it is the ‘quintessential^ Russian concept o f kenotic self-humiliation and 
self-giving love’ which inspired Bakhtin. Ruth Coates, ‘The First and Second Adam in Bakhtin’s 
Thought’, in Felch and Contino (eds), Religion in Bakhtin, pp. 63-78 (77).
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larger meaning of the work. And this is not a weakness of the author 
but his greatest strength. By this means a new authorial position is 
won and conquered, one located above the monologic position. {DP 
18)
The polyphonic novel is a negation of the closed world of the monologic novel. 
The author has given up his position above the world of the novel as a third, all- 
compassing consciousness. This is a negation of the closed, monologic form.
The monologic author is all-encompassing and leaves no space unoccupied; he is 
like Kraus’s image of George: the poet who occupies the temple. By contrast, like 
Benjamin’s destructive character, the polyphonic author clears space for a future 
and higher intervention. Thus, in a kenotic vein, the apparent weakness expressed 
in the author’s abdication of his authority constitutes his greatest strength: for this 
abdication of the authorial outsidedness clears space for a higher-level authorial 
position that is not presently occupied but can be occupied in the future.
Bakhtin develops a spatial metaphor predicated on definite temporal 
relations in a fashion remarkably similar to that of Benjamin. Like Benjamin, 
Bakhtin’s conception of open form is of a form that makes space for future 
completion. The spatial metaphor that Bakhtin develops is expressed most clearly 
in the image of the threshold: ‘The great dialogue in Dostoevsky is organized as 
an unclosed whole of life itself, life poised on the threshold’ {DP 64). Open form 
leaves a door ajar through which consummating intervention may come from the 
outside. Bakhtin remarks in his notes made in 1961 towards a revision of the 
Dostoevsky book: ‘The threshold, the door, the stairway. The chronotopic 
significance. The possibility of transforming hell into a paradise in a single 
instant (that is, passing from one to the other, cf. “the mysterious visitor”)’ {DP 
299). The ‘mysterious visitor’ in this fragment is a reference to a figure in The 
Brothers Karamazov. Reminiscing about his youth on his deathbed, the starets 
Zosima tells how he was visited unexpectedly at night by a strange gentleman. 
(‘There I was, sitting at home the next evening, when all of a sudden the door
38 Interpreting this passage in terms o f different temporalities seems to be the only way to 
understand what is otherwise an incoherent conception of a ‘new, higher authorial position’, 
located above the monologic author’s position.
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opened and this very same gentleman entered.’ )After a series of such visits, the
mysterious visitor confesses to the murder, many years before, of a woman with
whom he had fallen unrequitedly in love, a murder of which he was never
suspected. It is the act of opening himself in confession -  above all, to his fellow
human beings -  that can transform the hell of guilt into paradise. In the words of
the mysterious visitor:
‘Paradise’, he said, ‘is concealed within each one of us, it is hidden in 
me too at this very moment, and I need only to wish it, and it will 
come about the very next day and remain with me the rest of my life.
[..] In order to refashion the world, it is necessary for people 
themselves to adopt a different mental attitude. [...] You ask when 
this will come about. It will come about, but first there must be an 
end to the habit of self-imposed isolation of man.’40
Paradise, understood here as the radical refashioning of the world, is dependent on
the ending of the closedness of isolation, on the unblocking of passing points, on
the leaving clear of thresholds, on the possibility that doors may be opened from
outside. Such intervention from outside might, as Bakhtin suggests in the
Dostoevsky book, take the form of a Christ who is to bring about the end of
dialogue itself in an act of consummation and subjugation:
What unfolds before Dostoevsky [...] is a world of consciousnesses 
mutually illuminating one another [...]. Among them Dostoevsky 
seeks the highest and most authoritative orientation, and he perceives 
it not as his own true thought, but as another authentic human being 
and his discourse. The image of the ideal human being or the image 
of Christ represents for him the resolution of ideological quests. This 
image or this highest voice must crown the world of voices, must 
organize and subdue it. {DP 97)
This end to dialogue, as Bakhtin implies in the notes towards a revision, may, as
in Benjamin’s conception of messianic happening, come as catastrophe:
The problem of catastrophe. Catastrophe is not finalization. It is the 
culmination, in collision and struggle, of points of view (of equally 
privileged consciousnesses, each with its own world). Catastrophe 
does not give these points of view resolution, but on the contrary 
reveals their incapacity of resolution under earthly conditions; 
catastrophe sweeps them all away without having resolved them.
Catastrophe is the opposite of triumph and apotheosis. By its very 
essence it is denied even elements of catharsis. {DP 298)
3 9
Fyodor Dostoevsky, The Karamazov Brothers, trans. by Ignat Avsey, Oxford, 1998, p. 377.
40 Dostoevsky, The Karamazov Brothers, p. 379.
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This is the catastrophe that clears away the ground and makes space for a 
resolution that is not earthly in its origin.
The theological metaphor that underlies Bakhtin’s philosophy of the novel
consists in positing a negative relation between the fallen world, a world that is
provisional and open, and the world of salvation, a world of completion.41 It
follows then, that, as Hirschkop comments, ‘the double-voicedness of language,
its three-dimensionality, is therefore not the cue for some generalized scepticism
about all ideology, but the mark of the “future, lodged in the negated present’” . 42
The openness of dialogue is not a telos in itself, rather it is the precondition for a
truly just final word.43 Thus, Bakhtin’s theory of the polyphonic novel retains
negative traces of his early work’s emphasis on completion. The polyphonic
author is aware that his form-giving word is not the final word, and hence,
according to Bakhtin, he gives to its hero a space: what Bakhtin terms a
‘loophole’. As Coates comments:
It should again be stressed that as far as human or authorial 
finalisation is concerned, Bakhtin is its resolved opponent after 
“Author and Hero”. However, he clearly reserves a space, his 
“loophole” as it were, for surrender to the loving authority of an 
absolute Other, a peculiarly spiritual, and radical, solution, to an 
otherwise apparently hopeless existential situation.44
This is Bakhtin’s messianism, a messianism that stands close to that of 
Benjamin.45 Both consist in the ability to see signs of future completion and 
wholeness in the midst of an incomplete and fragmented world.
41 Just as Benjamin’s thought bears a relation to the Jewish tradition o f negative theology, so 
Bakhtin’s thought bears a relation to the Christian tradition o f apophasis. See Poole, ‘The 
Apophatic Bakhtin’.
42 Hirschkop, Bakhtin, p. 95.
43 As Tihanov comments: ‘true dialogue should be resolved, at the end of the day, into a 
monologue. The task o f dialogue is to enact a cathartic deliverance from the plurality of voices 
besetting the inner world o f the characters.’ Tihanov, Master and Slave, p. 199-200.
44 Coates, Christianity in Bakhtin, p. 123.
45 Brandist posits a genealogy o f messianic motifs in Bakhtin’s thought that suggests a direct 
connection to the messianic tradition in which Benjamin stands: ‘In 1961, the endlessly deferred 
judgement of the author is linked to the idea o f a final judgement as a structural requirement o f any 
utterance. The ultimate, “loophole” judge is cast as the superaddressee, “the absolutely just 
responsive understanding o f whom is presupposed either at a metaphysical distance or in distant 
historical time.” This might take the form o f “God, absolute truth, the court of dispassionate 
conscience, the people, the court o f history, science, and so on”. Since the world is nothing but the
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The Temporal Orientation of Artistic Form
For all that aesthetic activity might preserve the integrity of the life upon which it 
bestows form, a transformation also occurs. This dialectical transformation acts -  
perhaps most fundamentally -  upon the temporal structure of the material of life. 
This second section of the chapter will examine the nature of this transformation.
Aristotle, in the Eudemean Ethics, notes the importance of stasis in the 
work of art -  the cessation of happening and the arrest of attention that occur as 
the artist points to all the things that are happening at one particular moment.46 
Stasis may be understood as follows: this moment that becomes artistic material 
is lifted out of the flow of time of which it was a part. In this process, it is 
preserved; dignity is conferred upon it. It is not merely an arbitrary point of 
passing from one moment to another but a coherent constellation of competing 
forces and possibilities in its own right.47 Such is, for example, the moment of 
decision which the tragic hero enacts on stage. Time, here, stands still, as the hero 
grapples with all the possible paths of action that seem to be available to him and 
which present themselves to him as alternative futures. Through stasis, art has in 
its power the ability of rescuing the lived moment in its fullness from the 
indifferent passing of time which otherwise reduces the lived moment to an 
insignificant and empty instant of its own flow.
We have seen already in Chapter 2 Bakhtin’s and Benjamin’s emphasis on 
remembrance and the transformation of the structure of time that remembrance
systematic and cumulative but perpetually unfinished totality of all representations, the judgement 
o f the world (Weltgericht) associated with the “superaddressee” is actually a type o f messianism 
that derives, at least in part, from the Judaic elements o f Marburg neo-Kantianism.’ Craig 
Brandist, ‘ Law and the Genres o f Discourse: the Bakhtin Circle’s Theory o f Language and the 
Phenomenology o f Right’, in Bostad, Brandist, Evensen and Faber (eds), Bakhtinian Perspectives 
on Language and Culture, pp. 23-45 (39).
46 See Diane Collinson, ‘Aesthetic Experience’, in Oswald Hanfling (ed.), Philosophical 
Aesthetics, Oxford, 1992, pp. 111-78 (119-21).
47 The interpretation o f stasis in terms o f struggle and conflict is supported by the term’s use in 
classical Greece. In the Greek world, stasis comes to mean conflict and is the term that 
Thucydides uses to describe, for example, the civil strife in Corcyra. See Thucydides, History o f  
the Peloponnesian War, ed. by M. I. Finley, trans. by Rex Warner, London, 1972, pp. 236-45. 
Returning to a point that I have made in my Introduction: according to Thucydides, stasis, in 
political terms, is the violent result o f  the extreme dislocation o f phusis and nomos.
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enacts. In Bakhtin’s ‘Author and Hero’, totalizing aesthetic experience adopts the
structure of memory and commemoration. Aesthetic activity, as stasis, does not
pass over the moment indifferently but rather is able to ‘slow down and linger
over an object, to hold and sculpt every detail and particular in it, however minute
{TPA 64)’. In so doing, aesthetic activity is able to honour and confer meaning on
the totality of the mortal subject. Benjamin’s conception of artistic memory is
similar. As Rochlitz comments of Benjamin’s thought:
Art is a privileged manifestation of memory. Even if that is not its 
first goal, it saves from mutism and forgetting certain irreplaceable 
experiences to which society assigns no other rightful place. Its works 
make public and conserve through time the possibilities of humanity, 
the hopes they elicit, the defeats they have undergone.48
The attentiveness of art preserves the objects of the past in their plurality and 
potentiality.
‘Author and Hero’develops a conception of the relation between memory
and art as follows:
My memory of the other and of the other’s life differs radically from 
my contemplating and remembering my own life. Memory sees a life 
and its content in a different way formally; only memory is 
aesthetically productive (the constituent of content can, of course, be 
supplied by the observation and recollection of one’s own life, but 
these cannot provide the forming and consummating activity).
Memory of someone else’s finished life (although anticipation of its 
end is possible as well) provides the golden key to the aesthetic 
consummation of a person. An aesthetic approach to a living person 
forestalls his death, as it were -  predetermines his future and renders 
his future redundant, as it were; immanent to any determinateness of 
inner life is fate. Memory is an approach to the other from the 
standpoint of his axiological consummatedness. In a certain sense, 
memory is hopeless; but on the other hand, only memory knows how 
to value -  independently of purpose and meaning -  an already 
finished life, a life that is totally present-on-hand. {AH 107)
Aesthetically productive memory is able to transfigure the total individual life. It 
confers upon it weight and roundedness. Nevertheless, in so doing it imbues it 
with a certain hopelessness in the face of death. Benjamin’s essay, ‘The 
Storyteller’, contains a similar insight:
48 Rochlitz, The Disenchantment o f Art, p. 254.
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‘A man who dies at the age of thirty-five,’ Moritz Heinemann once 
said, ‘is at every point of his life a man who dies at the age of thirty- 
five.’ Nothing is more dubious than this sentence -  but for the sole 
reason that the tense is wrong. A man -  so says the truth that was 
meant here -  who died at the age of thirty-five will appear to 
remembrance at every point of his life as a man who dies at the age of 
thirty-five. In other words, the statement that makes no sense for real 
life becomes indisputable for remembered life. (GS I I456; SW III 
156)
Bakhtin and Benjamin both imply that totality is only accessible in the shadow of 
death. A totalizing art is only possible, in Bakhtin’s words, as ‘the perception of 
the other under the token of death’ (AH 107). Or, as Benjamin puts it in his 
description of the benignly totalizing figure of the storyteller: ‘Death is the 
sanction of everything that the storyteller can tell; he has borrowed his authority 
from death’ (GS 7/450; SW III 151).
The totalization which the artist appears to achieve through memory, then, is 
bought at a price: ‘The deeper and the more perfect the embodiment, the more 
distinctly do we hear in it the definitive completion of death and at the same time 
the aesthetic victory over death’ (AH 131). On the one hand, the artist declares the 
everlasting meaning of individual deaths in defiance of the abstract, biological and 
historical fact of death; aesthetic consummation seems to proclaim a promise of 
eternal life. On the other hand, the artist underlines the inevitability of death and 
the transience of human existence; aesthetic consummation only offers the 
prospect of death.49 In this fashion, aesthetic consummation sets up a complex 
relationship between history and eternity, between joy and hopelessness:
49 This second factor appears to be missing in Coates’s account o f this passage. Coates reads 
Bakhtin here in terms of new birth and eternal life. See Coates, Christianity in Bakhtin, pp. 50-51. 
Bonetskaia’s contextualizing comments are also o f interest: ‘In the early twentieth century the 
Russian cultural consciousness had developed a notion o f the artist as a tragic personality: there 
was a belief in the fatal guilt attached to any creative work. The poet’s guilt was considered 
similar to that o f a murderer, in that the creation o f artistic form was always an act o f limiting, and 
in some ways even killing, the vital impulse behind it. Hence Aleksandr Blok in a poem precisely 
on this theme “The Artist” (“Khudozhnik”, 1913) uses the image o f a cage imprisoning a free bird. 
Form in relation to life -  this is the perspective in which Bakhtin, too, poses the problem of the 
aesthetic. “The problem o f the aesthetic is precisely how the world may be thus paralysed by 
form.’” Bonetskaia, ‘Bakhtin’s Aesthetics’, p. 84. It is unclear to what extent this is a merely 
Russian phenomenon or more a phenomenon of the European Fin de siecle as a whole. One thinks 
of the connection between artistic creation and death in Huysmans’s A Rebours (1884).
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Throughout the entire course of an embodied hero’s life, one can hear 
the tones of a requiem. Hence that distinctive hopelessness of rhythm 
as well as its sorrowfully joyful lightness, that is, its relievedness of 
the pressure exerted by the irresolvable seriousness of meaning.
Rhythm takes possession of a life that has been lived: the requiem 
tones at the end were already heard in the cradle song at the 
beginning. In art, however, this lived-out life is saved, justified, and 
consummated in eternal memory; hence the kind, cherishing 
hopelessness of rhythm. {AH 131)
Perception under the token of death is redemptive. It rescues the life portrayed by 
conferring upon it the eternal life of memory. Nevertheless, it is peculiarly 
hopeless, in so far as all the questions of the particular life in consideration have 
already been answered; all its hopes have already been fulfilled or unfulfilled.
The life thus consummated is marked by a resigned knowing-in-advance which is 
both joyful and melancholy. Paraphrasing the passage from ‘The Storyteller’ 
once again: such is our approach in remembrance to the man who dies at thirty- 
five, who remains forever young, but forever fated to die young.
It is possible to discern an analogous relationship between transience and
eternity, effected by an orientation towards the past, in the sonnet which forms a
central pillar of Benjamin’s interpretation of Baudelaire, ‘A une Passante’:50
La rue assourdissante autour de moi hurlait.
Longue, mince, en grand deuil, douleur majestueuse,
Une femme passa, d’une main fastueuse 
Soulevant, balan9ant le feston et l’ourlet;
Agile et noble, avec sa jambe de statue.
Moi, je buvais, crispe comme un extravagant,
Dans son oeil, ciel livide ou germe l’ouragan,
La douceur qui fascine et le plaisir qui tue.
Un eclair... puis la nuit! - Fugitive beaute 
Dont le regard m’a fait soudainement renaitre,
Ne te verrai-je plus que dans l’etemite?
50 This poem embodies much o f the structure o f Benjamin’s aesthetics, hence the long quotation 
and the attention that I devote here to Baudelaire’s poem itself. In both Toward a Philosophy o f  
the Act and ‘Author and Hero’, Bakhtin illustrates his understanding o f aesthetic activity by means 
of a reading o f Pushkin’s poem, ‘Parting’. This poem, likewise, seems to occupy a privileged 
place in Bakhtin’s understanding o f aesthetic form. It is extraordinary to note the degree of 
congruence, in terms o f underlying structure, between these two poems: a woman who recedes; an 
attempt to stay time; a projection of eternity; transience and death. See both the poem and its 
analysis in TPA, pp. 65-72.
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Ailleurs, bien loin d’ici! trop tard ! jamais peut-etre !
Car j'ignore ou tu fuis, tu ne sais ou je vais,
O toi que j'eusse aimee, o toi qui le savais!
In the widow’s veil mysteriously and mutely bome along by the 
crowd, an unknown woman crosses the poet’s field of vision. What 
this sonnet communicates is simply this: far from experiencing the 
crowd as an opposing, antagonistic element, the city dweller discovers 
in the crowd what fascinates him. The delight of the urban poet is love 
-  not at first sight, but at last sight. It is an eternal farewell which 
coincides in the poem with the moment of enchantment. Thus, the 
sonnet deploys the figure of shock, indeed of catastrophe. (GS 1 622- 
23; SW JV323-24)
The poet’s regard is a glance backwards. For, as the woman approaches him, she 
is already receding into the past. The poem captures a moment of stasis. For one 
moment, the ‘rue assourdissante’ is counterposed to the implied quiet of the 
widow’s ‘grand deuil’ and ‘douleur majestueuse’. From being one of the faceless 
and objectified figures of the crowd, the woman is transformed into a subject; for, 
in this auratic moment, she looks back at the poet. It is the transience of her 
appearance that transforms her into a ‘fugitive beaute’. And yet, it is this very 
transience that makes the poet feel reborn and project this moment into eternity.
In the linking of the transient and the eternal, Baudelaire summons up an image of 
totality that is hopeless and joyous. The poet’s slowing down, his attention to the 
fullness of the moment that is passing, reveals all the possibilities in that moment 
(‘O toi que j'eusse aimee, o toi qui le savais!’), and at the same time reveals all 
their hopelessness (‘trop tard! jamais peut-etre!’). Benjamin’s description of this 
as shock and catastrophe is apt: these are the result of the collision of joy (‘the 
poet’s delight’) and his hopelessness (his awareness of the futility of transience).51 
This catastrophe is summed up as ‘love at last sight’, a phrase that might also 
describe Bakhtin’s aesthetics of consummation.52
51 Weber’s comments on this passage capture a key aspect of its bitter ambivalence: ‘Such love at 
last sight imposes direction and meaning upon an apparition whose transfiguring power, Benjamin 
insists, reposes exclusively upon a mass that as such is never depicted or named. The mass here, 
invisible and nameless, is precisely that ambivalent, divergent movement that carries the passante 
even as she appears to emerge out o f it.’ Samuel Weber, ‘Mass Mediauras; or, Art, Aura, and 
Media in the Work o f Walter Benjamin’, in Ferris (ed.), Benjamin: Theoretical Questions, pp. 27- 
49 (41).
52 One might also note that this poem contains an image o f the shadow of death from which it 
never quite escapes, the shadow cast by the (young?) widow’s feston and ourlet.
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In ‘Epic and Novel’, Bakhtin returns to the concept of commemoration.
Here, however, he has revised his evaluation:
Greatness always makes itself known only to descendants, for whom 
such a quality is always located in the past (it turns into a distanced 
image); it has become an object of memory and not a living object that 
one can see and touch. In the genre of the ‘memorial,’ the poet 
constructs his image in the future and distanced plane of his 
descendants (cf the inscriptions of oriental despots and Augustus).
[...] The epic past is a special form for perceiving people and events 
in art. [...] Artistic representation here is artistic representation sub 
specie aetemitatis. One may, and in fact one must, memorialize with 
artistic language only that which is worthy of being remembered, that 
which should be preserved in the memory of descendants; an image is 
created for descendants and this image is projected on to their sublime 
and distant horizon. Contemporaneity for its own sake (that is to say a 
contemporaneity that makes no claim on future memory) is molded in 
clay; contemporaneity for the future (for descendants) is molded in 
marble or bronze.
The interrelationship of times is important here. The valorized 
emphasis is not on the future and does not serve the future, no favors 
are being done it (such favors face an eternity outside time); what is 
served here is the future memory of a past, a broadening of the world 
of the absolute past, an enriching of it with new images (at the 
expense of contemporaneity) -  a world that is always opposed in 
principle to any merely transitory past. (D I18-19)
It is possible, however, to see a consistency between Bakhtin’s negative view of 
the memorial here and his positive view of commemoration in ‘Author and Hero’. 
In the later description of memorialization, the poet seeks not to honour death, but 
hubristically to deny it.53 (One must remember that Augustus declared himself a 
god, thus denying his mortal being.) The poet here does not register transience 
but rather seeks to obliterate it. This form of memorialization does not contain the 
structure of memory that registers the distance between the time remembered and 
the time of remembering. Representation sub specie aetemitatis of this sort is a 
blasphemous denial of time itself. Engaged in a desperate attempt to perpetuate
53 Benjamin comments on the denial o f death are pertinent: ‘Bergson the metaphysician suppresses 
death. The fact that death is eliminated from Bergson’s duree isolates it effectively from a 
historical (as well as a pre-historical) order. [...] The duree from which death has been eliminated 
has the miserable endlessness of a scroll. Tradition is excluded from it. It is the quintessence o f a 
passing moment [Erlebnis] that struts about in the borrowed garb of experience’ (GS 1 643; SW 
336). This suppression o f death also distorts and removes experience from history.
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power, the marble or bronze statues that result must be condemned to the same 
fate, one feels, as Shelley’s Ozymandias.
The bombast of this second form of memorialization seems to stand in 
direct opposition to the humble requiem tones of aesthetic memory in the earlier 
‘Author and Hero’. Bad memorialization, as described in ‘Epic and Novel’, is 
memorialization of those in power, those who are ‘deemed to be worthy of 
remembrance’ by their own present (D I18). It is what Benjamin describes in ‘On 
the Concept of History’ as empathy with the victors. Good memorialization 
might, in contrast, consist in that attitude towards the past which effects a stasis in 
the cause of the forgotten and oppressed of history, once again in the fashion that 
Benjamin describes in his ‘On the Concept of History’. Such an approach to the 
past, as I have argued earlier, entails an ability to subject it to continual revision, 
to see in it not the expression of inevitability but rather the source of boundless 
possibilities. The past, in this fashion, leaves the sphere of the entirely given and 
regains something of the posited. It is towards just such a conception of the past 
that Bakhtin moves in his later work.
Bakhtin rejects the conception of aesthetic memory that we have seen in
‘Author and Hero’, not least because it produces a world that is beautiful but
given, and hence dead:
Artistic vision presents us with the whole hero, measured in full and 
added up in every detail; there must be no secrets for us in the hero 
with respect to meaning; our faith and hope must be silent. From the 
very outset, we must experience all of him, deal with the whole of 
him: in respect to meaning, he must be dead for us, formally dead.
{AH 131)
This is unacceptable to the later Bakhtin. On the one hand, during the course of 
his career, Bakhtin’s fear of false totalizing grows to such an extent that even the 
apparently benign totalizing of this sort of aesthetic memory represents a danger. 
On the other hand, one can also only suggest that the requirement, that in order to 
become part of aesthetic vision the hero must be ‘dead for us’, defeats the purpose 
of aesthetic activity itself: the preserving and benign bestowal of form on life.
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It is in this light that one must view Bakhtin’s conception of the past in his
fragment of 1974, ‘Towards a Methodology of the Human Sciences’:
There is neither a first or last word and there are no limits to the 
dialogic context (it extends into the boundless past and the boundless 
future). Even past meanings, that is those bom in the dialogue of past 
centuries, can never be stable (finalized, ended once and for all) -  they 
will always change (be renewed) in the process of subsequent, future 
development of dialogue. At any moment in the development of the 
dialogue there are immense, boundless masses of forgotten contextual 
meaning, but at certain moments of the dialogue’s subsequent 
development along the way they are recalled and invigorated in 
renewed form (in a new context). Nothing is absolutely dead: every 
meaning will have its homecoming festival. The problem of great 
time. (SG 170)
In this formulation, the attitude taken towards the past is towards a past in which
nothing is absolutely dead. Here, there always remains the possibility of
remembering what has been forgotten, of recalling and invigorating the unfulfilled
hopes of the past.54 Here, any orientation towards the past is a form of memory
that draws the past into the living present and hence makes way for a redeemed
future. Such a temporal orientation will make space for what, already in ‘Author
and Hero’, Bakhtin defines as the absolute future:
The absolute future, the future of meaning. That is, not into the future 
which will leave everything in its place, but into the future which must 
finally fulfil, accomplish everything, the future which we oppose to 
the present and the past as a salvation, transfiguration, and 
redemption. That is, the future not as a bare temporal category, but as 
a category of meaning -  as that which axiologically does not yet exist; 
that which is still undetermined; that which is not yet discredited by 
existence. (AH 118)
It is hard to ignore here the connection with Benjamin’s conception of the relation 
of the messianic future to profane, historical time, referred to above, according to 
which the Kingdom of God is not the telos but rather the terminus of history. For 
both Bakhtin and Benjamin the fragmented nature of historical being is to be
54 It must be conceded that ‘Epic and Novel’, the most deconstructive o f Bakhtin’s essays, rejects 
almost entirely the concept o f memory in relation to the novel: ‘The “modernity” o f the novel is 
indestructible, and verges on an unjust evaluation o f the times. Let us recall the re-evaluation of 
the past that occurred during the Renaissance [...] and that is inherent in positivism (the exposure 
of myth, legend, heroization, a maximum departure from memory [...]’ (DI 31). Towards the end 
of his life, Bakhtin reincorporates some o f the insights o f his earliest period. This revised 
conception o f memory stems from this period. It may also be usefully related to Bakhtin’s 
thoughts on criticism and tradition, discussed in Chapter 1.
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fulfilled and brought to an end by a future which is radically incommensurate with 
the past and present. This is the ultimate task which will provide redeemed 
givenness.
It follows, then, that, for all the attraction of artistic forms of benign
completion, such as the aesthetic finalization in memory of ‘Author and Hero’ or
the auratic mode of story-telling, Bakhtin and Benjamin must give these up and
seek out artistic forms that are, on the contrary, open: the polyphonic novel,
montage, and cognate forms. For these forms do not consign their material to the
past but retain a connection to a living present and an ever-open, if dangerous
future. The polyphonic novel draws its material into an expanded present. On the
one hand, the present of the novel reaches into the past: ‘characteristic for the
historical novel is a positively weighted modernizing, an erasing of temporal
boundaries, the recognition of an eternal present’ (D I365). On the other hand, the
present of the novel points into the future:
It is precisely the zone of contact with an inconclusive present (and 
consequently with the future) that creates the necessity of this 
incongruity of a man with himself. There always remain in him 
unrealized potential and unrealized demands. The future exists, and 
this future ineluctably touches on the individual, has its roots in him.
[...] There always remains an unrealized surplus of humanness; there 
always remains a need for the future, and a place for this future must 
be found. (DI 37)
This temporal orientation towards an open present is different from memory.
Aesthetic memory consists in the attempt to slow time down, to hold on to the
particular moment in the face of the eroding stream of time. The temporal
orientation described here, however, remains in the present. Its aim is to thicken
and spatialize time and to bring into being an expanded present in which
competing and divergent possibilities might coexist. This is the form of stasis that
Bakhtin discerns in Dostoevsky:
The fundamental category in Dostoevsky’s mode of artistic 
visualizing was not evolution but coexistence and interaction. He saw 
and conceived his world primarily in terms of space, not time. Hence 
his deep affinity for the dramatic form. Dostoevsky strives to 
organize all available meaningful material, all material of reality into 
one time-frame, in the form of dramatic juxtaposition. [...]
Dostoevsky attempted to perceive the very stages themselves in their
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simultaneity, to juxtapose and counterpose them dramatically, and not 
to stretch them out into an evolving sequence. For him, to get one’s 
bearing on the world meant to conceive all its contents as 
simultaneous, and to guess at their interrelationships in the cross- 
section of a single moment. {DP 28)
In this temporal orientation, ‘reality [...] is only one of many possible realities; it 
is not inevitable, not arbitrary, it bears within itself other possibilities’ {DP 37).
Benjamin’s aesthetics also propose forms of stasis of this nature, analogous 
to Bakhtin’s ‘dramatic juxtaposition’. As we have seen, montage substitutes 
diachronic relations of sequence with synchronic relations of juxtaposition. 
Similarly, the effect of mechanical reproduction is the spatialization of time. In 
the destruction of aura, the unique object’s historical testimony through time is 
replaced by the simultaneous coexistence of its many reproductions in time. As in 
Bakhtin, these moments of stasis that interrupt the flow of events reveal to the 
contemplator the alternative possibilities in the present. The dragging of the art­
work from the cultic and ritual past into the present liberates it for new purposes 
in the future. Similarly, as we have seen, in Brecht’s epic theatre, interruption, 
through Verfremdungseffekte, creates an expanded present in which the distracted 
audience can reflect on how events might be different, in which the claims of 
competing viewpoints can coexist and be evaluated. As in Bakhtin’s polyphonic 
novel, reality reveals itself here as ‘one of many possible realities’, ‘not arbitrary’, 
and as bearing within itself ‘many possibilities’.
It is, however, in Benjamin’s concept of dialectics at standstill and the
dialectical image that this idea receives its most powerful expression:
Thinking involves both thoughts in motion and thoughts at rest. When 
thinking reaches a standstill in a constellation saturated with tensions, 
the dialectical image appears. This image is the caesura in the 
movement of thought. Its locus is of course not arbitrary. In short it 
is to be found wherever the tension between dialectical oppositions is 
greatest. The dialectical image is, accordingly, the very object 
constructed in the materialist presentation of history. It is identical 
with the historical object; it justifies its being blasted out of the 
continuum of the historical process. {GS V 595; AP 475)
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The dialectical image, what Andrew Benjamin describes as a form of ‘temporal 
montage’, is a means of bringing the material of the past into a relationship with 
the present in such a fashion that a pathway to a redeemed future is opened up.55 
Similarly, the expanded present of the polyphonic novel contains ‘tension 
between dialectical oppositions’. 56 The force of present and unresolved 
oppositions in the dramatic juxtapositions of dialogic discourse gives such 
discourse an urgency - ready at any moment to blast open the continuum of the 
historical process and spring over the threshold into the future.
For both Bakhtin and Benjamin, provisional openness and an orientation 
towards the present and future are ultimately preferable to premature and possibly 
false completion. The former make room for the possibility that something utterly 
unexpected might happen. They present a world that is more alive since it can be 
changed at any moment. They do not block the threshold. They make it possible 
that the present moment might be the ‘small gateway in time though which the 
Messiah might enter’ (GS 1 704; SW IV  397). The latter presents a world that is 
given in advance. It runs the danger that men and women attempt to speak the 
last word that, in truth, belongs only to God.
55 Andrew Benjamin, ‘Benjamin’s Modernity’, in Ferris (ed.), Companion to Benjamin, pp. 97-114 
( 111).
56 Gardiner’s suggestion seems to hit the mark: ‘Like Walter Benjamin, perhaps the Western 
Marxist he has the most affinity with, Bakhtin therefore exhorts us to probe the gaps and silences, 
the fractures and the fault lines that expose the operations o f a monologism which seeks to effect 
an ideological closure in order to “blast a specific era out o f the homogenous course o f history”. 
Only then can the meaning of a suppressed history have its “homecoming festival”, that is, be 
allowed to speak to us, and we in turn have the linguistic capacity and the cultural resources to 
answer it in a free and familiar manner, without fear of censure or retribution.’ Gardiner,
Dialogics o f  Critique, p. 194.
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Conclusorv Note: The Actuality of Bakhtin and Beniamin
More than a reshuffling of the deck of Bakhtin and Benjamin scholarship, the 
thematic centre of my thesis, the question of experience and form, has continuing 
relevance today. Unlike affirmative theorists of postmodemity, such as Jean- 
Fran9ois Lyotard and Jean Baudrillard, I do not believe that we have left entirely 
Bakhtin and Benjamin’s era -  a modernity of flux, characterized, one might argue, 
by anxiety -  and entered a postmodemity of possibility, characterized by play.
The dislocation of form and experience continues and has become, if anything, 
accentuated by the ever-increasing intensity of centrifugal and centripetal forces 
that operate in processes of globalization and social fragmentation. Never have 
Bakhtin’s and Benjamin’s insights been more pertinent in their radical 
deconstruction of hegemonic and authoritarian hierarchies, combined with a 
relentless attention to possibilities -  not empty possibilities, but possibilities for 
the intervention of human subjects, possibilities that are tensely coiled in the 
midst of the new.
The age in which we live is not characterized by the official seriousness of 
medieval culture which Bakhtin saw undermined by Rabelaisian carnival. Nor is 
it characterized by quite the same alliance of a cult of primal experience with 
technology that Benjamin saw in fascism and to which he opposed his own brand 
of disjunctive critical thinking and disjunctive artistic practice. None the less, it 
might be argued that the Straussian neo-conservatism, currently dominant in the 
United States, constitutes a qualitatively similar entwinement of myth and 
technology, and that the promotion of fear and orthodoxy by the proclamation of a 
‘war on terror’ constitutes a new form of official seriousness and fear.1 Bakhtin 
and Benjamin’s critiques of such phenomena, then, retain their actuality.
In similar fashion, the sense of an ‘end of politics’, of the ‘third way’, of 
the absolute and universal necessity of liberal democracy, as expressed, in
1 The final chapter o f Hirschkop’s study provides a subtle analysis o f the implications of 
Bakhtin’s conception of fear for political theory, focusing on the official seriousness and fear 
inherent in the everyday as an instrument o f hegemony. Completed in 1999, the book does not deal 
with our new culture o f fear. See Hirschkop, Bakhtin, pp. 272-98.
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different forms, by thinkers such as Anthony Giddens, Jurgen Habermas, and 
Ulrich Beck, has become the hegemonic discourse of our post-1989 world. It has 
become (taking a Bakhtinian standpoint) the monologic discourse which brooks 
no answering back. It has become (taking a Benjaminian standpoint) an uncritical 
hypostatization of the concept of progress which can conceive of no possible 
alternative state of affairs other than the present. Frustration at this situation has 
led some on the left to run into the embrace of some dangerous lovers: Chantal 
Mouffe into the arms of Carl Schmitt;2 Slavoj Zizek into the arms of Lenin.3 An 
alliance of Bakhtin and Benjamin may provide a more effective theoretical 
resource in breaking out of the Denkverbot of late capitalism. For the 
emancipatory forms that challenge authority need not be the by-now dusty pages 
of Dostoevsky or the by-now familiar stage-tricks of Brecht.4 Both thinkers 
exhibit a lucid ability to see potentialities in the nascent, in the still-coming-into- 
being. It may take a perspective that draws on both Bakhtin and Benjamin to 
engage with such nascent forms. Furthermore, the alliance of politics and ethics, 
of political commitment and loving attention, that is formed when we bring 
Bakhtin’s and Benjamin’s thought alongside each other is deeply valuable and 
powerful.
2 Mouffe articulates her theory o f an agonistic democracy, drawing on Schmitt’s definition o f the 
political as the sphere of the friend versus enemy distinction, in, inter alia, Chantal Mouffe, On the 
Political, London, 2005. I do not wish, however, to deny the undoubted influence o f Schmitt on 
Benjamin. This is the subject o f a substantial controversy in Benjamin scholarship. See Samuel 
Weber, ‘Taking Exception to Decision: Walter Benjamin and Carl Schmitt’, Diacritics, 22,
Autumn 1992, 3-4, pp. 5-19, and Horst Bredekamp, ‘From Walter Benjamin to Carl Schmitt via 
Thomas Hobbes’, Special edition: ‘ Angelus Novus: Perspectives on Walter Benjamin’, Critical 
Inquiry, 25, 1999, 2, pp. 247-66.
3 Zizek claims that the gesture o f a return to Lenin allows us to think beyond post-ideological 
coordinates and suspend the Denkverbot of consensus. Slavoj Zizek, ‘A Plea for Leninist 
Intolerance’, in Critical Inquiry, 28, 2002, 2, pp. 542-66.
4 There have been various attempts to turn Bakhtinian and Benjaminian theory towards the new 
forms emerging in information technology. See, for example, Bostad’s essay which analyses the 
new public sphere of the internet and the forms o f dialogue it both enables and inhibits: Finn 
Bostad, ‘Dialogue in Electronic Public Space: the Semiotics o f Time, Space and the Internet’, in 
Bostad, Brandist, Evensen and Faber (eds), Bakhtinian Perspectives on Language and Culture, pp. 
167-84. Kopenick attempts to rethink Benjamin’s concept o f the aura for an age o f digital 
reproducibility in Lutz Kopenick, ‘Aura Reconsidered: Benjamin and Contemporary Visual 
Culture’, in Richter (ed.), Benjamin's Ghosts, pp. 95-117. Ziarek maps an extension to 
Benjamin’s ‘Work of Art’ essay for an age o f internet interactivity, where reproductions can be 
altered by their recipients, in Krzysztof Ziarek, ‘The Work of Art in the Age o f Electronic 
Mutability’, in Andrew Benjamin (ed.), Benjamin and Art, pp. 209-26.
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